Johnson & Buel v.3,pt.l
Battles and leaders L468439
of the Civil War
PUBLIC LIBRARY
FORT WAYNE AND ALLEN COUNTY, IND.
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ALLEN COUNTY PUBLIC LIBR^
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GENEALOGY
973.7^
AAIJH,
V.3,
PT.l
^BATTLES AND
LEADERS OF THE
CIVIL WAR
VOLUME THREE
BATTLES^AND
LEADERS OF~THE
CIVIlLWAR
#rant-ilee€littion
PART
BEING FOR THE MOST PART CONTRIBUTIONS
BY UNION AND CONFEDERATE OFFICERS.
BASED UPON "THE CENTURY WAR SERIES."
EDITED BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD |OHN^Q]vl
AND CLARENCE CLOUGH BUEL, OF ThFedI-
torialstaffof"thecenturymagazine:'
^ U Ji" O NRW-YORK
]^ J Ct)c €tntmp Co.
Copyright, 1884, 1888,
By The Century Co.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREEJ
PAGE
FRONTISPIECE, " BETWEEN THE LINES DURING A TRUCE." By Gilbert Gaul VI
LIST OF MAPS xvm
LIST OF ARTISTS XIX
LIST OF DRAUGHTSMEN XIX
LIST OF ENGRAVERS «... M. r>.r* M. c\.n XIX
t^ 468439
THE PERRYVILLE CAMPAIGN.
BRAGG'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY GENERAL JOSEPH IVHEELER 1
ILLDSTKATIONS: lu the Van (W. Taber)—Ma.^ of North Mississippi and West Tennessee (Jacob Wells) —
Map of the Corinth and luka Region (reproduction from an official map) — Map of Bragg's Invasion of
Kentucky (Jacob WeZ/s; — Brigadier-General Preston Smith, C. S. A., from photo.— Union Fort at Muu-
fordville, from photo. (E. J. J/ee/rer^ — Lieutenant-General E. Kirby Smith, C. S. A., from Brady photo.—
Lieutenant-General .Joseph Wheeler, C. S. A., from Brady photo.— M:yor-General B. F. Cheatham, C. B. A.,
from photo.— Spring near Terry ville which helped to relieve Bragg's parched Army ; and Pear-tree, One
Hundred Years Old, at tlic T.eft of Rousseau's Position. Perry ville, from photos, hy E. H. Fox (Harry Fenn)
— Corner of the Confederate Cemetery at PerryvlUe, from photo, by E. H. Fox (Tlarry Fenn/ — Map of
theBattle-fleld of Perrj^ville (Jacob Wells) —DeteuBe of Cage's Ford, on the Cumberland River, November
21, 18G2, from a lithograph of a war-time sketch by A. E. Mathews, lent by Major E. C. Dawes (Harry
Fenn).
""^.mCTI.o."""-^'' """"^ ™' '^'"^ } C^W-^i BASIL U'.DUKE 26
INVASION )
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PERRYVILLE, KY. Composition, Strength, and Losses 29
rcKKYVILLh )
Illustrations : On the Skinuish Line ( W. Taber) — Brevet Majjor-General James B. Fry, from a photo.—
Brigadier-General James 8. Jackson, from a photo.— Brigadier-General William R. Terrill, from photo,
lent by Mrs. G. A. Porterfield.
ON THE FIELD OF PERRYVILLE GENERAL CHARLES C. GILBERT 52
ILLUSTKATIONS: PcrryviUe, Kentucky, looking South-east from the Mackville Pike, from photo, by E.
H. Fox (Harry Fenn)— Ridge on the Union Left Occupied by Stone's and Bush's Batteries — the Scene of
Starkweather's Contest, and Tree near where General James S. Jackson Fell, from photos, by E. II. Fox
(Harry Fcnn)—y\GV} looking North-east from the Position of Loomis's Battery, tlu' Center of Rousseau's
Line ; and Position of Loomis's Battery on Rousseau's Line, looking across Doctor's Creek, frcmi photos, by
E. H. Fox C//«r/v/ FcM»0—Eiirm-housc of H. P. Bottom, from i)hoto. by E. H. Fox (Harry /^V/ih;- Engjjge-
ment of Starkweather's Brigade on the Extreme Union Left, from lithograph of a war-time sketch
by A. E. Mathews (Harry Fenn).
NOTES OF A STAFF-OFFICER AT PERRYVILLE . ..MAJOR J. MONTGOMERY IVRIGHT GO
CUMBERLAND GAP GENERAL GEORGE IV. MORGAN «i2
ILLDSTRATIONS: BHgadlor-General (JeorgoW. Morgan, fnuu photo. by Hickcox — Plan of the Confederate
Works at Cumberland Gap. from a drawing by Captain W. F. Patterson (Jacob U>//s; — View of Cumber-
land (iap from the South, from a lithograph lent by Mrs. Carrie Buekner (E. J. Meeker).
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT CUMBERLAND GAP '•'■»
\ In order to save much repetition, particular credit is here given to tlie Massachusetts Couiumndery of the
I^Wal Legion, to Colonel Arnold A. Rand, (Jeueral .Mbert Onlway. and Cliarles B. Hall for the use of ph.itographs
and drawings. War-time phofograidiers whose wmk is of tlu^ greatest liistoii( al value, and lias l)eeu freely drawn
upou in the preparation of the illustrations, are M. B. Brady, .\h-xauder (iardiier, and Captain A. J. Russell in the
North; and D. 11. .\nderson of Rieliinond. Va., and Georg.' S. Cook of Charleston, S. C— the latter, 8iuc«- th(- war.
having succeeded to the ownership of the Aiuleisoii negatives.
ix
CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREE.
BURNSIDE AT FREDERICKSBURG.
PAGE
IWl BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET 70
iLLirsTRATiONS : Confederate Picket witli Blanket-Capote and Eaw-liide Moccasins (Allen C. Redu-ood)
— Brigadier-General Maxcy Gregg, C. 8, A., from Anderson-Cook photo.— Map of the Battle of Fredericks-
burg (Jacob TTcW/,; — Front of the Maryo Mansion, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber)—Tlxe Sunken Road
under Marye's Hill, from photo, by Betz & Kichards — House by the Stone Wall, in which General Cobb
died, from photo. ( W. Taber) — Cobb's and Kershaw's Troops behind the Stone Wall (Allen C. Redwood) —
Brigadier (iciieral Thomas R. R. Cobb, C. S. A., from photo. — Confederate Works on Willis's Hill, now
the Site of tlie National Cemetery, from Brady photo. (Harry Fenn) — WeUord's Mill on Hazel Run and
the Telegraph Road, from photo. (J. D. Woodward).
THE CONFEDERATE LEFT AT FREDERICKSBURG .. G£A/£/?^Z, LAFAYETTE MCLAIVS 86
Illustrations: Barksdale's Mississippians Opposing the Laying of the Pontoon Bridges (A. C. Red-
,<.oofO — Fredericksburg from the Foot of WilUs's HiU, from Brady photo. (E. J. Ifecfcer; — Brigadier-
General Robert Ransom, C. S. A., from photo.
RANSOM'S DIVISION AT FREDERICKSBURG GENERAL ROBERT RANSOM 94
KERSHAW'S BRIGADE AT FREDERICKSBURG GENERAL J. B. KERSHAIV 95
A HOT DAY ON MARYE'S HEIGHTS LIEUTENANT IVILLIAM MILLER OfVEN 97
Illustrations : The Washington Artillery on Marye's Hill Firing upon the Union Columns forming
for the Assault (A. C. Red icood) — James A. Seddon, Secretary of War to the Southern Confederacy, from
photo, lent by James Blair — Winter Sport in a Confederate Camp (A. C. Redtcood).
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER MAJOR IV. ROY MASON 100
Illistkation: Confederate Theatricals (A. C. Redwood).
THE REMOVAL OF M^CLELLAN COLONEL RICHARD B. IRIVIN 102
Illustration : Newspapers in Camp (Edwin Forbes).
SUMNER'S " RIGHT GRAND DIVISION " GENERAL DARIUS N. COUCH 105
Illustrations: Hot Work for Hazard's Battery (W. Tafter^ — Chatham, opposite Fredericksburg, also
known as the " Lacy House," and The Phillips House, Burnside's Headquarters, from Gardner photo.
(W. rafter;— General A. E. Burnside, from photo., with autograph — Fredericksburg from the East
Bank of the Rappahannock (two views) (Jo.seph I'ennell) — The Bomljardment of Fredericksburg, and
Crossing the River in Pontoons to Dislodge the Confederate Sharp-shooters (R. F. Zogbaum) —The Ninth
Corps crossing by the Pontoon Bridge (R. F. Zo()baum ) — Warehouse in Fredericksburg used as a Hospi-
tal, from photo, lent by W. H. Whiton (W. Taber)— The Ground between Fredericksburg and Marye's
Heights, from photo. (J. D. Woodward) — Stncb in the Mud — a Flank March across Country (Edivin
Forbe8) — The Grand Review at Falmouth during President Lincoln's Visit (Edwin Forbes).
THE CROSSING OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK BY \
Tuc Tu MAccAruiicuT-rc i CAPTAIN H. G. O. IVEYMOUTH 121
THE iqTH MASSACHUSETTS )
THE PONTONIERS AT FREDERICKSBURG COLONEL IVESLEY BRAINERD 121
IN FRONT OF THE STONE WALL AT |
FREDERICKSBURG } GENERAL JOHN IV. AMES 122
WHY BURNSIDE DID NOT RENEW THE ATTACK \
AT FREDERICKSBURC] } GENERAL RUSH C. HAIVKINS 126
FRANKLIN'S " LEFT GRAND DIVISION " GENERAL H^ILLIAM FARRAR SMITH . 128
li.LUfTUATioNs: Franklin's Men Charging across the Railroad iW. Tuber) — The Pontoon Bridges at
Franklin's Crossing, from Gardner photo. C//«r/-// Fejiu;- Franklin's Battle-Held, as seen from Hamil-
ton's Crossing (A. C. Retlwood) — (ieueval W. B. Franklin, from photo, by De Lamater, Avith autograph —
Kuins of •' Mansfield," also known as the " Bernard House," from Gardner photo. (.L D. Woodward) — A
.Tack-kuifc Record on the Htone Wall of the "Bernard House" (A. C. iierfjroorf; — Brigadier-General
(icorge 1). Bayard, from an engraving by H. B. Hall — Brigadier-General C. F. .lackson, from photo.,
with autograph.
WITI I JACKSON AT HAMILTON'S CROSSING /. H. MOORE 139
Illustrations: Trallic Between the Lines during a Truce (Edwin Forftes; — Hays's Brigade of Stone-
wall Jackson's Corps, at Hamilton's Crossing (A. C. Redwood).
CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREE. xi
PAGE
( 1. GEORGE R. SMITH )
IN THE RANKS AT FREDERICKSBURG \ _^ ORSON B CURTIS \
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FREDERICKSBURG. Composition, Strength, and Losses 143
A BIT OF PARTISAN SERVICE COLONEL JOHN S. MOSBY 148
Illcstratioxs : Union Camp Scene : A Quiet Game ( Winsloio Homer j— Colonel Joliu S. Mosby, C. S. A.,
tiom plioto. lent bj- James Blair,
CHANCELLORSVILLE.
STONEMAN'S RAID IN THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN 152
ILLLSTKATION : Major-Geueral George Stonemau, from photo, by Anthony.
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN GENERAL DARIUS N. COUCH 154
iLLUSTRATioxs : Coips Badges of the Army of the Potomac under Hoolier (H. A. Ogden) — Outline Map
of the ChancellorsviUe Campaign (Jacob Wells) — T\ie Kight Wing of Hooker's Army Crossing the Rappa-
hannock at Kelly's Ford (Edwin Forbes) — Map of the ChancellorsviUe Campaign (Jacob Wells) — General
Joseph Hooker, from Brady photo., with autograph — Hooker's Headquarters at ChancellorsviUe (Edicin
J'orftes;— Stampede of the Eleventh Corps on the Plank Road (A. C. ieedwoorf; — Staying Jackson's Ad-
vance, Saturday evening. May 2d, 1863 (Edwin Forbes) —The 29th Pennsylvania in the Trenches under
Artillery Fire, May 3d, 1863, from original picture in possession of Capt. W. L. Stork (W. L. Sheppard) —
Second Lineof Union Defense at the Junction of the Roads to Ely's and United States Fords (Edwin Forbes).
i GENERAL ALFRED PLEASONTON 172
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCEL-
LORSVILLE
Illcstratioxs: Union Cavalryman's Hat, from photo. (W. Tafter) — Parade at Falmouth of the llOth
Pcnusylvauia Volunteers, from photo, lent by W. H. Whiton (W. Tafte/'; — Abandoning the Winter Camp
at Falinouth (Edwin Forbes) —Vniou Troops Crossing the Rapidan at Ely's Ford (Edicin Forbesj — Miijor-
(icncral Hiram G. Berry, from Brady photo. ; Repulse of Jackson's Men at Hazel Grove by ArtiUery under
General Pleasonton (T. de T}mlstntp) — ^hi}or-Geiieviil Amiel W. Whipple, from Brady photo.
WHEN STONEWALL JACKSON TURNED OUR R\GHT JOHN L. COLLINS 183
iLLUSTRATioxs : Major Peter Keenan, from photo, lent by Samuel Wilson — General Howard striving to
rally his Troops (R. F. Zogbaum).
) 1. GEN. PENNOCK HUEY 1 S6
THE CHARGE OF THE EIGHTH PENNSYLVANIA ( ,, ^^^^^ j ^^IVARD CARPENTER. . . .1S7
CAVALRY ^ ijj CAPT. ANDREIV B. IVELLS 187
THE ARTILLERY AT HAZEL GROVE CAPTAIN JAMES F. HUNTINGTON .... 188
THE ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSVILLE GENERAL OLIVER O. HO^VARD 189
Illcstratioxs : Race on the Plank Road for Right of Way. between the Ninth Massachusetts Battery
and a Baggage Train, from a war-time sketch by C. W. Reed C"'. Taber) — T\w Old Chancellor House,
from photo, lent by Theodore Miller iC. A. Yanderhoof) —^lap of the Position of the Eleventh Corps
(Jacob Wells) — Dowdall's Tavern, Howard's Headquarters, from Gardner photo. ( W. Jafter; —Do wdall's
TavciTi in 1884 (Joseph Penuell) — The Wilderness Church and Hawkins's Farm, from photo, made in 188*
(Hurry Fenn)— The Wilderness Church, from photo. (Thomas Ho(jan) — Tht: Confederates Charging
Howard's Breastworks (W. L. Sheppard) —Major-GeneTiil Carl Schurz, from photo, by Brady— Union
Breastworks in the Woods between Dowdall's Tavern and ChancellorsviUe — Relics of the Dead in the
Woods near the Plank Road; and the Plank Road near where Jackson Fell, from war-time photos.
(Georye 6i?»s«»0 — Map of tlio Positions of the Twelfth Corps and iiart of the Third Corps, covering
the ChancellorsviUe Plateau, May 2d and 3d (Jacob jr«>//»; -Rescuing the Wounded on Sunday, May 3d.
from the Burning Woods (Edicin Forbes).
STONEWALL JACKSONS LAST BATTLE REV. JAMES POWER SMITH i'03
Illcstratioxs: Stonewall Jackson's Cap, from photo. — Lee and Jackson in Council on the Night of
Jlay ist (W. L. Sheppard) —VAC-«hni\e of General Jackson's Last letter. In possession of the Virginia
State Library — Lieutenant-(;eneral Thomas J. Jackson, C. S. A., from photo, lent by Major Jed. Hotch-
klBs — Stonewall Jackson's "Old Sorrel," from photo.— Brigadier-General E. F. Paxton, from ambrotype
lent by J. G. Paxton — Stonewall Jackson Going Forwanl on tlie Plank RoatI in Advance of his Line of
Battle (A. C. ifprfiroof/;- Mi»jor-General R. E. Colston, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.— Brigadier-
General F. T. Nicholls, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.— The New Chanrellor House, from photo.
(Harry Fenn) — Stonewall Jackson's Grave, Lexington, Vu., from photo, by M. Miley ( W. Taber \
xii CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREE.
PAGE
HOOKER'S COMMENTS ON CHANCELLORSVILLE ..SAMUEL P. BATES 215
Illustrations: Lance used by the Sixth Peunsylvania Cavalry (Rush's Lancers), from photo. (G. R.
Halm) — Retreat of the Union Army across the Rappahannock at United States Ford (Edwin Forbes) —
Foraging in the Wilderness (W. H. Shelton).
Illustrations : Feeling the Enemy (Winslow Homer) —'ilm Stone Wall under Marye's Heights, from
a photo, by Brady taken immediately after Sedgwick Carried the Position by Assault (W. Taber) — Cap-
ture of a Gun of the Washington Artillery, on Marye's Heights (R. F. Zogbaum) — Salem Church, from
photo, taken In 188i (W. Taber) —The Attack on Sedgwick at Banks's Ford, Monday evening, May 4th
(Edumi Forbes).
LEE'S KNOWLEDGE OF HOOKER'S MOVEMENTS ..GENERAL R. E. COLSTON 233
THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. Composition,
Strength, and Losses .
■"}
233
HOOKER'S APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL CHARLES F. BENJAMIN 239
Illustrations : Breaking up the Union Camp at Falmouth, from photo. (W. Taftcr; — Major- General
George G. Meade, from Brady photo.
GETTYSBURG.
LEE'S INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET 244
Illustrations : Union Cavalry Scouting in Front of the Confederate Advance ( W. Taber) — Map of the
Gettysburg Campaign (Jacob 17c?;s; — Relief Map of the Gettysburg Campaign, from photo, of original
cast by A. E. Lehman — General Robert E. Lee, C. S. A., from photo, taken after the war — Confederates
at a Ford (A. C. Redioood).
THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY IN THE » i i COLONEL JOHN S. MOSBY 251
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN ( " ' ' ( ii. GENERAL BEVERLY H. ROBERTSON .253
Illustration : General James Longstreet, C. 8. A., from Anderson-Cook photo., with autograph,
THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG GENERAL HENRY J. HUNT 255
Illustrations: Buford's Cavalry Opposing the Confederate Advance upon Gettysburg (W. Taber) —
General Meade in the Field, from photo.— Major-General John F. Reynolds, from Brady photo.— Fifteen
Maps Relating to the Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, compiled by General Abner Doubleday (Jacob
Wells) — Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, from photo, by W. H. Tipton ( W. Taber) — The Lutheran Semi-
nary, from war-time photo. ; and View of Seminary from Chambersburg Pike, from photo, by W. H. Tipton
(W. rafter^ — Gettysburg from Oak Hill, from photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Taber) — Geneva] Lee's Head-
quarters on the Chambersburg Pike, from photo. (W. Taber) — North-east Corner of the McPherson Woods,
where General Reynolds was killed, from photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Tuber) — Confederate Dead on the
Field of the First Day, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber) -Union Dead West of the Seminary, from Gard-
ner photo. (W. Taber) — Union Dead near McPherson's Woods, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber) — John
L. Burns, " The Old Hero of Gettysburg," from photo.— Malor-General Abner Doubh^lay, from Brady
photo.— Assault of Brockenbrough's Confederate Brigade (Heth's Division) upon the Stone Barn of the
McPherson Farm (A. C. Redwood )— Confederate Dead gathered for Burial near the McPherson Woods,
from Gardner photos. ( W. Taber) — Lieutenant Bayard Wilkeson holding his Battery to its Work in an
Exposed Position (A. R. TTaMcZ^ — The Line of Defense at the Cemetery Gate-House, from Gardner photo.
(W. Taber).
INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG . MAJOR E. P. HALSTEAD 284
Illustrations: Counting the Scars in the Colors (W. L. SJieppard j —Qeneral Wiulield 8. Hancock,
from photo, by Gurney & Son, with autograph.
HANCOCK AND HOWARD IN THE FIRST DAY'S ^
FIGHT. Extracts from Official Reports ♦
CITIZENS OF GETTYSBURG IN THE UNION ARMY . ..H. M. M. RICHARDS 289
THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG GENERAL HENRY J. HUN r 290
Illustrations: Hall's Battery on the First Day resisting the Confedcrnto Advance on tue Chambers-
burg Road CTT. Taber; — Relief Map of the Battle-field of Gettysburg, from photo, of original cast by A. E.
Lehman; General Meade's Headquarters on the Taneytown Road, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber) —
Miyor-<Jeueral Daniel E. Sickles, from photo.— View frofli the Position of Ilazlett's Battery on Little
Round Top, from photo, by W. H. Tipton (Hurry Fenn) — Tvfo Maps of Positions on July 2d, compiled by
.287
CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREE. xlii
PAGE
General Abner Doubleday (Jacob TTeWs^ — Union Breastworks on Little Round Top — Big Round Top in
the Distance, from Gardner photos. (W. Tafter^ — Colonel Edward E. Cross, from Brady photo.— Weed's
Position on Little Round Top (C. W. Reed) — General G. K. Warren at the Signal Station on Little Round
Top (A. B. TFawtZ^ — Brigadier-General Stephen H. Weed, from Brady photo.— Brigadier-General Strong
Vincent, from Brady photo.— Trostle's Barn and Trostle's House, the Scene of the Fighting of Bigelow's
Battery, from Gardner photos. Cl^- Taftcr^ — Monument of Bigelow's Ninth Massachusetts Battery,
from photo, by W. H. Tipton ( W. Taftery —Colonel George L. Willard, from Brady photo.— Brigadier-Gen-
eral Samuel K. Zook, from Brady photo.— View of Gulp's Hill from the Position of the Batteries near the
Cemetery Gate, from photo, by W. H. Tipton CTF. Ta6er;— Early's Charge on the evening of July 2d, upon
East Cemetery Hill (Edwin Forbes) — Confederate Skirmishers at the Foot of Gulp's Hill (Edwin Forbes).
THE COUNCIL OF WAR ON THE SECOND DAY. . ..GENERAL JOHN GIBBON 313
THE 20TH MAINE AT LITTLE ROUND TOP H. S. MELCHER 314
THE 146TH NEW-YORK AT LITTLE ROUND lO? . GENERAL JAMES G. GRINDLAY 315
Illustration: Uniform of the 146th New York Regiment, from photo, by Whiteley & Co. (W. Taber).
i CAPTAIN JESSE H. JONES 316
THE BREASTWORKS AT GULP'S HILL I rcKip^ji rcr^orv c r-Dccx,n o-.^
( GENERAL GEORGE S. GREENE 317
THE STRUGGLE FOR "ROUND TOP" GENERAL E. M. LAIV 318
Illustrations: At Close Quarters on the First Day at Gettysburg C4. C. Redwood) — Brevet Ma,jor-
General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, from Brady photo.— The Strug-
gle for Devil's Den (A. B. Waud)— The "Slaughter Pen" at the Base and on the Left Slope of Little
Round Top, from Gardner photos. (JV. Taber) —Dead Confederate Sharp-shooter in the Devil's Den, from
Gardner photo. (W. Tabe/-; — Brigadier-General William N. Pendleton, C. S. A., Lee's Chief of Artillery,
from photo, by Tanner & Vanness, lent by Commander John M. Brooke — Major-General J. B. Kershaw,
C. S. A., from photo, by G. W. Minnus.
KERSHAW'S BRIGADE AT GETTYSBURG GENERAL J. B. KERSHAIV 331
Illustrations: Devil's Den, facing Little Round Top (CW. Reed) —Major-General E. M. Law, C. S. A.,
from photo, by Lee — Major-General Lafayette McLaws, C. S. A., from photo.— Sickles's Position at
the Peach Orchard, viewed from the Emmitsburg Road, looking South — The "Wheat-Field," looking
toward Kershaw's Position in Front of Rose's House — The Peach Orchard, viewed from Longstreet's
Extreme Right on the Emmitsburg Road — Sickles's Angle at the Peach Orchard, as seen from the Road
leading from the Wheat-Field to the Peach Orchard, four sketches made in 1885 (C. TT. Reed).
LEE'S RIGHT WING AT GETTYSBURG GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET 339
Illustrations: The Last Confederate Gun at Gettysburg, on Longstreet's Right, opposite Round
Top (A. R. TTaHf/;- Lutheran Church on Chambersburg Street, Gettysburg, used as a Hospital, from
photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Taftcr; — Brigadier-General WiUiam Barksdale, C. S. A., from Brady photo.
— Brigadier-General Paul Semmes, C. S. A., from photo. — Dead in the " AATieat-Field " gathered for
Burial, from Gardner photos. CTF. Taber) -Map of Positions July 3d, 3:15 to 5 : 30 r. m., compiled l)y
GtMieral Abner Doubleday (Jacob TTeW."}) — Major-General William D. Pender, C. S. A., from photo.— Pro-
file of Cemetery Ridge as seen from Pickett's Position before the Charge, from sketch made in 1884 (C.
W. iJecrf;- Brigadier-General Lewis A. Armistead, C. 8. A., from photo.— The Charge of Pickett, Petti-
grew, and Trimble (Edwin For&csJ — Major-General George E. Pickett, C. 8. A., from Anderson-Cook
photo.
THE CHARGE OF PICKETT, PETTIGREW, AND » . ^ SMITH 354
TRIMBLE r
A REPLY TO GENERAL LONGSTREET COLONEL IVII.LIAM ALLAN 355
THE GREAT CHARGE AND ARTILLERY \ ,^^. ,,,^^„ o_^
FIGHTING AT GETTYSBURG } ^^^^^^^ ^- ''• ^^^'^'"^^^^^ ^^^
Illustrations: Charge of Alexander's Artillery CTT. T«&ri-; — Confederate Artillerjnnen at Dinner
(A. C. AVf/ir«ofO— Confederates Waiting for the End of the Artillery Du.l (1. C Jffrftroorfj — Migor-
General Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. 8. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.
THE THIRD DAY AT GETTYSBURG GENERAL HEKRY J. HUNT 309
Illustrations: Hand-to-hand for Rieketts's Guns on the Evening of the Second Tn\y (W. Taber) —
Steuart's Brigade renewing the Confederate Attack on Gulp's Hill, Morning of the Third Day (A. C. Red-
wood)—The 29tli Pennsylvania forming Line of Battle on Cnli/s Hill at 10 a. m.. July 3d, from artist's
l)icture in possession of Captain W. L. Stork (W. L. Slirppard) -Ureyet Major-GeniTal George S.Greene,
from ambrotype lent by Captain F. V. Greene — Gettysburg from CuMi's Hill, from photo, taken about
188f. / E. J. .IffrAr;-) — Monument of the 2d Massachusetts Infantry, facing the East Base of Gulp's Hill,
from photo, ( W. Taber) — Slocum's Headquarters, Power's Hill, from photo, by W. II. Tipton ( W. Taber) —
xiv CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREE.
FAGl.
Mencheys Spring, between Gulp's Hill and tbe Cemetery Gate ; and Spangler's Spring, East of Gulp's
HiU, from sketches by C. W. Reed (W. Ta&er; — Golonel Eliakim SlieiTill, fi-om photo.— (Pickett's Charge,
I.— Looking down the Union Lines from the '• Climip of Trees " ; Pickett's Charge, II.— The Main Collision
to the Right of the " Clump of Trees " ; Pickett's Charge, III. (continuation of the foregoing) — three pic-
tures, from photos, of the Gettysburg Cyclorama) — Inside Evergreen Cemetery, Cemetery Hill (Edwin
Forbes) — Nine Maps [Nos. 21 to 29] of the Confederate Retreat from Gettysburg, compiled by General
Abner Doubleday (Jacob TFe/?s; — Confederate Prisoners on the Baltimore Pike (Edwin Forbes).
GENERAL HANCOCK AND THE ARTILLERY AT j i. GENER/IL FRANCIS A. WALKER 385
GETTYSBURG ( ii. REJOINDER BY GEN. HENRY J. HUNT . 386
REPELLING LEE'S LAST BLOW AT GETTYSBURG.
Illustrations : Ground over which Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble Charged, from photo, hy W. H.
Tipton CTF. Ta&er; — Cemetery Ridge after Pickett's Charge (Edwin Forbes).
I. COLONEL EDMUND RICE 387
II. From the Official Report of COLONEL NORMAN J. HALL 390
III. From the Report of GENERAL ALEXANDER S. IVEBB 391
,v. LIEUTENANT L. E. BICKNELL 391
FARNSWORTH'S CHARGE AND DEATH CAPTAIN H. C. PARSONS 393
Illustrations : Farnsworth's Charge (W. Ta6er; — Map of Farnsworth's Charge, compiled by Captain
H. C. Parsons (Jacob TfeWs; — Brigadier-General Elon J. Farusworth, from Brady photo.
THE CAVALRY BATTLE NEAR GETTYSBURG CAPTAIN WILLIAM E. MILLER 397
Illustrations : Monument on tlie Field of the Cavalry Fight between the Forces of Gregg and Stuart,
from photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Tuber)— 'Breyet Major-General D. McM. Gregg, from Brady photo.— Two
Maps [Nos. 19 and 20] of the Cavalry Battle, compiled by General Abner Doubleday (Jacob TTe/Zs;- Bat-
tle between the Union Cavali-y imder Gregg and the Confederate Cavalry under Stuart (A. R. Waud).
MEADE AT GETTYSBURG GENERAL FRANCIS A. WALKER 406
Illustration : Monument to the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, on the Site of Sedgwick's Headquarters,
from photo. ( W. Taber).
THE MEADE-SICKLES CONTROVERSY.
Illustration : Monimientin the Gettysburg Cemetery, from photo, by W. H. Tipton (W. Taber).
I. A Letter from GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE 413
u. Comment by GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES 414
THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT FROM ) ^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^
GETTYSBURG ^ ■■■ ■ j
Illustrations : " Carry me Back to Die Virginny," Good-bye ! and The Retreat from Gettysbm-g (A. C.
Redwood) — General J. Johnston Pettigrew, C. S. A., from photo.
A PRISONER'S MARCH FROM GETTYSBURG ) ^ ^^^^^^^ ^^, _
TO STAUNTON )■••■./
Illustrations: Confederate Vidette CTF. i. -S'/tei^pa/vO— Confederates Captured at Gettysburg, from
war-time photo. (W. Taber).
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT GETTYSBURG, PA. Composition, Strength, and Losses 434
Illustration : Consecration of the Gettysburg Cemetery, November 19th, 1863 — The Gathering that
President Lincoln Addressed, from Gardner photo. (W. Taber).
THE VICKSBURG YEAR.
THE CONQUEST OF ARKANSAS COLONEL THOMAS L SNEAD 441
Illustrations : Union Cavalrymen : the Watcr-Call ( Wiiislom i/o»ir/-; -Map of the Campaigns of the
Mississippi Valley (Jacob Tl'c^s; - Lieutenant Geii.'ral T. II. Holnios, G. S. A., from photo, by Anthouy-
Major-General T. C. Ilindmau, C. S. A., from plioto.-Major-GciH-ral John S. Marmaduke, C. S. A., from
Brady photo. — Miijor-General James G. Blunt, from photo.- Fayetteville, Arkansas, from photo, by
Hansard & Osborn (C. A. VaHderhoof)-Unv of the Battle of Prairie Grove (J. von Oliimer) -Bvisn-
dier-Gencral T. J. GhnrchiU, C. S. A., from photo.- Map of the Battle of Arkansas Post (.Tacob Wells) —
Plan of Fort Hindniaii. Arkansas Post; section of a Casemate of Fortlllndman; and Casemate on the
Eastern Curtain of Fort Hindman, showing the eflfect of Shot from the Union Guns (Jacob Wem) -
Helena, Arkansas, from photo. (O. A. Tanderhoof) - Map of the Battle of Helena, Arkansas (Jacob Wells)
-Map of the Capture of Little Rock (Jacob Wells) - Major-General Frederick Steele, fx'om photo, lent by
Colonel Thomas L. Snead.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREE. xv
PAGE
THE OPPOSING FORCES IN ARKANSAS. Composition, Strength, and Losses 459
THE ASSAULT ON CHICKASAW BLUFFS GENERAL GEORGE IV. MORGAN. 4G2
ILLUSTKATIONS : CMckasaw Bayou and the Vicksburg BUiffs, from a sketch lent by Dr. E. Wyllys
Andrews (Harry Fenn) — Map of the First Vicksburg Campaigu or Chickasaw Bayou (Jacob Wells) —
Lieutenant-Geuei-al S. D. Lee, C. S. A., from photo.— Major-Geueral Dabney H. Maurj', C. S. A., from
Auderson-Cook photo.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT CHICKASAW BLUFFS (OR FIRST VICKSBURG), MISS. Com-
position, Strength, and Losses 471
JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN. GENERAL JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON 472
ILLUSTKATIONS : Lieutenant-General J. C. Pemberton, C. S. A., from photo.— Major-General Martin L.
Smith, C. S. A., from Brady photo.— Vicksburg Court House, from photo, by A. L. Blanks (C. A.
Vamlerhoof J —Colonel S. H. Lockett, C. S. A., from oil portrait by Nicolo Marschall, made in 1863.
THE DEFENSE OF VICKSBURG S. H. LOCKETT 482
Illustrations: Confederate Lines in the Rear of Vicksburg, from jy^oto.— (Harry Fenn)— Major-
General C. L. Stevenson, C. 8. A., from photo.— Passage of Gun-boats and Steamers at Vicksburg on the
Night of April 16th, 1863, from oil sketch by Colonel Lockett (J. O. Davidson)— " Sky Parlor Hill," a Confed-
erate Signal-Station during the Siege, and Caves of the kind in which Residents of Vicksburg sought
Refuge during the Bombardment by the Fleet, from photos. (Harry J'cmm;— Brigadier-General Edward
Higgins, C. S. A., from photo.— Effect of the Gun-boat shells on Vicksburg houses (Theo. R. Dai'is; — First
' Monument that stood on the Spot of the Interview between Generals Grant and Pemberton, and Monu-
ment'now on the Spot of the Interview, from photos. (Harry Fenn) — Logan's Division entering Vicks-
burg by the Jackson Road, July 4th, 1863 (Theo. R. Davis).
THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT 493
Illustrations : Vicksburg from the North, after the Surrender (Theo. R. Davis) —Map of the Campaign
against Vicksburg, from General Badeau's "Military History of U. S. Grant "— Fimeral on the Levee at
the Duckport Canal, April, 1863 (Theo. R. X>apts; — Rear- Admiral Porter's Flotilla passing the Vicksburg
Batteries, Night of April 16th, 1863, fi-om a sketch by Rear- Admiral Walke (F. H. Schell and Thos. Hogan) —
Rear- Admiral Porter's Flotilla arriving below Vicksburg on the night of April 16, 1863, from a sketch (J. A.
Davidson).— Majov-Geneval William W. Loriug, C. S. A., from photo.— Major-General J. S. Bowen, C. S. A.,
from photo.— Major-General Andrew J. Smith, fiom Bradj' photo.— Major-General Richard J. Ogleeby,
fi-om Brady photo.— Map of the Battles of Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Big Black River
Bridge (Jacob Wells j — Map of the Battle-fleld of Big Black River Biidge, fac-siiuile of the official map.—
General Blair's Division crossing Big Black River ("J^awes ^. Taylor) -Map of the Siege of Vicksburg,
from General Badeau's " Military History of U. S. Grant "— Headquarters of the Union Signal Corps,
Vicksburg, from photo. (W. Taber ) —V,'ooden Coehorn on Grant's Lines (TJieo. R. Davis) — Poaitiou of
Hovey's Division of McClernand's Corps, and Position of Qninby's Division of McPherson's Corps, two
pictures, after lithographs of war-time sketches by A. E. Mathews (E. J. ^eeA-cr;- Position of Logan's
Division of McPherson's Corps — The Fight in the Crater after the Explosion of the Uni(m Mine under
the Confederate Fort on the Jackson Road, June 25th, 1863, two pictures, after lithographs, of war-time
sketches, by A. E. Mathews (Harry Fenn) — In the Saps between the White House and the Vicksburg
Crater, July 2d, 1863; First Conference between Grant and Pemberton, July 3d, 1863, and Union Headquar-
ters, July 3d ; General Grant Receiving General Pemberton's Message, three pictiires (Theo. R. Davis) —
Extract in Fac-simile from a Letter of General Grant to General Marcus J. Wright, C. S. A., dated New
York, Novembei- 30th, 1884.
THE VICKSBURG MINE GENERAL ANDREIV HICKENLOOPER. . 539
Illustrations : The White House, or Shirley, at the Entrance to McPherson's Saps against the "Third
Louisiana Redan," Vicksburg ( Theo. R. Davis) — Plan of the Approaches to the Vicksburg Mine (looking
west), from a drawing by General Hickenlooper — Explosion of the Mine under the Confederate Fort on
the Jackson Road (Theo. R. X»«»is; — Vicksburg, from the River, from a photo. (W. Tabcr).
THE TERMS OF SURRENDER.
Illustration : Arrival of General Grant at General Pemberton's Vicksburg House. July 4th, 1863 (Theo.
R. Davis).
I. GENERAL JOHN C. PEMBERTON 543
II. GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT 545
111. Correspondence between GENERAL PEMBERTON AND GENERALS
GRANT AND BLAIR 545
THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN. Composition, Strength, and Losses . .54(5
Illustrations: Confederate River-battery on the Ridge South of Vicksburg (Theo. li. Dans; —Wreck
of the "Star of the West," in the Tallahatchie River, Opposite the Site of Fort Pemberton, from photo,
lent by 8. B. Morgan (C. A. Vanderhoof).
xvi CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREE.
PAGE
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE VICKSBURG »
CAMPAIGN ♦ ■ ■ ■ PROFESSOR JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY. 5 51
Illustrations : Colonel Charles Rivers Ellet, from aiiibrotype lent by Mrs. Mary V. E. Cabell — The Con-
fedciratc Ram " Arkansas " running through the Union Fleet at Vicksburg, July 15th, 1862 (J. O. Davidson)
—The "Black Hawk," Admiral Porter's Flag-ship, Vicksburg, 1863 (F.B. Schell), and the "Osage" and
"Choctaw," from photos.— The Union Vessels "Mississippi" and "Winona" at Baton Rouge, from
photos. C W. Taber) — Battle of Grand Gulf (second position) , from a sketch by Rear- Admiral Walke (F. H.
Schell and Tfiomas //o(/«>0 — Lieutenant-Comuiander Januis M. Prichett, from photo.
GULF OPERATIONS IN 1802 AND 1863 PROFESSOR JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY .511
THE CONFEDERATE GUN-BOAT " ARKANSAS ", . ..CAPTAIN ISAAC N. BROIVN 572
Illustrations: Building the "Arkansas " (J. O. Z)at)if/so/0— The Confederate Ram "Arkansas" along-
side the Union Gun-boat " Caroudelet," from a sketch by Rear-Admiral Walke (F. II. Schell and Thomas
Hogan ) —Cajttam I. N. Brown, C. 8. N., from photo.— Lieutenant John Grimball, C. 8. N., from photo, by
W. Kurtz, lent by Captain Isaac N. Brown —Commodore W. D. Porter, from photo, by Fredericks.—
Destruction of the Confederate Ram "Arkansas" (J. O. Davidson).
CONFEDERATE TORPEDOES IN THE YAZOO CAPTAIN ISAAC N. BROIVN 580
UNION VESSELS IN THE VICKSBURG OPERATIONS 581
PORT HUDSON.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOUISIANA IN 1862 ...COLONEL RICHARD B. IRIVIN 582-
Illustration: Private Houses in New Orleans in which Confederate Officers were Confined, from
photos (E. J. Meeker).
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT BATON ROUGE, LA. Composition, Strength, and Losses 585
Illustration : Burning of the State-House, Baton Rouge, on Sunday, December 28th, 1862 (Frank
H. Schell).
THE CAPTURE OF PORT HUDSON COLONEL RICHARD B. IRIVIN 586
Illustrations: Magruder's men boarding the " Harriet Lane" at Galveston (J. O. Davidsonj —Shvir\)-
shooters of the 75th N. Y. Volunteers picking off the Gimuers of the Confederate Gun-boat " Cotton," in
the Action at Bayou Teche, La., January 14th, 1863 (Frank H. Schell) — Return of a Foraging Party of the
24th Connecticut Volunteers to Baton Rouge (Frank H. Schell) —March of the Nineteenth Army Corps by
the Bayou Sara Road toward Port Hudson (Frank H. Schell) — The Baggage Train of General Augur's
Division crossing Bayou Montecino on the March to Port Hudson (Frank H. Schell) — Opening of the
Naval Attack on Port Hudson (A. B. TF^wrf; — Map of the Siege of Port Hudson, La. (Jacob Wells).
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PORT HUDSON, LA. Composition, Strength, and Losses 598
MURFREESBORO'.
BRAGG'S ADVANCE AND RETREAT COLONEL DA^ID URQUHART 600
Illustrations: General Braxton Bragg, C. S. A., from Anderson-Cook photo.— Buildings at Murfrees- .
boro'— General Rosecrans's Headquarters — Christian Church, used as a Post Chapel by the Union
Army — Soule Female College, need as a Hospital— Ileadqiiartors of General Bragg, afterward of Gen-
erals Thomas and Garfield — Union University, uwcd as a Hospital, from photos, taken in lH8i(C.A.
Vanderhoof) —The Nashville Pike out of Murfreesboro' and View of Minfrecsboro' from the Vicinity of
Fortress Rosecraus, from photos, taken in 1884 (E. J. J/ecA:e/'; — Brigadier-General James E. Rains, C. S. A.,
from photo.— Brigadier-General R. W. Hanson, C. 8. A., from Brady photo.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT STONE'S RIVER, TENN. Composition, Strength, and Losses. .. .610
THE BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER COLONEL GILBERT C. KNIFFIN 613
Illustrations: Monument to the Dead of tlie Regular Brigade, Stone's River Cemetery — Cannon In-
scribed with the Number Buried in Stone's River Cemetery — Stone's River Cemeterj-, thcNashvill(> Rail-
road in tlie Foreground, from pliotos. taken in 1884 (E. J. Meeker) — Mixp of the Battle-fields of Stone's
River, Tenn. (Jacob Wells) —View on the Nashville Pike at the Union Cemetery, and Monument to the
Dead of llazf-n's Brigade, on the Position held by his Brigade in the Angle between the Pike and the Rail-
road, from photos, taken in 1884 (E. J. Jfee/i-er)- Brigatlier-General Edward N. Kirk, from Bi-ady photo.—
Briga<lier-(Jeneral Joshua W. Sill, from a steel engraving — General Rosecrans's Headquarters at Stone's
River, and Bridge over Overall's Creek, from photos, taken in 1884 (C. A. FaJirff r/ioo/; — General Samuel
Beatty's Brigade (Van Cleve's Division) advancing to Sustain the Union Right near the Nashville Pike,
from litlmgrapli of war-time sketch by A. E. Atathcws (E. J. ifeckcr) — Scone of the Fighting of Palmer's
and Rousseau's Divisions, from lithograph of war-time sketch l)y A. E. Mathews (W. Taber ) -Volition
of Starkweather's and Seribner's Brigades on January l8t,2d, and 3d, from lithograph of war-time sketch
by A. E. Mathews (TTarri/ Fe;iH) — Position of Mendenhall's Fifty-eight Guns (as seeti from the East Bank
above the Ford) which Repelled the Clnirgo of Breckinridge, January 2d, 1863, from photo, taken in 1884
(0. A. Vanderhoof) — Advnnce Colonel M. B. Walker's Union brigade on January 2d, from lithograph
of war-time sketch by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Meeker).
CONTENTS OF f^OLUME THREE. xvii
TAGE
THE UNION LEFT AT STONE'S RIVER GENERAL THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN. . G32
Illustration : Brigadier-General Jobu H. Morgan, C. S. A., from photo, by W. E. Jolins of picture
taken at Eiclimond in 1864.
MORGAN'S OHIO RAID 634
Illustration : Map of Morgan's Ohio Raid (Jacob Wells),
CHICKAMAUGA.
MANCEUVRING BRAGG OUT OF TENNESSEE COLONEL GILBERT C. KNIFFIN G35
Illustrations : Map of the Tullahoina Campaign (Jacob Wells) — The Old John Ross House at Rose-
ville, from Brady photo. (Hurry Fenn).
CHICKAMAUGA— THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WEST . GENERAL DANIEL H. HILL 638
Illustrations : Confederate Line of Battle in the Chickamauga Woods ( W. Tuber) — Map of the Chicka-
mauga Campaign (Jacob Wells) — Alexander's Bridge, from the Confederate Side of the Chickamauga
looking Up-stream, from photo, taken in 1884 (Harry Fenn) —Jjee and Gordon's Mills on the Chicka-
mauga, from Brady photo. (Harry Fenn) — Map of the Battle-tield of Chickamauga (Jacob Wells) —
Crawfish Springs, from photo, taken in 1884 (Harry Fenn)— GenaTal Thomas's Bivouac after the First
Day's Battle (Gilbert Gaul) —Tha Sink-Hole near Widow Glenn's House, from photo, taken in 1884 (Harry
fcwn; — General W. H. Lytle, from Brady photo.— General J. M. Brannan, from photo.
GENERAL POLK AT CHICKAMAUGA CAPTAIN IV. M. POLK 662
THE CRISIS AT CHICKAMAUGA GENERAL GATES P. THRUSTON 663
REENFORCING THOMAS AT CHICKAMAUGA GENERAL J. S. FULLERTON 665
Illustration: The Suodgrass Farm-house, General Thomas's Headquarters, from photo, taken in
1884 (Harry Fenn).
NOTES ON THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN GENERAL EMERSON OPDYCKE 668
Illustration : House of J. M. Lee, Crawfish Springs, Rosecrans's Headquarters before the Battle,
and Site of the Union Field Hospital for the Right Wing, from photo, taken in 1884 (W. Tuber).
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT CHICKAMAUGA, GA. Compositiou, Strength, and Losses 672
CHATTANOOGA.
THE LITTLE STEAMBOAT THAT OPENED THE J ^^,,^„ ,, „,„,,,., ^ ,^ ^,,^
a ^D A^i/cD I iMcn \ GENERAL IVILLIAM G. LE DUG 676
" CRACKER LINE" )
Illustration: The Steamer "Chattanooga" unloading Forage at Kelley's Landing, from war-time
photo, lent by General W. G. Le Due ( W. Taber).
CHATTANOOGA GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT 679
Illustrations : The Army of the Cumberland in Front of Chattanooga, from lithograph of war-time
sketch by A. E. Mathews (E. J. Mcclccr)—Mn\t of the Battle of Chattanooga, from (ieneral Badeau's
"Military History of U. S. Grant"— Ilazcn's men Landing from I'oiitoon-boats at Brown's Ferry (Theo.
It. Davis) —Panoramic View of the Chattanooga region from Point Lookout, on Lookout Mountain, from
lithograph lent by J. B. Linn (E. J. Meeker) — View of Chattanooga and Moccasin Point from the side of
Lookout Mountain, from photo, lent by J. B. Linn (Hurry Fenn) — View of Lookout Mountain from the
Hill to the North, which was General Hooker's position during the Battle on the Mountain, November
24th, 1863, from photo, lent liy General W. G. Le Due (Hurry Fenn) — Bridging Lookout Creek preparatory
to the assault by Hooker ("77. ^. JSro?*'*?; — The Battle of Lookout IMountain (W. L. Sheppard)— The
Fight East of the Palisades on Lookout :\ronnt:iin (H. E. J?/v)ir>0 — Baird's Divisiim Fighting for the
Crest of Missionary Ridge, and Confedeiatcs Resisting Baird's Division on Missionary Ridge, fi-om
photos, of Cyclorama of Missi<mary Ridge — D.parture of the First Hospital Train from Chattanooga,
.January, 1864, and Interior of a Ilositital Car (Tluo. It. Duvis).
SHERMAN'S ATTACK AT THE TUNNEL CAPTAIN S. H. M. BYERS 712
COMMENTS ON GENERAL GRANT'S " CHATTANOOGA."
Illustration: Umbrella Rock, Point of Lookout Mountain, from war-time photo. ( ir. Taber).
I. GENERAL IVILLIAM FARRAR SMITH. 7 H
u. GENERAL HENRY M. CIST 717
m. GENERAL IV. F. SMITH 718
THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND GENERAL JOSEPH S. FULLERTON . . 719
Illustrations: Military Bridge over the Tennessee River at Chattanooga, built in Octol)er, 18C3, fnuu
photo, by R.M.Cressey, lent by General G. P. ThrustonCTT. rafter^ — General Hooker and Staff on the Ulll
xviii CONTENTS OF l/OLUME THREE.
PAGE
North of Lookout Creek, from whicli lie directed tlie Battle of Lookout Mountain, from plioto. lent by
General W. G. Le Due (W. Taber) — The Charge up Missionary Kidge of Baird's, Wood's, Sheridan's,
and Johnson's Divisious, from a sketch for the Cyclorama of Missionary Ridge.
GENERAL BRAGG'S COMMENTS ON MISSIONARY RIDGE .727
OPPOSING FORCES IN THE CHATTANOOGA )
TAMPAirN \ Composition, Strength, and Losses 727
THE DEFENSE OF KNOXVILLE GENERAL ORLANDO M. POE 731
Illustrations: Confederate Assault on Fort Sanders (W. Tafter^ — Map of the Approaches and
Defenses of Knoxville, Tenn., from drawing lent by General O. M. Poe — The North-western Bastion of
Fort Sanders, Viewed from the North, from photo. (W. Taber)— Mav of the Immediate Vicinity of Fort
Sanders, from drawing lent by General O. M. Poe — Brigadier-General William P. Sanders, from photo,
lent by General Poe — North-western Bastion of Fort Sanders, Viewed from the South-western Bastion,
fi'om photo, lent by General Poo (W. Ta^c/-;— Brigadier-General E. P. Alexander, C. S. A., from photo,
by E. Wearn (V. Gribayedoff).
LONGSTREET AT KNOXVILLE GENERAL E. P. ALEXANDER 74G
Illustrations : The North-western Bastion of Fort Sanders, showing the Ground over which the Con-
federates Charged, from war-time photo. (W. Taier) — Fort Stanley, Knoxville, from war-time photo,
lent by General Poe (E. J. Meeker) —Yevtical Section of Fort Sauders (Fred. E. Sitis).
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT KNOXVILLE. Composition, Strength, and Losses 751
Illustration : Knoxville in 1870 (Harry Venn).
MAPS.
NORTH MISSISSIPPI AND WEST TENNESSEE 2
CORINTH AND lUKA REGION 3
BRAGG'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY 6
BATTLE-FIELD OF PERRYVILLE, KY 24
PLAN OF CONFEDERATE WORKS AT CUMBERLAND GAP 65
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, VA 74
OUTLINE MAP OF THE CH ANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN 155
CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN 158
POSITIONS OF ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSVILLE AT 6 P. M. MAY sD, 1863 ... 191
POSITIONS OF THE TWELFTH CORPS AND PART OF THE THIRD CORPS, COVERING )
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE PLATEAU, MAY 2D AND 3D S ^^""^
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN 246
RELIEF MAP OF THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN . 247
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. — POSITIONS JUNE 3D, 6TH, 9TH, 12TH, 13TH 262
POSITIONS JUNE 17TH, 24TH, 28TH 264
POSITIONS JUNE 2qTH, 30TH 266
POSITIONS JULY 1ST, 8 TO 10 A. M., 10:10 TO 10:30 A. M., 3:30 P. M , ABOUT 4 P. M. 272
POSITIONS JULY I ST ABOUT b P. M 282
POSITIONS JULY 2D, ABOUT 3 : ^jo P. M 299
POSITIONS JULY 2D, ABOUT 7:15 P. M. TILL AFTER DARK 308
POSITIONS JULY 3D, 3:15 TO 5 : 30 P. M 344
POSITIONS JULY 4TH, ^TH, 6TH, 7TH, 8TH, qTH, i iTH 381
POSITIONS JULY 13TH, 14TH 382
RELIEF MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF GETTYSBURG, LOOKING SOUTH 292
FARNSWORTH'S CHARGE AT GETTYSBURG 394
CAVALRY BATTLE NEAR GETTYSBURG, JULY 3D, POSITIONS AT 2:30 AND 3:30 P. M. 400
CAMPAIGNS OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 442
CONTENTS OF VOLUME THREE. xix
PAGE
BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE, ARK 449
BATTLE OF ARKANSAS POST, ARK 452
PLAN OF FORT HINDMAN, ARKANSAS POST, ARK '. 453
BATTLE OF HELENA, ARK 455
CAPTURE OF LITTLE ROCK, ARK 457
FIRST VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN OR CHICKASAW BAYOU, MISS 465
CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG, MISS 494
BATTLES OF RAYMOND, JACKSON, CHAMPION'S HILL, AND BIG BLACK RIVER BRIDGE, MISS 506
BATTLE-FIELD OF BIG BLACK RIVER BRIDGE, MISS 512
SIEGE OF VICKSBURG, MISS 516
PLAN OF THE APPROACHES TO THE VICKSBURG MINE 540
SIEGE OF PORT HUDSON, LA 596
BATTLE-FIELDS OF STONE'S RIVER, TENN ; . '. 616
MORGAN'S OHIO RAID , . 635
TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN 636
CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN 640
BATTLE-FIELD OF CHICKAMAUGA, GA ; 648
BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA, TENN 686
APPROACHES AND DEFENSES OF KNOXVILLE 736
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF FORT SANDERS, TENN 739
ARTISTS.
BROIVN, H. E.
DAyiDSON, J. O.
DAl^lS, THEO. R.
FENN, HARRY
FORBES, EDIVIN
GAUL, GILBERT
GIBSON, GEORGE
GRIBAYEDOFF, V.
HALM, GEORGE R.
HOGAN, THOMAS
HOMER, IVINSLOIV
MEEKER, EDIVIN J.
OGDEN, HENRY A.
PEN NELL, JOSEPH
REDIVOOD, ALLEN C.
REED, C. IV.
SCHELL, FRANK H.
SCHELL, FRED. B.
SH ELTON, IV. H.
SHEPPARD, IV. L.
TABER, IV ALTON
TAYLOR, JAMES E.
THULSTRUP, T. DE
l^ANDERHOOF, C. A.
IVAUD, ALFRED R.
IVOODIVARD, J. D.
ZOGBAUM, RUFUS F.
SITTS, FRED. E.
DRAUGHTSMEN
VAN GLUMER, J.
IVELLS, JACOB
AITKEN, PETER
ANDREIVS, JOHN
ATIVOOD, K. C.
BABCOCK, H. E.
BARTLE, G. P.
BERTRAM, IV. A.
BODENSTAB, IV. R.
BUTLER, T. A.
CLEMENT, E.
CLOSSON, IV. B.
COLLINS, R. C.
DANA, IV. J.
ENGR
DAnS, SAMUEL
DE LORME, E. H.
ENGBERG, J.
ERTZ, EDIVARD
EVANS, J. IV.
FAY, GASTON
GAMM, ANTHONY
HEARD, T. H.
HEINEMANN, E.
HELD, E. C.
HELL A IV ELL, THOS.
JOHNSON, THOMAS
AVERS.
JONES, M.
JUNGLING, J. F.
KING, F. S.
KINGS LEY, ELBRIDGE
KLASEN, IV.
KRUELL, G.
LE BLANC, FELIX
MILLER, IVILLIAM
MULLER, R. A.
NICHOLS, DAVID
NORTHCOTE. S.
OIVENS, MARY L.
POIVELL, C. A.
REED, C. H.
SCHOONMAKER, E.
SCHUSSLER, T.
SPIEGLE, CHARLES
TIETZE, R. G.
TYNAN, JAMES
UNDERHILL, F.
VELTHN, H.
IVHALEY, M. J.
IVHITNEY, J. H. E.
IVILLIAMS, G. P.
ihs
^^1'^,
Awmm
BRAGG'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
BY JOSEPH WHEELER, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.
GENEKAL BRAGGr succeeded General Beauregard in command of the
Confederate troops at Tupelo, Miss., about fifty miles south of Corinth,
on June 27th, 1862. The field returns of June 9th, a week after our army
reached Tupelo, reported it at 45,080. J This return included the Army of
Mississippi, reenforced by the troops brought from Arkansas by Generals
Price and Van Dorn, together with detachments gathered from various locali-
ties. About two thousand cavalry not included in this return also belonged
to the army. This was the maximum force General Bragg could expect to
concentrate at that point. General Halleck, immediately confronting Bragg
with the armies of Grant, Pope, and Buell, had in and about Corinth a force
of 128,315 men, of which the field return of June 1st showed 108,538 present
for duty. A division reporting 8682 for duty, under the Federal General
George W. Morgan, was at Cumberland Gap ; a division with 6411 for duty,
under General Ormsby M. Mitchel, was in north Alabama, and three bri-
gades were located at Nashville, Murfreesboro', and other points in middle
Tennessee. Buell soon started en route to north Alabama, General Halleck
remaining at or near Corinth with seventy thousand men for duty, a force
strong enough to hold Corinth and west Tennessee, while Buell could menace
or even invade Alabama or north Georgia.
The changed condition of the opposing armies during four months should
now be considered. In January, 1862, the Confederates had held all of
J To prevent misconception, and to avoid fre- retiirnsof Confederate troops I shall always include
quent repetitions, I will here state that through- all officers, all non-coimuissioned officers, and all
out this paper when I mention the figures of field privates who are reported present for duty.— J. W.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
Tennessee and most of Kentucky, and the Mississippi River from Colnmbus
to the delta. Now, after a series of Confederate reverses, both States were
virtually under the control of the armies under General Halleck, and the
Federal flotilla sailed unmolested from St. Louis to Vicksburg. The Federal
right was thrown forward into Mississippi. Its center occupied north Ala-
bama, and its left was pressing the Confederates to the southern border of
east Tennessee.
The Confederate problem was to devise some plan to turn the tide of dis-
aster and recover at least a portion of our lost territory. Our soldiers had
expected a battle at Corinth, in which they felt confident of as decisive a vic-
tory as was won by them on the first day of Shiloh ; and the withdrawal to
Tupelo had at last forced upon them a conviction that the numerical prepon-
derance of the enemy was such that they could not expect to cope success-
fully with the combined armies then commanded by General Halleck.
Already the army had suffered much from sickness, and we could hardly
expect any improvement while it remained idle in the locality where it had
halted after its retreat from Corinth. An advance into west Tennessee
would not afford protection to Alabama or Georgia. An advance into middle
Tennessee by crossing the river at Florence, Decatur, or any neighboring point,
would have the disadvantage of placing the Confederates between the armies
of Grant and Buell under circumstances enabling these two commanders to
throw their forces simultaneously upon General Bragg, who could not, in this
event, depend upon any material cooperation from the army in east Tennessee
under General Kirby Smith. There was another line for an aggressive move-
ment. A rapid march through Alabama to Chattanooga would save that city,
protect Georgia from invasion, and
open the way into Tennessee and Ken-
tucky, without the disadvantage of an
intervening force between the column
commanded by Bragg and that under
the orders of General Kirby Smith.
This movement was determined upon
and resulted in what is called the
Kentucky Campaign of 1862.
Major-General E. Kirby Smith had
reached Knoxville March 8th, 1862,
and assumed command of the Confed-
erate troops in east Tennessee. The
retm*ns for June reported his entire
force at 11,768 infantry, 1055 cav-
alry, 5> and 635 artillery. The occu-
pation of Cumberland Gap, June 18tli,
by a Federal division, and the approach
of Buell's forces toward Chattanooga
seriously threatened his department.
SCALE OF STATUTE MILES ;
30 'so l(io
lUAf OJF NORTH MISSISSIPPI AND WEST TENNESSEE.
^ Not includiug Allstou's brigade. — Editors.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
MAP OF THE CORINTH AND ItTKA REGION.
General Bragg recognized the inadequacy of General Smith's force, and on
June 27th he transferred the division commanded by Major-Geueral John P.
McCown from Tupelo to Chattanooga. | Forrest and John H. Morgan had
already been sent into middle Tennessee and Kentucky, and the operations
of these enterprising officers materially lessened the pressure upon General
Smith. Correspondence between Generals Bragg and Smith resulted in an
order, dated July 21st, transferring the entire Army of Mississippi to Chatta-
nooga. To mislead the enemy and to prevent an advance upon Tupelo,
Bragg had, on the 19th, sent Colonel Joseph A\nieel(n- with a In-igade of cav-
alry into west Tennessee, and Brigadier-General Frank C. Armstrong ^vith
a like force into north Alabama. Wheeler's operations in west Tennessee
may be briefly summarized as a rapid march from Holly Springs, Mississippi,
4 General Kirby Smith, in a letter dated July 14tb, 18 02, estimated Stevenson's division at 10.000,
Heth's and McCown's at 10,000, Morgan's cavalry 1300. "Official Records," Vol. XVI., Pt. II., p.
727.— Editors.
4 BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
to Bolivar, Tennessee ; an attack upon the outposts at that place ; the destruc-
tion of bridges on the line of communications of the troops at Bolivar and
Jackson ; a number of slight affairs with the enemy's cavalry, and the burn-
ing of a quantity of cotton in transit to the North.
One week was thus occupied behind the enemy's lines, the main object of
the movement being to create the impression of a general advance. On July
31st Bragg and Kirby Smith met at Chattanooga, and a joint movement into
middle Tennessee was determined upon. Price and Van Dorn being left to
confront Grant in northern Mississippi. On August 5th Bragg sent two of
his brigades (Cleburne's and Preston Smith's) to General Smith at Knoxville.
General C. L. Stevenson, with nearly nine thousand men, was ordered to watch
the Federal General G. W. Morgan, who occupied Cumberland Gap. General
Smith started on the 14th en route to Rogers's Gap, with 4 brigades, 6000
strong. The brigades of Preston Smith and B. J. Hill were commanded by
General P. E. Cleburne, and the brigades of McCray and McNair were under
command of General T. J. Churchill. General Henry Heth, with a force
nearly 4000 strong, was ordered to march direct to Barboursville by way of
Big Creek Gap, and the army was preceded by 900 cavahy under Colonel
John S. Scott. General Smith had at first contemplated cutting off the sup-
plies of the garrison at Cumberland Gap, but learning that they were well
provisioned, and seeing the difficulty of supplying his own troops in the poor
and barren region of south-eastern Kentucky, he determined to push rapidly
on to the rich blue-grass country in the central part of the State. This deter-
mination had been communicated to General Bragg, and a march toward
Lexington was commenced.
On the evening of the 29th, having reached Madison County, Kentucky,
Colonel Scott found the enemy about half way between the small village of
Kingston and the town of Richmond. The force displayed and resistance
offered indicated that they were resolved to contest any farther advance of
the Confederates. Although his troops were quite weary and General Heth
was far to the rear, General Smith determined upon an immediate attack.
He was in the heart of Kentucky, and the Confederate commander rightly
judged that boldness was the sui'est road to victory.
Early on the 30th, General Cleburne, being in advance with his two bri-
gades, found that the Federal force had moved forward and was in line of
battle about a mile north of Kingston and probably five miles south of Rich-
mond. The extreme advance-guard of the enemy, about six hundred yards in
front of their main line, became engaged with Cleburne's leading brigade, com-
manded by Colonel Hill, but after a light brush retired upon the main body
of the Federal army. Hill's brigade was soon formed in lino behind the crest
of a low ridge which was nearly parallel with and about five hundred yards
south of the position occupied by the enemy. Cleburne also brought up
Douglas's battery, which he placed in a favorable position near the center of
his line. A fire of artillery and infantry commenced, and Captain Martin, with
a second battery, having arrived, it was also brought into action, and for two
hours both infantry and artillery were engaged from their respective positions.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY. 5
General Mahlon D. Manson, who was in command of the Federal army
before G-eneral Nelson arrived, and who commenced the battle, now pushed
his left forward to turn our right. Cleburne met this with one reg-
iment of Preston Smith's brigade, which had been formed behind a crest
in his rear, but the persistence of the enemy in that quarter made it neces-
sary to reenforce the right with all of the reserve brigade under Preston
Smith.
In the meantime Greneral Kirby Smith had reached the field with the two
brigades (McCray's and McNair's) forming General Churchill's division. He
promptly dispatched that officer with one brigade to turn the enemy's right.
The Federal commander, apparently disregarding this movement, still boldly
advanced his own left to carry out his plan of tui'ning the Confederate flank.
This well-conceived manoeuvre at first seemed to endanger the Confederate
army, but Colonel Preston Smith with his brigade stood firm, and after a
severe struggle checked and finally drove back the advancing enemy. Gen-
eral Cleburne, who up to this time had displayed both skill and gallantry, was
severely wounded and left the field. General Churchill had now gained the ene-
my's right, and by a bold and determined charge threw the enemy into disorder.
Two miles farther north the Federal force made a stand, and McCray's
gallant brigade, by a rapid march, struck their right, while Cleburne's division,
now commanded by Colonel Preston Smith, moved to the attack in front. The
celerity of McCray's movements brought him into action before the other
troops reached the field, and he suffered from the concentration of a galling and
destructive fire ; but the approach of Preston Smith, with troops cheering as
they advanced again, caused a rout of the Federal army, closely followed by om*
victorious soldiers. When in sight of the town of Richmond the enemy were
seen forming for a final struggle upon a commanding ridge, which had been
judiciously selected by the Federal commander, Major-General William
Nelson, both of the enemy's flanks being protected by skirts of woods.
General Smith promptly sent McNair's brigade again to turn the Federal
flank, and with the remaining force attacked directly in front. A warm fusil-
lade lasted a few moments, when the Federal army again retreated. Early in
the morning Colonel Scott had been sent to gain the rear of the town. His
arrival at this moment increased the dismay of the enemy, and assisted
materially in securing prisoners. The reports of the di\ision and brigade
commanders show that General Smith's entire force was about five thousand.
The enemy supposed it much greater, their estimate including General Hetli,
but his division did not join General Smith until the day after the battle. ^
Kirby Smith's loss was 78 killed, 372 wounded, and 1 missing.
Nelson in his report speaks of his own command on the Kentucky River as
16,000 strong,\ and the official report of casualties is given as 20(3 killed, 844
wounded, and 4303 captured. The Federal official reports admit that nine
pieces of artillery and all their wagon trains were captured by the Confederates.
^In a letter to General Bragg dated August 24th, 1862, General Kirby Smith says ho will have
with him, in his advance to Lexington, "about 12,000 effective men." — Editors.
\ This is the total force spoken of by Nelson as being on the Confederate flank.— Editors.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
Bragg s
INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
O
H
O
BRAGG — >t — X— SMITH — t— ♦-
BUELL'S ARMY-
^io^i\
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scale: of miles
10 20 30 40 50
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G \_^ O
General Manson contends that the Federals en-
gaged did not exceed 6500. i^Ir General Horatio
G. Wright, who commanded the department, in his report of Sept. 2d, saj^s :
" The force engaged in the battle in front of Richmond was utterly broken up, and after all
the exertions that could be made to collect the stragglers, only some 800 or 900 could be found.
The remainder of the force were killed, captured, or scattered over the country."
7^ According to the official reports tho Union force only been mustered into service a few (Jays. Gen-
engaged consisted of Hanson's and Cruft's bri- eral Nelson says in his report that he had ordered
gades, eight regiments and two detachments of in- General Manson not to fight, but to fall back, so as
fantry, one regiment and a battalion of cavalry and to concentrate on the Confederate flank. See the
two batteries of artillery, all neiu troops xcho had previous note.— Editors.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY. 7
Elated with success, and reenforced by about four thousand troops just
arrived under Heth, the victorious army moved forward to Lexington, and
was designated by its commander as " The Army of Kentucky." During che
month of September the greater portion of the army remained in that \dcinity.
On September 4th Colonel Scott, with a brigade of cavalry, was ordered
to push on as near as practicable to Louisville, and to destroy the Louisville
and Nashville Railroad. Heth, with a division of infantry and a brigade of
cavalry, marched north ; some of his troops, on September 6th, reached the
suburbs of Covington, but his instructions were not to make an attack upon
the city. Smith used vigorous efforts to gather and concentrate supplies,
arouse the people, and raise and organize troops for the Confederacy.
General Gleorge W. Morgan (Federal), who was left at Cumberland Gap
with 8682 men, seeing these active movements in his rear, evacuated that
position on September 17th and made his way through eastern Kentucky to
the Ohio River at Greenupsburg, arriving there October 3d.
While these events were haj)pening, Bragg had organized his army at
Chattanooga into two wings. The right, commanded by General Polk, con-
sisted of Cheatham's and Withers's divisions of infantry and Colonel Lay's
brigade of cavalry. The left wing, commanded by General Hardee, consisted
of Buckner's and Anderson's divisions of infantry and Wheeler's brigade of
cavalry. This entu'e force, on August 27th, reported 27,816 ofi&cers and men
for duty. J On the 28th the army was fairly in motion, but up to this time
General Bragg had not positively determined upon his plan of cam.paign,
and much depended upon the course pursued by the Federal army.
As early as the 22d General Buell had established his headquarters at
Decherd, on the Nashville Railroad, thirty miles north-west of Stevenson, and
had all the supplies at Stevenson transferred to that place. % Two parallel
mountain ranges, running north-east and south-west, separated him from
Chattanooga. A railroad, connecting McMinnville and Tullahoma, ran nearly
parallel to the north-west slope of these mountain ranges. Already he had
located General Thomas at McMinnville with Wood's and Ammen's divisions,
while the divisions of Schoepf, McCook, and Thomas L. Crittenden were
near the Nashville and Stevenson Raih'oad within easy call of headquarters
at Decherd. Buell seemed impressed with the belief that Bragg's objective
point was Nashville, and that he would take the short route over the moun-
tain by way of Altamont, which movement, if made, would have placed Bragg
between the force under Thomas and the ]*est of Buell's army. To prevent
this Buell, on the 23d, ordered these five divisions to concentrate at Altamont.
General Thomas reached his destination on the 25th, but, finding no enemy
to confront him and learning that there was no enemy on the mountains, the
nearest Confederates being at Dunlap's in the Sequatchie Valley, he reported
\ This return reports a total of 431 officers and ^ On August Gth, during this advance from Ste-
men in the cavalry. September 1 0th (O. R., XVI., venson to Declierd, Brig. -Gen. Kobert L. McCook
893) Colonel Joseph Wheeler reported his com- (of Thomas's division; brother to Alex. McD. Mc-
mand on the march (apparently a part of it) as 700 Cook), who, being ill, was riding in an ambulance,
strong, and (p. 890) part of Colonel Lay's brigade is was mortally wounded by the enemy's scouts near
mentioned as 550 strong, August 27th.— Editors. New Market.— Editors.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
these facts to Buell and returned to
McMinnville. Crittenden's division
halted near Pelham, and Schoepf at
Hillsboro'. McCook pressed on and
reached Altamont on the 29th, where,
on the 30th, Wheeler attacked his out-
posts, and McCook retired down the
mountain. The same day General
Buell ordered his entire army to con-
centrate at Murfreesboro'.
By September 5th, the five divisions
just mentioned had reached that place,
together with all detachments from
along the lines of railroad except
Rousseau's division, which, being on
the Nashville and Decatur Railroad,
marched directly to Nashville. The
strength of Buell's forces during the
months of July, August, and Septem-
ber was estimated by witnesses before
the Buell Commission, in 1863, at from
45,000 to 59,309. His own returns for
June, deducting the force at Cumber-
land Gap, showed 56,706 present for
duty, and his October returns, with
the same deduction, 66,595. | General Buell presented a paper to the Com-
mission which does not question any of these statements regarding strength,
but states that he could not have concentrated more than 31,000 men at
McMinnville to strike the Confederate forces as they debouched from the
mountains ; and the same paper estimated Bragg's army at 60,000, while his
retm-ns on August 27th showed but 27,816 officers and men for duty. ^ These
facts prove the large preponderance of the Federals.
At Murfreesboro' Buell heard of Nelson's defeat at Richmond, and without
halting he marched to Nashville. On September 7th he intrusted General
Thomas with the defense of that city with the divisions of Palmer, Negley,
and Schoepf, while with the infantry divisions of McCook, Crittenden,
Ammen, Wood, Rousseau, and R. B. Mitchell, and a cavahy division under
Kennett, General BueU determined to race with Bragg for Louisville.
4. The October returns include the heavy reen-
foreements, placed by General Buell at 22,000,
that were added to Buell's army on its arrival at
Louisville, at the end of September. — Editors.
J^ In his official report, dated November 4th,
1862, General Buell estimated his whole effective
force on the 7th and 8th of October, at 58,000,
including 22,500 raw troops, with little or no
instruction. He also estimated the total Confed-
erate force engaged in the invasion at from 55,000
to 65,000. In "The Army under Buell " (N. Y. :
IKUM A PHOTUGKAjeH.
D. Van Nostrand), General James B. Fry, Assist-
ant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff of the Army
of the Ohio, after a careful study of all the
data, estimates the force with which Buell moved
against Bardstown (exclusive of Sill's division
that moved against Frankfort) at 58,000 ; and
Bragg's, including Kirby Smith's, at 68,000.
By this estimate, when Sill joined the main
body of Buell's army after the battle of Perry-
ville, the armies were about equal in number.
Editors.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY, 9
It was a fair race, as on that day most of Bragg's army was south of
the Cumberland Eiver, at Carthage and Grreensboro'. Bragg was nearest to
Louisville by some twenty-five miles, but Buell had the advantage of a bridge
at Nashville and the assistance of the railroad to aid in his march. With
seven hundred cavalry, I hastened to strike and break the raihoad at points
between Bowling Green and Nashville, and otherwise sought to retard the
northern march of the Federal army. By the 12th it was e^ddent to Buell
that no attack would be made on Nashville, and he ordered Greneral Thomas
to join him with his own division, which had been commanded by General
r ■ <yf%':."*r"^; ';%:^.
UNION FORT AT MUNFORDVILLB, CAPTURED BY BRAGG, SEPTEMBER 17, 1862 — THE GREEN RIVER BRIDGE
ON THE LEFT. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN EN 1886.
Schoepf. Buell reached Bowling Green with his cavalry and two divisions
of infantry on the 14th, and turned his column in the direction of Mun-
fordville. I interposed my cavalry on the Munfordville road, and also on
the roads leading to Glasgow, and reported Buell's movements to Bragg.
General Chalmers, with Bragg's advance, reached Munfordville at daylight
on the 14th and learned that Colonel Scott, with a cavalry brigade, had
demanded the surrender on the night previous.\ Chalmers was misinformed
regarding the strength of the garrison and the character of the defensive
works. He attacked with vigor, but was repulsed. He reported his force at
1913 men, and his loss at 35 killed and 253 wounded. On the 14th all of
Buell's six divisions had reached Bowling Green, and on the 16th he advanced
vigorously to succor the garrison at Munfordville, the head of his column
being opposed by cavalry. Bragg, hearing of Chalmers's attack and of Buell's
movements, ordered his entire army, which had rested two days at Glasgow,
to start early on the 15th en route for Munford\dlle. On the next day he
reached that place, boldly displayed his army, and on the 17th at 2 p. M. the
\ The post was commanded by Colonel J. T. Wilder (17th Indiana), whose force consisted of foiu- regi-
ments of infantry, a battery, and several detachments, aggregating about 4000 men. — Editors.
VOL III. ft
lo BRAGG 'S INJyASION OF KENTUCKY.
fort and garrison surrendered. The Federals reported their loss at 15 killed,
57 wounded, and 4076 prisoners. We also captured their armament, 10 pieces
of artillery, and 5000 stand of small-arms. As might be expected, the Con-
federate army was much elated, and were eager to grapple with the dispirited
army under General Buell.
Bragg placed his troops in a strong position south of the river, using the
fort as a part of his line of defense. My command was thrown forward to meet
and skirmish with the enemy, who, on the 19th, commenced preparations for an
attack. On the 20th General Thomas joined the Federal army with his division.
General Bragg, in referring to the situation of September 20th, wrote :
'' With my effective force present reduced by sickness, exhaustion, and the recent affair before
the intrenchments at Munfordville to half that of the enemy, I could not prudently afford to
attack him there in his selected position."
If Kirby Smith's command had been ordered from Lexington to Munford-
ville even as late as the 12th, a battle with Buell could not have been other
than a decided Confederate victory. Bragg at first had determined to fight
with his four divisions, and no doubt would have done so had Buell advanced
on the 17th, or 18th, or 19th. Early on the morning of the 18th, General Bragg
sent for me and explained his plans. I never saw him more determined or
more confident. The entire army was in the best of spirits. I met and
talked with Generals Hardee, Polk, Cheatham, and Buckner ; all were enthu-
siastic over our success, and our good luck in getting Buell where he would
be compelled to fight us to such a disadvantage. It is true our back was to a
river, but it was fordable at several places, and we felt that the objection to
having it in our rear was fully compensated by the topographical features,
which, with the aid of the fort, made our position a strong one for defense.
So anxious was Bragg for a fight that he sent Buckner's division to the
front in the hope that an engagement could thus be provoked ; but after the
arrival of General Thomas, Bragg did not deem it advisable to risk a battle
with the force then under his command, believing that another opportunity
would offer after being joined by Kirby Smith. ,He therefore withdrew to
Bardstown, sending to me, who still confronted Buell, the following order,
dated September 20th, through General Hardee :
'' General Bragg directs that, if possible, the enemy be prevented from crossing Green
River to-morrow, and General Hardee instructs me to say that he expects you wiU contest the
passage of that river at Munfordville to that end."
Buell heard of Bragg's movements and pressed forward with determina-
tion. My small brigade of cavalry contested his advance on the 20th and
21st, in efforts to comply with the instructions from General Bragg. On
the afternoon of the 21st, Buell's right approached the river above the town,
and at the same time he pressed forward his line of battle so rapidly as
almost to command the only ford by which I could cross Green River with
both artillery and cavalry. Allen's 1st Alabama Regiment, being directly in
front, was thrown into column and, charging gallantly, defeated the opposing
cavalry and broke through their infantry. Among our killed was the noble
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY. 1 1
Lieutenant-Colonel T. B. Brown, but the charge sufficiently checked the
advance to enable the command to cross the ford in good order. The fol-
lowing note, referring to this engagement, explains itself :
''Headquarters, Sixth DmsiON, Army of the Ohio, September 22d, 1862. General
Wheeler, Commanding Cavalry Brigade. General : I am directed by General Buell to say,
in answer to your request to admit the brother of Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, killed in the
affair of yesterday within our lines, he regi-ets he cannot, on account of the present state of
the service, accede to youi' wishes. General Buell has referred your note to me to give you
the desired information in regard to the fate of Colonel Brown. He was killed outright in the
handsome cavahy charge executed by your troops yesterday afternoon. His body was taken to
a neighboring house and cared for. He wUl be interred to-day, and doubtless in the vicinity.
His watch was taken charge of by an officer of rank in our service, and I will make it a
point to have it forwarded to you. I am not now informed whether there were any other val-
uables on the person of Colonel Brown. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient sei-vant,
Th. J. Wood, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding."
The watch was subsequently sent to Colonel Brown's daughter.
On the 22d, with a clear road to Louisville, Buell moved with celerity in
that direction. My cavahy contested his advance, but the country was
too open to allow of effective opposition with so small a force. On the
25th the leading Federal column reached the city, and the seven divisions
were all up on the 27th. Bragg, Polk, and Hardee had been kept thoroughly
informed of Buell's march and of the exposure of his flank, which presented
an inviting opportunity for attack, but so worn and wearied was the con-
dition of our army that these officers did not feel justified in attempting
an aggressive movement. On the 28th Bragg left Bardstown with his
staff to confer with Kirby Smith at Lexington, and then proceeded to
Frankfort, where, on the 4tli of October, a day was occupied in the instal-
lation of the Hon. Richard Hawes as Confederate Provisional Goverrior of
the Commonwealth.
While these events were happening Buell was making active preparations
for an aggressive campaign. On the 26th Major-General Wright, command-
ing the Department of the Ohio, went from Cincinnati to Louisville to confer
with him, and on the 27th General Halleck issued an order placing Buell in
command of the troops of both departments, then in Louisville. There has
been much controversy as to the " strength of the opposing armies." After
the most careful study of Federal and Confederate official statements, I
have reached the following conclusions :
FEDERAL FORCES AVAILABLE TO MEET BRAGG, ix
Collected at Cincinnati 45,000
Collected at Louisville 30,000
Canied to Louisville by Buell, September 25th to 29th 54,198
Morgan's Seventh Division 8,084
Total under BueU's and Wright's command 137,282 \
it It will be contended, with some force, that most meager guard would have sufficed to protect
a portion of these troops was necessary to guard those cities had the main body moved vigorously
Cincinnati and Louisville. But on the other hand against the Confederates. — J. W.
it may be insisted, just as strenuously, that the J But see other estimates, p. 31.— Editors.
12 BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
To these we might with propriety add the 26,351 men which General Wright
could have drawn from his command in West Virginia.
These stupendous armies did not include the 12,397 troops left at Nashville,
which would make the entire force subject to Buell's and Wright's orders
176,030. ,
MAXIMUM CONFEDERATE FORCES.
General E. Kirby Smith's column taken to Kentucky 10,000
Humphrey Marshall, from West Virginia 2,100
Stevenson, joining after PeiTyviUe 7,500
John H. Morgan 1,300
Bragg's largest force before crossing Tennessee River — officers and
men, for duty 27,816
Bragg, Smith, and Marshall 48,776 g>
The above was the reported strength of the Confederate troops when the
campaign began, but to make sure and to compensate for any omitted cavalry
let us add 1000, making the entire force 49,776. The losses at Richmond and
Muufordville were very slight, compared to the daily depletion caused by
dropping out along the route. Some were allowed to organize in squads and
make their way back to east Tennessee ; some sought shelter among the kind
and hospitable people ; some struggled along with the ambulance trains, and
some were left at temporarily established hospitals, one of which, containing
two hundred inmates, was captured by the enemy at Glasgow.
This character of loss always attends a rapidly moving army, and its extent
can be realized when we see that Hardee's wing left Chattanooga 12,825
strong, was reenforced by Cleburne's brigade early in October; yet, even
with Cleburne included, Hardee, in stating officially the force with which
he fought at Perry ville, says: "Thinned by battle and long and arduous
service, my effective force did not exceed 10,000 men." It will be seen, there-
fore, that these causes reduced the Confederate ranks in much greater pro-
portion than they were increased by enlistments and other accretions, and
General Bragg in his official report of the campaign asserts that we were able
"at no time to put more than forty thousand men of all arms and at all places in
battle." This included Bragg's, Smith's, and Marshall's columns, and although
it is probably true that their aggregate strength in August was 48,776, it
would have been as difficult for Bragg and Smith to have concentrated that
number as it would have been for Buell and Wright to have concentrated the
163,633 which they commanded. Even with such a force available to drive
40,000 men out of Kentucky, General Wright on the 16th appealed to the
governors of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan for additional troops.
What troops came in answer to these calls I would not venture to say; but
leaving these and the troops in West Virginia under General Wright out of
the calculation, our strength, even after Stevenson joined us, was less than
half, and but little more than one-third that of the enemy, and that powerful
enemy was directly on its base of supplies, with unlimited commissary and
% But see other estimates, p. 31.— Editors.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
13
ordnance stores, while the Confederate army had no base, was living off the
country, and had no possibility of replenishing ammunition. Bragg felt very
keenly the misfortune caused by his inability to concentrate and gain a
victory over Buell before he should reach the reenforcements which awaited
him at Louisville.
In writing to the Government, September 25th, Bragg says :
" I regret to say we are sadly disappointed in the want of action by our friends in Kentucky.
We have so far received no accession to this army. General Smith has secured about a brigade
— not half our losses by casualties of different kinds.
Unless a change occurs soon we must abandon the gar-
den spot of Kentucky. . . ."
On September 18th, Kirby Smith writes to
General Bragg :
'' The Kentuckians are slow and backward in rally-
ing to our standard. Then- hearts are evidently with
us, but their blue-grass and fat-grass are against us.
Several regiments are in process of organization, and
if we remain long enough recruits will be found for all
the disposable arms in our possession."
These letters illustrated why a victory over
Buell was necessary.
Although Kentucky maintained her neu-
trality as long as it was possible, the chivalric
spirit of her gallant sons was fully manifested
at the earliest opportunity — each obeying
only the dictates of his own convictions of duty. While thousands united
their fortunes with the South, other and more thousands flocked to the
standard of the North.
The proud old families — descendants of the pioneers of the Common-
wealth— each sent sons to do battle in the opposing armies. Friends,
neighbors, kinsmen, and even brothers bade each other adieu — one to the
Northern army, the other to the Confederate. | Wherever daring courage,
rare intelligence, extraordinary fertility of resource, or fortitude under pri-
vation and suffering were displayed, Kentuckians were conspicuous; and
when the fight was over and the battle-rent banner of the vanquished Con-
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL E. KIRBY SMITH, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
4. The remarkable division of sentiment, upon
the issue presented by the secession of the South,
that existed in Kentucky is clearly illustrated by
the course of some of her leading families. The
three most prominent families in the State were
the Breckinridges, the Clays, and the Crittendens,
and each of them had representatives in both
armies. Major-Gen eral Thomas L. Crittenden and
Colonel Eugene W. Crittenden served in the army
of the Nortli, while their brother, Major-Greneral
George B. Crittenden, served in the army of tlie
South. Of Henry Clay's grandchildren, I recall
three who espoused the Federal cause, and four
who joined the Southern army. Vice-President
Breckinridge and three sons adhered to the South,
while his two distinguished cousins, the eminent
Presbyterian divines, were uncompromisiug in
their devotion to the Union. The elder, and per-
haps more famous of these cousins. Dr. Eobert J.
Breckinridge, had two sons in the Confederate and
two in the Federal army; one of whom (CoIouelJ.
C. Breckinridge, now [ISSS] of the regular army),
in the fierce battle at Atlanta, July 22d, 1S04,
became a prisoner to his brother, W. C. P. Breckin-
ridge, the present member of Congress, who made
as brilliant a record as a soldier as he lias since made
as a statesman. They passed the night following that
sanguinary battle with as much warmth of fraternal
affection as though visiting each other from neigh-
boring armies engaged in the same cause. — J. W.
14 BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
f ederacy fui'led about its shattered staff was buried in that grave from which
a resurrection is no less unwished for than impossible, the survivors of
the contest from that State returned to their homes with no feelings of
animosity, no brooding hopes of vengeance to be wreaked upon their late
opponents.
On October 1st Buell commenced his march from Louisville upon Bragg at
Bardstown. On September 29th General Thomas had been assigned by Presi-
dent Lincoln to the command of the army, but at Thomas's request the order
was revoked, and he was announced in orders as second in command.
Buell organized his infantry into three army corps, of three divisions each.
The First Corps on the left, under Major-G-eneral McCook, marched through
Taylorsville. The Second Corps, under Major-General Crittenden, marched
through Mount Washington, and the Third Corps, under Major-Oeneral Gil-
bert, which formed the Federal right, took the route by way of Shepherdsville.
General Sill, of McCook's corps, reenforced by Dumont's independent division,
marched direct to Frankfort to threaten Kirby Smith.
Buell, in his official report, says :
" Skiitnisliing with the enemy's cavah-y and artillery marked the movement of each column
from within a few miles of LouisviUe. It was more stubborn and formidable near Bardstown,
but the rear of the enemy's infantry retired from that place eight hours before oui- arrival, when
his rear-guard of cavalrj^ and artillery retreated after a sharp engagement with my cavalry.
The pursuit and skirmishing with the enemy's rear-guard continued toward Springfield."
General Smith prepared to meet Sill and Dumont, and on October 2d Bragg
ordered General Polk to move the entire army from Bardstown via Bloom-
field toward Frankfort, and to strike Sill's column in flank while Smith met
it in front. For reasons which were afterward explained that order was
not complied with, but, on the approach of Buell^^ Polk marched via Perry-
ville toward Harrodsburg, where he expected the entire army would be con-
centrated. ^ General Smith, confronted by Sill and Dumont near Frankfort,
had several times on the 6th and 7th called upon Bragg for reenforcements,
and Wither s's division of Polk's corps was ordered to him. Reports reached
Bragg exaggerating the strength of the movement upon Frankfort. He was
thus led to believe that the force behind Polk was not so heavy as represented,
and on the evening of October 7th he directed him to form the cavalry
and the divisions of Cheatham, Buckner, and Patton Anderson at Perry^ille,
and vigorously attack the pursuing column. Since October 1st our cavalry
had persistently engaged the two most advanced of Buell's columns.
The reader should now observe, by the map [p. 6], that McCook's corps
approached Perryville by the road through Bloomfield, Chaplin, and Mack-
ville, its general direction being nearly south-east. General Gilbert's corjis
approached by the road from Springfield, its general direction being east, but
bearing north-east as it approached the town. Crittenden's corps, accom-
panied l)y General Thomas and preceded by cavalry, having crossed Gilbert's
line of march, was on a road which runs due east from Le])anon to Danville.
i General Polk, finding his own front threatened, availed himself of previous instruetions as to how-
he should handle his force in certain contingencies, and retired slowly.— Editors.
BRAGG 'S INJ/ASION OF KENTUCKY. i 5
At a point about five miles south-west of Perryville this road has a branch
which turns north-east to that place. Now remember that our stores and
supplies were at Bryantsville and Camp Dick Robinson about eighteen miles
east of Perryville, and that Kirby Smith was at McCown's Ferry, on the
Kentucky River, en route for Versailles, menaced by two divisions under
General Sill. Also observe the important feature that McCook was at Mack-
ville during the night of the 7th, at which place a road forks, running east to
Harrodsburg and thence to om* depot at Bryants^ille ; and also consider that
Mack\dlle was as near Bryants\alle as were our troops in front of Perrj^ille.
On the 7th our cavalry fought with considerable tenacity, particularly in
the evening, when the enemy sought to get possession of the only accessible
supply of water. General Buell, in his report, says :
" The advanced guard, consisting of cavalry and artillery, supported toward evening by two
regiments of infantry, pressed successfully upon the enemy's rear-guard to within two miles
of the town, against a somewhat stubborn opposition."
After dark, at General Hardee's request, I went to his bivouac and dis-
cussed the plans for the following day. I explained to him the topogi-aphy
of the country and the location of Buell's columns. I understood from him
that the attack would be made very early the next morning, and I endeavored
to impress upon him the great advantage which must follow an early com-
mencement of the action. An early attack on the 8th would have met only
the advance of Gilbert's corps on the Springfield road, which was four or five
miles nearer to Perryville than any other Federal troops, and their overthrow
could have been accomphshed with little loss, while every hour of delay was
bringing the rear divisions of the enemy nearer to the front, besides bringing
the corps of MeCook and Crittenden upon the field. I explained, also, that
Thomas and Crittenden on the Lebanon and Dan^dlle road could easily gain
our rear, while all our forces were engaged with McCook and Gilbert. For
instance, if Crittenden turned toward Perryville at the fork five miles from
that place, he would march directly in the rear of our troops engaged with
Gilbert's corps. If he kept on toward Danville and Camp Dick Robinson,
our position would be turned, and a rapid retreat to our depot of supplies,
closely followed by McCook and Gilbert, would be the ine\4table result. With
equal ease, McCook, by marching from Mackville to Harrodsburg, could
reach our depot, thus turning our right flank.
The reader will plainly see that Perryville was not a proper place for six-
teen thousand men to form and await the choice of time and manner of
attack by Buell, with his tremendous army, and that every moment's delay
after daylight was lessening the probabilities of advantage to the Confeder-
ates. The cavalry under my command was pressed forward at dawn on the
8th, and skirmished with the outposts of the enemy, until, on the approach
of a Federal brigade of cavalry supported by a line of infantry, we charged,
dispersing the cavalry, and, breaking through both infantry and artillery,
drove the enemy from their guns and took 140 prisoners.
The Federal army was now being placed in line : McCook's corps on tlie
left, Gilbert's in the center, and Crittenden's corps, which reached the field
i6
BRAGG 'S INl/ASION OF KENTUCKY.
at 11 o'clock,\ on the right, its
flank being covered by Edward
M. McCook's brigade of cav-
ahy. The management of the
Federal right wing was un-
der the supervision of General
Thomas.
General Bragg reached Per-
ryville about 10 o'clock. Gen-
eral Liddell's brigade, of
Buckner's division, had been
advanced with his left near
the Springfield road, and his
skirmish line became engaged.
The cavalry on the Confederate
left apparently being able to
hold their own against the ene-
my upon that part of the field,
Cheatham's division, composed
of Donelson's, Stewart's, and
Maney's brigades, was ordered
to the right, where, between 1
and 2 o'clock, with its right
supported by cavalry, it moved
forward to the attack. Gen-
erals Hardee and Buckner, see-
ing Cheatham fairly in action,
ordered General Bushrod John-
son's and Cleburne's brigades
forward. There being considerable space between Cheatham's left and
Buckner's right. General John C. Brown's and Colonel Jones's brigades, of
Anderson's division, and General S. A. M. Wood's, of Buckner's division, had
been placed in position to fill the vacancy. Adams's and Powell's brigades, of
Anderson's division, were to the left of Buckner, and the line thus arranged
with cavalry on both flanks gallantly advanced upon the enemy. Cheatham
was first in action and was almost immediately exposed to a murderous fire of
infantry and artillery, which soon spread to the left of our line.
Our artillery, handled with great skill, told fearfully on the enemy, who
sought, when practicable, to take shelter behind stone walls and fences.
Fortunately we were enabled to enfilade many of their temporary shelters
with a well-directed fire from our batteries, and this, added to our musketry,
was so effective that first one regiment, then another, nnd finally the entire
Federal line, gave way before the determined onset of onr troops.
\ Critteuden testified before the Buell Commission that his leiidiiig division "was in line of battle
between 10 and 11." This line was formed ou the Lebanon pike about three miles from the battle-
field.—Editors.
LIEUTENANT (.1 M
FK< I
BRAGG 'S INI/ASIOK OF KENTUCKY. 17
At one time Cleburne and Jolmson seemed checked for a moment, as they
assailed a very strong position, the fire from which cut down our men and
severely wounded General Clebui-ne. But encouraged by the steady advance
on both right and left, these troops recovered from the shock, and with
increased speed the entire line overran the enemy, capturing three batteries
and a number of prisoners. Among the dead and wounded Federals lay one
who, the prisoners told us, was General James S. Jackson, the commander of
one of McCook's divisions. General Liddell, who had been placed in reserve,
followed the movement, and when the contest became warmest was sent to
reenforee Cheatham, where he did valiant service.
During this sanguinary struggle, our line had advanced nearly a mile.
Prisoners, guns, colors, and the field of battle were ours ; not a step which
had been gained was yielded. The enemy, though strongly reenforced,
was still broken and disordered. He held his ground mainly because
our troops were too exhausted for further elfort. At one point just at
dusk we captured a disorganized body, including a number of brigade and
division staff-officers. Soon darkness came on and we rested on the field
thus bravely won.
Our entire force engaged, infantry, cavalry and artillery, was but 16,000
men. Our loss was 510 killed, 2635 wounded, and 251 missing. Generals
S. A. M. Wood and Cleburne were disabled, and a large proportion of higher
officers were killed or wounded. Three of General Wood's staff were among
the killed.
General Buell lost 916 killed, 2943 wounded, and 489 captured by the
Confederates. General Jackson, commanding a division, and General Terrill
and Colonel Webster, commanding brigades, were among the Federal killed,
and Colonel Lytle was among the wounded.
At every point of battle the Confederates had been victorious. We had
engaged three corps of the Federal army; i^ one of these, McCook's, to use
Buell's language, was " very much crippled," one division, again to use his
language, " having in fact almost entirely disappeared as a body."
After darkness had closed a battle, it was a custom to send messengers or
notes to the nearest generals, detailing results, telling of this or that one who
had fallen, and asking information from other portions of the field. Resting
quietly on the ground, the army expected, and would gladly have welcomed,
a I'enewal of the fight on the next day, but the accumulation of Buell's forces
was such as not to justify further conflict in that locality. Kirby Smith was
near Lawrenceburg with his own troops and Withers's division, and after full
consultation it was determined to march to Harrodsburg, where it was hoped
the entire Confederate force in Kentucky might bo concentrated. I was
directed with the cavalry to prevent an advance on the road leading to
Danville. At midnight the troops withdrew to Perry ville, and at sunrise
continued the march. It was long after this when the Federal pickets began
to reconnoiter, and it was fully 10 o'clock when, standing on the edge of the
town, I saw the advance of the skirmish line of Buell's army. Bragg prepared
■5^ Only a small part of Crittendeu's corps was in actiou ; see p. 31.— Editors.
1 8 BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
for battle on the Harrodsbiirg road, only eight miles from Perryvillo, and
awaited Buell's advance.
Two days elapsed, and the Federal army evinced no disposition to attack.
A division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry fought me back to near
Danville, and at the same time Buell formed with his right within four
miles of that place, making a feint in Bragg's immediate front on the road
leading from Perryville to Harrodsburg. Buell, no doubt, hoped to cut him
off from the crossing of the Dick River near Camp Dick Robinson.
I sent Greneral Bragg information of Buell's dispositions, whereupon he
issued orders to his army and wrote me as follows:
''Harrodsburg, Ky., October 10th, 1862. Colonel Wheeler. Dear Colonel: I
opened yom- dispatch to General Polk regarding the enemy's movements. The information
you furnish is very important. It is just what I needed and I thank you for it. This infor-
mation leaves no doubt as to the proper course for me to pursue. Hold the enemy firmly till
to-morrow. Yours, etc., Braxton Bragg."
Bragg had now determined to retreat to Knoxville by the way of Cumber-
land Gap. It was evident that Buell's large army would enable him to select
his own time and position for battle unless Bragg chose to attack. Bragg
already had 1500 sick and over 3000 wounded. A severe battle would
certainly have increased the wounded to 4000 or 5000 more. The care of
such a number of wounded would have embarrassed, possibly controlled,
our movements.
Hardee states that he had but 10,000 men before the battle of Perryville,
and Bragg said that the three divisions which fought that battle had but
14,500. If that was correct they had now but 11,000.
It was too hazardous to guard our depot of supplies and contend with the
Federal forces within easy march. Our wagon trains were immense, and our
artillery large in proportion to other arms.
The enemy pushed up close to Danville on the night of the 10th, but we
easily held him in check until all our army had crossed Dick River. On the
11th we contended against a force of infantry, which finally pressed us so
warmly that we were compelled to retire east of Danville. Here the enemy
was again diiven back, and we held our position near the town.
Before day on the 13th I received the following appointment and instruc-
tions in a special order from Greneral Bragg, dated Bryantsville :
*' Colonel Wheeler is hereby appointed chief of cavalry, and is authorized to give orders
in the name of the commanding general. He is charged under Major-General Smith with
covering the rear of the army and holding the enemy in check. All cavahy will report to him
and receive his orders."
Compliance with the above of course involved considerable fighting, but by
using the cavalry to the best advantage, and adopting available expedients,
the movement of our infantry and trains in retreat was unmolested. These
engagements were constant, and were often warmly and bitterly contested.
The large trains of captured stores made the progress of our infantry very
slow, and the corps commanders sent frequent admonitions to me urging the
BRAGG' S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
19
importance of persistent resistance to Buell's advance. In crossing Big Hill,
and at other points, the trains hardly averaged five miles a day, and General
Kirby Smith at one time regarded it as impossible for the cavahy to save
them. In his letter to Bragg, on the 14th, he says : " I have no hope of saving
the whole of my train " ; and in his letter on the 15th he says : " I have little
hope of saving any of the trains, and fear much of the artillery wiU Ije
lost." But fortunately nothing was lost. Our cavalry at times dismounted
and fought behind stone fences and hastily erected rail breastworks, and when
opportunity offered charged the advan-
cing enemy. Each expedient was adopted
several times each day, and when practi-
cable the road was obstructed by felling
timber. These devices were continually
resorted to until the 22d, when the enemy
ceased the pursuit, and early in Novem-
ber the cavalry force, which covered the
retreat from Kentucky, reached middle
Tennessee and was close to the enemy,
less than ten miles south of Nashville.
The campaign was over. Buell was
deprived of his command for not having
defeated Bragg, who, in turn, was cen-
sured by the Southern people for his
failure to destroy the Federal army com-
manded by Buell.
*=^,
This campaign was made at a time
MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. CHEATHAM, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
when the opposing Grovernments hoped
for more from their generals and armies than could reasonably be accom-
plished. The people of the South were misinformed regarding the resoui'ces
at the disposal of Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith, and oiu' fii'st successes
aroused expectations and hopes that the Kentucky movement would result
in the defeat, or at least the discomfiture, of Buell's army, the possible inva-
sion of the North, and certainly the recovery of Confederate power in the cen-
tral and eastern portions of Kentucky and Tennessee. They were sorely
disappointed when they heard of General Bragg's "svithdrawal through Cum-
berland Gap, and could not easily be convinced of the necessity of such a
movement immediately following the battle of Perryville, which they
regarded as a decisive victory. The censure which fell upon Bragg was
therefore severe and almost universal. It somewhat abated after the prompt
advance of the army to Murfreesboro' ; but to this day there are many who
contend that Bragg should have defeated Buell and maintained himseh' in the
rich and productive plains of Kentucky. On the other hand the Federal
Government was, if possible, more severe in denunciation of General Buell,
and held that, fcir from allowing General Bragg to cross the Tennessee River
and the mountains into middle Tennessee, Buell should have anticipated these
movements, occupied Chattanooga, and, as some even contended, inarched
20 BRAGG 'S INK4SI0N OF KENTUCKY.
his army toward Atlanta. The Government was convinced that he could
easily have met and halted Bragg as he debouched from the mountains before
entering middle Tennessee. It was emphatic in its assertion that ordinary
celerity on the part of General Buell would have saved Munford\dlle and its
garrison of 4'200 men ; that proper concentration would have destroyed the
Confederate forces at Perryville, and that the plainest principles of strategy
presented the opportunity of throwing forward a column to cut off Bragg's
retreat via Camp Dick Robinson, or that at least after the commencement of
the conflict at Perryville he should have pressed close to his antagonist and
forced Bragg to continuous battle, contending, as they did, that superior num-
bers and proximity to his base gave the Federal commander advantages
that, if properly improved, would have resulted in the destruction of the
Confederate army.
Buell's strategy and tactics were the subject of Congressional investigation
and inquiry by a military commission. With regard to the adverse criticisms
on Bragg's campaign it must be admitted that there were opportunities, had
they been improved, to cripple, if not to defeat, the Federal army.
The failure to " concentrate and attack " tells the story of the campaign.
The first opportunity was on September 18th, when we caught Buell south of
Munfordville. Bragg could not have attacked at Altamont, because it will be
remembered that on August 30th, at the first appearance of our cavalry, the
Federal force retreated from that place down the mountain. Neither could
he have overtaken Buell's troops at McMinnville, because, fully three days
before Bragg could have reached that place, Buell had ordered all his army
to Murfreesboro'.
Those who contend that Bragg should have followed Buell to Nashville do
not consider that he would have found him in a good position, strengthened
by fortifications, and defended by 9 divisions of infantry and 1 of cavalry;
his available force for duty then being 66,595.
After the surrender of the Federal fort at Munfordville, it became painfully
apparent that a single mind should control the Confederate troops in Ken-
tucky, and concentrate our entire force and attack the divided enemy ; but a
condition existed which has been repeated in military operations for four
thousand years, and always with disastrous results. The troops in Kentucky
had two commanders. The troops of two different departments were expected
to cooperate.
Both Kirby Smith and Bragg were brave and skillful generals. The
devotion of each to the cause in which they were enlisted was absolute, and
their only amlntion was to contribute to its success. In their characters the
pettiness of personal rivalry could find no place, and either would willingly
have relinquished to the other the honor of being the victor, if the victory
could only have been won.
It will be remembered how promptly, in the preceding June, General Bragg
had weakened his own army and strengthened Smith's by sending McCown's
division from Tupelo to Chattanooga, and again in August by sending the
brigades of Cleburne and Preston Smith from Chattanooga to Knoxville;
BRAGG' S INK4SI0N OF KENTUCKY.
PEARTRFE, OM II I M 1 I I > ^ I M - < 'I 1 \1 I
ROUSSLVt > lO-UloN, 1 1 KUWll I 1 1
PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 18«o
SPKrsG >r \n vru\ ^ \ ii 1 1 w iik ii in i
lO REIILVI BllVO( b I'VUCllLD VKM\
I ROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKFX IN 1885.
and again, when Smith was
pressed at Frankfort, that
Bragg reenf orced him prompt-
ly with one of his best divi-
sions. That Kirby Smith
would, at any time, have been
as ready and prompt to give
Bragg any part or all of his
army there can be no doubt,
but when the decisive moment
came, the two independent
armies were more than one
hundi-ed miles apart, and neither commander could be informed of the other's
necessities. Bragg and Smith conferred together, but neither commanded the
other. If all the troops had belonged to one army, Bragg would have ordered,
and not conferred or requested.
To aggravate the difficulties inherent in the system of independent
commands and divided responsibility, Brigadier-Greneral Marshall, who had
commanded in West Virginia, appeared upon the field of active opemtions
with 2150 men. He was an able and distinguished man and determined
in his devotion to the Confederac^y. He wished to do his full duty, but he
appeared to feel that he could render more efficient service with a separate
command than if trammeled by subordination to a superior commander-;
and his aversion to having any intervening power between himself and the
President was apparent.
While G-eneral Smith was anxious to cooperate, he nevertheless, in reply
to Bragg's request for cooperation, wrote indicating very forcibly that he
thought other plans were more important ; and, in fact, the only cooperative
action during the campaign was Bragg's compliance aWHi Smitli's request to
22 BRAGG' S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
transfer to him two brigades on August 5th, and to transfer Withers's division
to him on October 7th.
In reply to the question as to what one supreme commander could have
done, I confidently assert he could have concentrated and attacked and
beaten Buell on September 18th south of Munfordville. He could then have
turned and marched to Louisville and taken that city. If it should be argued
that this plan involved unnecessary marching on the part of Kirby Smith,
who was then at Lexington, a supreme commander could have adopted the
one which was contemplated by Bragg early in the campaign. \
After the surrender of Munfordville he could by September 21st have
reached Louisville with all the force in Kentucky, taken the city, and then
risked its being held by a small garrison, while making another concentra-
tion and attack upon Buell.
As an evidence of how easily we could have taken Louisville, it must be
observed that on September 22d Buell sent Major-General Nelson orders
containing these words :
" If you have only the force you speak of it would not, I should say, be advisable for you to
attempt a defense of Louisville unless you are strongly intrenched ; under no circumstances
should you make a fight with his whole or main force. The alternative would be to cross the
river or march on this side to the mouth of Salt River and bridge it so as to form a junction
with me. . . . "
Nelson seemed to concur with Buell, and it was not until that officer was
but a day's march from Louisville that Nelson telegraphed the fact to General
Wright, saying, " Louisville is now safe ; ' Grod and Liberty.' "
In further corroboration of this, " Harper's History," p. 311, says :
" Just before the Federal army entered Louisville, on the 25th of September, the panic there
had reached its height. In twenty -foui* hours more Nelson would have abandoned the city."
But sui^pose neither plan had been adopted, the next chance for a supreme
commander of the Kentucky forces was to "concentrate and attack" Buell's
flank while his army was strung out en route to Louisville. Elizabethtown
would have been a good place, and had it been done with vigor about
September 23d it certainly would have resulted in victory. But at this time
General Smith's forces were all moving to Mount Sterling, 130 miles to the
east of that place (Elizabethtown), and General Smith was asking, not order-
ing. General Marshall to cooperate with him. The next field upon which a
supreme commander had an opportunity to concentrate and attack was
at Perryville. Three hundred cavalry could have played with Generals
Sill and Diimont around Frankfort, and every other soldier, except a few
\ On the 1st of August General Bragg wrote the fairest prospect of cutting off General Buell."
from Chattanooga to Eichmond : "As some ten On the 12 th Bragg wrote to Smith, at Knoxvillo,
days or two weeks must elapse before my means as follows: "On Friday I shall probably com-
of transportation will reach here to sucli extent as mence crossing the river [Tennessee], by which I
to enable mo to take the field with ray main force, shall draw their attention from you. ... I shall not
it has been determined that General Smitli shall desire to hold you longer in check than will enable
move at once against General [G. W.] Morgan in me to get in motion to support you, for it would be
front of Cumberland Gap. Shoidd he be success- too great a risk to allow Buell, by rapid railroad
ful, and our well-grounded hopes fulfilled, our en- movements, to get in your front. In the meantime
tire force will be thrown into middle Tennessee with I hope you will bring Morgan to terms."— Editors.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
23
scouts, could then have struck Clilbert's corps as day dawned on the 8th
of October.
Since, in the final result, we neither defeated Buell nor took Louis^dlle, it
is now evident that it was unfortunate Bragg did not foresee the end imme-
diately after his victory at Munfordville, He could certainly have crippled
Buell to some extent as he attempted his hazardous flank movement en route
to Louisville, and then, by a rapid march, he could have reached and
captm-ed Nashville and relurned and established himself at Bowling Green.
I have pointed out these
lost opportunities as an
additional proof of the
adage, as old as war itself,
"that one bad general is
better than two good ones."
The very fact that both the
generals are good intensi-
fies the evil; each, full of
confidence in himself and
determined to attain what
he has in view, is unwilling
to jdeld to any one ; but if
both are weak the natural
indisposition of such men
to exertion, their anxiety to
avoid responsibility, and
their desire in a great crisis
to lean on some one, will
frequently bring about the
junction of two independ-
ent armies without any
deliberately planned concert of action between the commanders. Both
Bragg and Kirby Smith were men who had, to an eminent degree, those
qualities that make good generals, and, once together with their armit\'< upon
the same field, victory would have been certain. Both fully appreciated the
fact that, when an adversary is not intrenched, a determined attack is the
beginning of victory. By this means Smith had been \dctorious at Manassas
and at Richmond, Ky., and by ^dgorous attack Albert Sidney Johnston and
Bragg had won at every point of battle at Sliiloh, on the Cth of April. Later,
the Confederate points of attack were Bragg's scene of \nctory the first day at
Murfreesboro', and the boldness of his onset gave Bragg his great triumph
at Chickamauga. Nothing was therefore wanting in Kentucky but absolute
authority in one responsible commander. Cooperation of the most cordial
character is a poor substitute. The word cooperation should be stricken from
military phraseology.
Li writing to the Government on August 1st, aftei- he had met (Jeneral
Smith, General Bragg says : " We have arranged measures for mutual sup-
corner OF THE CONFEDERATE CEMETERY AT PERRTVILLE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1886.
The cemetery is situated on a knoU a few rods south-east of the hill on
which General J. S. Jackson was killed. After the battle Squire Henry
P. Bottom oflered the friends of the Confederates any plot of sroimd
they might choose on his farm for a burial spot. They chose this knoll
because their dead lay thickest near its eastern slope. In the autumn
of 1886 a fragment of a lime-stone wall was visible above the weeds. At
that time Squire Botton> said that 435 Confederates were buried hero,
of whom about 100 were identified. Only one headstone was to be found,
and that lioic tlie name of Samuel H. Ransom, of the 1st Tenn., and
was placed there by his wife. Several offlcers were buried with the
unidentiticd dead.— EDITORS.
BRAGG 'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY.
25
DEFENSE UE
CLAUiEKLANO KIVEli,
FROM A LITHOGllAPH.
According to a note on the lithograph, a detach-
ment of Morfraii'8 cavalry, and of infantry, approached
Cage's Ford at daybreak of November 21, 18G2, hoiiiiig
to surprise the 31st Ohio regiment, which had been en-
camped on the south side of the Cumberland. Finding
that the Union troops had changed their camp to the
north side, the Confederates threw shells from two 12-
pouuder howitzers until tlieir cannoneers were driven
from the pieces b.\- the musketry tire of the Ohioaus,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Lister, three of -whom were
wounded. The Confederates made no serious attempt
to cross, and soon withdrew.— Editors.
port and effective cooperation." On August 8th Bragg writes to Smith: " I
find myself in your department ; without explanation this might seem an
unjustifiable intrusion." While it is no doubt true that General Smith was
at all times willing to yield to the authority of General Bragg, yet the fact
that Smith was the commander of an independent department, receiving
orders from and reporting directly to the President, made him prhnarily
responsible to the Executive, and this limited the authority of General Bragg.
Nevertheless the Kentucky campaign was attended with great results to the
Confederacy. Two months of marches and battle by the armies of Bragg and
Smith had cost the Federals a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners of 2(v')o0.
We had captured 35 cannon, 16,000 stand of arms, millions of rounds of
ammunition, 1700 mules, 300 wagons loaded with military stores, and 'JOOO
horses. We had recovered Cumberland Gap and redeemed middle Ten-
nessee and north Alabama. Yet expectations had been excited that were
not realized, and hopes had been cherished that were disappointed; and
therefore this campaign of repeated triumi»hs, without a single reverse,
has never received — save from the thougliirul, intelligent, and inii)artial
minority — any proper recognition.
MORGAN'S CAVALRY DURING THE BRAGG INVASION.
BY BASIL W. DUKE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.
"T'TT^HILE Bragg was concentrating at Chatta-
VV nooga, in August, 1862, preparatory to his
march iuto Kentucky, Colonel John H. Morgan,
with his cavalry command, numbering some nine
hundred effectives, was actively engaged in middle
Tennessee, operating chiefly against the Federal
garrisons in the vicinity of Nashville, and the
detachments employed immediately north and to
the east of that city. All of these were successively
captured or dispersed, and on the 21st of August
Morgan defeated and completely routed a select
body of cavalry, twelve hundred strong, sent under
command of General R. W. Johnson to drive him
out of Tennessee. Of this force 164 were killed
and wounded, and a much larger number, includ-
ing Johnson and his staff, were made prisoners.
Morgan had been notified of the intended inva-
sion of Kentucky, and part of his duty was the
destruction of the railroad track and bridges
between Nashville and Bowling Green, for the
purpose of retarding Buell's movements when the
latter should begin his retreat to Louisville.
On the 28 th of August Bragg crossed the Ten-
nessee River at Chattanooga, and pushed north-
ward. General Kirby Smith had previously entered
Kentucky, and had ordered Morgan to report to
him at Lexington, in the blue-grass region. Mor-
gan marched from Hartsville, Tenn., on the 29th
of August, and on the 4th of September reached
Lexington, already occupied by General Smith.
His command consisted of the 2d Kentucky Cav-
alry C. S. A., about 700 strong, and Gano's squad-
ron, of 2 companies of Texan cavalry, about 150
strong. It was vex'y largely recruited, however,
during the occupation of Kentucky. A small
detachment of the 2d Kentucky, leaving Lexing-
ton on the same day, made a rapid march of some
90 miles, and captured the garrison, 150 strong,
of the stockade fort erected for the protection of
the railroad bridge over Salt River, 17 miles
south of Louisville. The bridge was burned in
pursuance of the programme to destroy rail com-
munication between Bowling Green and Louis-
ville. By order of General Smith, the command
was then divided for separate service. I was
ordered to proceed with 600 men of the 2d Ken-
tucky to the vicinity of Covington, whence
General Heth, who had threatened Cincinnati,
was then retiring. Colonel Morgan was ordered,
with the remainder of the regiment, Gano's squad-
ron, and all the cavalry recruits then organized, to
march to, the assistance of General Marshall in the
mountains of eastern Kentucky, The Federal
general, George \V. Morgan, had evacuated Cum-
berland Gap, and followed by Stevenson, who had
been instructed to observe and pursue liim if he
moved, was making his way to the Ohio. It was
intended that Marshall and Morgan should inter-
cept and arrest his niarcli until Stevenson could
overtake him and attack him in rear.
The detachment under my command became
immediately very actively engaged with the enemy,
who, in considerable numbers, had crossed the
river and advanced to Walton, twenty-five miles
south of Covington. For several days, skirmishing
went on constantly, and I was steadily driven
back, until I became convinced that it was an
advance in force. Discovering, however, by care-
ful reconnoissance that the entire Federal strength
consisted of only 7000 or 8000 infantry, about
1000 cavalry, and 8 pieces of artillery, and that
troops were being transported in large numbers
by the river from Cincinnati, I became satisfied
that the movement was intended to cover and
divert attention from the real concentration at
Louisville, and was not meant as a serious move-
ment on Lexington, and I so reported to General
Smith. Reports fi'om my scouts and from citizens,
to the effect that these troops were quite raw and
inexperienced, and that, on account of the omission
to scout or reconnoiter, the encampment at Wal-
ton, where the enemy had halted, could be easily
approached, induced me to attack the camp. By
a quick dash upon it, just after daybreak, I secured
90 or 100 prisoners, with very little loss on my
part ; but found that no effort by a force numer-
ically so inferior could compel the enemy to retire.
It was important, however, that his column
should be forced to fall back and not remain as a
menace to Lexington, whence it was distant only
two or three days' march. I learned that a regiment
was orgaTiized for the Federal army out of some
"home guai"d " companies at Augusta, a small town
on the Ohio, about forty miles above Co\angton. I
was also informed that at that season of year, when
the river was at a very low stage of water, it was
f ordable immediately below this place. Leaving the
greater part of my command in front of the enemy
at Walton to observe and follow him if he retreated,
I marched rapidly with 250 men to Augusta, be-
lieving that the recruits there could be captured
or dispersed with ease, and without loss on my
part, and that I could cross the river into Ohio,
enter the suburbs of Cincinnati, and induce such
consternation that the troops at Walton would be
recalled. On the 27th of September I attacked,
meeting, however, with fierce resistance. Two
small river steamers were there, bulwarked with
bales of hay, and each carrying a 12-pounder how-
itzer. On these boats were, about one hundred in-
fantry. The " Home Guards," 400 or 500 strong,
were ensconced in the houses of the little town. I
planted two small howitzers attached to my com-
mand on a hill overlooking the village, and within
a half-mile range of the river. After the exchange
of a few shots on each side, the boats, with the
troops upon them, steamed off in disgraceful panic.
I thought then that the affair was over, but when
I entered the town I found nearly every house a
fortress, and was met with severe volleys which did
much damage. Before I could overcome the resist-
ance of the inmates, I was forced to burn some of
MORGAN'S CAl/ALRY DURING THE BRAGG INVASION.
27
I
i
the houses, storm many others, and even double-
sliot the small tield-pieces aud fire them point-blauk
from the street into some whose defenders were
unusually stubborn. The hand-to-hand fighting in
this little skirmish was the fiercest lever saw. In
many instances when the firing from the windows
was stopped by the volleys poured into them from
the streets, the inmates still refused to surrender,
and the details of my men who broke down tlie doors
and entered were compelled to kill all they found
inside. Captain S. D. Morgan killed seven men
with his own hand, and was himself killed before
the house he entered was taken. In some houses I
saw blood dripping down the stairways.
My loss was 21 men killed aud IS wounded. A
very much larger number of the " Home Guards "
was killed, and I carried off between 300 and 400
prisoners. The combat lasted not more than fif-
teen minutes after I entered the town; but my
loss, the number of prisoners, and especially the
fact that I had nearly exhausted my ammunition,
decided me not to cross the Ohio and carry out the
movement on Cincinnati I had contemplated. I
knew, also, that 500 or 600 Federal troops at Mays-
ville, not far distant, would be ordered immediately
to Augusta, and that my return by that point would
be intercepted. On the next morning I was at-
tacked at Brookvill e by these troops, under Lieuten-
ant-Colonel H. B. Wilson, nine miles from Augusta ;
but the affair was trifling, the loss on either side
slight, and I carried off my prisoners. Four or five
days afterward I was ordered to return to Lex-
ington.
Col. John H. Morgan had been sent to eastern
Kentucky, as I have said, to intercept the retreat
of the Federal general, George W. Morgan. He did
not find Marshall in the vicinity where he was in-
structed to seek him, nor, indeed, at all. Learning
that the Federal column was moving from Man-
chester via Booneville to Mount Sterling, doubtless
to reach the Ohio at Maysville, Colonel Morgan ex-
pected to strike the enemy between Booneville and
Mount Sterling. But General Morgan concentrated
at Irvine on the 21st, and moved toward Proctor.
The Confederate cavalry then moved as rapidly
as the mountainous country permitted, and receiv-
ing further information tliat the enemy had turned
to the right and was at Carapton, in Wolfe County,
succeeded in getting directly iu his front near
Hazel Green. From the 2r)th of September until
the 1st of October every effort was made to arrest
or delay the Federal retreat. The roads were bar-
ricaded, the column was attacked in front and
flank, and the skirmishing was contiimous. Dur-
ing that time the enemy progressed only thirty
miles ; nevertheless, John Morgan received no aid
as promised him, Jior did Stevenson overtake the
Federal commander and force liim to battle. At
noon, October the 1st, Colonel Morgan received
orders to withdraw from the enemy's front, and
rejoin General Smith " at Lexington, or wherever
he might be." He reached Lexington on the 4th
of October. I reported to him there the next day.
The town was about to be evacuated, and Gen-
eral Smith's entire army, Stevenson having arrived,
was marching to effect a junction with Bragg. Wo
left Lexington on the Gth, and until the 10th were
employed in preventing the debouchment of Sill's
and Dumont's divisions (Federal) from the rough
country west of Frankfort, where they wer(; demon-
strating to induce Bragg to believe that Buell's at-
tack would be delivered from that direction when
the latter had in reality marched to Perryville.
After General Bragg had moved from Munford-
ville to Bardstown, the entire Confederate strategic
line, including the disposition of the forces under
General Smith, may be described as extending
from Bardstown on the left flank, via Lexington, to
Mount Sterling on the extreme i-ight. It was one
admirably adapted for defense. However threat-
ened, the troops could be marched to the point
menaced by excellent interior roads, and favorable
ground for battle was available wherever attack
was probable. The base at Bryantsville was
secure, and was an exceedingly strong natural posi-
tion. The aggregate strength of the Confederate
armies was little, if any, less than Gl ,000 men.
On October 1st Buell moved out of Louisville
with 58,000 effective men, of whom 22,000 were
raw troops.
Under the impression that Buell was about to
throw his entire army upon Smith at Frankfort,
Bragg, on the 2d, ordered Polk to march with the
Army of the Mississippi from Bardstown via Bloom-
field toward Frankfort in order that he might strike
the enemy in rear, while Kirby Smith should assail
him in front. Until the 7th he remained appar-
ently under the impression that Buell was advan-
cing to attack Smith. But on the evening of the 7th,
Gilbert, in command of Buell's center, came in
contact with Hardee near Perryville, and compelled
him to prepare for action. Hardee called for reen-
forcements, and Cheatham's division was sent him,
while the remainder of Polk's corps continued its
march toward Versailles with the view of joining
the forces under General Smith.
It thus happened that General Bragg, completely
misled by the mere demonstration upon Frankfort,
kept more than two-thirds of the entire force under
his control idly manoeuvring in a quarter where
nothing could possibly be accomplished, and per-
mitted less than 20,000 men to become engaged
upon afield where more than 45,000 of the enemy
could have been hm-led upon them. Buell's whole
army (with the exception of the di%isions of Sill
and Dumont — together 10,0(tOor 12,000 strong)
was concentrated at Perryville on the 8th, and but
for the unaccountable circumstance that McCook
had been fighting several hours before Buell was
informed that a T)attle was in progress, the Con-
federate line would have been overwhelmed by an
attack in force. If such had been the result at
Perryville on the Sth, and Buell liad then gotten
between the scattered remnants of the troojis
that opposed liiju tlun-e, as he would almost
surely liave done, he would have been master of
the situation, and nothing but disaster could liave
befallen the Confederates. For on the 0th Sill
and Dumont were marching to rejoin tlie main
body, and in another day Bu(dl coidd have had his
entire 58,000 — minus the loss sustained in the
battle — well in hand.
28
MORGAN'S CAyALRY DURING THE BRAGG INVASION.
After Perryville, Morgan was ordered to rejoin
tlie army, when everytliing was concentrated at
Harrodsburg, as if for a battle which General
Bragg couhl have won but never meant to fight.
When the army, leaving Harrodsburg, without
battle, began its retreat to Tennessee, Morgan,
assisted by Col. Henry Ashby with a small brigade
of cavalry, was employed in covering its rear.
This rear-guard was engaged very arduously, and
almost constantly, in contact with Buell's advance
regiments until the I7th. At that date Morgan
received permission to retrace his march, capture
Lexington, which was, of course, in the hands of
the enemy, and then move southward, directly
across Buell's rear, doing the latter all possible
damage. Marching rapidly for twenty-four hours,
he reached Lexington at dawn of the following
morning, and immediately attacked the 4th Ohio
Cavalry, which was encamped at Ashland — once the
residence of Henry Clay — about two miles from
the city. The enemy was defeated after a short
combat, and nearly six hundred were made prison-
ers. The loss in killed and wounded on either side
was slight. Resuming his march at noon that
day, Morgan encamped on the following night at
Shryoek's ferry on the Kentucky River. At mid-
night he was attacked by Dumont, and fearing
that be would be surrounded and entrapped in the
rugged hills of that region, he marched with all
speed for Lawrenceburg, four miles distant, reach-
ing and passing through that little town just as a
heavy Federal column, sent to intercept him there,
was entering it upon the Frankfort turnpike. Pass-
ing around Bardstown on the next day, we encamped
between that place and Elizabethtown. We were
now directly in Buell's rear, and during the next
twenty-four hoiu's capturedmauy laggards, and sev-
eral wagon trains — one quite lai-ge and richly laden.
From the 20th to the 25th of October Morgan
continued to march in a south-western direction,
reaching Hopkinsville on the 25th. Here he had
entirely passed beyond the zone of Federal garri-
sons in middle Kentucky, but still had arduous work
before him in Tennessee and in front of Nashville,
whither Bucll, having turned aside from pursuit
of Bragg through the mountains of south-eastern
Kentucky, was now directing his course. After a
short sojourn at Hopkinsville for much-needed rest.
Colonel Morgan moved directly to Gallatin, Ten-
nessee, with a view of completing the dostruetion
of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in that
vicinity, and to that extent impeding the transpor-
tation of troops and supplies to Nashville. While
engaged in this work lie received orders from Gen-
eral John C.Breckinridge, who was stationed with
a small infantry force at Murfreesboro', to coiip-
erate with Forrest in a movement intended to effect
the destruction of the rolling-stock of the Louis-
ville and Nashville Railroad (Jompany collected at
Edgefield, on tlio bank of the Cumberland River,
opposite Nashville. It was planned that Forrest
should make such a demonstration south of Nash-
ville that the attention of the garrison would be
attracted, while Morgan should dash into Edgefield
and burn the cars, several hundred in number.
Leaving Gallatin on the night of November the
4th, Morgan entered Edgefield at daybreak the
next morning, and immediately attacked the IGth
Illinois and part of another regiment stationed
there. After a sharp fight he drove this force back
and obtained possession of the cars it was intended
he should destroy. We heard Forrest's artillery
at the same moment on the other side of the river.
But Nashville was so strongly fortified on that
side, and perhaps, also, the inadequacy of the small
force under Forrest to make any serious attempt
upon the place was so apparent, that although he
advanced resolutely upon the works, the movement
failed: a large portion of the garrison was dis-
patched to reenforce the detachment we had at-
tacked; and before the work of demolition was
fairly commenced, a column of infantry streamed
at the double-quick over the pontoon-bridge, and
reenforced the troops with which we were already
engaged. The fight grew too hot to be maintained
so near to yet stronger hostile forces, and under the
heavy batteries which commanded the ground on
which we stood. Morgan accoi-dingly withdrew,
followed a short distance by the enemy. Our loss
in killed and wounded was not so heavy as the en-
emy's, and we carried off a few prisoners. Only a
small number of the railroad ears were burned, and
the expedition was a failure. Rosecrans's army •j^
was now close at hand, marching upon three or four
roads leading into Nashville, and we were immedi-
ately in it s path. Crittenden's corps was in advance,
the major part of it marching on the Louisville and
Nashville turnpike. Morgan sent strong detach-
ments to harass these troops, and, if possible,
delay their march. The leading division was am-
buscaded near Tyree Springs, and a volley deliv-
ered at seventy-five yards' range inflicted some
loss. Similar attacks were kept up all day on the
8th, but of course the efforts of so small a body
against more than twenty thousand men were
merely annoying. Early on the morning of the
9th Wood's and Van Clove's divisions moved into
and on either flank of Gallatin, nearly surrounding
our people, who incautiously resisted the advance
of the central column too long, thus necessitating
brisk movement as well as sharp fighting to effect
an escape. That afternoon Morgan crossed the
Cumberland and encamped in a safe position be-
tween Lebanon and Mui-freesboro'. Morgan's loss
diiring the entire campaign, in killed and wounded,
was not more than one hundred. He had inflicted
a much greater loss on the enemy, and had capt-
ured nearly twelve hundred prisoners. He had
entered Kentucky with less than 900 effectives ;
his command when he returned to Tennessee was
nearly 2000 strong. It was admirably mounted, ai;(l
well armed, and the recruits were fully the equals of
the original "Morgan IMen," in spirit, intelligence,
and capacity to endure.
1^ Ocncral Buell was succocdort in the conuDand of OrdovR of October 21th the Department of the Cum-
the trnoi)H of the Army of the Ohio by G('n(>ral W. S. berlanrt was croatod, :m<l tlio troops witliin it were
RoBocrauB ou the 30th day of October. Under General designated the Fourtceutli Army Corps.— Editors.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PERRYVILLE, KY.,
October 8th, 18G2.
The composition, lo.ssea, and strength of each army as licri! .stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the OfiScial
Records. K stands for killed ; w for wounded ; in \v for mortally wounded ; m for captured or missing ; c for captured.
THE UNION FORCES.
ARMY OF THE OHIO.— Maj.-Gen. Don Carlos Bucll; Maj.-Gen: George H. Thomas, second in command.
Escort: Anderson (Pa.) Troop, Lieut. Thomas S. Maple;
4th U. 8. Cav. (6 GO'S), Lieut.-Col. James Oakes. E.s-
cort loss : m, 1. Unattached : 7th Pa. Cav. {i co's), Maj.
John E. Wyukoop. Loss : w, 4; m, 3 = 7.
FIRST ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Alexander McD.
McCook.
THIRD DIVISION, Brig -Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau. StaflT
loss : m, 1.
Ninth Brigade, Col. Leonard A. Harri.s: 38th Ind., Col.
Benjamin F. Scribner; 2d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John Kell;
33d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Oscar F. Moore (w and c), Maj. Fred-
erick J. Look ; 94th Ohio, Col. Joseph W. Frizell ; 10th
Wis., Col. Alfred R. Chapin; 5th Ind. Battery, Capt.
Peter Simonson. Brigade loss : k, 121 ; w, 419 ; m, 51 = 591.
Seventeenth Brigade, Col. William H. Lytle (w and c),
CoL Curran Pope (m w) : 42d Ind., Col. James G. Jones ;
88th Ind., Col. George Humphrey; 15th Ky., Col. Curran
Pope ; 3d Ohio, Col. John Beatty ; 10th Ohio, Lieut.-Col.
Joseph W. Burke; Ist Mich. Battery, Capt. Cyrus O.
Loomis. Brigade loss: k, 193; w, 606; m, 23=822.
Twenty-eighlh Brigade, Col. John C. Starkweather: 24th
111., Capt. August Mauflf; 79th Pa., Col. Henry A. Ham-
bright; 1st Wis., Lieut.-Col. George B. Bingham; 21st
Wis., Col. Benjamin J. Sweet; 4th Ind. Battery, Capt.
Asahel K. Bush ; Ist Ky. Battery, Capt. David C. Stone.
Brigade loss: k, 170; w, 477; m, 109 = 756. Unattached :
2d Ky. Cav. (6 co's). Col. Buckner Board ; A, C, and H, Ist
Mich., Eng'rs and Mech's, Maj. Enos Hopkins. Unat-
tached loss : w, 18 ; m, 4 = 22.
TENTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gcn. James 8. Jackson (k). Staff
loss: k, 1,
Thirty-third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William R. Terrill (k).
Col. Albert S. Hall : 80th 111., Col. Thomas G. Allen ; 123d
ni., Col. James Monroe; Detachments 7th and 32d Ky.
and 3d Tenn., Col. Theophilus T. Garrard; 105th Ohio,
Col. Albert S. Hall; Parsous's (improvised) Battery,
Lieut. Charles C. Parsons. Brigade loss : k, 100 ; w, 336 ;
m, 91 = 527. Thirty-fourth Brigade, Col. George Webster
(k) : 80th Ind., Lieut.-CoL Lewis Brooks ; 50th Ohio, Col.
Jonah R. Taylor, Lieut.-Col. Silas A. Strickland; 98th
Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Christian L. Poorman; 121st Ohio, Col.
WiUiam P. Reid; 19th Ind. Battery, Capt. Samuel J.
Harris. Brigade loss : k, 87 ; w, 346 ; m, 146 = 579.
SECOND ARMY CORPS, ) Maj.-Gen. Thomas L. Crit-
tenden.
FOURTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William S. Smith.
Tenth Brigade, Col. William Grose : 84th 111., Col. Louis
H. Waters; 36th Ind., Lieut.-Col. O. H. P. Carey; 23d
Ky., Lieut.-Col. J. P. Jackson; 6th Ohio, Lieut.-Col.
Nicholas L. Anderson ; 24th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frederick
C. Jones; H, 4th U. 8. Arfy. Lieut. Samuel Canby ; M,
4th U. S. Art'y, Capt. John Mendenhall. Nineteenth
Brigade, Col. William B. Hazen : 110th 111., Col. Thomas
8. Casey; 9th Ind., Col. William H. Blake; 6th Ky., Col.
Walter C. Whitaker; 27th Ky., Col. C. D. Peunobaker;
4l8t Ohio. Lieut.-Col. George 8. Mygatt; F, 1st Ohio
Art'y, Capt. Daniel T. Cockerill. Twenty-second Brigade,
Brig.-Gen. Charles Cruft: 31st Ind., Lieut.-Col. John
Osborn; Ist Ky., Lieut.-Col. David A. Enyart; 2d Ky.,
Col. Thomas D. Sedgwick ; 20th Ky., Lieut.-C(d. Charles
8. Hanson; 90th Ohio, Col. Isaac N. Ross; B, 1st Ohio
Art'y, Capt. William E. Standart. Cavalry: 2d Ky.
(4 co's), Lieut.-Col. Thomas B. Cochran.
FIFTH DIVISION, Brig.-(ien. Horatio P. Van Clove.
Eleventh Brigade, Col. Sanmcl Beatty : 79th Ind., Col.
Frederick Knefler ; 9th Ky., Lieut.-Col. George H. Cram ;
13th Ky., Lieut.-Col. J. B. Carlile; 19th Ohio, Lieut.-Col.
E. W. HolUnsworth ; 59th Ohio, Col. James P. Fyffe.
Fourteenth Brigade, Col. Pierce B. Hawkins : 44th Ind.,
Col. Hugh B. Reed; 86th Ind., Col. Orville 8. Hamilton ;
11th Ky, Lieut.-Col. S. P. Love; 2Gth Ky., Col. Cicero
Maxwell; 13th Ohio, Col. Joseph G. Hawkins. Tventij-
third Brigade, Col. Stanley Matthews: 35th Ind., Col.
Bernard F. Mullen ; 8th Ky., Col. Sidney M. Barnes; 2l8t
Ky., Col. S. Woodson Price; 5l8t Ohio, Lieut.-Col.
Richard W. McClain ; 99th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John E.
Cummins. Artillery: 7th Ind., Capt. George R. Swallow ;
B, Pa., Lieut. Alanson J. Stevens; 3d Wis., Capt. Lucius
H. Druiy.
SIXTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood.
Fifteenth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Milo 8. HascaU: 100th
111., Col. Frederick A. Bartleson; 17th Ind., Lieut.-Col.
George W. Gorman ; 58th Ind., Col. George P. Buell ; 3d
Ky., Lieut.-Col. William T. Scott; 26th Ohio, Msy. Chris,
M. Degenlield ; 8th Ind. Battery, Lieut. George Estep.
Ticentietli Brigade, Col. Charles G. Harker: 51st Ind.,
Col. Abel D. Streight ; 73d Ind., Col. Gilbert Hathaway ;
13th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Frederick W. Worden ; 64th Ohio,
Col. John Fergu,son; 65th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William II.
Young ; 6th Ohio Battery, Capt. Cullen Bradley. Twenty-
first Brigade, Col. George D. Wagner: 15th Ind., Lieut.-
Col. Gustavus A. Wood ; 40th Ind., Col. John W. Blake ;
57th Ind., Col. Cyinis C. Hiues ; 24th Ky., Col. Louis B.
Grigsby ; 97th Ohio, Col. John Q. Lane ; 10th Ind. Bat-
tery, Capt. Jerome B. Cox. Brigade loss (40th Ind.) :
w, 2. Unattached : B, E, I, and K, Ist Mich., Eng's and
Mech's, Col. William P. Innes; let Ohio Cav. (detach-
ment), Miy. James Laughlin.
THIRD ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Charles C. Gilbert.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Geii. Albin Schoepf.
First Brigade, Col. Moses B. Walker: 82d Ind., Col.
Morton C. Hunter; 12th Ky., Col. William A. Iloskins;
17th Ohio, Col. John M. Council ; 3l8t Ohio. Lieut.-Col.
Frederick W. Li.'^ter; 38th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William A.
Choate. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Speed S. Fry: 10th
Ind., Col. William C. Kise; 74th Ind., Col. Charles W.
Chapman ; 4th Ky., Col. John T. Croxton ; 10th Ky., Lieut.-
Col. Wilham H. Hays; 14th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. (ieorge P.
Este. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 7 = 11. Third Brigade,
Brig.-Gen. James B. Steedman : 87th Ind., Col. Kline ii.
Shryock; 2d Minn., Col. James George : iHli Ohio, Lieut.-
Col. Charles .Joseph ; 35th Ohio, Col. Ferdinand Van Der-
veer ; 18tli U. 8., Miij. Frederick Townsend. Brigade
lo.ss: w, 6; m, 8 = 14. Artillery: 4tli Mich., Capt. Josiah
W. Church ; C, let Ohio, Capt. Daniel K. Southwick ; I,
4th U. 8., Lieut. Frank G. Smith. Artillery loss: w, 1.
Cavalry: 1st Ohio idetachment), Col. Minor Milliken.
NINTH DIVISION. Bri^'.-(i«n. Robert B. Mitchell.
Thirtieth J{riga<lr.Vo\. Michael Gooding: 59th 111.. Mnj.
Joshua C. Winters; 74th 111., Lieut.-Col. James B. Kerr;
75th 111., Lieut.-Col. .Tohn E. Bennett: 22d Ind.. Lieut.-
Col. Scpiire I. Keith (k) ; .^th Wis. Battery, Capt. Oscar F.
Pinnev. Brigade loss : k. 121 ; w. 314 ; m. 61 = 499. Thir-
ty-first Brir/ade. Col. Wllliani P. Carlin : 21.<t 111.. Col.
John W. 8. Alexander; 38th 111.. Ma.j. Daniel II. (Jilm.r:
lOlst Ohio. C<d. Leander Stem: l.^tli Wis.. Col. Hans C.
Heg; 2d Minn. Battery. Capt. Willi;im \. Hot<hkiss.
Brigade loss : w. 10. Thirly-seroml lirigadc. Col. Williani
W. Caldwell : 25th 111.. Lieut.-Col. James S. McClelland;
35th 111., Lieut.-Col. William P. Chandler; Slst Iml.,
i Of the operations „f this corps O.Mier.al Buell .says, in his ..lllcial report : " The corps «f Oenoral «;ritt'<nden closed in. and
Wagner's brigade, of WooTs division, became engaged and di.l good service on the right of Mltehell s dlvl-sion. but knowing
nothing of tlie severity of tlie light on the extreme left the rest of the corps did not get into acUou." - t,DlT0W8.
29
30
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PERRYl^ILLE, KY.
Lieut. -Col. Jotin Timlierlake ; 8tli Kan. (battalion),
liieiit.-Col. John A. Martin; 8th Wis. Battery, Capt.
Stephen J. Carpenter. Cavalry: B, 3f>tb 111., Capt. Sam-
uel B. Sherer.
ELEVENTH DIVISION, Brif,'.-Gon. Philip H. Sheridan.
Thirty-fifth Brigade, Lieut.-Col. Bernard Laiboldt : 44th
111., Capt. Wallace W. Barrett ; 73d 111., Col. James F.
Jaquess ; 2d Mo., Capt. Walter Hoppe (k) ; 15th Mo.,
Maj. John Weber. Brigade loss: k, 22; w,J02; m, 1 =
12.5. Thirty-sixth Brigade, Col. Daniel McCook : 85th 111.,
Col. Robert 8. Moore- 86th 111., Col. David D. Irons;
I25th 111., Col. Oscar F. Harmon ; 52d Ohio, Lieut.-Col.
D. D. T. Cowen. Brigade loss : k, 7 ; w, 63 ; m, 9 = 79.
Thirty-seventh Brigade, Col. Nicholas Greusel : 36th lU.,
Capt. Silas Miller; 88th 111., Col. Francis T. Sherman;
21st Mich., Col. Ambrose A. Stevens; 24th Wis., Col.
Charles n. Larrabee. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 124; m,
4 = 143. Artillery : I, 2d 111., Capt. Charles M. Barnett;
G, 1st Mo., Capt. Henry Hescock. Artillery loss : w, 3.
cavalry: Third Brigade, Capt. Ebenezer Gay: 9tli
Ky. (detachment), Lieut.-Col. John Boyle; 2d Mich.,
Lieut.-Col. Archibald P. Campbell ; 9th Pa., Lieut.-Col.
Thomas C. James. Cavalry loss : k, 4 ; w, 13 = 17.
% In March, 1888, General D. C. Buell wrote to the editors :
" Adopting this estimate and adding Sill's Division, say 7000,
which moved on the Frankfort road and did not join until
after tlio battle (i. e., on the 11th), will make tlie entire
aruiv 01,000 before the battle and 57,000 after. The corps
Total Union loss : killed, 845 ; wounded, 2851 ; captured
or missing, 515 = 4211.
The most definite information afforded by the " Official
Records" relative to the strength of the Union forces is
contained in tlie testimony given before the Buell Com-
mission by Major J. M. Wright, assistant adjutant-gen-
eral at Buell's headquarters. On page 660, Vol. XVT.,
Part I., ho says : " After the battle I do not think there
were more than fifty thousand of the army which ap-
peared in front of Perryvllle." Adding to this number
the 4000 casualties sustained in the battle, would make
the entire army at and about Perry viUe 54,000 strong. 3>
Perhaps not over one-half of these were actually en-
gaged. General McCook, commanding the First Corps
(which bore the brunt of the fight), says that " Rous-
seau had present on the field 7000; Jackson, 5500; the
brigade of Gooding [from Mitchell's division of Gilbert's
corps] amounting to about 1.500." The strength of Crit-
tenden's (Second) and Gilbert's (Third) Corps is not any-
where otHcially stated. Crittenden did not reach the
field of action until the conflict was practically ended,
and only parts of Wagner's and Hazen's brigades of
Ms corps became slightly engaged.
were of about equal strength. Gilbert told me recently
that he estimated his corps at about 18,000 before the
battle. About one-thirrt of the whole were raw troops.
Jackson's division was composed almost entirely of raw
regiments." — EDITOUS.
THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.
General Braxton Bragg.
ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI : Major-General Leonl-
das Polk. Right WiNG,Maj.-Gen. Benjamin F.Cheatham.
cuKATHAM's DIVISION, Brig.-Geu. Daniel S. Donelson.
First Brigade, Col. John H. Savage : 8th Tenn., Col.
W. L. Moore; 15th Tenn., Col. R. C. Tyler; 16th
Tenn., Lieut.-Col. D. M. Donnell ; 38th Tenn., Col. John
C. Carter; 5l8t Tenn., Col. John Chester; Tenn. Bat-
tery, Capt. W. W. Carnes. Brigade loss: k, 68; w, 272;
m, 7 = 347. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. P. Stewart:
4th Tenn., Col. O. F. Strahl; 5th Tenn., Col. C. D. Ven-
able; 24th Tenn., Lieiit.-Col. H. L. W. Brattou; 31st
Tenn., Col. E. E. Tansil; 33d Tenn., Col. W. P. Jones;
Miss. Battery, Capt. T. J. Stanford. Brigade loss : k,
62; w, 340; m, 26 = 428. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen.
George Maney: 4l8t Ga., Col. Charles A. McDaniel (w),
Maj. John Knight; IstTenn., Col. H. R. Field; 6th Tenn.,
Col. George C. Porter; 9th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. John W.
Buf(ud (w). Major George W. Kelsoe; 2;thTenn., Lieut.-
Col. W. Friei'son (w), Ma^jor A. C. Allen; Miss. Battery,
Lieut. William B. Turner. Brigade loss : k, 136 ; w, 517 ;
m, 34 = 687.
CAVALRY BRIGADE, Col. Jolm A. Wharton : 1st Ky.
(3co's), ; j. 4thTeun., ; 8th Tex., . Brigade
loss (not separately reported).
Left Wing, Maj. -Gen. William J. Hardee.
SECOND division, Brig.-Gen. J. Patton Anderson.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Brown (w), Col.
William Miller: Ist Fla., Col. William Miller; 3d
Fla., ; 41.st Miss., ; Palmer's Battery,
Brigade loss (not separately reported). Second Bri-
gade, Brig.-Gen. Daniel W. Adams : 13th La., Col. R. L.
Gibson; 16th La.. Col. D. C. Gober; 20th La., Col. Aug.
Reichard, Lieut.-Col. Leon von Zinken; 25th La., Col. S.
W. Fisk; 14th Battalion La. Sharp-sliooters, Ma^ior J. E.
Austin; 5th Co. Washington (La.) Art'y, Capt. C. H.
Sloconib. Brigade loss: k, 6; w, 78; m, 68=1.52. Third
Brigade, Col. Samu<'l Powell: 4.5th Ala., ; 1st
Ark., ; 24th Miss., Col. William F. Dowd; 29th
4- The dasli indicates tli.at the name nf the commanding otfl-
cer lias not been found in the " Ofticial Uecorda."— Editors.
bin March, 1888, General Buell wrote to the editors :
"This probably did not include tlie cavalry. It is scarcely
credible that the three divisions of infantry contained only
13,500.
Tenn., ; Mo. Battery, Capt. Overton W. Barret.
Brigade loss (not separately reported). Fourth Bri-
gade, Col. Thomas M. Jones: 27th Mis.'?., ; 30th
Miss., ; 37th Miss., ; Ala. Battery (Lums-
den's). Brigade loss (not separately reported).
THIRD division, Maj. -Gen. Simon B. Buckner.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. St. JolinR. Liddell : 2d Ark.,
; 5th Ark., Col. L. Featherston ; 6th Ark., ; 7th
Ark., Col. D. A. Gillespie ; 8th Ark., Col. John H. Kelly ;
Miss. Battery (Swett's). Brigade loss : k, w, and m, 71.
Second BHgade, Brig.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne (w) : 13th Ark.,
; 15th Ark., ; 2d Tenn., ; Ark. Battery
(Calvert's). Brigade loss (not separately reported).
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson : 5th
Confederate, Col. J. A. Smith; 17th Tenn., Col. A. 8.
Marks; 23d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R. H. Keeble; 25th Tenn.,
Col. John M. Hughs; 37th Tenn., Col. Moses White;
44th Tenn., Col. John S. Fulton ; Miss. Battery (Jefl'er-
son Art'y), Capt. Put. Darden. Brigade loss : k, 30 ; w,
165; m, 9 = 204. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. A. INI.
Wood (w) : 16th Ala., r 33d Ala., ; 3d Con-
federate, ; 45th Miss., ; I5th Battalion Miss.
Sharp-shooters, ; Ala. Battery, Capt. Henry C.
Semplo. Brigade loss (not separately reported).
CAVALRY BRIGADE, Col. Joseph Wheeler: 1st Ala.,
Col. William W. Allen ; 3d Ala., Col. James Hagau ; 6th
Confederate, Lieut.-Col. James A. Pell ; 2d Ga. (battal-
ion), Maj. C. A. Whalcy; 3d Ga., Col. Martin J. Craw-
ford ; Ist Ky. (6 co's), Maj. J. W. Caldwell. Brigade loss
(not separately reported).
Total Confederate loss: killed, 510; wounded, 2635;
missing, 251 = 3396.
General Bragg reiiorts (" Official Records," Vol. XVI.,
Pt. I., p. 1092) that "our forces . . . consisted of
three divisions of infantry (about 14,500) .and two small
brigades of cavalry (about 1500)." General Polk reports
(p. 1110) : " The whole of our force, including all arms,
did not exceed 15,000." ^
" However, the imjiortant question is as to the force that
Bragg had in the field in Kentucky, for that was the force
tlijit was to be expected in a great battle. That question
is not fully di'tcrmined by oflicial reports, but a careful
study of the i)ublisli('d records seems to place it at not leas
than 08,000 men."— EDITQKS.
-%. ^^'■
ON THE SKIRMISH LINE.
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYVILLE.
BY DON CARLOS BUELL, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. 8. V.
THE invasion of Kentucky in the summer of 1862 by the Confederate forces
under General Bragg was one of the most prominent incidents of the war;
and both the officer who conducted it and the one who repelled it were the
objects of much popular displeasure on their respective sides. On the one
side there was severe condemnation of the withdrawal, and on the other
unmeasm*ed dissatisfaction that the invaders had not been captured in a body.
Of course, there were in both cases numerous specifications to the general mat-
ter of complaint. With reference to the result, it i^ust follow that the critics
were wi^ong on one side or the other. It may even be that in the main, what-
ever may have been the incidental blunders, they were wi'ong on both sides :
that is, that an invasion for a permanent occupation which lacked the support
of the population, and was opposed by an army able and ready to contest the
object, was wisely abandoned without further resistance ; and that the con-
testant, in the presence of a skillful and not inferior adversary, wisely took
his measures to make the result reasonably certain. The rashness of revo-
lutionary ends might reject the former, but no rule of loyalty to the public
welfare would condemn the latter.
In gi\dng here a brief review of the subject — which properly includes the
project for my advance into east Tennessee in the early summer — I shaU
undertake no more than a simple outline of the essential facts, and an expo-
sition of the circumstances which controlled events.
The period immediately following the evacuation of Coi-inth, and lasting
through the summer, found the Western armies in a less satisfactory state
than at the first glance would. be supposed. The early delusion of a ninety-
days' campaign had not so completely passed away as not to give rise to dis-
appointment in the ranks and among the people, at finding no signs in the
32
E/tST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRY yiLLE.
South of reconciliation or submission, after the signal successes which the
Union cause had achieved ; and it could hartUy fail to happen that the dis-
appointment would for a while act injuriously upon the temper and efficiency
of unseasoned troops. It resulted, in fact, that the desire to get back to
friends, or to find relief for a time from the hardships and restraints of service,
caused large numbers to get away from the front on every possible pretext
on leave granted with or without proper authority, upon authority exercised
too loosely, and even without any authority ; and when once away their return
was very difficult. Appeals were of little avail, and the recourse of sending
officers to recall the absentees was attended with poor results.
But al)sence from the colors was not the worst form of the evil. Duty of
every sort was performed with a sluggishness which greatly retarded every
sort of work, of which there was much that had to be done, and the service
of escorts and road guards was executed in very many cases with a fatal
laxity. An idea grew up that a soldier on parole was virtually released from
all restraint ; and there was good reason to believe that large numbers of
stragglers were quite willing to find themselves for a moment in the hands
of the enemy, and that even the vigilance and resoluteness of escorts and
guards were materially affected by the idea that captivity meant liberty and
relaxation. J
Even in the routine of camp life, the weariness and impatience manifested
themselves in some manner, actively or passively, in a protest against the
interior demands and the exterior restraints of discipline. The thousands of
letters which poured from the camps into the soldiers' homes and the puljlic
press were mediums for these manifestations, which put upon the general in
)To this rule there were of coui-se honorable
exceptions. The followng orders concerning
absentees and paroles were published in view of
these evils, which were seriously impairing the
strength and efficiency of the army :
" Headquarters, Army of the Ohio,
•' In Camp, near Florence, Ala., June 24th, 1862.
"fiKNERAL Orders, No. 26: There are 14,000 officers
anil HDldifTs absent from their duty with the various
(liviHioiis of this army, /. c, the live tlivisious south
of tlic TcniK'Sscc Uivcr. Some of them have gimc otF
without any aiitliority ; others with the permission of
oHicers not autliorized to fjraiit it. In general, sickness
is given as the cause of iil>Neiiee. hut in very mauj' cases
that cause has notoriously ceased to exist, and men
remain away, drawing the same pay as their comrades
wlio are faithfully performing their duty. To correct
this abuse it is ordered
"(4th.) .\11 absejit oflieers and soldiers who do not.join
their coinj>aiiicH and regiments or are not satisfactorily
aeeoiinteil for as above l)y the 10th of July next, will be
reiiorled on their muster-roll as deserters, dating from
the tini<' that they may have been absent without
aiitliority. I$y act of f'ongress every deserter forfeits
all claim on the (Joveriimcnt for i)ay and allowances,
besides being liable to arrest ;ind trial by court-martial.
Any iierson who ai)pr(heiiils and returns a deserter to
the commanding oflflcer of a military post is entitled to
a reward of f.i. liy command of MA.ioR-ft enehal Ktteli,.
James B. Fry, Aseistant Adjutant-General, Chief-of-
Staff."
" Headquarters, Army of the Ohio,
"In Camp, Huntsville, Ala., August 8th, 1862.
"General Orders, No. 41: The system of paroles
practiced in this army has run into an intolerable abuse.
Hereafter no otficer or soldier belonging to the forces in
this district will give his paroU' not to take up arms, for
the purpose of leaving the enemy's lines without the
sanction of the general commanding this army, except
when, by reason of wounds or disease, he could not bo
removed without endangering his life.
"Any parole given in violation of this order will not
be recognized, and the jurson giving it will be required
to perform military duty and take the risks prescribed
by the laws of war.
" Any ollicer or soldier of this command, being in the
hands of the enemy and desiring to be released on parole
for the purpose of lea\ ing the enemy's lines, will make
application to the general coiiinianding tills army, in-
closing in duplicate the parole which he proposes to
give, and await its ap)iroval.
"The sanction of tli<' ollicer commanding the forces by
which he is held, being necessary to eflfect the arrange-
ment, should l)c forwarded with the application. No such
application will be appioved when the capture has re-
sulted from neglect or misbehavior on the part of the
prisoner or of the command to which he belonged.
" The evidence of a lawful parole will be the parole
itself, l)eariiig the ai>i>roval of the commanding general.
" The same rule will be observed by this army in parol-
ing iirisoiicis taken frinii the eneiny. If fliey cannot bo
held until (he siinction of such ofliceras the general com-
manding' tlie enemy's forces may designate; for that pnr-
Iiose is obtained, they will be released. By commajid of
M\.IOR-<iENKRAL BUELL. JAMES B. FRY, Coloucl and
Chlcf-of-Staff."
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYU'ILLE.
33
command the burthen of every compkiint, and the responsibility of every
miscarriage. If a command started upon a march, every soldier would be
anxious to know how his haversack was to be replenished, but it never
occurred to him that there was a question as to how the depots were to be
supplied.
The Government, also, seemed to di*op suddenly into a similar state of
disappointment, discontent, and inaction. It had not apparently been
imagined that the depletion which would unavoidably go on rapidly in the
ranks must be replaced, and when at length the work of repair was taken up
it was done by creating new regi-
ments instead of replenishing the
old ones. A vast waste of time, and
material, and efficiency was caused
by this plan of throwing large
numbers of raw troops suddenly
into service in distinct bodies.
Moreover, party politics, which at
first, under a spontaneous burst of
patriotism, had put aside all party
distinctions, began now to resume
its old organization. That, of
course, meant old ambitions and
opposing policies with reference
to means, however united men
might be in motive upon the
one great object of preserving
the Union. No doubt all of these
causes worked to the same end.
At all events it resulted that dur-
ing the summer of 1862, after the
withdrawal of the Confederates
from Corinth, the armies were
weaker numerically than they
had been or ever were afterward, and that the tone of the troops, though
always loyal, was in some respects seriously defective.
It was exactly the reverse on the other side. To the South the result of
the battle of Shiloli was the disappointment of a great hope almost consum-
mated, rather than a discouragement. The first depressing effect of the
retreat from Corinth was more than compensated for by the splendid successes
which were considered to have been gained in Virginia. Their Government
acted vigorously. Their armies were speedily recruited, and never again
entered the field in as great relative strength and as high spirit as in tliat
summer. The army at Tupelo, no longer thrc^atened, an«l under a new com-
mander of established reputation for nerve and ability, paused for a moment
to discover an opening for attack or a call for defense, and the disposition
of the now unoccupied force under General Halleck soon pointed the wa\-.
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES B. FRY, CHIEF-OF-8TAFP
TO GENERAL BUELL ; AFTERWARD I'ROVOST-MAR-
SHAL-GENERAL. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
34 BAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYl^ILLE.
As soon as the expulsion of the Confederates from the line of the Mem-
phis and Charleston Railroad was consummated by the definitive retreat of
the Corinth army, the large Federal force that had been called together for
the operations on that line was redistriliuted for ulterior objects. About
65,000 men were retained under General Halleck's immediate command to
occupy the line from the Tennessee Eiver to Memphis; the Army of the
Ohio was restored to its original departmental territory, to advance into east
Tennessee, perhaps even to penetrate Georgia; and the remainder of the force
was sent to strengthen General Curtis in Arkansas. Thus the Army of the
Ohio was the only army in the West that was assigned to an aggressive
campaign.
The occupation of east Tennessee had from the first been a favorite meas-
ure with the President, apparently more from political than from military
considerations. It had at one time been enjoined upon my predecessors in
specific orders, and was m-ged upon my attention by General McClellan in
the instructions with which I came to Kentucky. Some abortive steps had
been taken in that direction by General Sherman before my arrival, but vari-
ous causes, which need not here be enumerated, compelled its postponement
then and afterward, — especially the inexpediency of the attempt upon military
grounds under the circumstances, and finally the drift of events, which car-
ried the bulk of the army to Shiloh and Corinth. A general view of the thea-
ter of war, and a consideration of the geography of east Tennessee, will show
the importance of the lodgment that was now to be undertaken, and indicate
the opposition it was sure to encounter, unless seconded by operations of a
decisive character in other quarters.
East Tennessee is an elevated valley of great salubrity and considerable
agricultural capacity, practically inclosed, though with some natural open-
ings, by a mountainous and rugged belt of country in which rise the sources
of the Tennessee River. The surplus of food products during the war was not
large, but was not without value to the South at first, when so much of the
country was absorbed in the growth of cotton. The railroad passing east and
west through the valley afforded the most direct and convenient communica-
tion between Richmond and the Mississippi, while abreast of it, from Chatta-
nooga, a branching railroad penetrated the Atlantic and Gulf States to the
coast, affording a valuable system of internal communication for supply
or defense, and an equally effective line for external invasion. On the
northern side, the valley had a strong defensive line in the difficult, though
not impracticable mountains, which, farther to the north, assume an expanse
and ruggedness that present what might bo considered practically a secm-e
barrier between Kentucky and Virginia. East Tennessee might therefore be
regarded as a doorway to the rear of Richmond, and a commanding rendez-
vous which looked down with a menacing adaptability upon tlie Gulf and
Atlantic States. In the latter light, more than as a means of defense, its
preservation was of vital moment to the Confederacy. The occupation of it
by the Federal force would be like the last stage in a regular siege, when the
glacis is crowned and batteries are established for breaching the walls and
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OP PERRYl^fLLE.
35
delivering the final assault. But the fact that it was the home of all that
was loyal to the Union in the States in rebellion, seemed to blind the Grovern-
ment to the considerations which insured that it would be defended with all
the energy of self-preservation. The powerful force and desperate battles
that were finally found necessary to secure the object, afforded a vindication,
to which nothing need be added, against the fatuity which demanded that
the Army of the Ohio, without supplies and with severed communications,
should accomplish it in the summer of 1862 with a movable force of 31,000
men against more than 60,000 that barred the way. [See maps, pp. 3 and 6.]
I was following the movements of the enemy retreating from Corinth,
when, on the 9th of June, I received notice from General Halleck that my
army was to resume its separate action, and advance into east Tennessee.
My divisions started in the new direction the next day, and on the 11th I
received my instructions verbally from G-eneral Halleck. I was to move
as diligently as possible to the object specified, but I was to repair the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad as I proceeded, guard it, and draw my
supplies from it. The inexpediency of these conditions, as I had pointed out,
was realized before the rejDairs were completed. The road, running along the
enemy's front, was peculiarly exposed to attack — was in fact attacked while
we were working on it and afterward; it was not supplied with rolling
stock, and we derived no benefit from it, though the repairs detained us
until the last of June. Foreseeing these embarrassments, I had given orders
for the repair of the roads south from Nashville, and for the accumulation
of supplies at that point. I desired also the option of making the advance
through McMinnville and Kingston, which I imagined might be found to
present decided advantages. It would avoid the heavy work on the railroads
to the Tennessee River, the bridging of the river, and the extremely difficult
ground that must at first be overcome by wagon transportation after crossing.
It would establish a junction promptly with the force under Gr. W. Morgan
operating against Cumberland Gap, and give actual possession of east Ten-
nessee, which the mere occupation of Chattanooga would not. Halleck at first
assented to my proposition, but a day or two afterward \vithdrew his consent,
and enjoined that the movement should be made directly upon Chattanooga.
We crossed the Tennessee by extemporized ferries — three di\'isions at
Florence, arriving at Athens on the Nashville and Decatur Railroad on the 28th
of June, and one division l)etween the 1st and 6th o| July, by a very inefficient
ferry prepared by General Mitchel at Decatur. !«« 4 6 S 4 3 9
General Thomas with his division was still detained on the Corinth road
under General Halleck's orders, and did not join at Huntsville until the last
of July ; so that the available effective force for an advance when I reached
Huntsville on the 29th of June was between 24,000 and 25,000 men. The
16,000 already in middle Tennessee and north Alabama would still be retiuired
to guard Nashville and keep open the connnunications. But there was much
to be done before an advance could be possible. We found ourselves already
at the very limit of our means of transportation. Nothing had been accom-
plished in the way of repairing the raih-oads, and it required every wagon to
36 EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRY^ILLE.
haul supplies euougli for the daily consumption. Much of the time there-
after the troops were on half rations. We could gather some forage from the
country, but not enough for the animals.
Before my arrival G-eneral Mitchel had urgently reported demonstrations of
the enemy from the direction of Chattanooga. To the Secretary of War he
said, June 21st : " I am with difficulty maintaining my position in front of
Chattanooga. I will endeavor to hold my position until reenforcements
arrive." His nearest position was in fact at Battle Creek, twenty miles below
Chattanooga, with the Tennessee River and a mountain range intervening.
To me he telegraphed, June 21st : " I think everything depends on celerity of
movement. If we should be driven from Stevenson (the junction of the Nash-
ville and Chattanooga and the Memphis and Charleston railroads), or even
from the position we now occupy (at Battle Creek, nine miles above Bridge-
port), I should deem it a great misfortune." Partly therefore to oppose this
supposed danger, and especially to place a strong working force on the Nash-
ville and Chattanooga Railroad, McCook's and Crittenden's divisions were sent
to Stevenson and Battle Creek. Nelson's and Wood's divisions were for the
present kept on the Nashville and Decatur road ; and the repairs by means of
the troops and by experienced hired hands were urged energetically. At the
same time mills were put to work to get out lumber, and the building of boats
for a bridge was commenced. We had no pontoon train, and the Tennessee
was a formidable river, requiring a bridge 1400 yards long.
The depredations of the small bands that had harassed Mitchel before my
arrival were continued afterward, and soon demonstrated the necessity of
defensive works for bridges and other vulnerable points. An inclosed earth-
work of considerable strength, large enough for a regiment, was constructed
at Stevenson for the protection of the depot to be established there for the
advance; and a specific plan and instructions for small block-houses, or,
more properly speaking, picket-houses, at the less important points were
prescribed. An officer was specially assigned to the direction of these works,
and the supervision of the guards. Iron-clad dummy cars were provided for
such purj^oses and for express service. Much of the road-repairing and
other engineering work was done and supervised by a splendid regiment of
mcichanics and engineers from Michigan, under Colonel William P. Innes.
These, from among the thousand other details, are mentioned, because they
were infinitely important to our existence, and absolutely necessary for the
first step in advance. Clearly the means of transportation, which were barely
sufficient to provider us with a precarious subsistence where we were, would
l)e insufficient to carry us at least thirty miles farther away, across a l)road
river and a mountainous country, into the presence of the enemy. The records
show that lab(n'ious and unceasing efforts were used to bring about the neces-
sary conditions for a forward movement, and that every officer employed
in command or in staff positions was stimulated to the utmost by advice and
instructions for the object before us. We had been engaged in this earnest
manner just nine days from the time of my arrival at Huntsville [June 29th],
when I received a dispatch from Ilalleck,' saying that my progress was not
E/IST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRY^ILLE.
satisfactory to the President. I was so astonished at the message that I made
no reply until three days afterward, when I was called on for explanations. \
The road from Nashville to Stevenson was completed on the 12th of July,
and a train was started the next morning with supplies for the depot at
Stevenson. My attention had been attracted to the importance of McMinn-
ville as an outpost. It was at the foot of the mountain on the direct wagon
road between Nashville and Chattanooga, and was the terminus of a branch
railroad, twenty miles east of the Nashville and Chattanooga Kailroad. I had
just organized a new brigade at Murfreesboro' to occupy McMinnville. On
the morning of the 13th Forrest, \\dth a large body of cavalry, surprised the
brigade, killed and wounded some and captured the rest, damaged the railroad
seriously, and produced alarm in Nashville, where the force was not large. \
4. "Official Records," Vol. XVI., Part II., pp.
104, 122.
^ The following orders were published with ref-
erence to this and similar affairs. It is proper to
add that a Court of Inquiry, instituted by General
Rosecrans, at the request of General T. T. Crit-
tenden, the commander of the brigade, after his
exchange, acquitted the commander of blame, on
the ground that he had only arrived the day before
the attack, and had shown commendable energy
in his new position. Colonel Duffield had also just
arrived. He appeared to have behaved well in the
attack, and was severely wounded:
" Headquarters, Army of the Ohio,
"In Camp, Huntsville, Ala., July 21st, 1862.
" General Orders, No. 32 : Ou the 13th instant the
force at Murfreesborough, under command of Brigadier-
General T. T. Crittenden, late colonel of the 6th Indiana
Regiment, and consisting of 6 companies of the 9tb
Michigan, 9 companies of the 3d Minnesota, 2 sections of
Hewett's (Kentucky) battery, 4 companies of the 4th
Kentucky Cavalry, and 3 companies of the 7th Penn-
sylvania Cavalry, Wiis captured at that place bj' a force
of the enemy's cavalry variously cstiniatcd at from
1800 to 3.'50). It appears from tlic ixst infoi-niation that
can be obtained, that Bi'ijjadicr-CJcucral Crittenden and
Colonel Duffleld of the '.tth Michigan, with the six com-
panies of that rciiinii lit and all of the cavalry, were
surprised and oapt nnd early in the morning in the
houses and streets of the town, or in their camp near
by, with but slii,'^ht rcHistaiiec^ and witliout any timely
warning of tlie presences of tlie enemy. The rest of the
force, consisting of tlie 3d Minnesota and the artillery
under Col. Lester, left its camp and took aiiollier posi-
tion, M'liieli it maintained with but few casualties again.st
tlie feeble attacks of the eiuMuy until about 3 o'clock,
when it was surrendered and marched into captivity.
"Take it in all its features, few more disgraceful
examples of neglect of duty and lack of good conduct
can be found in tlie history of wars. It fully merits the
extreme penalty whicli the law provides for such mis-
conduct. The force was more than sufflcient to reoel
the attack effectually. The mortification which the
army will f(-el at the result is poorly compens.ated bv the
exertion made by Kome — perhaps inany — of thi> otlicers
to retrieve the disgrace of the surprise. The action lit
to be adopted with reference to those who arc bliiniable.
especially the officers highest in conunaiid, 'cannot be
determined without fiirthei' investigation.
"In contrast to this slianicfiil affair, the general com-
manding takes ph'asnre in making honorable mention
of the conduct of a detachment of twenty-two men of
Companies I and II. loth Wisconsin Reginieiit. nnder the
command of Scrg<'ants W. Nelson and A. II. Makinson.
The detachment was on duty guarding a bridge east
of HuntsviUe, when it was attacked on April 28th by a
force of some 200 or 300 cavalry, wlii<-li it fought for two
hours and repulsed in the most signal manner. Such is
the conduct that duty and honor demand of every sol-
dier; and this example is worthy of imitation by higher
officers and larger conmiands. By command of Ma.jor-
General Buell. James B. Fry, Col. and Chief-of-Btaff.
" Headquarters, Army of the Ohio,
"In Camp, Huntsville, Ala., August 1st. 1862.
" General Orders, No. 37 : The nnijor-general com-
manding has to announce other instances of disgrace-
ful neglect and contrast them with another of gallantry :
"The guard at Courtland Bridge, consisting of com-
panies A and H, 10th Kentucky, under the command
of Captain Davidson, and a part of Captain Egglcston's
company, 1st Ohio Cavalry, was completely surprised
and captirrcd with but trifling loss on the morning of
the 25th ultimo, by a force of irregular cavalry. On the
same day the companies of Captains Boyl and Goben,
10th Indiana, which wen- ordered to protect two bridges
on the same road, respectively six and twelve miles
east of Courtland, deemed it Aviser to bring in an
empty train which came up than to defend their posts,
threatened with an attack from the same irregular cav-
alry ; and so put themselves on the train and arrived
safely at Decatur, a few miles distant, without the loss
or injury of a man. On the same day, and on the same
road, eight miles from Decatur, a guard, consisting of
twenty-four men of Ccmipauy E, 31st Ohio, under the
command of Lieutenant Harman, were suddenly at-
tacked by a greatly superior force of the same cav-
alry. The.v defended themselves gallantly, however,
and repulsed the enemy, killing several of the nunilur.
Lieut, llarinan ami eleven of his men were wounded,
himself in two places, and two of his men were killed.
"The general submits these examples to tlie reflection
of the troops. He reminds t hem that neglect and bn<l con-
duct on the part of guards brings dishonor upon them and
may even jeopardize the safety of an army. If these ap-
peals to their personal and professional pride should fail
of their oltject. he warns them that the extreme penalty
of the law niust intervene to punish the guilty and save
the army from the jeopardy in which they place it. The
duty of guarding the coumiunicatious of the army is
among the most important with which an officer and his
troops can b(> intrusted. Vigilance, det«'rmination. and
the ju-eparation of suitable defenses in the way of in-
trcnchnients or stockades will i>revent such attacks, or
enable a small force to repel a greatly siiiverior one. Had
the order for bridge-guards to fortify their posts been
promptly executed and iU'Oi)er vii.'ilance been observed,
the attacks referred to, if made at all. would hav.' had
very different results. This order and (tcnend Orders,
No." 32, will be read at the head of ev(>ry company and
detachment. By command of M v.toR-ciKNERAL ItCEl.L.
James B. Fry, Colonel and Chicf-of-Stafl'."
38 EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYl^ILLE,
This was the first appearance of any large body of the enemy in our rear
south of the Cumberland, though Morgan was at the same time engaged in a
formidable raid in Kentucky. Nelson was immediately ordered to occupy
Murfreesboro' and McMinnville with his division, himself and one brigade
going by railroad. He had just reached Murfreesboro' with a portion of his
troops when Forrest, on the 18th, appeared again on the railroad between
him and Nashville, captured guards, and destroyed two more bridges. Work
was immediately commenced to repair the damage. It was completed on the
28th of July, and the shipment of supplies for the depot at Stevenson was
resumed.
As soon as my designs upon east Tennessee were known, the Confederate
authorities took prompt measures to counteract them. The sudden appear-
ance of large bodies of cavalry under Morgan and Forrest on my communi-
cations in Tennessee and Kentucky early in July, and the increased activity
of small parties, were a part of these measures. It was at first in contempla-
tion to move the Tupelo army upon my rear in middle Tennessee, but the
wiser plan was adopted of concentrating in my front. One division of that
army, and reenforcements from other quarters, reached Chattanooga in June.
General Bragg arrived on the 30th of July, and by that time the transfer of
his force from Tupelo was about completed. The nucleus of a force under
Van Dorn and Price was left in Mississippi to neutralize the large Federal
force on the Memphis and Charleston road, an object which was accomplished
at first by inaction alone, and at last by bold though unsuccessful attacks
with inferior numbers.
The foreshadowing of an aggressive campaign from east Tennessee soon
began to be seen. By report, and actually, as the record now shows, the
objective was at first middle Tennessee and Nashville. Rumor, as usual,
placed the force that was ready for the work at very large numbers — 80,000
or 100,000 men. I realized that the enemy in front of us was assuming formi-
dable proportions, but I did not doubt that his strength was over-estimated,
nor that, if necessary, my own force would be increased, and therefore my
efforts for the accumulation of supplies for an advance were not relaxed.
On the 7th of August I informed Oeneral Halleck of the condition which
the campaign was assuming, and told him that my force should be increased.
I estimated the force opposed to me at sixty thousand men. The records now
show that it was greater. He answered on the 8th that Oeneral Grant would
turn over two divisions to my command " if I absolutely required them," but
cautioned me not to ask for them if I could avoid it with safety. By the 12th
the accumulating evidence showed that the call could not be dispensed with,
and I requested General Grant to forward the divisions without delay. One
of them joined on the 1st of September; the other did not arrive until the
12th, after the movement northward to follow Bragg had commenced. The
strength of the two divisions was about 5000 men each.
Our communications south of the Cumberland had been made secure by
the distribution of the troops, but to the north the depredations were prose-
cuted with increased vigor. Our cavalry was totally insufficient to cope with
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRY ^ILLE.
39
these incursions, which it must be said, also, were seldom resisted by the
infantry guards with vigilance and resohition. On the 10th of August, Mor-
gan again appeared on the railroad north of Nashville, captured the guard of
about 150 men at Grallatin, effectually disabled the tunnel north of that place,
and destroyed several bridges toward Nashville. Our communication with
Louisville, on which we were dependent for supplies, was thus, for the pres-
ent, effectually severed. Work was immediately commenced to repaii- the
damage, but the constantly recurring presence of the enemy's cavalry inter-
fered so effectually as to require a large increase of force from the front or
the rear for the defense. I had already strengthened the guards at Bowling
Grreen and Munfordville. To continue to draw from the front was not yet
to be thought of. On the 16tli, therefore, I gave General Nelson a couple of
field-batteries and some experienced cavalry and infantry officers, and sent
him to Kentucky to organize such troops as could be got together there to
reestablish our communications and operate against Morgan's incursions.
On the 18th a guard of a regiment belonging to Orant's command was capt-
ured without a show of resistance at Clarksv^lle, i^ where a considerable quan-
tity of supplies had been deposited for transshipment in consequence of the
suspension of navigation by low water in the Cumberland. Upon hearing of
Morgan's appearance again on the Cumberland north of Nashville, General R.
W. Johnson, a spirited cavalry officer, under whose command I had asseml)led
all the cavalry that was available, moved promptly in pursuit, and with his
inferior force attacked Morgan vigorously near Hartsville. Johnson was
defeated with a loss of 80 killed and wounded and 75 prisoners, himself among
the latter. The rest escaped and made their way as stragglers or in small
bodies to Nashville.
These details, harassing and disappointing to the actors at the time, are now
no less wearisome and uninteresting to the careless reader ; but the considera-
tion of them is essential to a correct appreciation of the campaign. It is a
story familiar to history of the crippling of an invading army by a successful
war upon its too long and inadequately protected communications, with an
enemy in its front. The line in this case was a single railroad, 350 miles long,
through a population either hostile to the invader, or at least in a consider-
able degree friendly to his opponent. Under the circumstances that were
to ensue, it is not perhaps to be accounted a misfortune that the contemplated
advance was checked at the start. A Union army of 81,000 men at Chatta-
nooga in July, 1862, without supplies, with its communications broken for
400 miles, and the Government on the Potomac appealing for 25,000 men
which could not be spared from Corinth, might well have been in a worse
condition than the stronger army in November, 1863, which was reduced to
horse and mule meat for its ration, with its communications complete to
within 30 miles, and with an unoccupied army from Vicksburg and consider
able reenforcements from the Potomac hastening to its succor.
i^Fov an explanation of the sun-ender see Vol. after the surronder tlio colonel iind nil the liiio-otli-
XVI., Part I., pp. 8G2-8G9, "Official Records." cers present were cashiered ])y order of the I'resi-
Colonel Rodney Mason, 71st Oliio regiment, the dent, but tliis action was subse«itieii(ly revoked, and
commander, had less than 200 effective men. Soon they were honorably discliarged.— D. (,'. B.
40 EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYl^lLLE.
The roi)orts of the superior force assembled in east Tennessee were con-
finutMl as tlie time passed, and there could be no doubt that our position in
middle Tennessee was about to be assailed. Already there were rumors of
crossing at Chattanooga, Harrison's Landing, and Kingston. These starting-
points indicated no certain plan of attack. The enemy might descend the
Sequatchie and Cumberland valleys and enter at north Alabama, in which
case he would have a railroad for his supplies ; or he might cross the mount-
ains by direct roads toward middle Tennessee. In either case, Stevenson,
on the south side of a declining spur of the Cumberland Mountains reaching
to Huntsville, was unsuitable for om- depot, and Decherd, on the north side,
was adopted instead.
On the 19th of August I received information from Gleneral McCook, who
was at Battle Creek with his own and Crittenden's divisions, that the enemy
was crossing in force at Chattanooga. My plans were already matured and
McCook had his orders for such a case, only waiting the signal to act, which
was given on the 20th. He was to march with his division to the point at
which the Anderson or Thm*man road between Chattanooga and McMinnville
crossed the Sequatchie valley, watching and opposing the enemy on that road,
and gradually fall back toward McMinnville until he joined the remainder
of the army. Crittenden was to follow him, and act similarly and in con-
junction with him on the Higginbottom road, which crossed the valley a little
lower down, and united with the Thurman road further north. They had
pre\iously been provided with rockets and a signal code for communicating
with each other and with the rest of the army. The same day I went to Battle
Creek and then to Decherd to superintend the further concentration, for
which general instructions had already been given. Altamont, in advance
of McMinnville, was designated as the point of junction, though that could
have been modified, if desirable, after an examination of the locality. General
McCook proceeded up the valley some distance until he received information
on which he relied, that the enemy had already entered the valley in force,
or would enter it before he could be intercepted. He therefore returned to
Crittenden at the Higginbottom road, which he deemed to be impracticable
for his artillery and train, and both divisions returned to Battle Creek, where,
after hearing from them, I sent them fm^ther orders. The information was
positive that the enemy was advancing on the Thurman road, where in fact
his cavalry was encountered ; and under the orders for the concentration
Thomas went to Altamont from McMinnville with one division, but returned
to McMinnville. McCook arrived there a little later and remained until the
final concentration at Murfreesl)oro' under the orders of the 30th. A brigade
under Colonel W. H. Lytic, of Rousseau's division, was still retained at Hunts-
ville, and two regiments under Colonel L. A. Harris were at Battle Creek. The
failure of McCook's movement up the Sequatchie was unfortunate. It gave
a false impression of the enemy's progress, and of the route he was to pursue.
But for the erroneous information under which it was abandoned, it ought
to have led to important results. There would have been no advantage,
however, in retiring on the Higginbottom road without meeting the enemy.
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYJ/ILLE. 41
We were now reduced to ten days' provisions. Our railroad communica-
tion north of Nashville had been broken for twenty days, and no effort was
being made at Louisville to reopen it. My orders to General Nelson had
been of no avail. In fact, on his arrival there he found Kentucky organized
into a separate department not under my command ; and his report of my
instructions and his representations of the necessity of opening the road to
Nashville were answered with orders from Washington to first open com-
munication with Cumberland Gap, where General G. W. Morgan was not in
danger, and had abundant supplies for the present. The result of those
orders, unnecessary for the relief of Morgan, and insufficient for stopping
Kirby Smith, was the defeat of Nelson at Richmond on the 30th. Ten days
had elapsed since the enemy's advance was positively reported, and there was
no more evidence of his approach than at first. He was, of course, to be
expected, any day, but he might not come in two weeks.
Under the circumstances it was plainly necessary to concentrate nearer
Nashville, where we could get to work on the railroad, and at the same time
be ready for the enemy when he should come. Orders were accordingly
given on the 30th of August for concentrating at Murfreesboro' on the 5th
of September. Thomas, at McMinnville, was to march on the 2d, and other
commands according to their position. To the last Thomas had no defi-
nite information of the approach of the enemy. It turned out that Bragg
crossed at Chattanooga on the 28th of August, entered Sparta on the 3d of
September, and made his way to Glasgow, where he arrived on the 14th,
ha^dng crossed the Cumberland at Carthage and Gainsboro'. Something
of these movements, though not of the entii-e force, was learned on the 6th,
and that Bowling Green was threatened. Two divisions were, therefore,
moved across the river at Nashville on the 7th, — one to go to the protection
of Bowhng Green, where there was a small garrison with some stores, and
the other to Gallatin, to gain information of the movements of the enemy in
the valley.
At the same time preparation was made to act with the remaining force as
circumstances might require. Two and a half divisions, including Paine's
division from Grant, which had not yet arrived, and a large nunil)er of con-
valescents, were designated to hold Nash\alle, under the eoniniand of General
Thomas. It was ascertained on the lOtli that the bulk of Bragg's army had
marched north from the Cumberland, and my movable divisions were accord-
ingly put in motion to follow. They were concentrated at Bowling Gi-een on
the evening of the 15th. I there learned that the garrison at Munfonhille
had been attacked, but the result was not certainly known, Bragg was
reported at Glasgow, and on the KJth I marched to givi^ battle to him at that
place; but during the day it was asc(>rtaiiied that he had marched the day
before for Miiiit'ordville, the garrison of which, it was also ascertained, had
re]ielled the first attack, and my divisions were directed upon that point. Tlu»
next day, at Prewett's Knob, thirteen miles from :Munfordville, I learned tliat
the garrison had that morning surrendered to Bragg's entiic army, and that
night Colonel Wilder reported to mo with his command as j.risoners of war,
VOL. Ill 4.
42
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYKILLE
The enemy was now concentrated in front of us, and had taken up a posi=
tion of unusual strength upon and beliind a rather low crest on the south side
of Green River. My information of the aggregate force assembled in east
Tennessee was sufficiently accurate, but at fii'st there was no means of know-
ing what portion of it was with Bragg, and what portion had followed Kirby
Smith. The proximity of the last three days had given a better knowledge
of Bragg's strength. Colonel Wilder, who was competent, and had had some
opportunity for observation, estimated it at from 35,000 to 40,000 men, and
nobody estimated it at any less. I supposed it to be from 30,000 to 40,000. I
had with me 35,000 effective men, but
on being satisfied at Bowling Green
that no considerable force remained to
threaten Nashville, I called up Thom-
as's division, and now determined, on
its arrival, to attack Bragg's position if
he should remain. Thomas arrived on
the 20th. There was some skirmishing
between the lines that evening, but
the enemy withdrew during the night.
His rear-guard was driven out of Mun-
f ordville the next day, and was pressed
by oui' advanced guard until he turned
off the main road toward Bardstown.->V
There was no reason to hesitate at
this point as to the course which I
should pursue. I did not know where
Kii'by Smith was, but the junction be-
tween himself and Bragg was to be
considered as practically established.
United for battle they would outnumber me very greatly. Louisville also, in the
presence of this combined force, might be in danger. Besides, our provisions
were nearly exhausted ; some of the troops were without rations after arriv-
ing at West Point, twenty-five miles from Louisville. I therefore pushed for-
ward to Louisville, the leading division arriving there on the 25th, and the
last on the 29th. The cavalry was kept as an outpost at Elizabethtown to
guard the flank of the passing columns and watch any possible movements
of the enemy toward Bowling Green. The large empty wagon train which
the exhaustion of our supplies at Nashville had rendered useless and insup-
portable, had })een pushed through from Bowling Green by the way of Browns-
ville, Litchfield, and West Point, under a cavalry escort.
The army was now to encounter grave danger from the influence of Oliver
P. Morton, Governor of Indiana. He had from the ])eginning tried to retain
a r/uasl authority over Lidiana troops after they had been mustered into the
•^ 111 his official report General Bragg states that he ' ' offered battle " at Mimf ordville. No doubt he
was willing to fight on his own terms at more than one point. But the general who offers battle is he
who stays to give or receive it. — D. C. B.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES 8. JACKSON, KILLED AT
PERRYVILLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYl^ILLE. 43
service of the United States and had joined my army. His interference was
injurious to discipline 5 but he persisted in order to preserve his influence with
the troops, the people, and the Government. The seeds of mischief, always
present in his extra-official conduct toward the Indiana troops, were now being
sown with a vigorous but crafty hand, in the counsels at Washington and
among the executives of other States, to impair my authority and effect my
removal from command. General Nelson, an officer of remarkable merit, was
in command of the center corps of my army. He was assaulted and killed by
General Davis, accompanied by Governor Morton, the very day before the
army was to march against the invaders. Nelson, though often rough in
command, was always solicitous about the well-being of his troops, and was
held in high esteem for his conspicuous services, gallantry in battle, and
great energy ; and his death caused much indignation among the troojDS that
knew him best. Davis, an Indianian, was unknown in my arm}^ except in his
own division, which had just joined while he was absent ; but Morton's rela-
tion to the affair brought to bear in Davis's behalf a State feeling inspired by
Morton and strengthened by his habitual intervention in favor of Indiana
troops against the rigidity of my control. The restraining influence of dis-
cipline was all that prevented an outbreak between the friends of Nelson and
Davis, which might have added the most serious consequences to the criminal
occurrence.
Nothing but the law of violence could, under any circumstances, justify the
manner of the killing for the alleged provocation, and no mere merit of ordi-
nary soldiership could ever atone for the sacrilege against discipline under
the circumstances which existed. The dignity of a State was abused by the
attitude of its governor in the affair, and the authority of the general gov-
ernment was even more degraded by its condonement of the act — a con-
donement made virtually, if not actually, at his dictation.i!^
Davis was immediateh^ placed in arrest, and the case reported to General
Halleck, with the request that a court might be ordered from Washington
for its trial, as the operations then in progress made it impracticable for me
to spare the officers for the purpose at the moment. Instead of that, Davis
i^ Briefly stated, the particulars of the occurrence nounced him for appearing as an abettor of the in-
are as follows : Nelson was in command at Louis- suit forced upon him, and retired toward his room
villc, and was laboring to put the city in a state of in the adjoining hall. Davis received a pistol from
defense against the expected attack. A few days be- the hand of his other attendant, not Morton, and
fore my arrival lie rebuked Davis, no doubt harshly, followed Nelson to the hall. Nelson, apparently
for what he considered a neglectful or inefficient dis- changing his purpose, returned before reaching his
charge of duty, and ordered him to report to General room, and as he nearly reached the end of the liall
Wright at Cincinnati. Upon my arrival Davis was where DaWs was, the latter tired, inflicting a wound
ordered by Wright to report to me for duty with his in the breast, of which Nelson died in about half an
division. Instead of proceeding directly to Louis- hour, after receiving the ministrations of the church
ville, he went by Indianapolis and was joined by and forgiving his slayer. It has recently been
Morton. With liim and with another friend Davis made known for the lirst tinu^ in a publislied stati--
approached Nelson in tlio vestibule of the Gait House ment of the affair by General James B. Fry, who
at Louisville at breakfast-time, in the presence of at the moment ])laced Davis in arrest, and as a
a considerable number of persons. The reception ])ersonal friend listened to his statement, that
which Davis's demand for satisfaction received was upon accosting Nelson. Davis tilliiied into Ins face
no doubt such as he had expected. Wliat the l)y- a i)aper-wad that he Inid b(HMi crumpling between
standers witTiessed and what was reported at the liis fingers. It was then tluit Nelson struck liim. I
time was a slap from the back of Nelson's liand in was not aware of this circumstance until the ap-
Davis's face. Nelson then turned to Morton. <le- pearance of the statenu'nt referred to.— D. C. B.
44 EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYI/ILLE.
was released, ostensibly that the case might be turned over to the civil
authority; and thus the military authority of the Government was abased
over the grave of a high officer, whose slaughter by another officer under
such circumstances, and as a purely military offense, it had not the character
to bring to trial. J
In the midst of the excitement caused by the killing of Nelson, and the
active preparation that was going on for an advance against the enemy the
next day, an order was received from Washington relieving me from the (».om-
mand, and appointing Greneral Thomas to succeed me. In a little while
General Thomas came to my room and stated his intention to decline the
command. I answered that I could not consent to his doing so on any gi'ound
that was personal to me, and that if his determination was fixed I must be
allowed to see the message he proposed to send. He then prepared the fol-
lowing dispatch to General Halleck :
" Colonel McKibbin handed me your dispatch placing me in command of the Department of
the Tennessee. General Buell's preparations have been completed to march against the enemy,
and I therefore respectfully ask that he may be retained in command. My position is very
embarrassing, not being as well informed as I should be as the commander of this army, and
on the assumption of such a responsibility."
I could make no personal objection to his reasons, but I encouraged him to
accept the duty assigned to him, saying that nothing remained to be done but
to put the army in motion, and that I would cheerfully explain my plans to
him and give him all the information I possessed. He persisted, however,
and the message went off. I did not then know of the steps that were being
taken for my retention by both of the senators and two representatives
from Kentucky. 5^
Halleck replied to Thomas that the order had not been made by him or
by his advice, and he had no power to revoke it, but that he would sus-
pend it until the question could be submitted to the Government, and that
Colonel McKibbin had been twice telegraphed to withhold the order. The
order was accordingly suspended. I at once resumed the reins of command,
which, indeed, had scarcely been laid aside, and proceeded with the prepara-
tions to advance.
On my arrival at Louisville I had found a considerable number of newly
made regiments or fragments of regiments, which the crisis had hurried into
\ The following order announced General Nel- of public duty; but no man was more prompt to recog-
son's death to the army : "i^^ ^""^ foster merit in bis inferiors, and in bis own
conduct be set an example of tbat vigilance, indus-
" HEADQUAKTEKS, ARMY OF THK Oiiio, Loi'isviLLE, t^'^' •'^"*^ Piowpt attention to duty whicb be exacted
September 29tb, 18(;2. General Orders, No. 47a. Tbe fiomotbers. In battle bis example was equally marked,
seiicnil conniianding announces witb inexpressible re- ^n more tban one field -at Sbilob, Ricbmond, and
Kr.-t tl.e.leutber Msuor-General William Nelson, wbicb Ivy Mountain -be was conspicuous for bis gallant
occurred in tbis city at 8 : 30 o'clock tbis morniiiK- bearing.
"Tbe deceased was bred a sailor, and was an officer of "T'lf funeral of the deceased wiU take place at 3
tbe navy wbile bolding a commission in tbe militan' ^- '"• t'>-m<.rrow, at Calvary Cbureb, Third street. By
service. ITisfory will honor him as one of tlie first to f""'""""^ of Major-General Buell. James B. Fey,
()n,'iiiii/,c. l)y bis iiKlividiml exertion, a military force in Colonel and Cbief-of-8taflF."
K.iitu.'ky. his naf iv HI ate. to rescue be- from tbe vor- + Dispatch from Senators Crittenden and Davis,
'"^n::::^2^"^:^^::s:!^ts,::z^::"::^;.,r ,. ™.iBep.-™.«tive.M»,wa„dD„„iap,to,he
sive views, and great eiu-rgy and foicr of cbaraitei-. By l'i-(^sident (" Official Records," Vol. XVI., Part II.,
bis nature be was intolerant of disobedience, or neglect p. 557).
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYK/LLE.
4S
the State from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. After desi^-nating a portion as a
guard for Louisville, mostly organized into a division under General Dumont,
the remainder of the new regiments were assigned to places in the old divisions ;
the baggage, hospital, and supply trains were reorganized ; the equipment of
the soldier was repaired ; each man was provided with individual cooking-
utensils, so as almost to dispense
with baggage-wagons; and on
the arrival of the last division, on
the 29th, the army was ready to
march on the next day. One day
was lost by the instructions from
Washington, Ijut orders were
given for marching on the 1st of
October. The army was divided
into three corps : the First under
Genera] McCook, the Second un
der General T. L. Crittenden, and
the Third under General Gilbert.
This corps was to have been com-
manded by General Nelson. Gen-
eral Thomas was announced as
second in command in the army.
It is now proper to take a survey
of the military situation which
was before me.
My instructions of the 18th
of March placed General G. W. Morgan in command of the Seventh division
of the army, to operate in the Cumberland Gap road from Kentucky to east
Tennessee, and required him to take the Gap if practicable, and if not, to
hold the enemy in check on that route. The division was at first only
partially formed, and some time elapsed before it was in a condition to
advance. The Gap was naturally strong, and was occupied by a consider-
able force. Morgan turned the position on the 17th of June by marching
through Big Creek and Rogers's Gaps. The Confederates thereupon evacu-
ated the place without waiting for an attack, and Morgan took possession
on the 18th. It was at once strongly intrenched under the supervision of
an officer of engineers, but its importance in a general campaign was not in
proportion to the force to which its maintenance gave occupation. It was
chiefly as an encouragement to the loyal element in east Tennessee that the
possession of it was desirable. The campaign inaugurated by the Confed-
ei-ates in east Tennessee emi)loyed the troops of two military dei>artments,
and lal)ored under the inconvenience of cooperation l)etween the two inde-
])endent commanders, instead of subordination to a single authority. It was
executed with a harmony and zeal unusual under such circumstaiKM's, but
perhaps lacked the consistency which either of the two leaders wt)uld have
been amply capable of imi)arting to it.
BEIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM R. TERRILL, KILLED AT
PERRTVILLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
46
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRY yiLLE.
The original plan was for a combined movement
into middle Tennessee for the recovery of Nash-
ville. The invasion of Kentucky was at first prob-
ably not thought of at all, or at least only as a
later possibility. But as Bragg could not be ready
to cross the river from Chattanooga for about two
weeks after his arrival, it was arranged that in the
meantime Kirby Smith with his troops should at-
tack and capture Morgan at Cumberland Gap. The
strength of Morgan's fortified position, however,
with 8000 good troops to defend it, was upon con-
sideration deemed to preclude the attempt. The
alternative was to invest him on the soutii side
with 1)000 men under Stevenson, while Smith with
lL',000 sliould seize and hold his communications
on the north ; by which means, not being strong
enough to break his way out on either side, Mor-
gan, upon the exhaustion of his sup])lie8, would be
compelled to surrender. This i)laii l)eiug adopted,
Smith commenced his movement through Kogers's
and Big Creek Gaps on the 14th of August, and
reached Morgan's rear at Barbourville on the 18th.
He now perceived that it would be impossible
for him to gather supplies for his command from
that poor and exhausted region, and later his em-
barrassment was increased by Morgan's occupa-
tion of Eogers's and Big Creek Gaps. Nothing
therefore remained for him but to withdraw or
advance boldly into the rich portion of Kentucky.
Bragg was not at first in favor of the latter course,
until he should be prepared to follow up the pre-
cipitate movement which it was not doubted I
would make from middle Tennessee for the pro-
tection of Kentucky. However, his concurrence
was readily yielded, for the proposition was allur-
ing. The idea of invasion, which had now taken
firm root, was coupled with the chimera of an up-
rising of the people and a transfer of the State to
the Confederacy. I never had the slightest appre-
hension of such a result. Boys might join John
Morgan's roving cavaliers, and some mature men
might commit themselves with less romance to the
cause of the Confederacy, and these phenomena
would of course be multiplied by the backing of an
army. But when Kentucky so far overcame her
sympathy as to assume an attitude of neutrality,
she listened to a call of reason and interest, not
unmingled with genuine love of the Union, that
was not to stop at half-measures ; and as soon as
it became apparent that neutrality was impractica-
ble, it was the deliberate choice of the mass of the
people — not any pressiire of coercion — that ar-
rayed her irrevocably on the side of the Union.
To that choice she was thoroughly loyal, and no
finer example of political and popular generosity
can anywhere be foimd than that wherein, at the
close of the conflict, she restored to all the rights
of citizenship and the ties of fraternity her oxp:i-
triated sons who for four years had inad<' war
upon her.
Smith advanced from Barljourville with 12,000
men on the 2r)th of August, encountered at Kogers-
ville and Richmond the 5000 or 0000 raw troops
assembled there, scattered them like chaff, mak-
ing prisoners and capturing arms, proceeded to
Lexington, where he established his head<iuarters
.on the 2d of September, occupied Frankfort and
Cynthiana, and finally threw his pickets almost to
the gates of Cincinnati and Louisville.
These events produced widespread effects. They
were the signal tor the movement of Humphrey
Marshall with 3000 men into Kentucky through
Pound Gap, and it would seem stimulated Bragg's
advance from Chattanooga. They changed the
concentration of my army from Murfreesboro' to
Nashville, and would perhaps have caused the trans-
fer of half of it into Kentucky, which seemed to be
jjowerless, but for the sudden appearance of Bragg
in the Valley of the Cumberland endangering Nash-
ville. In Kentucky and other bordering States,
they produced an excitement which was intense in
some places, amounting almost to consternation.
Business at Cincinnati was for a few days entirely
suspended for the purpose of defense ; intreneh-
ments were vigorously prosecuted at Covington
and Louisville by the labor of the citizens and the
troops, and raw regiments in the process of forma-
tion were hurried into Cincinnati and Louisville
from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The Government
of Kentucky sought refuge at Louisville, where on
my arrival Nelson reported a force of 30,000 raw
troops.
General Morgan at Cumberland Gap was promptly
aware of Kirby Smith's movement, and informed
me of it on the IGth of August. He had thirty
days' provisions, and was instructed the same day
to hold his position. The exhaustion of his sup-
plies and the improbability of their being replen-
ished in time made it necessary for him at last to
withdraw, which he did on the night of the 17th
of September'. He was pm"sued by Stevenson and
harassed by John Morgan's cavalry, but made his
way successfully through Manchester, Boonesville,
West Liberty, and Grayson to the Ohio River at
Greenup, where he arrived about the 2d of Octo-
ber. Stevenson with his division joined Kirby
Smit-h near Frankfort about the time of my arrival
at Louisville, and was present in the operations
around Perryville.
On his ai'rival in central Kentucky, Smith issued
his proclamation inviting the people to join the
cause of their deliverance, and Bragg did the same
in pathetic terms at Glasgow. These appeals, like
many of the orders promulgated to arouse the ani-
mosity and stimulate the valor of the Southern
troops, would give a sad impression of the condi-
tion of the inhabitants, especially the innocent and
helpless, and of the brutality of the oppressor ;
but they were not confirmed by the feebleness of
the response. There was a sweet sympathy, so the
Confederates thought, but that was all. The arms
in abundance, which Kentuckians were advised to
grasp, remained in the store-houses. Kentuckians
suffered just as Ohioans would have suffered with
armies in their midst, and they had as a body no
more thought of changing their colors. During the
whole occupation enough perhaps for a brigade
joined tlie invaders.
The arrival of Bragg at Bardstown gave the
Confederates ^^rtual possession of the whole of
Kentucky east of the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad, excepting within the limits of Covington
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYI^ILLE.
47
and Louisville, and Smith called his troops to-
gether near Frankfort to assist in the proposed
attack upon Louisville. That project was post-
poned after tny arrival ; but Polk, Bragg having
gone to Frankfort and Lexington, was ordered
to occupy Shepherdsville, Taylorsville, and other
near points around Louisville. Steps were being
taken to that end when, on the 2d of October, the
enemy's pickets announced to the leaders at Frank-
fort and Bardstown the advance of my army in
force on four roads, threatening the whole of their
front, which covered a distance of sixty miles.
The plan of my movement was to force the ene-
my's left back and compel him to concentrate as
far as possible from any convenient line of retreat,
while at the same time making a strongdemonstra-
tion against his right, so as to mislead him as to
the real point of attack, and prevent him from
moving upon my left flank and rear. With that
object General Sill, commanding a division in Mc-
Cook's corps, was ordered to move boldly toward
Frankfort through Shelbyville, followed tempora-
rily by the division of raw troops under Dumont
which hadljeen organized as a guard for Louisville.
McCook with his two remaining divisions moved
upon Taylorsville, where he halted the second night
in a position which pointed to either flank. The
other two corps moved respectively through Shep-
herdsville and Mt. Washington, to converge upon
Bardstown, and halted the second night at Salt
River. The enemy's pickets were encountered on
all of the roads within a few miles of the city, in-
creasing in strength as the movement progressed,
and opposing a sharp opposition at Bardstown and
Shelbyville. Polk withdrew his army from Bards-
town on the night of the 3d, going through Spring-
field, and Sill, against a considerable resistance,
pushed back the force in front of him toward
Frankfort. These measures brouglit to a hurried
completion the inauguration of Provisional Gov-
ernor Hawes at Frankfort on the 4th, under the
supervision of General Bragg. Polk, on his part,
was pressed so closely t lint Hardee, who was bring-
ing up his rear, w.is ((niiiMlled to make a stand at
PeiTyville and call for assistance. Assuming that
Smith was the object of my attack, and that my
right and rear would thereby bo exposed to Polk
at Bardstown, Bragg ordered Polk on the 2d to
attack in that manner, while Smith should attack
my left, and that view of my design was persisted
in ; so tliat only one of the two divisions which
were being pressed forward to reenforce Smith
was returned to assist Hardee at Perryville on the
uiglit of the 7th.
The strength of the opposition to Sill and the
continued presence of Kirby Smith about Frankfort
pointed to a concentration in that dii-ection, at least
nortli of PeiTyville ; but on the (Ith the information
was that Smith was moving upon Danville. Mc-
Cook, who had been halted momentarily at Bloom-
field until the question should be developed, was
therefore directed on Harrodsburg, and Sill was
ordered to join him by forced marclies. During tlie
night the information in regaril to Smith was con-
tradicted, and the expectation of a concentration
i " Olllcial Kecords," Ve
at or north of Perryville was confirmed. MeCook
was therefore promptly turned upon Perryville,
and Sill was ordered to follow him. Under a stub-
born resistance fi"om Polk, during the 7th, the
center corps halted in the evening about three
and a half miles from Perryville without water, of
which it had had but little since morning, and the
corps was put in order of battle. It appeared
now that the enemy was vii'tually concentrated in
our front. Orders were therefore dispatched to
McCook, who was supposed to be about seven
miles back, on the left, and to Thomas, who had
been ordered to halt the right corps (Crittenden's)
for the night at Haysville, about four miles in rear,
on the road from Lebanon to Perryville. They
were to march precisely at 3 o'clock in the morn-
ing, prepared in every respect for battle, and on
arriving at certain designated jioints were to be
formed in order of battle on the left and right,
respectively, of the center corps. They were then
to be made as comfortable as possible, but not to
leave ranks. A reconnoissance was to be made to
ascertain the position of the enemy, and as soon
as that was done Thomas and McCook were to
report at headquarters for further orders. | I
expected that these objects would be accomplished
by 7 o'clock in the morning.
During the night it was ascertained that there
were some pools of water in the bed of Doctor's
Fork, which crossed the road in front of us, and
of which the enemy's rear-guard held possession.
Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding a brigade in
Sheridan's division, was selected to attack the
enemy and get possession of the water, which he
did in a handsome manner at day dawn. Very
soon the enemy attempted to recover the lost posi-
tion, but Sheridan's and Mitchell's divisions were
moved to the front and defeated the design. From
that time a desultory cannonading was kept up
between the two lines until it merged into the bat-
tle, which suddenly burst forth fiercely at 2 o'clock.
The arrival of McCook's corps is dated from half-
past 10 o'clock, but for the bulk of the corps it
was later. He reported to me at about half-past
12, and I hastened his return to his command;
for though the time had passed when I had some-
what apprehended an attack, while the center
corps was alone, yet the occasion was critical,
and he had not reconnoitered his front. Thomas
had not reported, and no final instructions for
attack could be given. When McCook readied
his corps, it had materially changed its ground and
was not in position. Artillery guns were exchang-
ing distant shots, but evidently no one on our side
was expecting an attack. It came at about 2
o'clock, while a line was moving forward to take
possession of the water which could be discerned
in the bed of Clniplin river, behind wliich the
enemy were formed for the assault.
It turned out tliat Polk witli three divisions, with
cavalry on both fljinks, had determined \o figlit a
"defensive-olTensive" battle; but as the morning
wore away without the attack, which was awaited,
Bragg came ujion the ground and onlered an as-
sault. If was delivered mainly upon McCook, but
1. XVI., I'Mit H., 1). 580.
48
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYl^lLLE.
also fell heavily upon Sheridan, who repelled it
handsomely on his side. MeCook fought bravely,
and by (rilberfs order was reenforced with Good-
ing's brigade from Mitchell's division ; but he was
steadily driven back for a mile, until the enemy's
pursuing line came within the enfilading fire of
Sheridan's artillery, which was delivered with great
effect across the intervening valley of Doctor's
Fork. At 4 o'clock Captain Fisher of McCook's
staff arrived and reported to me that the left corps
had been sustaining a severe conflict for a consid-
erable time, and was being driven back. I was
astonished. Not a sound of musketry had been
heard, and my staff-oflB.cers had been at the front
until dinner-time, I had noticed a sudden increase
of eaiinonadiiig at 2 o'clock, and General Gilbert,
who had come in from his lines and was getting
his dinner with mo, immediately proceeded to his
command ; but as the firing as suddenly subsided,
and no report came to me, I had ceased to think
of the occurrence.
Keenforcements were immediately ordered to
McCook from Schoepf's division, which was in re-
serve, and a staff-officer was dispatched to Thomas
with orders to move the right corps forward vigor-
ously and attack the enemy's left. Thomas could
not be found until about 6 o'clock, and owing to
the lateness of the hour the advance was not made ;
but McCook was relieved by the succor sent to him
and the battle ceased about night-fall. Fm'ther
orders were sent to Thomas at 6.30 P. M. :
October 8th, 1862, 6.30 p. m. General Thomas, Sec-
ond in Comiiiaiid : The First Corps (McCook's) on our
left has been very hciivily engaged. The left and center
of this cori)8 gained ground, but the right of it yielded a
little. Press your lines forward as far as possible to-
night, and get into position to make a vigorous attack
in tlie niorning at daylight. Tf you have got your troops
into a position whicli yon dconi advantageous it will not
be advisable to make acliant;c for tlicpuriioseof coiuply-
. ing witli tlif gcnci-al's iiistiiutioiiK for yon sent by Cap-
tain Mack. It may lie as well to halt tlic division ordered
to the center and let it wait wliere it is for further orders.
The general desires to see you in ])erson as soon to-night
as yoni- duties will permit you to come, over. Respect-
fully, Jamks U. Fry, Colonel and Cliief-of-Staff.
McCook liad 12,500 men in the battle, and lost
in killed and womided about 3000 — nearly one-
quarter ; Gilbert lost in killed and woimded nearly
900, all of which belonged to Sheridan's division
and one of Mitchell's brigades; and about iSOinall
were taken prisoners ; total loss, 4348. The force
i " IlAYSViLLE, October 7th, 1862, 6 p. m.— Major-Gen-
ERAL BnELL: About two and a half miles west of this
place I can get a camp on the Rolling Fork, where th(>re
ifl said to bo an abundance of M'ater. As there is no
water here, 1 propose to camp there. It will only throw
us about one and a half miles farther from Perry ville.
It was reported to me on 7iiy arrival that the rebels had
200,000 pounds of pork at Lelianon. At flrst I ordered a
regiment to go there and seize it. I afterward learned
that it belonged to a (•nm))any of pork-packers, who
profess to be Union men. I tlierefare concluded not
to send or seize it, as we can get it at any lime by send-
ing for it. Maxey's lirigade is also rei)orle(l as leaving
Lebanon to-day for Danville, via liiadfordsville and
rinstonville, with a train loaded with flour and pork
from Lebanon. Shall I send and intercept him now, or
laiiture him hereafter? Very respectfully, Geo. H.
Thomas."
actually engaged on the Union side numbered
about 22,000, though more came into position for
battle near the close. All of the force had a good
number of new regiments. One of McCook's di-
visions was composed entirely of new regiments,
with one exception. Its division commander,
Jackson, and its two brigade commanders, Terrill
and Webster, were killed. The enemy claim to
have fought the battle, according to Bragg's re-
port, with 16,000 men. His loss is reported at
3396, of which 251 were prisoners. He captm-ed
some artillery that he did not carry off, though he
exchanged some of his pieces for better ones.
Not long before the commencement of this
partial but fierce contest, a staff-officer arrived
from General Thomas and reported two divisions
of the right corps up — the last had not yet ar-
rived. The enemy was in front, and Thomas
thought it not advisable to leave to report in
person. The want of definite information from
both flanks, the failure of a meeting of the
two commanders at my headquarters for explana-
tions and final orders, and the lateness of the hour
for effecting these preliminaries for the great bat-
tle which was to be fought, precluded the idea of
bringing it on that evening. That conclusion had,
indeed, been rendered probably unavoidable at
the time of McCook's arrival at my headquarters,
by two dispatches which had been received from
Thomas dui-ing the morning : One dated the 7th,
6 o'clock p. M., at Haysville, ^ saying that finding
no water at that point he would march the right
corps to the Rolling Fork for a camp ; and the
other, dated on the EoUiug Fork, October 8th, 3
o'clock, A. M.,\ reporting that my order to march
at 3 o'clock had just been received, that the corps
reached that place at 11 o'clock at night, and was
then camping, the trains being not all yet up, and
that he would be in front of Perryville as soon as
possible. The staff-officer was, therefore, started
back a few minutes before 2 o'clock with some
minor instructions to General Thomas, and a desire
that he should report in person after night-fall.
Thomas, McCook, and Gilbert met at my head-
quarters after dai-k, and after conversation upon
the events of the day, orders were given for battle
the following morning. Crittenden's corps on the
right was to move forward at 6 o'clock and engage
the enemy, and the center was to do likewise as
soon as they were abreast. MeCook was to close
"X " HE\DQtTARTERS, UNITED STATES FORCES, ROLLING
Fork, Ky., October 8th, 1862, 3 a. m.— General Buell:
Your letter of instruction came to hand at the time
indicated for the Second Corps to nuirch. Have given
the necessary orders to General Crittenden, and will
take position before Perryville as 8007i as possible. The
roads over which we marched yesterday were exceed-
ingly rough and tortuous, and, with one exception,
witlioMt water. Reached this {)liice at 11 o'clock last
Jiighf,l)nt all the trains are not up yet. I found, as night
approached, that the troops must have water, which
could not be obtained short of Rolling Fork, some two
miles out of our way, to which place the command was
ordered, and \V(i are now camping. As soon as I decided
to make Rolling Fork, I dispatch(>d messengers to your
headiiuarters, who nnist have reached you l)efore this.
Respectfully, etc., Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, U.
8. Volunteers."
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYl/lLLE.
4^
ill and remain in reserve. In fact, only one of his
divisions (Rousseau's) was in a condition to fight
as a distinct body. At that hour not a man in the
army who had any knowledge beyond the limit of
his own vision doubted that the whole Confeder-
ate army was in our front, and that the battle was
to be renewed in the morning.
The right corps did not commence the move-
ment until 9 o'clock, owing, as was afterward
explained, to Thomas's message to Crittenden by
signal, from my camp, only specifying that he
should be ready to advance at 6 o'clock; so that
the orders to advance had to be repeated when
it was discovered that the movement had not
commenced. It was then ascertained that the
enemy had withdrawn, and that only three of his
divisions had been present. The battle had en-
abled him to perfect his junction with Kirby Smith
at Harrodsbui-g, as originally intended, and I did
not hesitate to await the arrival of Sill's division
before precipitating the anticipated battle. In
the meantime, the army was put in position for
any emergency, andreconnoissances were actively
employed to gain information of the movements
of the enemy.
We had repelled the enemy's fierce attack when
it was supposed his whole force was in front of
us. My official report stated succinctly the causes
which prevented us from winning a more fruitful
success, namely, the difficulties which prevented
the troops from getting on the ground simultane-
ously, and the fact that I was not apprised early
enough of the condition of affairs on my left
("Official Records," Vol. XVI., Part I., p. 1031).
When the orders in anticipation of battle were
given on the evening of the 7th, McCook's exact posi-
tion was .not known. He was supposed to be about
seven miles in rear. The orders did not reach
him until 2 : 30 o'clock, and he marched at 5. It
■was 10:30 when the head of his column arrived.
The road was hilly and rough, and the march was
understood to be made in the vicinity of the en-
emy. It was therefore properly conducted with
prudence, and was of course slow. The right
corps had been ordered to halt for the night at
Haysville, not more tlian four miles to the rear.
But on arriving at that point, finding no water,
General Thomas, who was conducting tlie corps,
determined to go to the Rolling Fork to encamp.
He was told the distance was two and one-lialf
miles off to the right, but he did not arrive until 1 1
o'clock, after five liours of night marching. The
courier diil not find him until .3 o'clock in the
morning, at which hour he was camping, his trains
being not all yet up. It is evident from his dis-
patches that he did not rea.lize the gi-avity of tlie
occasion. It wfis impossible, under the circum-
stances, that marches should be regulated witli
reference to water. The center corps marched
witli no assurance of finding it, halted on the even-
ing of the 7th without it, and only obtained it th(>
next morning by wresting it from the haiuls of the
enemy. Had tli(> right corps been found at Hiiys-
villt>, it sliould have been in ])ositi(ui for battle
by 7 o'clock, and, whatever else iray have liii]>-
pened, wo^ild have been in such coniuH-lioii with
headquarters by signals, as the otlier corps were,
that the orders of 4 o'clock for it to attack would
have been delivered immediately, and would have
given fully two hours of daylight for action.
On the other hand, had the battle on the left
been reported at 2 o'clock, when it commenced,
the succor which was ordered from the reserve at
4 would have come in the form of reenforcements
two hours earlier ; and the orders which were sent
at the same time to the right corps would have had
at least that much more time for execution. I
make no prediction of all of the consequences
that might have flowed from these conditions. It
would have depended much upon the action of the
riglit corps. They ought to have been of a very
decisive character. For the rest, the reports show
that the left corps was not fully prepared for the
heavy blowthat fell upon it, but the reverse which
it sustained was largely due to the ^aw^^ess of the
troops. Fully one-half of the two diNisions was
made up of new regiments.
While the battle was in progress at PerrjTille,
Kirby Smith, still thinking that my movement was
upon his front, had prepared for a battle at or near
Lawrenceburg. His cavalry attacked Sill at that
point on that day, and the next day on the march,
but Sill extricated himself skillfully, and contin-
ued his march, joining his corps at Perryville on
the 1 1th. Smith now discovered his mistake, and
dispatched Bragg on the 51th that he would join
him immediately at Harrodsburg, which he accom-
plished partly on the 9th and fully on the 10th.
On the latter day a strong reconnoissance found
him in line of battle about four miles south of Har-
rodsburg. He withdi-ew entirely on the 11th, fol-
lowed by my cavalry toward Camp Dick Robinson,
where Bragg's whole force now took position, shel-
tered in front and on his right flank by the perpen-
dicular cliffs of Dick's River and the Kentucky. I
was moving on the 12th and 13th to turn his jiosi-
tion and attack him on the left, when I learned that
he was withdrawing. General Bragg states in his
report that he was ready and desirous for battle at
this point and previously after Perr\-A-ille, and I
have no doubt that was true, if he could have had
his own terms. His order for withdrawal was an-
nounced on the 1 3th.
The piu-suit was taken up that night, under the
supervision of Thomas, Avith Crittenden's corjis. fol-
lowed by the other corps. The details afford no
interesting or important fact, exce])t that tlie re-
treating army was pressed into difficulties wliich
involved it in great hardship and teni]>(U-ary dis-
organization. The juirsuif was ciuitinued in that
manner as far as London, and then, about the
20th, my several colunins were turned by the most
direct routes toward the gmund in Tennessee and
Alabama from which they had started six weeks
before, and where it was foreseen tlie iiieiny would
soon again be «>ncountered. The rejtnir of the
railroa<l had been pushed forward witli energy,
and the army was arriving at Glasgow and Howl-
ing (Jreen on its route, when on the 3(Uii of Octo-
ber I turned over th(> commiind to General Rose-
(•r.ins, in nbedieiice to onlers from Washington. It
woidd lie useh'ss to review tlu- oflicio-personr.l jiart
50
EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYl^ILLE.
of the correspondence wliich immediately preceded
that event between the Washington authorities
and myself, or even the official part of it, relating
chiefly to the plan of a movement into east Ten-
nessee, to which my successor in a measure fell
heir. Toward him, I may add, the transfer brought
no heart-burning on my part, and the prayer ex-
pressed in my parting order was sincere, that the
army might, under his command, be the means of
speedily restoring the Union to its integrity.
In spite of my connection — I can scarcely speak
of it as a personal interest — with the subject, I ven-
ture to make some observations that appear to me
proper with reference to the campaign which I
have outlined. It extended over a greater territory
and involved greater hazard on the side of the
Union than any other campaign of the war. In the
early part, and up to the time of ray arrival in
Louisville, it was more neglected by the Govern-
ment than any other. It was distinguished also
from all others, except a part of Pope's operations
in Virginia, in the relative strength of the con-
tending forces.
The important results, favorable and adverse,
were that the object for which I had started out,
the occupation of east Tennessee, was not even in
a condition to be attempted ; and that on the other
hand, a formidable political and strategical scheme
which aimed at the conquest and absorption of
Kentucky, was defeated with substantial disaster
to the invader, and at the close the Federal arms
returned with increased strength to the possessions
from which they had been withdrawn to counter-
act the invasion. It has been said that territory
was given up which was not recovered for a year ;
but that is not substantially true, except with ref-
erence to Cumberland Gap, and as to that, it is to
be remarked that it had been held at a greater cost
than it was worth, and that afterward it was no
obstacle when the advance into east Tennessee
was made with an adequate force. When the
army on the way back changed commanders at
Bowling Green, there was no new obstacle to its
resumption of every position it had held in middle
Tennessee and Alabama. The enemy, with broken
fortune and relatively impaired strength, was
only on the south side of the Tennessee from
which he had started two months before. I do
not comment upon what was afterward done, or
raise the question whether it was desirable to
resume the position which had been occupied
as a point of departure ; but if it was not desir-
able to resume it, certainly for stronger reasons it
was not a position which it was advisable for me
to hold.
If the campaign, with no more advantageous re-
sults, had been marked by one general and destruc-
tive, but not disastrous battle, it would no doubt
have been received with more popular favor, and
perhaps even have been more easy of professional
praise. I shall not insist on that point, but T shall
particularly make no apology for not ha\ing fought
battles where the issue was reasonably doubtfid,
and wliere they in fact proved not to have been
necessary for the success of my cause. Besides,
in an open field, with capable commanders, it takes
two parties to inaugurate a battle — one to begin
the attack, and another to stand to receive it.
It was much talked of after the event, that Ken-
tucky was known to be the immediate object for
which Bragg moved from Chattanooga ; that it
was proposed to me to concentrate at Sparta to
oppose him ; and that that mountainous and com-
paratively barren region could have been relied
upon to support my army, with exhausted maga-
zines and in the presence of the enemy; but the
facts were as erroneous as the theories were
fallacious. There was never at the time an intelli-
gent judgment or an accepted rumor that Bragg's
first object, if he had any, was any other than the
recovery of middle Tennessee and Nashville ; and
if, under the circumstances, a proposition had been
made to me to concentrate the army at Sparta, I
should have rejected it.
Various speculations and confident declarations
have been indulged in by critics on both sides,
as to the results that would have flowed from cer-
tain drfferent action on the part of the two
commanders. Such opinions with reference to
extended operations are seldom of any value.
They generally have no knowledge of the circum-
stances which would have prevented the prescribed
action, and take no account of the modifying
influence which it would have had on the conduct
of the opposing commander. It is, therefore, idle
to assert, as many have done, that Kirby Smith
could and should have marched into Lou:s\'ille
after the battle of Richmond, or what would have
been the substantial fruit of that proceeding if it
had been accomplished ; or that Bragg and Smith
united would have overwhelmed me at Munford-
ville. The disappointment of calculations pending
the events, affords no stronger marks of fallibility
than do assumptions afterward. Of the former
this campaign, like all campaigns, presents many
examples. Thus, the military problem, as it ap-
peared to my mind, was to be solved by a com-
bined descent of the Confederates upon the iufeinor
Union force in middle Tennessee. But instead of
that, an army, embarrassed in its situation, to be
sure, but intact and powerful, was left in the rear,
and a distant invasion which had no well-founded
prospect of success was undertaken. The bold-
ness and formidable character of this alternative
appeared to give assurance that it would not be
abandoned without at least one vigorous blow in
attack or defense ; but when prudential measures
were taken on the opposing side with reference to
such a contingency, the invader, with a prudence,
not to be expected from the audacity of his ad-
vance, withdrew from the contest. On the other
side, to General Bragg's mind, as early as the 24th
of August, the army opposed to him was demoral-
ized and in full flight, with doubtful prospect of
stopping short of the Ohio ; later it was racing to
get the lead of liim at Munfordville ; and at that
point, astonished to find himself not attacked at
sight, he imagined that his opponent must be in
retreat by some secret route to the Ohio River.
But all of these impi-essions wei-e delusive. When
to his mind the opposing army was in retreat,
it was awaiting his approach from behind the
E^ST TENNESSEE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF PERRYl^/LLE.
SI
Tennessee River and the mountains. When he
imagined it trying to get ahead of him, it was
moving especially to keep him in front and away
from Nashville, deeming the retention of that point
of more consequence than his transient intrusion
upon Kentucky; always pursuing him, always
aiming to get nearer to him, always willing to
avail itself of advantages, and confident in the
end of triumphing over him.
A philosophical study of our civil conflict must
recognize that influences of some sort operated
fundamentally for the side of the Confederacy in
every prominent event of the war, and nowhere
with less effect than in the Tennessee and Ken-
tucky campaign. They are involved in the fact that
it required enormous sacrifices from 24,000,000 of
people to defeat the political scheme of 8,000,000 ;
2,000,000 of soldiers to subdue 800,000 soldiers:
and, descending to details, a naval fleet and 15,-
000 troops to advance against a weak fort, manned
by less than 100 men, at Fort Henry ; 35,000 with
naval cooperation to overcome 12,000 at Donel-
son ; 60,000 to secure a victory over 40,000 at
Pittsburg Landing; 120,000 to enforce the retreat
of 65,000 intrenched, after a mouth of fighting
and manoeuvring, at Corinth; 100,000 repelled by
80,000 in the first Peninsular campaign against
Richmond; 70,000, with a powerful naval force
to inspire the campaign, which lasted nine months,
against 40,000 at Vicksburg; 90,000 to barely
withstand the assault of 70,000 at Gettysburg;^
115,000 sustaining a frightful repulse from
60,000 at Fredericksburg . 100,000 attacked and
defeated by 50,000 at Chancellorsville ; 85,000
held in check two days by 40,000 at Antietam ;
43,000 retaining the field uncertainly against
88,000 at Stone River ; 70,000 defeated at Chiek-
amauga, and beleaguered by 70,000 at Chatta-
nooga ; 80,000 merely to break the investing line
of 45,000 at Chattanooga ; 100,000 to press back
50,000, increased at last to 70,000, from Chatta-
nooga to Atlanta, a distance of 120 miles, and
then let go — an operation which is commemorated
at festive reunions by the standing toast of "one
hundred days under fire"; 50,000 to defeat the
investing line of 30,000 at Nashville ; and finally
120,000 to overcome 60,000 with exhaustion
after a struggle of a year in Virginia. The rule
which this summary establishes will not determine
al)solutely the relative merit of the different
achievements, but is not to be ignored in a judg-
ment upon particular events.
Individually, the Northern soldier was in no sense
the inferior of the Soutliern. What, then, is the
explanation of this rule which is so nearly invari-
able as to show that superior numbers were gener-
ally essential to Union victories, and the success of
Union operations ? Much was due to the character
of the contest. Revolution is calculat(>d to in-
spire bold and desperate action, and Wiirs of s(>nti-
inent, of the nature of whicli this partook more in
the South thaTi in the Nortli. are always marked
by unusual energy. In tlic North there was much
7!V(i'Micral Fnniris .\. Wiilk.T, in his "IIin(or.v of tlu
tlic roHi)onsil)ility of renewing tlic attack an ordcrotl by
advance is I'lioucou.s.— Editohs.
animosity, but it was more collective, and operated
more in shaping public policy than upon the
temper of the armies. The style of the orders and
I)roelamations issued by many of the Southern
generals shows how much they relied on the jjas-
sionate enthusiasm of their soldiers, and how they
tried to stimulate it. They recognized that the
odds must generally be against them, and that
they must find some means of overcoming the
effect of the fact upon the spirits of their troops,
and themselves set an example of audacity.
Of eom-se the necessity of invasion against a
hostile population placed the Federal cause at a
tlisadvantage which had to be overcome by
greater numbers. The sinapler mode of life to
which the bulk of the Southern troops were accus-
tomed made them more contented with meager
supplies ; the lack of resources of eveiy sort pre-
cluded the luxurious outfit to wliich the Nortliern
troops were accustomed ; and thus the inqiedi-
menta of military operations were more restricted
without impairing their efficiency than in the
Northern armies. It took some time to eradicate
this inequality. Another sectional distinction pro-
duced a marked effect in the beginning of the war.
The habits of the Southern people facilitated the
formation of cavalry corps which were com-
paratively efficient even without instruction ; and
accordingly we see Stuart, and John Morgan,
and Forrest riding with impunity around the Union
armies, and destrojdng or harassing their com-
munications. Late in the war that agency was
reversed. The South was exhausted of horses,
while the Northern cavalry increased in numbers
and efficiency, and acquired the audacity which
had characterized the Southern.
But still another influence must be found in the
personal differences between the two sections, —
differences due chiefly to the more rural condition
of the South and the institution of slavery. In all
popular movements the Southern leader was then,
and is now in a less degi-ee, followed with an im-
plicit confidence which did not mean humility by
any means, but produced subordination. Tliis
difference is illustrated by two historical incidents.
At Cold Harbor, the Northern troops, who had
proven their indomitable qualities by losses nearly
equal to the whole force of their ojiponent, when
ordered to another sacrifice, even under such a sol-
dier as Hancock, answered the demand as one
man, with a silent and stolid inertia : ■^ at Gettys-
burg, Pickett, when waiting for the signal wliich
Longstreet dreaded to repeat, for the hopeless but
immortal charge against Cemetery Hill, saluted
and said, as he turned to his ready column: "I
shall move forward, sir!"
Nor must we give slight importance to the infiu-
ence of the Southern women, who in agony of
heart girded the sword upoii their loved ones and
bade them go. It was to be expected that these
various inlhiences would give a confidence to lead-
ershi]) that would tend to bold adventure, and leave
its mark upon the contest.
St'coiid Army CorpH." Hnys. i>. filfi. that Hancock doclhied
Moadc ; and fliat the statciucut that the troops refused to
\iy-
KENTUCKY, LOOKING SOUTH-EAST FROM THE MACKVILLE PIKE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN
ON THE FIELD OF PERRYVILLEJ
BY CHARLES C. GILBERT, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. 8. V.
AS the Army of the Ohio, moving from Bardstown, approached Perry ville
^t\- on the 7th of October, 1862, McCook's corps formed the left, Critten-
den's the right, and mine — which was moving on the direct road by the way
of Springfield, and was ahead of the others — the center. [See maps, pp.
6 and 24.] In my column, R. B. Mitchell's division had the lead; Schoepf
followed, and Sheridan brought up the rear. Our advance was vigorously
resisted by Wheeler's cavalry, forming the rear-guard of Hardee's corps, which
was retiring before us. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when the head of
the column was nearing the line of Doctor's Creek, a tributary of the Chaplin
River, or more properly the Chaplin Fork of Salt River, the enemy, in force,
was observed lining the crest of the ridge on the farther bank, obviously
with the intention of disputing the possession of a few pools of water that
remained in the water-course, Avhich was otherwise nearly dry. An excessive
drought had prevailed for months in this part of Kentucky. At sight of the
enemy, orders were given to form Mitchell's division in order of battle across
the Springfield road and along some high ground on the right. When Schoepf
cani(; up his di\dsion was massed in reserve in Mitchell's rear, on the left of the
road, and Sheridan, arriving after Wheeler had been dislodged and was being
pressed back toward Porryville, was posted in front and to the right of Mit-
chell. Before daybreak on the 8th, a position was gained that covered the
pools in Doctor's Creek, and these formed our only water-supply for the next
two days, or as long as the enemy held the Chaplin River.
^Condensed from General Gilbert's articles iu the "Soutliern Bivouac," and revised bv him.— Editors.
ON THE FIELD OF PERKYl^ILLE.
53
During the night Greneral Buell ordered McCook's and Crittenden's corps
to march at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 8th, and to form in order of
battle on the center corps — my own. The movements of these columns
were delayed, and General Buell, apprehensive of an attack while the center
corps was isolated, directed me to select a strong position, and my troops
were soon moving out of their camps and taking positions for the main attack,
which it was supposed would come on about 10 o'clock. As that horn* drew
near, I observed, in visiting General Sheridan's ground, that a part of it was
vacant, and that one of his brigades was in march on the road to PeiTyville,
and the remainder were preparing to follow. On inquiry it was discovered
that this movement was in consequence of some misunderstanding of orders.
General Sheridan was directed to recall the brigade, resume his position,
and limit himself to its defense until a general advance to attack in force
should be ordered. To this' order was added the explanation that General
Buell was particularly solicitous that nothing be done to bring on a general
engagement until after the junction of the flank corps.
General Sheridan lost no time in reestablishing his division on the ground
to which he had been originally assigned. He had barely accomplished it
when he was attacked in force and a fight ensued, in which the loss was
severe on both sides. In the meantime the head of General McCook's
corps, coming over the Mackville pike, appeared on the high ground marked
.iv^^U^-^>^*
wi-
1^^
1
KIDGK ON THE UNION' I.KFT ()(('tTIIi;i) liV STONK'S AND BUSH S BAT
TKKIKS — THE SCENE OK STAKKWEATHEK'S CONTEST [SEE I'. 58].
I'HOM A PHOTOGRAPH FBOM THE DIRECTION OF ROUS-
SEAU'S LINE, 'taken in 188").
by Russell's house, due north of Sheridan's posi-
tion about one mile. This was about 10: !>() .\. m.
Marking out his line of battle. General McCook
ordered General R<^usseau to form it. Looniis's
battery was established on a commanding piece
of gi-ound near Russell's house, and to the l«'ft
of it. General Rousseau had been ]>rovi()iisly
ordered to send a line of skinnishers to tlif left
54
ON THE FIELD OF PERRYI/ILLE.
VIEW LOOKING NORTH-EAST FROM THE POSITION OF LOOMIS'S BATTERY, THE CENTER OF ROUSSEAU'S
LINE [SEE MAP, P. 24, AND NOTE ON P. 55]. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.
and front to examine some wood on that quarter, and Captain Wiekliffe,
with his company of cavahy, was sent to reconnoiter the ground to the left
of this line of skirmishers. At this time there was some light skirmishing
going on with Sheridan's division, . at the head of the center corps, which was
still in column, as previously described ; but this soon ceased, and General
McCook was satisfied that the enemy he found engaging my corps when
he arrived had retired from the field.
McCook's corps, as previously related, had been ordered to march at 3 a. m.,
but it was 2 : 30 A. M. before the order reached Greneral McCook, and his
march began at 5 a. m. M(;Cook had with him then two divisions, Rousseau's
and Jac^kson's. Rousseau's division took the lead on the march, but when it
arrived at Perry ville only two of the brigades were present — the remaining
one, Starkweather's, having been thrown to the rear by the interposition of
Jackson's division, which cut it off at Mackville. Without waiting for the
arrival of this brigade. General McCook, after giving his assistant adjutant-
general particular instructions to post Jackson's two brigades on a command-
ing ]riece of ground immediately to the right of the Mackville and Perryville
road, and to hold them in column so that they could be moved in any direc-
tion as occasion required, turned over the command to General Rousseau,
and galloped off to report to General Buell at headquarters. Buell was in
my camp, on the Springfield pike about two and a half miles distant from
McCook's position on the Mackville pike. At half -past 12 the Confederates
advanced, and in a few moments the skirmishers and artillery were engaged.
The attack fell upon Sheridan's division at the head of my corps and upon
ON THE FIELD OF PERRYl/ILLE.
55
POSITION OF LOOMIS'S BATTERY ON ROUSSKAU'S LINE, LOOKING ACROSS DOCTOR'S CREEK.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.
Loomis'8 battery occupied the highest part of the
rid^e above H. P. Bottom's house, at about the center
of KouHseau's liue (see map, p. 24). Lytlc's l)riga(l(' ox-
teiuled from the battery across the old Mackvillc iiikf to
the "burnt baru." Lytlc's brigade was awsailcd fioni
the direction of Bottom's house, and from the right
flank. The attack upon the position lield by Loomis's
battery was made chiefly from the ridge in the middle
distance of the i)icture on page 54. The Confederates
gained the north-oast side of that ridge by following
down the dry bed of Doctor's Creek under tlie shelter of
its west bank.— Editors.
the head of McCook's corps, now advancing from its first position at Kussell's
house down the slope toward Chaplin Eiver.
When General McCook returned to his troops after having reported at
headquarters, he found that General Rousseau had advanced the right of the
hue about eight hundred or a thousand yards, and was occupying a com-
manding ridge which was to the left of the Mackville and Perry^illc inke.
The enemy was firing on this line from three batteries, and Loomis's and
Simonson's batteries were replying. As there was no Confederate infantry in
sight McCook ordered the firing to cease, so as to economize ammunition, and
then prepared to make a reconnoissance toward Chaplin River for water, as he
had just been ordered to do by General Buell. Riding off to the left, General
McCook found a commanding ridge about six hundretl yards from tlie stream
and overlooking it. Sending for Generals Jackson and Terrill, he showt'd
them the water, marked his line of l)attle, and placed a l)attery on it with
strong supports. General Teri'ill was then ordered to advance a body of
skirmishers down the slope to the water as soon as tlic line nvjis formed.
Not being apprehensive of an attack, General McCook then went back to his
rigiit. It was now nearly 2 o'clock. At this time the liiu> of the left corps
stood with its right on the Mackville and Perryville ])ike near t]i(> rr.>ssing of
Doctor's Creek and its left near (liai)lin Riv(M-, its direetioii being abont y\\\o
north and south. It Avas formed of two l)rigades of Ixousseaii's division
56
ON THE FIELD OF PERRY l^iLLE.
i V
FARM-HOUSE OF n. p. BOTTOM. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKICN IN 1885.
The fariii-house stands near Doctor's Creek, under the ridge occupied by Rousseau; and the view
is from the old MackvlUe pike. [See map, p. 24.]
(Lytle's and Harris's) and Terrill's brigade of Jackson's division, Webster's
brigade of Jackson's division had not yet come into position, and Stark-
weather's brigade of Rousseau's division had not yet reached the field.
Just previously to this the enemy, in pursuance of his plan of attack, had
begun to engage Sheridan's division, the head of the center corps. Mitchell's
division was at that tim(3 closing up to take position within supporting dis-
tance of Sheridan. Caldwell's and Carlin's brigades of this division were to
the right and roar, under cover, and Gooding's brigade was north of Doctor's
Creek, near the stream. In this position the latter covered Sheridan's left,
and watched the interval between the two corps so long as the left corps
remained in its place in line of battle, and before it advanced to the front.
As Mitchell came into his position on the second line, the enemy appeared on
his right in force and engaged Carlin's brigade, but were repulsed. It was
now nearing lialf-past 2, and tlie enemy's entire line, from his left, where the
attack began on SlK^-idan, to his right, where it fell in heaviest force on
Rousseau, was in full progress, carrjdng everything before it. When Sheri-
dan's assailants reached his main line he gave them a reception, cool, effect-
ive, and disastrous, and when their repulse was complete a brigade from the
second line (Carlin's), which had been called up to assist in the defense, pur-
sued the enemy to Perryville, thus turning his left and establishing itself on
his rear, (xeneral Sheridan's action was according to the sound principles
of tlie profession, and, as lie was am]ily and promptly supported, tlie opera-
tions on this ])arl of the Held, in wliicli he liad Ihc lead, were fully successful.
Olsf THE FIELD OF PERRYl^lLLE. 57
and his conduct here foreshadowed the exceptionally successful career that
lay before him.
General McCook was assailed by greatly superior numbers. His brigades,
which Greneral Rousseau had put in motion to the front in his absence, were
surprised on the march by Greneral Bragg's attack, and were taken in the act
of forming, and on ground favorable to the attacking party. Rousseau's right
brigade, the extreme right of the left corps, was attacked with great severity
and pertinacity. Terrill's brigade on the left, and Starkweather's, which had
now arrived, were in turn heavily assailed. Being composed of entirely raw
troops, Terrill's brigade in a few moments gave way in confusion, losing Par-
sons's battery of eight Napoleon guns. Greneral Jackson, who was with this
brigade, was killed at the first fire. Genei'al Terrill did all in his power to
steady his men, but in vain. An hour and a half later, while still striving to
rally his broken troops, he was mortally wounded. 5t Starkweather's brigade
and Stone's and Bush's batteries were on the extreme left and rear of Terrill's
brigade, and checked the attack.
General McCook, perceiving that he was assailed by at least three times his
number, sent an aide-de-camp, Lieutenant L. M. Hosea, to General Sheridan,
requesting him to look to the right of his line and see that it was not turned.
Just at this time Sheridan had his attention fully occupied with his own
right, where two opposing batteries were in position, and troops were mass-
ing behind them to attack him front and tlank. About half an hour later
McCook sent Captain H. N. Fisher, of his staff, to General Schoepf, com-
manding the reserve of my corps, with an urgent request for reenforcement,
reporting that his reserves were all exhausted and his corps upon the point
of being compromised. General Schoepf was at the time on the march to
the front with two of his brigades (Walker's and Steedman's), and although
desirous of rtmdering assistance, he declined to take the responsibility of
changing his line of march. He referred the officer to me, but I was at the
time at General Buell's headquarters, wdiere I had been since noon.
Owing to the conformation of the gi'ound and to the limited use of artillery
on both sides, no sound of the battle had been heard at General Buell's head-
quarters until the attack reached General Sheridan's position, which was
about half-past 3 o'clock. Then the cannon firing became so continuous and
was so well sustained and so different from the irregular shots, at wiile
intervals, which had characterized the "shelling of the woods" earlier in
the day, that it was readily recognized as a battle. It was near 4 o'clock
when there came up the valley of Doctor's Creek the sound of rapid artil-
lery firing. It was too heavy and too well sustained to come from merely
"shelling the woods." Listening attentively for a nioincnt, (Jcncral Bn.'U
said to me, "That is something more than shelling the woods; it sounds
like a fight." I at once mounted and set off" at a rapid jtace down the
^Colonel Cliiiili's D.-iil.y. of th.' llM IikHmm:! "'i> .■n-.i-rmml. Th.ir ..pinion was thai mm would
reRinu'iit, says : '"•v
i;lil.ii.'.l if tli<\ .onsidi if.l the tlo.-tiiiu' of
l.iol.Ml.illtirs and liow sli.i,'lil tin- .hanc." was of any
"ItiH <uri<His tliat tlu> night lu'fort' tin- battU' |of parti, iilar prrwon It.in^; kill. -d. Tlifory failod. an it has
Perryvillc] (i.n.iMls Jackson and Torrill and Colonel oft.ii d.>n.' lioforo; all tlnoo wiTC killod in tlie noxt
WcbHtcr weiv discussiuK Ibc cliancfs of being bit in day's tlgbt." EDITORS.
VOL III. 5
=,8
ON THE FIELD OF PERRYl/ILLE.
•■ SI-'
mmri^^
ENGAGEMENT OF STARKWEATHER'S BRIGADE ON THE EXTREME UNION LEFT. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.
Gciicr.'il .Toliii ('. Starkwpathor, in his official report,
savH tliat flic bri.i^adc, coiisiHtiiig at the time of the 24th
Illinois. iHt and Slst WisconHiii, and 79th Pennsylvania,
'• arrived on the held of battle at about 1 : 30 P. M., havliiR
iiiarclicd twelve miles — about three miles thereof being
tluKiitrli tiilds, woods, etc. Finding the troops already
engaged well on the right, center, and left, and thinMng
the extreme left position most accessible, and, from
appearances, one that should be held at all hazards, 1
placed my command at once in iiosition facing the en-
emy's right." General McCook, in his report on the part
taken by Starkweather's brigade, saj's that the 21st
Wisconsin was stationed "in a corn-field, lying down,
awaiting the approach of the enemy, and when he ap-
proached with his overwhelming force this new regi-
ment poured into his raiLks a most withering tire."
road in the direction of the firing. Within a mile I met Captain Fisher com-
ing at full speed and bearing General McCook's message. Instead of sending
Captain Fisher back to General McCook with my answer to his appeal for
help, I advised him to continue on and bear to General Buell the astound-
ing news, and at once sent orders to Schoepf to go to the interval between
the two corps, — on the left of Sheridan, — and to Mitchell to close toward
Sheridan's right and support him. Directing \xij course toward the left, I
found Gooding's brigade of Mitchell's division still standing to the left of
Doctor's Creek, and at once put it in motion to the right to join the main
body of the division and be nearer Sheridan, who had just reported that he
was hard pressed in front and that the enemy was driving our left wing.
General Schoepf was now on the ground with his leading brigade (Walker's).
This he was ordered to deploy, to replace Gooding. In the midst of these
movements, another staff -officer. Captain AV. T. Hol)litzell, came from the left
coi-ps for lielp, with the information that the troops, though fighting stub-
boi-nly, were falling back everywhere, and that if assistance was not speedily
afforded they must soon be driven from the field.
Up to this moment the fighting with Sheridan had been gi'owing in inten-
sity, and judging fi-om the sound that it must soon cuhninate, I detained
C'aptaiii no])litzell to await the issue. It was soon perceived that the firing
was diminisliiug, and as there were no signs of defeat on our side, I turned
ON THE FIELD OF PERRYyiLLE.
S9
to Walker's brigade to send it over to the left wing, Avlien I discovered it had
not yet deployed, and, moreover, did not seem to be sufficiently familiar
with the tactics to make the simplest movements with promptness and in-
telligence. Accordingly I sent my adjutant-general, Captain J. E. Stacy,
to recall Gooding and order him to proceed under the guidance of Captain
Hoblitzell to report to Greneral McCook. Gooding took with him Pinney's
Wisconsin battery. Within twenty minutes after receiving the order, Good-
ing made himself felt on the flank of the Confederates, who had thus far
been steadily diiving Rousseau's troops back toward the Russell House.
Within a few minutes after this brigade had started, Sheridan, ha^'ing re-
pulsed his assailants, turned his guns and opened fire across the valley of
Doctor's Creek on Rousseau's assailants, who, in their advance, had come to
present their flank within easy range, and from his commanding position
he delivered a fire so effective as to force back the enemy in this part of the
field, to the great relief of the right of General McCook's line. Just after
Sheridan's artillery opened, General Steedman came up with his brigade of
Schoepf 's division and kept on his course down Doctor's Creek. The enemy
had now been So far driven from McCook's front that they were beyond the
reach of Steedman's infantry ; but, passing under the fire of Sheridan's guns,
Steedman halted and opened to the left with Smith's battery of his brigade.
Viewed from the Confederate stand-point, the battle of Perry\dlle appears
to have consisted of an attempt to turn the left flank of the Union line, in
which, for the distance of a thousand or twelve hundred yards, the assailants
drove all before them. At this junctm'e, after a fierce fight, the attack came
to a stand, having expended its force, and the left of the Confederate Hue
was now itself di'iven and turned, and its line of retreat threatened. This
last the Confederates supposed had been effected by a fresh corps arriving
on the field from the direction of Lebanon. In abandoning the battle-ground
the Confederates, although obliged to leave their wounded behind, moved
without any sense of humiliation, for they had made a good fight, and
appeared only to be withdrawing from the presence of a greatly superior force.
From the Union side, the battle takes this appearance : The center corj^s,
arriving on the ground alone on the afternoon of the 7tli, met with consider-
able opposition in establishing itself in position. This opposition continued
with only a Inief interval till about 11 o'clock on the 8th, when the Hank
corps began to arrive on the line abreast of the center. After the lapse of about
an hour four brigades from the left wing started to the front in cpiest of wat(»r.
Tliis movement coincided with the advance of the Confederates in full foicc to
turn the left of the Union army. Those brigades were accordingly met and
overpowered and driven back to their places in line, and some of them l)eyond
it. But they made a most obstinate resistance. In the center ('ori»s the
detachments thrown out to watch the ap])roaches to the i)osition held by
the leading division were driven in, and that division was attacked in strong
force and with great determination. liut the assailants were r(»]>nlsed and
driven from the field, and then thecenter cor}>s conti'ibuted al)out one-third of
its effective force to the relief of the left winir and saved it from destruction.
NOTES OF A STAFF- OFFK'Eli AT PEUKYVILLEJ
BY J. MONTGOMERY WRIGHT, MAJOR, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. V.
rpnE situation at Louisville in the latter part of
-J- September, 18G2, was not unlike that at Wash-
ington after the first battle of Bull Run. The be-
lief was entertained by many that Bragg would
capture the city, and not a few had removed their
money and valuables across the Ohio River, not
over-assured that Bragg might not follow them to
the lakes. Nelson had sworn that he would hold
the city so long as a house remained standing or
a soldier was alive, and he had issued an order
tiiat all the women, childi'en, and non-combatants
should leave the place and seek safety in Indiana.
Tie liiul only raw troops and convalescent veterans,
ami few citizens believed that he could hold out
against an attack. His tragic death occurred a
few days later. 3>
Buell's arrival changed the situation of affairs.
The uncertain defensive suddenly gave way to an
aggi'cssive attitude, and speculation turned from
whether Bragg would capture Louisville to whether
Buell would capture Bragg.
The country through which Buell's army marched
is almost destitute of water, but at Perry ville a
stream ilowed between the contending armies, and
access to that water was equally important to both
armies. Buell accompanied the center corps (Gil-
bert's), and the advance reached this stream on the
evening of October 7th. From that time until the
stream was crossed there was constant fighting for
access to it, and the only restriction on this fighting
was that it should not bring on an engagement until
the time for the general attack should arrive. An
incident will illustrate the scarcity of water. I ob-
tained a cantoenful, and about dark on October
7tli, after giving myself a good brushing and a
couple of dry rubs without feeling much cleaner,
mycai'eless announcement that I was about to take
a tin-dipper bath brought General Buell out of his
tent with a rather mandatory suggestion that I
pour the water back into my canteen and save it
for an emergency. The emergency did not come to
i Condensed from a paper in " The Southern Bivouac."
Editors.
^The facts hi relation to the killing of Geucral Will-
iam Nelson by General Jefferson C. Davis are recounted
by General James B. Fry in his pamplilet, " Killed by a
Brother Soldier," from which the followins ac(!Ount is
coiidcTiscd : Davis, wlio had been on sick leave in
Indiana, hearing that goneral offlcers were nrcdcd about
f'iiiiiiinati and Louisville to assist in rciiclliufr the
invawion of Kirby Smith and Bragg, vohiutccrcd liis
8crvi('i-s, and was sent by General H. G. Wriglit at Cin-
cinnati to report to Nelson at Louisville. Tlie latter
assigned to Davis tlu^ work of arming the citizens of
l^ouisville. A day or two afterward Davis called at
Nelson's headipiarters in tlie Gait House. N(>l8on in-
quired, " Well, Davis, how are you getting along with
your ooniniand f " Davis re)ilied, " I don't know," and
gave similar answeiHlo t woor three questions as to the
number of regiments and companies he liad organized.
Nelson, who was angered by his seeming inditt'erenee,
rose and said, " But you should know. I am disa))-
pointed in you. General Davis ; I selected you for this
duty because you were an olliccr of the regular army.
me, but on the morning of October 9th that water
helped to relieve the suffering of some wounded
men who lay between the two armies.
At Buell's headquarters, on the Sth, preparations
were going on for the intended attack, and the in-
formation was eagerly waited for that Crittenden
had reached his position on the right. Fighting
for water went on in our front, and it was under-
stood that it extended all along the line, but no
battle was expected that day. McCook was at
Buell's headquarters in the morning, and received,
I believe, some oral instructions regarding the
contemplated attack. It was understood that care
would be taken not to bring on a general engage-
ment, and no importance was attached to the
sounds that reached us of artillery-firing at the
front of the center. Of course the young officers
of the staff, of whom I was one, were not taken
into conference by General Buell, but we all knew
that the subject of attention that morning was
the whereabouts of Crittenden's corps, and the
placing it in position on the right for the general
engagement that was to be brought on as soon as
the army was in line. We all saw McCook going
serenely away like a general carrying his orders
with him.
In the afternoon we moved out for a position
nearer Crittenden, as I inferred from the direc-
tion taken. A message came from the line on
the left center to General Buell, and in a few mo-
ments Colonel James B. Fry, our chief of staff,
called me up, and sent me with an order to Gen-
eral Gilbert, commanding the center corps, to
send at once two brigades to reenforce General
McCook, commanding the left corps. Thus I came
to be a witness to some of the curious features of
Perryville.
I did not know what was going on at the left,
and Colonel Fry did not inform me. He told me
what to say to General Gilbert, and to go fast, and
taking one of the general's orderlies with me, I
but I Und I made a mistake." Davis replied, deliber-
ately, "General Nelson, I am a regular soldier, and I
demand the treatment due to mo as a general officer."
Dr. Irwin, Nelson's medical director, was called in by
Davis to be a witness to the altei-cation. In his presence
Nelson rejieated the rei)riniau(l, and ordered Davis to
report to (ieneial Wright at Cineiiniati. Davis replied,
"You have no authority to oi'<ler mo." Nelson turned
to his ad,jntaiit geneial and said, " Captain, if General
Da\is does not leave the city bj' 9 o'clock to-night, give
instructions to the provost-marshal to see that he is put
across the Ohio." Davis was highly incensed by the
manner and bearing of Nelson. He withdrew, and that
night reported to Wright in Cincinnati. When Buell
reached Louisville on September 25th, Wright ordered
Davis to return and report to Buell. IIo arrived at the
Gait House on the mrirning of September 2!>th. Nelson,
after breakfast, was standing in the hotel office, and was
leaning against the counter when he was approached
by Davis in company with (Jovernor Oliver P. Mor-
ton, of Indiana. Davis accosted Nelson Avith the re-
mark that Nelson had insulted him at the last meetmg
and that he must have satisfaction. Nelson told him
NOTES OF A STAFF-OFFICEK AT PERRVyiLLE.
6i
started on my errand. I found General Gilbert at
the front, and us he had no staff-officer at hand at
the moment, lie asked me to go to General Schoepf,
one of his division commanders, with the order.
Schoepf promptly detached two brigades, and he
told me I had better go on ahead and find out
where they were to go. There was no sound to
direct me, and as I tried to take an air line I
passed outside the Union lines and was over-
taken by a cavalry officer, who gave me the pleas-
ing information that I was riding toward the en-
emy's pickets. Now up to this time I had heard no
sound of battle ; I had heard no artillery in front
of me, and no heavy infantry-firing. I rode back,
and passed behind the cavalry regiment which was
deployed in the woods, and started in the direction
indicated to me by the officer who called me back.
At some distance I overtook an ambulance train,
urged to its best speed, and then I knew that some-
thing serious was on hand. This was the first inti-
mation I had that one of the fiercest struggles of
the war was at that moment raging almost within
my sight.
Directed by the officers in charge of the ambu-
lances I made another detour, and pushing on at
greater speed I suddenly turned into a road, and
there before me, within a few hundred yards, the
battle of Perryville burst into view, and the roar
of the artillery and the continuous rattle of the
musketry first broke upon my ear. It was the finest
spectacle I ever saw. It was wholly unexpected,
and it fixed me with astonishment. It was like
tearing away a curtain from the front of a great
picture, or the sudden bursting of a thunder-cloud
when the sky in front seems serene and clear. I
had seen an unlooked-for storm at sea, with hardly
a moment's notice, hurl itself out of the clouds and
lash the ocean into a foam of wild rage. But here
there was not the warning of an instant. At one
bound my horse carried me from stillness into the
uproar of battle. One turn from a lonely bridle-
path through the woods brought me face to face
with the bloody stiniggle of thousands of men.
Waiting for news to carryback, I saw and heard
some of the unhappy occurrences of Penyville. I
saw young Forman, with the remnant of his com-
pany of the intli Kentucky regiment, withdrawn
to make way for the reenforcements, and as they
silently passed me they seemed to stagger and
reel like men who had been beating against a great
storm. Forraan had the colors in his hand, and he
and several of his little gioup of men had their
hands upon their chests and their lips apart as
though they had difficulty in breathing. They filed
into a field, and without thought of shot or shell
they lay down on the ground apparently in a state
of exhaustion. I joined a mounted gi-oup about a
young officer, and heard Rumsey Wing, one of
Jackson's volunteer aides, telling of that general's
death and the scattering of the raw division he
commanded. I remembered how I had gone up to
Shiloh with Terrill's battery in a small steamer,
and how, as the first streak of daylight came, Ter-
rill, sitting on the deck near me, had recited a line
about the beauty of the dawn, and had wondered
how the day woidd close upon us all. I asked about
Terrill, who now commandeil a brigade, and was
told that he had been carried to the rear to die.
I thought of the accomplished, good, and brave
Parsons, — whom I had seen knocked down seven
times in a fight with a bigger man at West Point,
without ever a thought of (juitting so long as he
could get up, and who lived to take orders in
the church, and die at Memphis of the yellow
fever, ministering to the last to the spiritual
wants of his parishioners, — and I asked about
Parsons's battery. His raw infantry support had
broken, and stunned by the disaster that he thought
had overtaken the whole army, he stood by his
guns until every horse and every man had gone,
and the enemy was almost touching him, and had
been dragged away at last by one of his men who
had come back to the rescue. His battery was a
wreck and no one knew then where he was. And
so the news came in of men I knew and men with
friends about me.
to go away. Davis pressed his demand and Nelson
Bald, " Go away, you puppy. I don't want anything
to do with you." Davis, who had picked up a blank visit-
ing card and had squeezed it into a ball as he was talk-
liiK, responded to the liisultiug words by flipplnfi the
card into Nelson's fiioe. Nelson then 8lai)ped l)avin in
the face and siiid to Governor Morton, " Did you eouie
here, sir, to see me insulted 1 " " No," replied Morton,
whereupon Nelson walked toward his room on the office
floor. After the ulap Davis asked for a pistol, and a
friend borrowed one and lian(h'(l it to Davis, who started
toward NelHon's room and met liim in the corridor
ne;ir tlie foot of the Hlaircase. apparently on his way to
Hnell'H apartment npstairn. When a yiird apart Davis
tired. Nelson walked npstairs and fell in the hall m-ar
linell's door. To the proin-ietor of tin' liolel Nelson
said, "Send for a <-lerLcynniii ; I wisli to t)e liaptiz.tl. I
have l)oen basely murdered." General T. L. Crittenden,
who wasattln^ in-eakfiist tahle. hnrrie<l to the corridor,
and, takiiifr N«'lson's hand, said, " Nelson, ar." yon seri-
ously hurt?" Nelson replied. "Tom, I am nmrdered."
WluMi Rnrseon Uobert Mni-rav arrived Nelson waslvins,'
.Ml tin' floor of a n.om m^ar wlnMe h.' ha.l fallen, insensi-
ble. Tliesnnill pistol-ball entered Just over tlu> li.aM.
In less than an hour Nelson was dead. General Fry was
in the grand hall of the hotel at the time of the en-
counter. On hearing the sound of the pistol he made
his way through the crowd that had surrounded Davis
and arrested him in the nann' of General Ruell. Fry
took Davis's arm. and tlu'y went to Davis's room on an
upi)er floor. Wlien the door was closed Davis said he
wanted to relate the facts while they were fresh in his
mind, and anu)ug other details mentioned the flipping
of the paper into Nelsmi's face. (JeJieral Gilberi was
appointed to succeed Nelson, and fwo «h(ys afferwanl
the army nnirehed for rerryville. Ruidl could not then
si)are oftleers for a eourt-nnirtial. ami suggested to
IIalle<k that a trial by eomndssion appointeii from
Wasliington should take place immediately As no
eliarires were preferred against Davis within the luriod
tlxed by military rules, he was released by onler of
General Wright."
On October 27th, 1S62, (Jcnernl Davis was tndieted
by a grand Jury for inanshiughler. and was admittetl
to bail in tliV sum of live thousand dollars. The ejise
was continued from tiux' to time until May IWh, IsiVI,
when "it was stricken from the do<ket. with h-«ve to
reinstate."— Kditoks.
CUMBERLAND GAP.
BY GEORGE W. MORGAN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.
ON the 11th of April, 1862, with the Seventh Division of the Army of the
Ohio under my command, I arrived at Cumberland Ford with orders
from General Buell to take Cumberland Gap, fourteen miles to the south-
ward, and occupy east Tennessee, if possible; if not, then to prevent the
Confederates from advancing from that direction. [See map, p. 6.] This
movement and Mitchel's advance into northern Alabama formed detached
parts of the general plan of operations arranged between General Buell and
General Halleck.
The division under my command consisted of four brigades, commanded
by Brigadier-Generals Samuel P. Carter and James G. Spears, Colonel John
F. De Com-cy, 16th Ohio regiment, and Colonel John Coburn, 33d Indiana
regiment. (Coburn's brigade was afterward commanded by Brigadier-Gen-
eral Absalom Baird.) During the preceding wintei'. Carter had occupied a
position near the ford and threatening the Gap.
The condition of Carter's brigade was deplorable. The winter's storms,
converting the narrow roads into torrents, had practically cut him off from
his base of supplies, and, in spite of all he could do, his troops were half-
famished and were suffering from scurvy. Of the 900 men of the 49th
Indiana regiment, only 200 were fit for duty.
Reconnoissances at once satisfied me that the fastness could not be taken
by a direct attack, nor without immense loss. I determined to try to force
the enemy to abandon his stronghold by strategy.
The position of the Confederate commander in east Tennessee, Major-
General E. Kirby Smith, was a difficult one. A large majority of the people
of east Tennessee were devoted to the Union, and the war there had become
a vendetta. The Union men regarded the Confederates as criminals, and
were in turn denounced by the Confederates as insurgents. Kirby Smith
recommended the arrest and incarceration in Southern prisons of leading
citizens, not in arms, as a means of converting the majority to the South-
ern cause. J
For a distance of eighteen miles north of Big Creek Gap, a pass south-
west of Cumberland Gap, the Confederates had heavily blockaded the narrow
and al)ru])t defiles along that route. The work of clearing the blockades
was tlioroughly done. But while Spears was thus engaged Kirby Smith
advanced with a large force of infantry through a bridle-path called Wood-
son's Gap, to cut him ott'. Th(^ attempt might well have succeeded but for the
i On our side acts not less vigorous were resorted was that th<>y liad arrested T. A. R. Nelson, while
to. A few days after our occupation of Cumberland on his way to take his seat in the United States
Gap, June ISth, General Spears, witliout authority, Congress, and had sent him to Eiclmiond. Their
sent out in the night, captnred and wanted to hang lives were saved by my interposition, and they were
a number of Confederate citizens, wliose offense sent as prisoners to Indianapolis.— G. W, M.
I
CUMBERLAND GAP.
63
heroic act of Mrs. Edwards, a noble womai], whose heart was wholly in the
Union cause, although she had a son in each of the opposing armies. Well
mounted, she passed the mountains by another path, and, by incredible
efforts, reached my headquarters in time to enable me to send couriers at full
speed with orders for Spears to fall back toward Barboursville, until his
scouts should report that Smith had recrossed the mountains.
In order to succeed in the task committed to me it was necessary to compel
Kirby Smith, who was at this time concentrating his whole army in my im-
mediate front, to divide his forces.
To this end I urged General Buell
to direct General 0. M. Mitchel to
threaten Chattanooga, and thus
draw the main force of the Confed-
erates in that direction.
About four miles south of Cum-
berland Ford is a narrow defile
formed by an abrupt mountain on
one side, and the Cumberland Elver
on the other, through which passes
the State Road to Cumberland Gap,
and on the edge of the defile was an
abandoned cabin, known as "The
Moss House," situated at the junc-
tion of the State Road and a path-
way leading to Lambdin's on the
main road to Big Creek Gap. On
the morning of May 22d I sent
forward the brigade of De Courcy,
with a battery, with orders to oc-
cupy the defile, and, as a stratagem intended to puzzle Smith, to construct a
fort at the junction of the pathway and road.
I threw forward a strong party of pioneers to widen the path leading to
Lambdin's, so as to enable my artillery and train to move forward. The
mountain was steep and rugged, and skill and toil were necessar>- to the
accomplishment of the work. Twenty-two guns, 2 of them SO-poundcr and
2 20-pounder Parrott's, had to be dragged over the Pine and Cumberland
mountains, at times by means of block and tackle, at others by putting
in as many horses as could be used, and again by men — 200 at a single
piece — hauling with drag-rojuxs. The pathway leading from tlie ]\I(>ss House
had been made the width of a wagon, but two teams could not pass eacb
other there.
On the 6tli and 7tli of June J^ncll caHscd divcrsi
advance of part of Mitchel's command to the v'ww (
and Smith, with two brigades, hastened to its i-esene
Courcy had gone forward; Baird oecujtied the delilc
and Carter was assiijrned to liold tlie delile till th<' la
HKIGADIER-GENERAL GEORGE W. MORGAN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
lis to be made l»y aii
•1 )l)0site Chattanot)ga,
. The brigade ,.f De
■ at the Moss IloUM-,
t moment, and then
64 CUMBERLAND GAP.
bring up the rear of the cohimn. On the 9th of June Greneral Buell tele-
gi-aphecl me from Booneville, Mississippi :
" The force now iu Tennessee is so small that no offensive operation against east Tennessee
can be attempted, and you must therefore depend mainly on your own resources."
And on the 10th:
" Considering your force and that opposed to you, it will probably not be safe for you to
undertake any offensive operations. Other operations will soon have an influence on your
designs, and it is better for you to i-un no risk at present."
It was, however, next to impossible to change my plans at this moment,
and move back on a road such as described. We therefore continued to toil
forward over the almost impassable mountains.
Thinking that the series of feints against Chattanooga that were being-
made at my request indicated an advance in force, Kirby Smith now con-
centrated for defense at that point, after evacuating Cumberland Grap and
removing the stores. This was just what I wanted. On the evening of the
17th of June, General Carter L. Stevenson of the Confederate forces sent
Colonel J. E. Eains to cover the evacuation of Cumberland Gap,^ which had
been commenced on the afternoon of that day ; Rains withdrew in the night
and marched toward Morristown. Unaware of that fact, at 1 o'clock on the
morning of June 18th we advanced in two parallel columns, of two brigades
each, to attack the enemy ; but while the troops were at breakfast I learned
from a Union man who had come along the valley road that Rains had with-
drawn and that the gap was being evacuated. The advance was at once
sounded, the Seventh Division pressed forward, and four hours after the
evacuation by the Confederates the flag of the Union floated from the loftiest
pinnacle of the Cumberland Range. The enemy had carried away his
field-guns, but had left seven of his heavy cannon in position, dismantling
the rest.
At the request of Carter, his brigade was sent forward in pursuit of the
enemj^ as far as Tazewell, but the enemy had fallen back south-eastward to
the Clinch Mountains. Cumberland Gaj) was om-s without the loss of a
single Hfe. Secretary Stanton telegraphed the thanks of the President, and
General Buell published a general order iu honor of this achievement of the
Seventh Division.
Lieutenant (now Colonel) William P. Craighill, of the Corps of Engineers,
a soldier of distinguished merit and ability, was sent by Secretary Stanton
to strengthen the fortifications at the Gap, and he soon rendered them
impregnable against attack.
My hope and ambition now was to advance against Knoxville and arouse
the Uidon men of east Tennessee to arms. I urgently asked for two additional
brigades of infantry, a battery, and two regiments of cavalry, and, thus reen-
forced, pledged myself to sweep east Tennessee of the Confederates. My guns
were increased from 22 to 28, and a battery of east Tennessee artillery was
organized, commanded by Lieutenant Daniel Webster, of Forster's 1st Wis-
3> The Confederate forces covering the mountain and river passes north of Knox-sdlle at this time
were under General C. L. Stevenson, First Division, Department of East Tennessee.— Editors.
CUMBERLAND GAP.
65
"^^.
M-n
PLAN OF THE CONFEDERATE WORKS AT CUMBERLAND GAP, JUNE 14, 18G2.
FROM A DRAWING BY CAPTAIN W. F. PATTERSON.
consin battery. Four thousand stand of arms, destined for east Tennessee, but
left at Nicholasville and Crab Orchard during the winter on account of the
impassable state of the roads, were now sent forward to Cumberland Gap
with a largo supply of ammunition, and magazines and an arsenal were got
ready for them. A vast store-house, capable of containing supplies for
20,000 men for G months, was also built by Cai)tain AV. F. Patterson. The
nerves and muscles of every man were stretched to the utmost tension, and
the Gap became a vast workshop. Captain S. B. Brown, assistant quarter-
master and acting commissary of subsistence, a man of fine intelligence
and great energy, put on the road in small trains over four hundred wagons,
and by this means the various munitions of war were dragged from the blue-
grass region through the wilderness to Cumberland Gap.
Colonel De Courcy and Captain Joseiili Edgar (afterward killed in action
under De Courcy at Tazewell) were detailed as instructors of tactics for the
of&cers of the new regiments of east Tennessee troops, who wcic brave,
ambitious men and anxious to learn. Forage was collected with tlilliculty
by armed partitas.
About the middle of August Stevenson went into position in my immediate
front. On the morning of the 17th T receiviMl iiitelligtMice, ]>robabl(» in its
character, that Stevenson woiiM a1tem])t to carry the (lap that night. At
66 CUMBERLAND GAP.
2:. 'JO A. M. oil the 18tli reveille was sounded, and the lines were manned, but
the enemy did not attack. It was evident that he intended a siege.
On the 16th Kirby Smith crossed the mountains south of us, into Ken-
tucky, occupied Cumberland Ford, and sent a demand for the surrender of
the Gap, to which I replied : " If you want this fortress, come and take HP
Smith's position was critical. He had no base of supplies ; the valley in
which his troops were concentrated was soon exhausted; the longer he
delayed pushing toward the blue-grass region, the greater would be the
force he would have to meet on reaching there. Having completely cut me
oif from my base, he therefore pushed forward toward Lexington, leaving
Stevenson still in front of me.
The Confederates were invading Kentucky in three Columns: Bragg on
the left. Smith in the center, Humphrey Marshall on the right, while John
H. Morgan hovered like an eagle on the wing, ready to pounce upon any
weak point. They now regarded the capture or destruction of my division as
certain. Our situation was indeed critical. We had been three months in
this isolated position. Our only reasonable hope of succor had been destroyed
by the defeat and dispersion of Nelson's force at Richmond on the 30th of
August. [See p. 4.] We were destitute of forage. The horses of the 9th
Ohio Battery literally starved to death, and then- skeletons were dragged
outside the lines. Our supplies of food were rapidly becoming exhausted.
De Courcy had been sent to Manchester, sixty miles distant, in the hope of
obtaining supplies, but there was scarcely sufficient for his own brigade.
Enveloped on every side by the enemy, absolutely cut off from my base of sup-
plies, and with starvation staring us in the face, I assembled a council of war,
and, stating the situation in a few words, asked for the opinions of the mem-
bers. Spears, Carter, and Baird (De Courcy being absent) gave it as their
opinion, in which I concurred, that retreat was inevitable. In fact, I had
already marked out in red chalk on the map of Kentucky my line of retreat,
just as it was afterward carried out. Holding out the idea that we were
seeking to obtain supplies by way of the barren wilderness through which I
purposed to reach the Ohio, I had previously caused Lieutenant-Colonel George
W. Gallup, of the 14th Kentucky, a soldier of rare merit, to send me at inter-
vals men of his command familiar with the country through which each day's
march would have to be made. The information given me by those brave
mountaineers w^as discouraging. The want of water, the rugged character of
tlie defiles, the almost absolute want of supplies, were stated by every one,
but the opinion was expressed that a few wagons, laden with half a ton each,
might get tiirough. My topogi-aphical engineer. Captain Sidney S. Lyon, a
man of fine intelligence and skill, had been the geologist of Kentucky, and
was familiar with every foot of the State. Pointing out to him the region
I had marked across the map T said, " Can I take my di\asion by that route
to the Ohio River ?" "Yes, possibly, by abandoning tiie artillery and wagons."
However, there was practi(^ally no choice. To retreat on Lexington would
have ])laced my division, with its reduced numbers, between Stevenson in
our imincdiate rear, Smith in our front, Bragg on our left, and Humphrey
CUMBERLAND GAP.
67
^ ll
^^^^iiil-^^
f'vlii
^M~t\
VIEW OF CUMBERLAND GAP FROM THE SOUTH, SEPT. 14,
FROM A LITHOGRAPH.
A, Battery No. 1 ; B, Battery No. 2 ; C, Fort Moripllan ; D, Battery No. 3 ; E, Fort Halleck ; 1, 1st Teiiuessee Regt. ;
2, 2d Tennessee ; 5, 49th Indiana ; 6, l-ttli Kentucky; 8, Headquarters Provost Guard; 9, 3d Kentucky ;
10, 33d Indiana; 11, General Baird's lit ;ul(iiiarters; 12, (ieneral Carter's Headquarters ;
13, House used as General Morgan's Headquarters.
Marshall on our right, with the passes of the Wild Cat or of the Big Hill to
overcome. I therefore determined to retreat by the red-chalk line, and at all
hazards to take my artillery and wagons with me. |
Stevenson, who knew as well as I did that I must attempt a retreat, was
vigilant and energetic. From a knob on the east flank of Baptist Gap, with
the aid of a good telescope, he could see all that was going on in Cumberland
Gap. His line was nearly a semicircle, the opposite points of .the diameter
resting on the mountain's base to the right and left of the Gap. His policy
was to starve us out.
During the night of the 16th of September, a long train of wagons was sent
toward Manchester under the convoy of Colonel Coburn's 3od Indiana, two
companies of Garrard's 3d Kentucky regiment, and the 9th Ohio Battery.
This entire night and the following day, every preparation was made for the
retreat. Mines had beiMi constructed to blow uj^ the magazines and arsenal
and fire the vast store-houses constructed and under construction. Every-
thing moved with the precision of a well-constructed and well-oiled jnece of
machinery, until late in the afternoon of the 17th, when a ri'port came from
our signal station on the crest of the mountain that a flag of truce from the
enemy was approaching. This was in reality a party of observation. I tlien^-
fore sent Lieutenant-Colonel Galluji, with a small escort and a few .^lirewd
olficers, to meet the enemy's flag outside oni- jticket liin's. The oflicers in
4.Tho retreat was made across Kentucky by the way of .Mancliesler, H i.ville, ami West Lilterty
to Greenup on the Ohio Kiver. [See map, p. tJ.] — Ki>it(M;s.
68 CUMBERLAND GAP.
either side were laughing and joking together, when suddenly a glare of
fii-e shone from the valley at the foot of the Gap and a volume of smoke
curled over Poor Valley Ridge. One of the Confederates exclaimed, " Why,
Colonel, what does that mean ? It looks like an evacuation." With admirable
coolness and address Gallup replied, " Not much. Morgan has cut away the
timber obstracting the range of his guns, and they are now burning the brush
on the mountain-side." This off-hand explanation was apparently satisfac-
tory, but the fact was that some reckless person had fired a quartermaster's
building, — a criminal blunder that might have cost us dear.
On the night of the 17th, Gallup, with a body of picked men, was left to
guard the three roads leading from the camps of Stevenson, and to fire the
vast quartermaster buildings, as well as the enormous store-house, nearly
completed, on the crest of the mountain, and near the gap. The arsenal,
containing four thousand stand of small-arms, and a large amount of shells
and grenades, had been mined, and trains had been laid to the magazines.
At 8 o'clock that night my command wheeled into column with the cool-
ness and precision of troops on review ; and without hurry, without confu-
sion, with no loud commands, but with resolute confidence, the little army,
surrounded by peril on every side, set out on its march of more than two
hundred miles through the wilderness. Toward morning Gallup fired the
vast buildings and the trains leading to the mines. The shock of the explosion
was felt fourteen miles away ; the fiaming buildings lighted up the sky as
though the Gap and mountain crests were a volcano on fire, and from time to
time till after dawn we heard the explosion of mines, shells, or grenades. At
Manchester we halted for a day and a' half, to concentrate the command, and
to organize for the march before us. A day or two before a soldier had
murdered a comrade in cold blood, under circumstances of great aggravation.
I had ordered a court to try him. The sentence, of course, was death, and
at the very moment of the execution the fii^ing of our troops could be heard
repelling the dash of Stevenson's cavalry on the wagon train of Spears.
1 fully expected to be met by the enemy in force at Proctor, where the deep
and abrupt banks would have rendered the passage of the Kentucky River
perilous and difficult if disputed. We accordingly moved by two nearly parallel
roads, and the two columns reached Proctor almost simultaneously. I at once
threw a brigade, with a battery, across the river, and gave the command half a
day's rest. The previous day and night the ever -vigilant John H. Morgan,
with his dai-ing followers, had been at Proctor, had burned the steam flouring-
mill and its valuable contents, and had then withdrawn to Irvine, thirteen
miles away.
In order to deceive the enemy as to my intended line of march, I directed
Captain George M, Adams, Commissary of Subsistence, to send an officer
toward Mount Sterling with written authority to purchase supplies. He set
out, wearing his uniform, and attended only by two or three soldiers, know-
ing with certainty that he would be taken prisoner, and his papers seized.
He was, of course, captured, since the Confederates were concentrating at
Mount Sterling, believing my objective point to be Maysville.
CUMBERLAND GAP. 69
Two roads run from Proctor to Hazel Green : the Ridge road, then destitute
of water, and the North Fork road, which had water, but which the torrents
of the previous rainy season had greatly damaged and in parts destroyed.
De Courcy and Spears marched by the former, while Baird and Carter, with
the wagon train, took the latter. It was largely through the energy of Baird
that the wagon train was saved. After a day's halt at Hazel Green to rest and
refresh the half-famished men and animals, the march was resumed toward
West Liberty, supposed to be occupied by Humj^hrey Marshall. However,
he was not there. During this march, John H. Morgan attacked the rear of
De Courcy's brigade and scattered a lot of cattle intended for the use of the
retreating column. Morgan then passed around us and commenced blockad-
ing the defiles between West Liberty and Grayson and destroying everything
that could feed man or beast. He did his work gallantly and well. Frequent
sku'mishes took place, and it several times happened that while the one Mor-
gan was clearing out the obstructions at the entrance to a defile, the other
Morgan was blocking the exit from the same defile with enormous rocks and
felled trees. In the work of clearing away these obstructions, one thousand
men, wielding axes, saws, picks, spades, and block and tackle, under the gen-
eral direction of Captain William F. Patterson, commanding his company of
engineer-mechanics, and of Captain Sidney S. Lyon, labored with skill and
courage. In one instance they were forced to cut a new road through the
forest for a distance of four miles in order to turn a blockade of one mile. At
Grayson, however, on the 1st of October, John Morgan abandoned the con-
test, to seek a new field for the exercise of his superior partisan skill and
high courage; and on the 3d we reached the Ohio River at Greenup [see
map, p. 6], without the loss of a gun or a wagon, and with the loss of but
eighty men. Not only that, but, as General Bragg states in his report, we had
detained General Kirby Smith, and thus prevented the junction of the Con-
federate armies in Kentucky, long enough to save Louisville.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT CUMBERLAND GAP, JUNE 17th— IStii, 1S02.
Union Forces.— seventh ditision, army of the iiartiiioiit of East Tenneesec, was In position confront-
Oiiio. Brif;.-(!(Mi. GioiKt' W. Mmjjan. ini; Morj^an at ("uniborlaud (inp. The strtMisjtli of tliis
Twi-uln-foiirtlt llrii/iii/c, Hv\'^.-(ir]\. Samuel P. Carter: division was stated by (teiieral Kirby Sniitli on the •J4th
49th Intl., Lieut. -Col. James Keif,'\viii; 3d Ky., Col. of th<' month to be HOMO eltVetives. •• well oiiicanized and
T. T. Garrard; 1st Tenn., Col. Kobort K. Byrd; mobilized, and in j^ood eondition for active serviee."
2d Tonn., Col. James P. T. Carter. Twentij-Sifth The organization on the ;ul of July was as foUows :
Brujade, Hrif?.-(ien. James (}. Spears: 3d Tenn., ."JcroHf/ /{/•/(/«(/<■. ("ol. Jaines K. Kains : 4th Tenn., Col.
Col. LeonidasC. Ilouk ; 4th Tenn., Col. Robert .lohnson ; J. A. MeMnrry; llth Tenn.. C<d. J. K. Hains; 42d (Ja..
5tli Tenn., C(d. James T. Shelley ; 0th Tenn., Col. Joseph Col. K. .T. Henderson ; 3d (Ja. J?attalion, Lient.-Col. M.
A. Cooper. Twfuli/sijfli nrii/tide. Col. John V. De A. Stovall; 2!nh N. C. Col. H. H. Vanee; (Ja. Kattery.
Conrey: 2'2d Ky., Col. Daniel W. Lindsey; ir.th Ohio, Capt. J. C Yeiser. T/iinf liriuade, UrifT.-Gen. S. M.
Lient.-Col. <ieor^a■ W. Hailey; ud Ohio. Col. Lionel A. liarton : :iOth Ala., Col. C. M. Shelley; 31st Ala., Col. I).
8heldoii. Tirciiti/sfi'riitli Urii/nilf, Hrijr.-Cien. .Vbsalom \i. Hundley; 40th (ia.. Col. .\. Johnson; S2d (ia.. Col.
Baird; 33d Ind., Col. John ("obnrn; 14th Ky.. Col. John \V. Boyd; i)th (ia. Battalion, .Ma.|. J. T. Sndth; Va. But-
C. Cochran; IDtli Ky., Col. William J. Landr.im. .1/7//- tery, (apt. Josei)h W. .\nderson. Fourl/i llrii/nttr, ro\.
icn/, Capt. J. leob T. Foster; 7th Mich . Capt. Charles H. A. \v. Keynol.ls: 201 h Ala., C<d. L W. (iarrott ; 3<5th (Ja..
Lanphere:'.ithOhio, Lieut. Leonar<l I*. Marrows; 1st Wis., Col. J. .V.Cl.nn; :!'.)! h t;a.. Col. J. T. MeConnell ; 4;td(;H..
Lieut. John D. Anders<ni ; Sie^'e Battery, Lieut. Daniel Col. S. Harris; imili N. C., Col. D. Coleman; :)d M.l. Hat-
Webster, ('(inilrti: Ky. Battalion, Li<iit. Col. KeulMii tery. ("apt. 11. B. Latrobe. Fifth llri,/<i<lr. Col. T. H.
Muuday. A'//. Eiu/iiirns. Ca|)t. William F. Patterson. Taylor: 2;iit Ala., Col. F. K. Beek ; 4f.tli Ala., Col. M. L.
CONFEDICRATE FoitCKs. — Tli.ir enupositioii is not Woods; :!<l Tenn.. Col. J. C. Vaughn; 31st Tenn.. CoL
stated in the" Offleial Records." During; tin- nu>idh of W. M. Bradfonl; .VJtIi Tenn., Col. J. B. Cooko; Tenu.
July Brig.-Geu. Carter L. Bteveusou, First Division, De- (Khett) Ball.ry. Capt W. IL Burroughs.
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
BY JAMES LOXGSTREET, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.
CONFEDERATE PICKET
'-HIOE MOCCASINS.
N the early fall of 1862, a distance of not more than
tlnrty miles lay between the Army of the Potomac and
the Army of Northern Virginia. A state of uncertainty
had existed for several weeks succeeding the battle of
Sharpsburg, but the movements that resulted in the
battle of Fredericksburg began to take shape when on
the 5th of November the order was issued removing
General McClellan from command of the Federal forces.
The order assigning General Burnside to command
was received at General Lee's headquarters, then at Cul-
peper Court House, about twenty-four hours after it
reached Warrenton, though not through official courtesy. General Lee, on
receiving the news, said he regi-etted to part with McClellan, "for," he added,
" we always understood each other so well. I fear they may continue to make
these changes till they find some one whom I don't understand."
The Federal army was encamped around Warrenton, Virginia, and was soon
divided into three grand divisions, whose commanders were Generals Sumner,
Hooker, and Franklin.
Lee's army was on the opposite side of the Eappahannock Eiver, divided
into two corps, the First commanded by myself and the Second commanded
by General T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson. At that time the Confederate army
extended from Culpeper Court House (where the First Corps was stationed)
on its right across the Blue Ridge down the Valley of Virginia to Winchester.
Tliere Jackson was encamped with the Second Corps, except one division
which was stationed at Chester Gap on the Blue Ridge Mountains.
About the 18tli or 19th of November, we received information through our
scouts that Sumner, with his grand division of more than thirty thousand
men, was moving toward Fredericksburg. Evidently he intended to surprise
us and cross the Rappahannock before we could offer resistance. On 'receipt
of the infonnation, two of my divisions were ordered down to meet him. We
made a forced march and arrived on the hills around Fredericksburg about
3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st. Sumner had already arrived, and his
army was encamped on Stafford Heights, overlooking the town from the
Federal side. Before I reached Froderickslnirg, General Patrick, provost-
marshal-general, crossed the river under a flag of truce and put the people
in a state of great excitement by delivei-ing the following letter :
"Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, November 21st, 1862.
" To the Mayor and Common Council of Fredericksburg. Gentlemen : Under cover
of the houses of your city, shots have been fired upon the troops of my command. Your mills
and manufactories are furuishinj? provisions and the material for clothing for armed bodies in
rebellion against the Government of the United States. Youi- railroads and other means of
transportation are removing supplies to the depots of such troops. This condition of things
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 71
must terminate, and by direction of General Burnside I accordingly demand the sui'render of
your city into my hands, as the representative of the Government of the United States, at
or before 5 o'clock this afternoon. Faihng in an affirmative reply to this demand by the
hour indicated, .sixteen hours will be permitted to elapse for the removal from the city of
women and children, the sick and wounded and aged, etc., which period ha^'iug expii-ed I
shall proceed to shell the town. Upon obtaining possession of the city eveiy necessaiy means
will be taken to preserve order and secure the protective operation of the laws and policy of
the United States Government. I am, veiy respectfully, your obedient servant,
"E. V. Sumner,
" Brevet Major- General, U. S. Army, Commanding Right Grand Division."
While the people were in a state of excitemeut over the receii:)t of this
demand for the surrender of their town, my troops appeared upon the heights
opposite those occupied by the Federals. The alarmed non-combatants heard
of my arrival and immediately sent to me the demand of the Federal general.
I stated to the town authorities that I did not care to occupy the place for
militarv pui-poses and that there was no reason why it should be shelled by
the Federal army. We were there to protect ourselves against the advance
of the enemy, and could not allow the town to be occupied by the Fed-
erals. The mayor sent to General Sumner a satisfactory statement of the
situation and was notified that the threatened shelling would not take place,
since the Confederates did not purpose to make the town a base of mihtary
operations.
Before my troops reached the little city, and before the people of Freder-
icksburg knew that any part of the Confederate army was near, there was
great excitement over the demand for surrender. No people were in the place
except aged and infirm men, and women and childi-en. That they should
become alarmed when the surrender of the town was demanded by the Fed-
erals was quite natural, and a number proceeded with great haste to board a
train then ready to leave. As the train drew out, Sumner's batteries on Staf-
ford Heights opened fire on it, adding to the general terror, but fortunately
doing no serious damage. The spectacle was nothing, however, to what we
witnessed a short time after. About the 26tli or 27th it became e\ddent
that Fredericksburg would be the scene of a battle, and we ad^'ised the
people who were still in the town to prepare to leave, as they would soon
be in danger if they remained. The evacuation of the place by the dis-
tressed women and helpless men was a painful sight. Many were almost
destitute and had nowhere to go, but, yielding to the cruel necessities of
war, they collected their portable effects and turned their backs on the
town. Many were forced to seek shelter in the woods and brave the icy
November nights to escape tht» approaching assault from the Fedei'al army.
Very soon after I reached Fredei-icksburg the remainder of my corps arrived
from Culpeper Court House, and as soon as it was known that all the Army
of the Potomac was in motion for the prosjxvtive scene of battle Jackson
was drawn down from the Blue Ridge. In a v»M-y .-^liorl liiiic tlic Army of
Northern Virginia was face to face with the Army «»t' the I'oloniac
Wlien Jackson arrived he objected to the positi(Mi, n..t that he 1"care<l the
result of the l.attUs hut because lie tiiought (liat bcliiiid the North Anna was
72
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
a point from which tlie most fruitful results would follow. He held that we
would win a victory at Fredericksburg, but it would be a fruitless one to us,
whereas at North Anna, when we drove the Federals back, we could give
pursuit to advantage, w^liich we could not do at Fredericksburg. General
Lee did not entertain the proposition, however, and we continued our prep-
arations to meet the enemy at the latter place, i^
At a point just above the town, a range of hills begins, extending from the
river edge out a short distance and bearing around the valley somewhat in
the form of a crescent. On the opposite
side are the noted Stafford Heights, then
occupied by the Federals. At the foot of
these hills flows the Rappahannock River.
On the Confederate side nestled Fredericks-
burg, and around it stretched the fertile
bottoms from which fine crops had been
gathered and upon which the Federal troops
were to mass and give battle to the Confed-
erates. On the Confederate side nearest
the river was Taylor's Hill, and south of it
the now famous Marye's Hill ; next. Tele-
graph Hill, the highest of the elevations on
the Confederate side (later known as Lee's
Hill, because during the battle General Lee
w^as there most of the time), where I had
my headquarters in the field; next was a
declination through which Deep Run Creek
passed on its way to the Rappahannock
River ; and next was the gentle elevation at
Hamilton's Crossing, not dignified with a
name, upon which Stonewall Jackson massed thii'ty thousand men. It was
upon these hills that the Confederates made their preparations to receive
Burnside whenever he might choose to cross the Rappahannock. The
Confederates were stationed as follows : On Taylor's Hill next the river and
forming my left, R. H. Anderson's division ; on Marye's Hill, Ransom's and
McLaws's divisions; on Telegraph Hill, Pickett's di\dsion ; to the right
and about Deep Run Creek, Hood's division, the latter stretching across
Deep Run Bottom.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL MAXCY GREGG, C. S.
KILLED AT FREDERICKSBURG.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
■5^ That General Lee was not quite satisfied with
the place of battle is shown by a dispatch to the
Riclimond authorities on the second day after the
battle, when it was uncertain what Burnside's
next move would be. In that dispatch he says:
"Sliould the enemy cross at Port Royal in force,
before I can fi;et tliis army in position to meet him,
I tliink it more advantageous to retire to the
Annas and give battle, than on the banks of the
Rappahannock. My desip:n was to have done so
in the first instance. My purpose was changed
not from any advantage in tiiis position, but from
an unwillingness to open more of our country to
depredation than possible, and also with a view of
collecting such forage and provisions as could be
obtained in the Rai^pahannoek Valley. With the
numerous array opposed to me, and the bridges
and transportation at its command, the crossing of
the Rappahannock, where it is narrow and wind-
ing as in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, can be
made at almost any point without molestation. It
will, therefore, be more advantageous to us to draw
him farther away from his base of operations."
Editors.
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 73
On the hill occupied by Jackson's (iorps were the divisions of A. P. Hill,
Early, and Taliaferro, that of D. H. Hill being in reserve on the extreme
right. To the Washington Artillery, on Marye's Hill, was assigned the
service of advising the army at the earliest possible moment of the Federal
advance. General Barksdale, with his Mississippi brigade, was on picket
duty in front of Fredericksburg on the night of the advance.
The liills occupied by the (Confederate foi'ces, although over-crowned by the
heights of Stafford, were so distant as to be outside the range of effective fire
by the Federal guns, and, with the lower receding grounds between them,
formed a defensive series that may be likened to natural bastions. Taylor's
Hill, on our left, was unassailable ; Marye's Hill was more advanced toward
the town, was of a gradual ascent and of less height than the others, and we
considered it the point most assailable, and guarded it accordingl}'. The
events that followed proved the correctness of our opinion on that point.
Lee's Hill, near our center, with its rugged sides retired from Marye's and
rising higher than its companions, was comparatively safe.
This was the situation of the 65,000 Confederates massed around Fred-
ericksburg, and they had twenty-odd days in which to prepare for the
approaching battle.
The Federals on Stafford Heights carefully matured their plans of advance
and attack. Grenei'al Hunt, chief of artillery, skillfully posted 147 guns to cover
the bottoms upon which the infantry was to form for the attack, and at the
same time play upon the Confederate batteries as circumstances would allow.
Franklin and Hooker had joined Sumner, and Stafford Heights held the
Federal army, 116,000 strong, watching the plain where the bloody conflict
was soon to be. In the meantime the Federals had been seen along the banks
of the river, looking for the most available points for crossing. President
Lincoln had been do^m with General Halleck, and it had been suggested hy
the latter to cross at Hoop-pole Ferry, about 28 oi- 30 miles below Freder-
icksburg. We discovered the movement, however, and prepared to meet
it, and Burnside abandoned the idea and turned his attention to Fredericks-
burg, under the impression that many of our troops were down at Hoop-pole,
too far away to return in time for this battle. \
The soldiers of both armies were in good fighting condition, and there was
every indication that we would have a desperate battle. We were confident
that Burnside could not dislodge us, and patiently awaited the attack.
On the morning of the 11th of December, 1862, an hour or so before day-
light, the slumbering Confederates were awakened by a solitary canncm
thundering on the heights of Marye's Hill. Again it boomed, and instantly
the aroused Confederates recognized the signal oi the Washington Artillery
and knew that the Federal ti-oops were preparing to crc^ssthe Ka])pahannock
to give us the expected battle. The Federals came down to tlio rivrr's edge
and l)egan the constructicm of their bridges, when Barksdale opened lire with
such ett'ect that they were fcnved to retire. Again and again they made an
4 It is more than probablo that Biinisidc a.-i-.-i-lcil tlu> proposition to movo by Hoop-polo Ft-rry for the
purpose of drawing some of our troops from thi' [loints ht- had roally soloctod for his crossing.— J. L.
VOL. III. G
NoTK.— Tlio hiittcrics wliicli liiid position on the oiitslfirtsot' the town in rear of Sumner's attack were AVaternian's
Kusserow's, Kirby's, Hazard's, Frank's, Arnold's, Phillips's, and Dickenson's. In placing the Union artillery, we
liave followed au official map made under direction of General Henry J. Hunt, cliief of artillery.— Editoks.
74
THE BATTlE of FREDERICKSBURG. 75
effort to cross, but each time they were met and repulsed by the well-
directed bullets of the Mississippiaus. This contest lasted until 1 o'clock,
when the Federals, with angry desperation, turned their whole available force
of artillery on the Httle city, and sent down from the heights a perfect storm
of shot and shell, crushing the houses with a cyclone of fiery metal. From our
position on the heights we saw the batteries hurling an avalanche upon
the town whose only off'ense was that near its edge in a snug retreat
nestled three thousand Confederate hornets that were stinging the Army
of the Potomac into a frenzy. It was terrific, the pandemonium which that
little squad of Confederates had provoked. The town caught fire in sev-
eral places, shells crashed and burst, and solid shot rained like hail. In the
midst of the successive crashes could be heard the shouts and yells of those
engaged in the struggle, while the smoke rose from the burning city and the
flames leaped about, making a scene which can never be effaced from the
memory of those who saw it. But, in the midst of all this fury, the little bri-
gade of Mississippiaus clung to their work. At last, when I had everything in
readiness, I sent a peremptory order to Barksdale to withdraw, which he did,
fighting as he retired before the Federals, who had hj that time succeeded in
landing a number of their troops. The Federals then constructed their pon-
toons without molestation, and during the night and the following day the
grand division of Sumner passed over into Fredericksbui'g.
About a mile and a half below the town, where the Deep Run emj^ties into
the Rappahannock, General Franklin had been allowed without serious oppo-
sition to throw two pontoon-bridges on the 11th, and his grand division
passed over and massed on the level bottoms opposite Hamilton's Crossing,
thus placing himself in front of Stonewall Jackson's corps. The 11th and 12th
were thus spent by the Federals in crossing the river and preparing for battle.
Opposite Fredericksburg, the formation along the river-bank was such that
the Federals were concealed in their approaches, and, availing themselves
of this advantage, they succeeded in crossing and concealing the grand
division of Sumner and, later, a part of Hooker's grand di^dsion in the city
of Fredericksburg, and so disposing of Franklin in the open plain below as
to give out the impression that the great force was with the latter and about
to oppose Jackson.
Before daylight on the morning of the eventful 13tli I rode to the right of
my line held by Hood's division. General Hood was at his post in plain
hearing of the Federals south of Deep Run, who were marching their trooj^s
into i)osition for the attack. The morning was cold and misty, and every-
thing was obscured from view, but so distinctly did the mist bear to us the
sounds of the moving Federals that Hood thought the advance was against
him. He was relieved, however, when I assured him that the enemy, to
reach him, would have to put himself in a pocket and be subjected to attack
from Jackson on one side, Pickett and McLaws on the other, and Hood's own
men in front. The position of Franklin's men on the V2th, with the configu-
ration of th(^ ground, had left no doubt in my mind as to Franklin's inten-
tions. I explained all this to Hood, assuiiug him that the attack would be
76
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
FRONT OF THE MAKYE MANSION. FROM A
AVAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
on Jackson. At the same time I
ordered Hood, in case Jackson's
line should be broken, to wheel
around to his right and stiike
in on the attacking bodies, tell-
ing him that Pickett, with his
division, would be ordered to join
in the flank movement. These
orders were given to both divis-
ion generals, and at the same
time they were advised that I
would be attacked near my left
center, and that I must be at
that point to meet my part of
the battle. They were also ad-
vised that my position was so
well defended I could have no
other need of their troops. I then
returned to Lee's Hill, reaching
there soon after sunrise.
Thus we stood at the eve of
the great battle. Along the Stafford Heights 147 guns were turned upon us,
and on the level plain below, in the town, and hidden on the opposite bank
ready to cross, were assembled nearly 100,000 men, eager to begin the com-
bat. Secure on our hills, we grimly awaited the onslaught. The valley, the
mountain-tops, everything was enveloped in the thickest fog, and the j^rep-
arations for the fight were made as if under cover of night. The mist brought
to us the sounds of the preparation for battle, but we were blind to the move-
ments of the Federals. Suddenly, at 10 o'clock, as if the elements were
taking a hand in the ch*ama about to be enacted, the warmth of the sun
brushed the mist away and revealed the mighty panorama in the valley below.
Franklin's 40,000 men, reeiiforced by two divisions of Hooker's grand
division, were in front of Jackson's 30,000. The flags of the Federals fluttered
gayly, the polished arms shone brightly in the sunlight, and the beautifid
uniforms of the buoyant troops gave to the scene the air of a holiday occasion
rather than the spectacle of a great army about to be thrown into the
tumult of battle. From my place on Lee's Hill I could see almost every
soldier Franklin had, and a splendid array it was. But off in the distance
was Jackson's ragged infantry, and beyond was Stuart's battered cavalry,
with their soiled hats and yellow butternut suits, a striking contrast to the
handsomely equipped troops of the Federals.
About the city, here and there, a few soldiers could be seen, but there was
no indication of the heavy masses that were concealed by the houses. Those
of Franklin's men who were in front of Jackson stretched well up toward Lee's
Hill, and were almost within reach of our best guns, and at the other end
they stretched out to the east until they came well under the fire of Stuart's
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
11
THE SUNKEN HOAD rM>i;U MAKYE";
In the background is seen the continuation of Hanover
street, which on the left ascends the hill to the Marye
Mansion. The little sciuaic field lies hi the fork made by
the former road and flic T(lci;ra|ih road (sec map, p.
74). Nearly all that remained in lS8t of the famous stone-
wall is seen in the right of the picture. The horses are
in the road, which is a continuation of the street south
of Hanover street, and on which is the brick house men-
tioned ill (icmial Coucirs article. Tla^ house in which
(ieneralCnhl) died would lie tlie iii'xf ol.ject in the right
of t lie piel lire it t lie toret;roiiiid were extended. And be-
yond that house, following the Telegraph road south,
there was, at the time of the battle, a long stretch of
stone-wall (see map, p. 74), little if any of which was to
be scM'ii in 188i, the stone having been used for the gate-
llous(^ of till- National Cemetery.
In his ollieial report (ieneral Kershaw, who succeeded
(icneral Cobb, thus describes llni situation durlTig the
battle in that part of tin- road seen in the picture: "The
roail is about 'i'> I'eet wide, and is faced by a stone-w.all
about 4 feet high on thi^ city side. The road having
been cut out of the sid<> of the hill, in iiiaiiy places this
last wall is not visible above the surface of the ground.
The ground falls off rapidly to almost a level surface.
Which extends aboiil 150 yards, then, with another
abrupt fallof a lew feet, to another plain which extends
some '.iOO yardw, and then falls oil' abruptly into a wide
ravine, which extends along flic whole front of the city
and discharges into Hazel Knn. I found, on my arrival,
that ('obb'H tirii;ade. Colonel McMillan coninianding, oc-
cuiiied our entire front, and my trooiis conid only get
into position by doiililiiig on them. This was accord-
ingly doni!, and the formation ahing most of the lino
during the engagement wae cousequoutly four deep. As
III.I.. FliOM A I'lIoToCltAl'H TAKEN IN 1884.
an evidence of the coolness of the command, I may men-
tion here that, notwithstanding that their tiro was the
most rapid and continuous I h.ave ever witnessed, not a
man was injured by the fire of his comrades. . . . lu
the meantime line after line of the enemy dephiycd in
the ravine, and advanced to the attack at intervals of
not more than lifteeu minutes until about 4 : 30 o'clock,
when there was a lull of about a half hour, during which
a mass of artillery was placed in position in front of the
town and opened upon our position. At this time I
brought up Colonel De .<?aussure"s regiment. Our batter-
ies on the hill were silent, haviiiir exhausted their am-
munition, and till' Washimrton .Art illery were relieved
by a part of Colonel Alexander's battalion. Undercover
of this artillery lire, the most formidable column of at-
tack was formed, which, about 5 o'clock, emerged from
the ravine and, no longer impt'ded by our artillery,
impetuously assailed our whole front. From this time
until after 6 o'clock the attack was continnous, and the
Are on both sides terrirtc. Some few, chiefly ollicers, got
within 30 yards of our lines, luit in every instance their
columns were shattered by the time they got within \oo
paces. The tiring gradually subsided, and by 7 o'clock
our pickets were established within thirty yards of those
of the enemy.
" Our chief lo.ss after getting Into position In the road
was from the tire of sharp-shooters, who occupieil some
buildings on my left flank in the curly part of the en-
gagement, and were only silenced by Captain (W.) Wal
lace, of the 2d Regiment, directing the continuous Are of
one company upon the bidltlings. (buieral Cobb, I learn,
was killed by a shot from that quarter. The regimciits
on the hill sutTered most, as they were less perfectly
covered."— Editors.
78
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
horse artillery under Major John Pelham, a brave and gallant officer, almost
a boy in years. As the mist rose, the Confederates saw the movement against
theu' right near Hamilton's Crossing. Major Pelham opened fire upon Frank-
lin's command and gave him lively work, which was kept up until Jackson
ordered Pelham to retire, Franklin then advanced rapidly to the hill where
Jackson's troops had been stationed, feeling the woods with shot as he
progressed. Silently Jackson awaited the approach of the Federals until
they were within good range, and then he opened a terrific fire which threw
the Federals into some confusion. The enemy again massed and advanced,
pressing through a gap between Archer and Lane. This broke Jackson's line
and threatened very serious trouble. The Federals who had wedged them-
selves in through that gap came upon Gregg's brigade, and' then the severe
encounter ensued in which the latter general was mortall}^ wounded. Archer
and Lane very soon received reenforcements and, rallying, joined in the
counter-attack and recovered their lost ground. The concentration of Talia-
ferro's and Early's divisions against this attack was too much for it, and the
counter-attack drove the Federals back to the railroad and beyond the reach
of our guns on the left. Some of our troops following up this repulse got
too far out, and were in turn much
, ^■. discomfited when left to the enemy's
superior numbers, and were obliged to
retire in poor condition. A Federal
brigade advancing under cover of
Deep Run was discovered at this time
and attacked by regiments of Pender's
and Law's brigades, the former of
A. P. Hill's and the latter of Hood's
division ; and, Jackson's second line
advancing, the Federals were forced to
retire. This series of demonstrations
and attacks, the partial success and
final discomfiture of the Federals, con-
stitute the hostile movements between
the Confederate right and the Federal
left.
I have described, in the opening of
this article, the situation of the Con-
federate left. In front of Marye's Hill is
a plateau, and immediately at the base
of the hill there is a sunken road known as the Tt^egraph road. On the side
of the road next to the town was a stone-wall, slioulder-high, against which
the eartli was banked, forming an almost uiia])proacliable defense. It was
impossible for the troops occupying it to expose more than a small portion
of tlieir bodies. Behind this stone-wall I had placed about twenty-five hun-
dred men, being all of General T. P. R. Cobb's brigade, and a portion of the
brigade of General Kershaw, both of McLaws's division. It must now be
^()U8^: uv the stone-wall, iv WFiirii general
OOBIJ DIED FROM A WAR-TIME rilOTOGKAril.
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 79
understood that the Federals, to reach what appeared to be my weakest
point, would have to pass dii-ectly over this wall held by Cobb's infantry.
An idea of how well Marye's Hill was protected may be obtained from the
following incident : General E. P. Alexander, my engineer and superintend-
ent of artillery, had been placing the guns, and in going over the field with
liim before the battle, I noticed an idle cannon. I suggested that he i)lace it
so as to aid in covering the plain in front of Marye's Hill. He answercnl :
" General, we cover that ground now so well that we will comb it as with
a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open
on it."
A little before noon I sent orders to all my batteries to open fire through
the streets or at any points where the troops were seen about the city, as a
diversion in favor of Jackson. This fire began at once to develop the work
in hand for myself. The Federal troops swarmed out of the city like bees out of
a hive, coming in double-quick march and filling the edge of the field in front
of Cobb. This was just where we had expected attack, and I was prepared
to meet it. As the troops massed before us, they were much annoyed by the
fire of our batteries. The field was literally packed with Federals from the
vast number of troops that had been massed in the town. From the moment
of their appearance began the most fearful carnage. With our artillery from
the front, right, and left tearing through their ranks, the Federals pressed
forward with almost invincible determination, maintaining their steady step
and closing up their broken ranks. Thus resolutely they marched upon
the stone fence behind which quietly waited the Confederate brigade of
General Cobb. As they came within reach of this brigade, a storm of lead
was poured into their advancing ranks and they were swept from the field
like chaff before the wind. A cloud of smoke shut out the scene for a
moment, and, rising, revealed the shattered fragments I'ecoiling from their
gallant but hopeless charge. The artillery still i)lowed through their retreat-
ing ranks and searched the places of concealment into which the troops had
])lunged. A vast number went pell-mell into an old railroad cut to escape
fh-e from the right and front. A battery on Lee's Hill saw this and turned
its fire into the entire length of the cut, and the shells began to pour down
ui)on the Federals with the most frightful destruction. They found their
position of refuge more uncomfortable than the field of the assault.
Thus the right grand division of the Army of. the Potomac found itself
repulsed and shattered on its first attempt to drive us from Marye's Hill.
Hardly was this attack off' the field before we saw the determined Federals
again filing out of Fredericks! )urg and prepaiing for another charge. The
Confederate's under (Jobb reserved their fire and cpiietly awaited tlie a})proat'h
of the enemy. The Federals came nearer than before, l)nt were forced to
retire before the well-directed guns of Cobb's brigade and the fire of the
artillery on the heights. By that time the field in front of CV^bb was thickly
strewn with the dead and dying Federals, but again they formed with des-
perate courage and renewed the attack and again were driven off. At each
attack the slaughter was so great that by the time the lliird attack was
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
repulsed, the ground was so thickly strewn with dead that the bodies seri-
ously impeded the approach of the Federals. General Lee, who was with me
on Lee's Hill, became uneasy when he saw the attacks so promptly renewed
and pushed forward with such persistence, and feared the Federals might
break through our line. After the third charge he said to me : " General,
they are massing very heavily and will l)reak your line, I am afraid." " Gen-
eral," I replied, " if you put every man now on the other side of the Potomac
on that field to approach me over the
same line, and give me plenty of am-
munition, I will kill them all before
they reach my line. Look to your
right ; you are in some danger there,
but not on my line."
I think the fourth time the Fed-
erals charged, a gallant fellow came
within one hundred feet of Cobb's
position before he fell. Close behind
him came some few scattering ones,
but they were either killed or they
fled from certain death. J^ This charge
was the only effort that looked like
actual danger to Cobb, and after
it was repulsed I felt no apprehen-
sion, assuring myself that there were
enough of the dead Federals on the
field to give me half the battle. The
anxiety shown by General Lee, how-
ever, induced me to bring up two or
three brigades, to be on hand, and
General Kershaw, with the remainder
of his brigade, was ordered down to the stone-wall, rather, however, to carry
ammunition than as a reenforcement for Cobb. Kershaw dashed down the
declivity and arrived just in time to succeed Cobb, who, at this juncture, fell
from a wound in the thigh and died in a few ndnutes from loss of blood.
[See also p. 94.]
A fifth time the Federals formed and charged and were repulsed. A sixth
time they charged and were driven back, when night came to end the dread-
ful carnage, and the Federals withdrew, leaving the battle-field literally heaped
with the l)odies of their dead. Before the well-directed fir.' of CoblVs brigade,
the Federals had fallen like the steady dri])i)ing of rain finm tlic eaves of a
house. Oui- musketry alone killed and wounded at least .")()()(); au<l thes»».
" ""^""r^^
BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS R. R. COISB, 0. S. A.
FROM A PIH)TOGUArH.
Before the war, General Cobb was a lawyer. He was
born in (Jeorfria in 1820. In 1851 he imblishe<l a
"Difjeet of the Laws of Georgia."
^ In his oilieial report (iencral Ijat'ayctd' Mc-
Laws says: ''Tlio body of one man, Ix-lieved to
bo an oflieor, was fonnd within about tliirty
yards of the stone-wall, and otlier sing^lo bodies
were scattered at increased distances until tlie
main mass of the dead lav tliieklv strewn over tlie
,1,'roMnd at sonielhiiif,' over one iiiindred yards o(T.
and extendin^j to tlie ravine, eoinmeneinf? at the
point where our men would allow the enemy's
column to apin-oaeh before oixMiiuj; fire, nntl be-
yoiul which no organized body of men was able to
jiass."— Editors.
82 THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
with the slaughter by the artillery, left over 7000 killed and wounded before
the foot of Marye's Hill. The dead were piled sometimes three deep, and when
morning broke, the spectacle that we saw upon the battle-field was one of the
most distressing I ever witnessed. The charges had been desperate and
bloody, but utterly hopeless. I thought, as I saw the Federals come again and
again to their death, that they deserved success if courage and daring could
entitle soldiers to victory.
During the night . a Federal strayed beyond his lines and was taken up
by some of my troops. On searching him, we found on his person a memo-
randum of Oeneral Burnside's arrangements, and an order for the renewal of
the battle the next day. This information was sent to General Lee, and
immediately orders were given for a line of rifle-pits on the top of Marye's
Hill for Ransom, who had l)een held somewhat in reserve, and for other guns
to be placed on Taylor's Hill.
We were on our lines before daylight, anxious to receive Greneral Burnside
again. As the gray of the morning came without the battle, we became more
anxious ; yet, as the Federal forces retained position during the 14th and 15th,
we were not without hope. There was some little skirmishing, but it did not
amount to anything. But when the full light of the next morning revealed
an abandoned field, General Lee tui-ned to me, referring in his mind to the dis-
patch I had captured and which he had just re-read, and said : " General, I
am losing confidence in your friend General Burnside." We then put it down
as a ruse de guerre. Afterward, however, we learned that the order had been
made in good faith but had been changed in consequence of the demoralized
condition of the grand divisions in front of Marye's Hill. During the night
of the 15th the Federal troops withdrew, and on the 16th our lines were
reestablished along the river, i^
I have heard that, referring to the attack at Marye's Hill while it was in
progress, General Hooker said: "There has been enough blood shed to satisfy
any reasonable man, and it is time to quit." I think myself it was fortunate
for Burnside that he had no greater success, for the meeting with such
discomfiture gave him an opportunity to get back safe. If he had made any
progress, his loss would i)rol)ably have been greater.
8uch was the battle of Fredericksburg as I saw it. It has been asked why
we did not follow up the victory. The answer is plain. It goes without say-
ing that the battle of the First Corps, concluded after nightfall, could not have
been changed into offensive operations. Our line was about three miles long,
extending tln-ough woodland over hill and dal(\ An attempt at concentration
to throw the troops against the walls of the city at that hour of the night
would have been little better than madnc^ss. The Confederate field was
•j^ General Lee explained officially, as follows, not fk'cnicd expedient to lose the advantages of our posi-
why he expected the attack woidd be resumed : '••>" ""•• exi)oso tlie troops to the Are of his inaccessible
Imttcrics licyond t lie river ))v advaneinir a.irninst him;
"The attack on the 13th hnd been so easily repulsed, l)ut we wen' ncc<"ss;iril v itriioraiit of the extent to which
and by so Nuiall a part of our army, that it was not sup- he had suflTered, and onlv l.eeanie aware of it when, on
ixmod the eneiny would liuiit his efforts to :in att(Mnpt the morning of the lOth. it was discovered that he had
whieli in view of the ini.fr.iitnde of his preimrations :ind availed himself of the darkness of nitflit. and the prcv-
the <;\teiit of hiH toree, seemed to be eomi.iii-af ively in- alenco of a violent storm of wind iind rain, to recross
^'f.'ll !'.""!■ the river. The town was immediately reoccupied and
liem-vm-, therefore, that he would attack ns. it w.as our position on the river-bank resumed." EDITORS.
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
83
CONFEDERATE WORKS ON WILLIS'S HILL, NOW THE SITE OF THE NATIONAL CEMETERY.
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
armiigod for defensive battle. Its abrupt termination could not have l)e('n
anticipated, nor could any skill have marshaled our trooi)s for olfensive oper-
ations in time to meet the emergency. My line was long and over broken
country, — so much so that the troops could not be promptly handled in offen-
sive operations. Jackson's corps was in mass, and coidd he have anticipated
the result of my battle, he would have been justified in pressing Franklin to the
river when the; battle of the latter was lost. Otherwise, pursuit would have
IxH'u as unwise as the attack he had just driven off. The Federal batteries
on Stafford Heights were effectively posted to jn'otect their troops against our
adv^ance, and Franklin would have been in good defensive position against
attack on the next day. It is well known that after driving off attacking
forces, if immediate pursuit can bo made so that the victors can go aU)ng with
tlie retreating forces pell-mell, it is well enough to do so; but the attack
should be innnediate. To follow a success by counter-attack against the
enemy in position is problematical. In the case of the armies at Fredericks-
l)urg it would have been, to say the least, very hazardous to give counter-
attack, the Federal position being about as strong as oui-s from wliicli we had
(h'iven them back. Attempts to break uj* .-in ;inn\- by foIl<«\\ ing on iis line of
retreat are hazardous and rnr(>ly successful, while movements against the
Hanks and rear increase the demoralization :ni<l otb r better oi)portunities
for great results. The condition of a retreating army may b(> illustrated by
84
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
^'^^
^**WBaf«^ 1^ ^•^'(^m^
a little incident witnessed thirty years ago on the western plains of Texas.
A soldier of my regiment essayed to capture a rattlesnake. Being pursued,
the reptile took refuge in a prairie-dog's hole, turning his head as he entered
it, to defend the sally-port. The soldier, coming up in time, seized the tail as
it was in the act of passing under cover, and at the same instant the serpent
seized the index finger of the soldier's hand. The result was the soldier lost
the use of his finger. The wise serpent made a successful retreat. The rear
of a retreating army is always its best guarded point.
During the attack upon Greneral Jackson, and immediately after his line
was broken, General Pickett rode up to General Hood and suggested that
the moment was at hand for
% the movement anticipated
by my orders, and requested
that it be executed. Hood
did not agree, so the oppor-
tunity was allowed to pass.
Had Hood sprung to the oc-
casion we would have envel-
oped Franklin's command,
and might possibly have
marched it into the Con-
federate camp. Hood com-
manded splendid troops,
quite fresh and eager for
occasion to give renewed as-
sui-ances of their mettle.
It has been reported that
the troops attacking Marye's
Hill were intoxicated, having
been plied with whisky to nerve them to the desperate attack. That can
hardly be true. I know nothing of the facts, but no sensible commander
will allow his troops strong drink upon going into battle. After a battle is
over, the soldier's gill is usually allowed if it is at hand. No troops could
have displayed greater courage and resolution than was shown by those
brought against Marye's Hill. But they miscalculated the wonderful strength
of the line behind the stone fence. The position held by Cobb surpassed
courage and resolution, and was occupied by those who knew well how to
hold a comfortable defense.
After the retreat. General Lee went to Richmond to suggest other opera-
tions, but was assured that the war was virtually over, and that we need not
harass our troops l)y marches and other hardships. Gold had advanced in
Now York to two hundred, and wo were assured by those at the Confederate
capital that in thirty or forty days we would be recognized and peace pro-
claimed. General Loo did not share in this belief.
I have been asked if Bnrnside could have been victorious at Fredericks-
burg. Such a thing was hardly possible. Perhaps no general could have
'-^^^\~
WELFORD'S MILL ON HAZEL RUN AND THE TELEGRAPH ROAD.
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
The southern slope of Willi«'.s Hill is seen in the background.
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 85
accomplished more than Bura.side did, and it was possible for him to have
suffered greater loss. The battle of Frederickslnirg was a great and unprofit-
able sacrifice of human life made, through the pressure from the rear, upon
a general who should have known better and who doubtless acted against
his judgment. [See p. 99.] If I had been in General Burnside's place, I
would have asked the President to allow me to resign rather than execute
his order to force the passage of the river and march the army against
Lee in his stronghold.
Viewing the battle after the lapse of more than twenty years, I may say,
however, that Burnside's move might have been made stronger by throwing
two of his grand divisions across at the mouth of Deep Eun, where Franklin
crossed with his grand division and six brigades of Hooker's. Had he thus
placed Hooker and Sumner, his sturdiest fighters, and made resolute assault
with them in his attack on our right, he would in all probability have given
us trouble. The partial success he had at that point might have been pushed
vigorously })y such a force and might have thrown our right entirely from
position, in which event the result would have depended on the skillful hand-
ling of the forces. Franklin's grand division could have made sufficient
sacrifice at Marye's Hill and come as near success as did Sumner's and
two-thirds of Hooker's combined. I think, however, that the success would
have been on our side, and it might have been followed by greater disaster
on the side of the Federals; still they would have had the chance of success
in their favor, while in the battle as it was fought it can hardly be claimed
that there was even a chance.
Burnside made a mistake from the first. He should have gone from War-
renton to Chester Gap. He might then have held Jackson and fought me, or
have held mo and fought Jackson, thus taking us in detail. The doubt about
the matter was whether or not he could have caught me in that trap l)efore
we could concentrate. At any rate, that was the only move on the board that
could have benefited him at the time he was assigned to the command of the
Army of the Potomac. By interposing between the corps of Lee's army he
would have secured strong ground and advantage of position. With skill
equal to the occasion, he should liave had success. This was the move about
which we felt serious apprehension, and we were occupying our minds with
plans to meet it when the move toward Fredericksburg was rejtorted. Gen-
eral McClelhin, in his report of August -ith, 1861), spi^aks of this move as that
upon which he was studying when the order for Burnside's assignment to
command reached him.
When Burnside determined to move by Fredericksburg, he sliould lKi\t'
moved rapidly and occujned the city at once, but this would only liave t<>i-ct'd
us back to the plan })referred by General Jackson.
THE CONFEDERATE LEFT AT FREDERICKSBURG.
BY LAFAYETTE McLAWS, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A.
ON the 25th of November, 1862, my division marched into Fredericksburg,
and shortly after, by direction of General Longstreet, I occupied the city
with one of my brigades and picketed the river with strong detachments from
the dam at Falmouth to a quarter of a mile below Deep Run creek, the enemy's
pickets being just across the river, within a stone's-throw of mine. Detach-
ments were immediately set at work digging rifle-pits close to the edge of the
bank, so close that our men, when in them, could command the river and
the shores on each side. The cellars of the houses near the river were made
available for the use of riflemen, and zigzags were constructed to enable the
men to get in and out of the rifle-pits under cover. All this was done at
night, and so secretly and quietly that I do not believe the enemy had any
conception of the minute and careful preparations that had been made to
defeat any attempt to cross the river in my front. No provision was made
for the use of artillery, as the enemy had an enormous array of theii' bat-
teries on the heights above the town, and could have demolished ours in
five minutes.
Two or three evenings previous to the Federal attemj^t to cross, I was with
General Barksdale, and we were attracted by one or more of the enemy's bands
playing at their end of the railroad bridge. A luimber of their officers and a
crowd of their men were about the band cheering their national airs, the
" Star Spangled Banner," " Hail Columbia," and others, once so dear to us all.
It seemed as if they expected some response from us, but none was given
until, finally, they struck up " Dixie," and then both sides cheered, with much
laughter. Surmising that this serenade meant mischief, I closely inspected
our bank of the river, and at night caused additional rifle-pits to be con-
structed to guard more securely the approaches to the bridge.
Early in the night of the 10th General Barksdale reported that his pickets
had heard noises, as if the enemy were hauling pontoon-boats to the brink of
the river ; a dense fog had prevented a clear view. About 2 a. m., of the 11th,
General Barksdale notified me that the movements on the other side indi-
cated that the enemy were preparing to lay down the pontoon-bridges. I told
him to let the bridge building go on until the enemy were committed to it
and the construction parties were within easy range. At 4:30 he reported
that the bridge was being rapidly constructed and was nearly half done,
and he was about to open fire. I then ordered the signal to be given by firing
two gTins of J. P. W. Read's battery, posted on the highest j^oint along my
front, on the edge of the hills alongside the main road running to the city.
Previous notice had been sent to General Lee and to corps headquarters that
tlu! bridge was being constructed. With the sound of the cannon was mingled
the rattle of the rifles of the Mississippi men, who opened a concentrated fire
from the rifle-pits and swept the bridge, now crowded with the construction
THE CONFEDERATE LEFT AT FREDERICKSBURG.
87
parties. Nine distinct
and desperate attempts
were made to complete
the bridge, but every
one was attended with
such heavy loss from
our fire that the efforts
were abandoned until
about 10 A. M., when
snddenly the tremen-
dous array of the Fed-
eral artillery opened
fire from the heights
above the city.
It is impossible fitly
to describe the effects
of this iron hail hurled
against the small band
of defenders and into
the devoted city. The
roar of the cannon, th(^
])ursting shells, the fall-
ing of walls and chim-
neys, and the flying
bricks and other ma-
terial dislodged from
the houses by the iron
balls and shells, added
to the fin^ of the infan-
try from both sides and
the smoke from the guns and from the burning houses, made a scene of
indescrilmble confusion, enough to appall the stoutest hearts ! Under cover of
this bond )ardment the Federals renewed their efforts to construct the bridge,
but the little band of Mississippians in the rifle-pits under Lieutenant-Colonel
John C. Fiser, 17th Mississippi, composed of his own regiment, 10 shai-p-
shooters from the 13th Mississippi, and 3 companies from the 18th Mississippi
(Ijieutenant-Colonel Luse), held their posts, and successfully rei^«'ll«Ml t^very
attempt. The enemy had been committed to that point, l>y ha\iiig iis.'d
half their })ontoons.
About 4:30 p. iv[. the enemy began crossing in boats, and tlic conccnti
fire from all arms, directed against Barksdale's men in the rille-pits, be*
so severe that it was impossible for tliem to use their rilh's with etfect. ,1
As the main purpose of a determined defense, wliidi was to gain tim
the other troops to take position, had been accomiilislicd, Colonel Fiser
BARKSDAI.E'S MISSISSIPPI ANS OPPOSINr. THE LAYING OF THE
PONTOON-BKIDU ES.
itrd
for
was
i Colonel Fiser himself had V)eeii ki
recovering consciousness,
•1<(<1 down and stum
.'Id to Ids post, and d
;.f a fall!
.-L. Ml
ig wall, hut,
88 THE CONFEDERATE LEFT AT FREDERICKSBURG.
directed to di'aw his command back from the river and join the brigade iu
the city ; and just in time, for the enemy, no longer impeded by our fire,
crossed the river rapidly in boats, and, forming on the flanks, rushed down to
capture the men in the rifle-pits, taking them in the rear. Some of the men
in the cellars, who did not get the order to retire, were thus captiu^ed, |
but the main body of tliem rejoined the brigade on Princess- Anne street,
where it had been assembled, and all attempts made by the enemy, now cross-
ing in large numbers, to gain possession of the city were defeated. The firing
ceased by 7 o'clock, and as the grand division of Franklin had effected a cross-
ing below the mouth of Deep Run, and thus controlled ground which was
higher than the city, and other ti'oops had crossed above the city, where,
also, the ground was higher, so that our position would become untenable in
the morning, I directed Greneral Barksdale to retire to a strong position I had
noticed along a sunken road cut through the foot of Marye's Hill and running
perpendicular to the fine of the enemy's advance.
We read in the accounts given by Federal officers of rank that although
General Franklin's command had constructed a bridge or two across the
Rappahannock, below the mouth of Deep Run, and had crossed the greater
portion of his division on the 11th, yet, because of the failure of General
Sumner's grand division to force a crossing in front of Fredericksburg, all
but one brigade of Franklin's grand division had been recrossed to the left
bank to await the result of Sumner's efforts, and that Franklin's grand divis-
ion was not again crossed to our side until the 12th. The Federal accounts
show that this detennined defense offered by a small fraction of Barksdale's
brigade not only prevented Sumner's crossing, but by this delay caused the
whole of Franklin's Left Grand Division, except one brigade, to recross the
Rappahannock, and thus gave General Lee twenty-four hours' time to prepare
for the assault, with full notice of the points of attack.
Early on the night of the 11th General Thomas R. R. Cobb was directed to
relieve the brigade of General Barksdale, and accordingly three Georgia
regiments and the Phillips Legion of Cobb's brigade took position in the
sunken road at foot of Marye's Hill, on the lower side of which there was a
stone- wall something over four feet high, most of which was protected by the
earth thrown from the road, and was invisible from the front. Barksdale's
brigade retired to their originally assigned position as my rear line of
defense, in Bernard's woods, where they constructed abatis and rifle-pits
during the 12th.
Meanwhile tlui 18th Mississippi Regiment, of Barksdale's brigade, under
Colonel Luse, which had been detached to defend the river-bank below the
town on the night <^f the 10th, had offered such vigorous resistance from
behind some old huts and thickets that the enemy had delayed the construc-
tion of their pontoon-bridges there until after daylight on the 11th, and there-
fore, instead of crossing the grand division by daylight of the 11th, did not
cross until late on that day. The enemy on the 11th brought grape and
canister against Colonel Luse, who was not fortified, not having rifle-pits
jPorliaps tliirty or forty, not more.— L. McL.
THE CONFEDhKATE LEFT AT FKEDEK/CKSBURG.
FREDICUICKSBURG FUOM TIIU FOOT OF WILLIS'S HILL. FROM A WAR-TIME I'UOTOGKAPII.
Ill the niiddlc-Krouiid is Keen the Routh end of tlie
stoue-wall, aud it may be hccii tliat the trout Hue of
defense foriued by the wall waw contiuiied still farther
to the right by the eiiukeu Tclci,a'aph road. At the
base of the hill, this side of the stone-wall, is seen an
earth-work which was a part of the second line. A
third line [see p. 83] wa.-: on tlu" brow of this hill, n..w
the National Cenietery. Between the steeples on the
outskirts of Fredericksburg is seeu the end of Han-
over street, by which, and by the street in the right
of the picture, the Union forces tiled out to form for the
assault.— Editors.
even, and liis regiment was witlulrawn to the river I'oad. The IGtli Georgia,
Colonel Bryan, and tlie 15tli S(Kitli Carolina, Colonel De Sanssure, wliieh had
been ordered to the assistance of Colonel Luse, retired with liis cokunn. Early
on the 11th a battalion of the 8th Florida, under Captain Lang, numbering
150 men, had been posted to the left of Colonel Fiser's command, above Fred-
ericksburg, and while under Captain Lang did good service. But unfortu-
nately the captain was badly wounded about 11 a. m, and the battalion was
withdrawn. I think the defense of the river-crossing in front of Fredericks-
burg was a notable and wondei'ful feat of arms, challenging conii)arison witli
aiiytliing that liappened during the war.
On tlie 12th close and heavy skirmishing was kept up between my advanced
parties and the enemy, and whole divisions were employed in fortifying tlu^r
l)Ositions and preparing for the coming assaults. The grounds in my front
had been well studied by myself, in company with my brigade commanders
and colonels of regiments, and all the details for the suj)ply of annnunition,
]»rovisions, water, care for the wounded, and otlier necessary arrangements
liad been attended to, so lliat we waited for the enemy willi perfect cahimess
and with confidence in our ability to repel them.
A heavy fog hung over the valley, concealing tlie town froni our \ iew, and
until late in the day the banks below were not visible. As I was anxiously
iiKpuring for some news from the i)ickets, since the point «•!" attack had not yet
been developcMl, my aid(wle-cami), Cajttain 11. L. P. ]\iiig, \oInnteered to goto
VOL. in. 7.
90 THE CONFEDERATE LEFT AT FREDERICKSBURG.
the river and collect information by personal observation, and I consented to
his going, but did not send him. He rode off, and in about two hours returned,
reporting that he had ridden down Deep Run as far as he could go in safety
on horseback, and, dismounting and concealing his horse, had gone on foot
down the run to its mouth, and from there he had watched the enemy cross-
ing the river on two bridges. One or two hundred yards below the mouth of
the I'un large bodies of infantry, artillery, and some cavalry had crossed,
while heavy forces on the opposite side were waiting their turn to cross. On
his return he had gone into a two-story wooden dwelling on the banks of the
river, and had taken a leisurely view of the whole surroundings, confirming
his observations taken from the mouth of Deep Run. This was a daring
reconnoissance, as, at the time, none of our troops were within a mile of him.
Up to this time the enemy had not shown us any very large body of troops,
either in Fredericksburg, on the opposite side, or below.
On the 13th, during the early morning, a thick fog enveloped the town in
my front and the valley of the river, but between 9 and 10 o'clock it lifted,
and we could see on our right, below Deep Run, long lines of the enemy
stretching down the river, and near it, but not in motion. Reconnoitering
parties on horseback were examining the grounds in front of our army, coming
within range without being fired on. After they retired a strong body of
infantry advanced from a point on the river somewhat below my extreme
right, as if to gain possession of the Bernard woods, but I had seven rifle-
guns on the hill above those woods to meet this very contingency, and these
opening on this advancing body, it fell back to the river before coming
within reach of Barksdale.
As the fog lifted higher an immense column of infantry could be seen
halted on the other side of the river, along the road leading from the hills
beyond to the pontoon-bridges in front of the town, and extending back for
miles, as it looked to us, and still we could not see the end. In Jackson's front
the enemy had advanced, and their forming lines were plainly visible, while in
Longstreet's front we could see no body of troops on the Fredericksburg side
of the river. The indications were that Jackson was to receive the first blow,
and General Longstreet came to me and said he was going over to that flank.
I called his attention to the immense column of troops opposite us, on the
other side of the river, with its head at the pontoon-bridges, crossing to
Fredericksburg in our immediate front, and told him that in my judgment
the most desperate assault was to be made on his front, and it would Ije
developed close to us, without our knowing that it was forming, nor would we
know when it commenced to move against us; that the assault would be
sudden and we should be ready to meet it, acd that there wei-e certainly as
many of the enemy in that column threatening us as appeared in the lines
opposite General Jackson. General Longsti'cet agreed with me, and remained.
Not long after, the grand division of General Franklin, in plain view from
where we stood, was seen advancing in two lines against Jackson's front,
marching in most magnificent order. No perceptible check could I observe
in the advance, and the first line in good order entered the woods and was
THE CONFEDERATE LEFT AT FREDERICKSBURG. 91
lost to our view. But the immediate crash of musketry and the thunder of
artillery told of a desperate conflict, and we waited anxiously for some sign of
the result. Soon masses of the enemy were seen emerging from the woods in
retreat, and the whole body of the enemy marched back in the direction they
came from, in excellent order, and very deliberately. Now began the trial
against Longstreet's lines; but our confidence in our ability to resist all
assaults against us had been wonderfully increased by seeing the rei)ulse of
Franklin.
My line of defense was a broken one, running from the left along the
sunken road, near the foot of Marye's Hill, where General Cobb's brigade
(less the 16th Georgia) was stationed. During the 12th the defenses of this
line had been extended beyond the hill by an embankment thrown up to pro-
tect the right from sharp-shooters, as also to resist assaults that might be
made from that direction, and then the line was retired a hundred or more
yards to the foot of the hills in the rear, along which was extended Kershaw's
brigade of South Carolina troops, and General Barksdale's Mississipijians,
from left to right, the brigade of General Semmes being held in reserve. The
Washington Artillery, under Colonel Walton, were in position on the crest of
Marye's Hill over the heads of Cobb's men [see p. 97], and two brigades
under General Ransom were held here in reserve. The heights above Kershaw
and Barksdale were crowned with 18 rifle-guns and 8 smooth-bores belonging
to batteries, and a number of smooth-bores from the reserve artillery. The
troops could not be well seen by the enemy, and the artillery on my rear
line was mostly concealed, some covered with brush. The enemy, from theu*
position, could not see the sunken road, near the foot of Marye's Hill, nor do I
think they were aware, until it was made known to them by our fire, that
there was an infantry force anywhere except on top of the hill, as Ransom's
troops could be seen there, in reserve, and the men in the sunken road were
visible at a short distance only.
Soon after 11 a. m. the enemy approached the left of my line by the Tele-
gi-aph road, and, deploying to my right, came forward and planted guidons
or standards (whether to mark their advance or to aid in the alignment I do
not know), and commenced firing ; but the fire from our artillery, and espe-
cially the infantry fire from Cobb's brigade, so thinned their ranks that tlie
line retreated without advancing, leaving their guidons phinted. Soon an-
other force, heavier than tlie first, advanced, and were driven l)ack with great
slaughter. They were met on retiring by reenforcements, and advanced
again, but were again repulsed, with great loss. This continued until about
1 V. M., when General Cobb reported to me that he was sliort of ;immu-
nitioii. I sent his own very intelligent and brave conrici-, little -lolinny
Clark, from Augusta, Georgia, to bring up his ordnance sui)])lies, and directed
General Kei'shaw to reenforce General Cobb with two of his South Carolina
regiments, and I also sent the IGth Georgia, which had been detached, to
report to General Cobb. A few minutes after these ord(M-s had been given I
received a note from General Cobb, informing me that General R. H. Anders(Ui,
whose division was posted on the left and rear of Cobb's, had just told him
92 THE CONFEDERATE LEFT AT FREDERICKSBURG.
that if the attack was tui-ned on him he would retire his troops to the hills
in their rear. As this would leave my troops in the sunken road with their
left flank unprotected, and at the mercy of the enemy, should they come up
on my left, I went over to Greneral Longstreet and represented to him that if
this were done I would have to provide in some other way for the protection
of the troops in the sunken road, or move them out, so soon as there was a
lull in the attack, which would be vir-
tually giving up the defense of Marye's
Hill. General Longstreet at once or-
dered General Pickett to reenforce
Anderson, and directed Anderson to
hold his position until forced back. I
then went over and examined the
ground where Anderson's force was on
my left, and finding that the prepa-
rations for defense made to resist an
^^^ _ assault were incomplete and inconsid-
♦ ^T- erable, I thought it best to take meas-
^ ^ I w^ ^ ^ ures to protect my own flank with
I* - _ ^^ my own troops, and therefore directed
General Kershaw to take his brigade,
BKIGADIER-GENERAL ROBERT RANSOM, C. S. A. aud, SCUdiug tWO Of lllS rCglmCntS tO
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. , ,-, ^ 1 /^ 1 1 i T 1
strengthen General Cobb's line be-
neath the hill, to hold the rest of his command on top of the hill, to the left
of Cobb's line, to meet emergencies, and especiall}^ to hold in check, or aid
in repelling, any force coming on Cobb's flank, until the force in the sunken
road could be withdrawn by the right flank ^ the only chance it would have
of retiring without very heavy loss. I then tore a leaf from my memoran-
dum-book and wrote to General Cobb, " General : Hold your position, witli
no fear of your flank, it will be protected," and handing it to Captain King,
my aide-de-camp, told him to carry it to General Cobb, and to inform him
that both ammunition and reenforcements were on the way.j General Ker-
shaw at once moved his brigade as ordered, but while it was in motion a
courier came from General Cobb and informed me that the general was des-
perately wounded. General Kershaw was directed to go at once and take
command of the force at the foot of Marye's Hill.
Kershaw doubled his 2d and 8th regiments on Phillips's Legion and 24th
Georgia, commanded by Colonel McMillan, who succeeded General Cobb in
command of the brigade, leaving the 3d and 7th South Carolina on the hill,
and holding the 15th, Colonel l)e Saussure, in reserve. His 3d Battalion was
])osted on the right at Tlowison's mill to repulse any attack up Hazel Run, and
the l()tli (Sreorgia was doubled on the right of Col)b's brigade in the road. The
3d and 7th South Carolina suffered severely while getting into position, Colonel
Nance, Lieutenant-Colonel Rutherford, Major Maffett, Captains P. Todd and
^ This was the last I saw of Captaiu King until we found this gallant officei-'s body, after
the battle. — L. McL.
THE CONFEDERATE LEFT AT FREDERICKSBURG.
93
John C. Summer being shot down. Summer was killed. The 2d and 8th
arrived just in time to resist a heavy assault made on the left about 2:45 p. m.,
and all of these reenforcements were opportune. The enemy, then deploy-
ing in a ravine about three hundred yards from the stone-wall, advanced with
fresh lines of attack at short intervals, but were always di'iven back with
great loss. This was kept up until about 4:30 p. m., when the assaults ceased
for a time ; but the enemy, posting artillery on the left of the Telegraph road,
opened on our position ; however, they did no damage worth particularizing.
The batteries on Marye's Hill were at this time silent, having exhausted
their ammunition, and were being relieved by gans from Colonel E. P. Alex-
ander's battalion. Taking advantage of this lull in the conflict, the 15tli
South Carolina was brought forward from the cemetery, where it had been
in reserve, and was posted behind the stone-wall, supporting the 2d South
Carolina regiment.
The enemy in the meanwhile formed a strong column of lines of attack,
and advancing under cover of their own artillery, and no longer impeded by
ours, came forward along our whole front in the most determined manner ;
but by this time, as just explained, I had lines four deep throughout the
whole sunken road, and beyond the right flank. The front rank, firing,
stepped back, and the next in rear took its place and, after firing, was
replaced by the next, and so on in rotation. In this way the volley fi]-ing
was made nearly continuous, and the file firing very destructive. The enemy
were repulsed at all points.
The last charge was made after sundown — in fact, it was already dark in
the valley. A Federal officer who was in that assault told me that the first
discharge at them was a volley, and the bullets went over their heads " in
sheets," and that his command was ordered to lie down, and did lie down for a
full half-hour and then retired, leaving a large number of killed and wounded.
The firing ceased as darkness increased, and about 7 p. m. the pickets of the
opposing forces were posted within a short distance of each other, my pickets
reporting noises as of movements of large bodies of troops in the city.
Thus ended the battle. The enemy remained in possession of the city until
the night of the 15th, and then retired across the Rappahannock, resuming
their former positions, and Kershaw's brigade of my di\'ision re-occupied
the city. My loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 853 ; of which number
67 were missing, 62 being from Barksdale's brigade, 100 of the 853 being
killed. Over 200 of the number were killed or disabled in Kershaw's conunaiid
while taking positions to defend my left flank.
There was a ravine in my front, distant between 200 or 300 yards, where
large masses of the enemy were constantly deployed, and they controlled the
slope of Marye's Hill, so that it would have been a hazardous feat, even for
a dog, to have attempted to run down it; and yet a Georgia boy named
Crumley, an orderly of Genei-al Kershaw's, fliiding that the general had no
use for his horse in the sunken rond, or thi?d<ing that it was no place for a
fine animal, deliberately rode him up that slope without injury either to the
horse or to himself, — and going back to his camp, returned with an inferior
94
RANSOM'S DIVISION AT FREDERICKSBURG.
horse, rode down the slope unscathed, and joined his chief, who, until his
return, was ignorant of Crumley's daring feat.
General Cobb, who was wounded by a musket-ball in the calf of the leg, ^
died shortly after he was removed to the field-hospital in rear of the division.
He and I were on intimate terms, and I had learned to esteem him warmly,
as I beheve every one did who came to know his great intellect and his
good heart. Like Stonewall Jackson, he was a reUgious enthusiast, and,
being firmly convinced that the South was right, believed that God woiild
give us visible sign that Providence was with us, and daily prayed for His
interposition in our behalf.
% The statement in the text is made on the authority of Surgeon Todd, of Cobb's brigade, who says
he saw the wound, and I am assured that General Cobb received all possible attention, and that every-
thing that skill could do was done to save his life. — L. McL.
EANSOM'S DIVISION AT FREDERICKSBURG.
BY ROBERT RANSOM, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.
IN "The Century" magazine for August, 1886,
General James Lougstveet published what he
" saw of the battle of Fredericksburg, Va., Decem-
ber 13th, 1862." [See p. 70.]
The omissions in that article were so glaring, and
did such injustice, that I wrote to him and re-
quested him to correct what would produce false
impressions. His answer was unsatisfactory, but
promised that, " I [Longstreet] expect in the near
future to make accounts of all battles and put them
in shape, in a form not limited by words, but with
full details, when there will be opportunity to
elaborate upon all points of interest."
General Lee, in his report of the battle of Fred-
ericksburg, December 13th, 1862, writes as fol-
lows :
..." Longstreet's corps constituted our left, with
Audersou's division resting upon the river, aud those
of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood cxtciuling to the righr in
the order named. RiuiHomV division supported the bat-
teries on Marye's and Willis's hills, at the foot of wliich
Cobb's l)rigad(- of McLaws's divisinu and tlif ittli North
Carolinaof Kansoiu's brigade were stationed, protected
by a stonewall. Tlie hnincdialc cure of litis )Ktint Wds
commuted to General Ransom."
The italics in this paper are all mine. The
positions are stated by General Lee exactly as
the troops were posted. Lee's report continues
farther on :
..." About 11 A. M., having massed hie [the en-
emy's] troops under cover of the houses of Fredericks-
burg, ho moved forward in strong cobimns to seize
Marye's and Willis's liills. General Ransom advanced
Cooke's brigade to the top of the hill, ami placed his
own, with the exception of the 24th North Carolina, a
short distance in rear." . . . "In the third as-
sault," his report continues, "the brave and lamented
Brigiulier-General Thomas R. R. Cobb fell at the head of
his gallant troops, and almost at the same monn^nt
Brigadier-General Cooke was borne from the tlcld
severely wounded. Fearing that Cobb's brigade might
exhaust its ammuiiithm, General Longstreet had di-
rected General Kershaw to take two regiments to its
support. Arriving after the fall of Cobb, ho assumed
command, his troops taking position on the crest and at
the foot of the hill, to jp/iich point General Ransom also
advanced three other regiments."
General Kershaw took command of Cobb's bri-
gade, which I had had supplied with ammunition
from my wagons, and I repeated the supply during
the day.
General Longstreet, in his official report, says :
. . . " GeneralRansom on Marye's Hill was cJiarged
u^ith the immediate care of the point attacJ^ed, with orders
to send forward additional reenforcements if it should
become necessary, and to use Featherston's brigade of
Anderson's division if he should require it." And con-
tinuing, "I directed Major-General Pickett to send me
two of his brigades : one, Kemper's, teas sent to General
Ransom to be placed in some secure position to be ready
in case it should be wanted." And again, " I would also
mention, as particularl.\ distinguished in the engage-
ment of the 13th, Brii^adier-CJcnerals Ransom, Kershaw,
and Cooke (severely wounded)."
General McLaws was not upon the part of the
field in the vicinity of Marye's and Willis's hills
during the battle, but his aide, Captain King, was
killed on the front slope of the hill near Marye's
house.
My own permanent command was a small divis-
ion of two brigades of infantry, — my own, con-
taining the 24th, 25th, 35th, and 49th; and
Cooke's, the 15th, 27th, 46th, and 48th regi-
ments,— all from North Carolina ; and attached to
my brigade was Branch's battery, and to Cooke's
brigade the battery of Cooper,
At the time the fog began to lift from the iield, I
was with Generals Lee and Longstreet on what has
since been known as Lee's Hill. Starting to join
my command as the Federals began to emerge
from the town, General Longstreet said to me :
" Remember, General, I place that salient in your
keeping. Do what is needed ; and call on Ander-
son if you want help."
I brought up Cooke before the first assault to
the crest of the hill, and before that assault
KERSHAW'S BHIGADE AT FREDERICKSBURG.
95
ended Cooke took the 27th and the 4Gth and part
of the 15th North Carolina into the sunken road
in front. The iSth North Carolina fought on top
of the hill all day.
At the third assault I brought up the 25th North
Carolina just in time to deliver a few deadly vol-
leys, and then it " took position shoulder to shoul-
der with Cobb's and Cooke's men in the road."
During this third attack Genei-al Cobb was mor-
tallj' hit, and almost at the same instant, and
within two paces of him, General Cooke was se-
verely wounded and borne from the field, Colonel
E. D. Hall, 46th North Carolina, assuming com-
mand of Cooke's brigade.
At this juncture I sent my adjutant-general,
Captain Thomas Rowland, to the sunken road to
learn the condition of affairs. "His report was
most gratifying, representing the troops in fine
spirits and an abundance of ammimition. I had
ordered Cobb's brigade supplied from my wagons."
After this tliird attack I was bringing up the
35th and 49th North Carolina of my brigade, when
General Kershaw, by a new road leading from the
mill below, came up on horseback with his staff at
the head of one regiment, which he took in just at
Marye's house. He was followed by a second regi-
ment, which halted behind a brick-walled gi-ave-
yard upon Willis's Hill. [See below.]
About sundown Brigadier-General Kemper was
brought up, and relieved the 24th North Carolina
with two of his regiments and held the others in
closer supporting distance. On the 20th of Decem-
ber, 1862, he sent me a list of his casualties, with
this note :
"Headquarters, Kemper's Brigade,
" Dpceiuber 20th, 1862.
" General : I inclose heremth the statement of the
losses of ray brigade on the 13th and 14th lust, while
acting as part of your command. While a report of my
losses has been called for by my permanent division
commander, and rendered to him, it has occmn-ed to me
that a similar one rendered to yourself would be proper
and acceptable. Permit me to add, General, that our
brief .service with you was deeply gratifying to myself
and to my entire command. I have the honor to be,
General, very respectfully, yom- obedient servant,
" J. L. Kemper, Brigadier-General.
" Brig.-Gen. Ransom, Commanding Division."
As stated in my letter to General Longstreet
dated August 14th, 1886, when I brought to his
attention his extraordinary omissions, it gave me
unfeigned pleasure to mention properly in my offi-
cial i-eport the meritorious conduct of those who
were a part of my permanent command and those
others who that day fell under my direction by
reason of my " immediate care of the point attacked."
My official report exhibits no self-seeking nor par-
tial discriminations.
Upon a letter from me (of the 17th of Decem-
ber, 1862) to General R. H. Chilton, assistant ad-
jutant-general Army of Northern Virginia, wherein
I protest against the ignoring of my command in
some telegraijhic dispatches to the War Depart-
ment at Richmond relative to the battle of the 1 3th,
General Longstreet indorses these words: ''Gen-
eral Ransom^s division teas engaged throughout the
battle and was quite as distinguished as an;/ troops
upon the field" ; and the same day, the 19th of De-
cember, I received from both him and General
Chilton notes expressing the regret felt by General
Lee at the injustice of which I complained. Those
original letters are now among the " Official Rec-
ords " in Washington.
I may be pardoned for remembering with pride
that among the Confederate troops engaged on the
whole battle-field of Fredericksburg, Va., Decem-
ber 13th, 1862, none were more honorably dis-
tinguished than the sons of North Carolina, and
tiiose of them who, with brother soldiers from
other States, held the lines at Marye's Hill against
almost ten times their number of as brave and
determined foes as ever did battle, can well trust
their fame to history when written from truthful
official records. |
I Where credit Is not given for quotations, they are from my official report of the battlo.-
KERSHAW'S BRIGADE AT FREDERICKSBURG.
GENERAL J. B. Kershaw writes to the editors
as follows, December 6th, 1887:
" General Ransom's letter, in ' The Century ' for De-
cember, 1887, in regard to his services at Fredericks-
burg, contains an error in relation to the operations of
my brigade. In the morning of that day, my troops
wt'ic sfatioiifd at the footof Lee's Hill. After the as-
Riiiilts on (icMKTiil ('obl)'s position had connnenccd, I was
ilircctcd to send two of my regiments to rcf'nforcc Cobb,
and (li<l so. lictoi-c^ they had reached liini, tidinirs ar-
rived of tlie fall of (ioneral Cobb, and I wasininiediately
ordered to take t lie rest of my brigade to the position
held by his forces, and assiini(> eonniiand of tlie troops
of MeLaws's division there. I preceded my troops, and
as soon as possil)h' arrived at the Stevens House at the
foot of Marye's Hill. As my brigade arrived they were
placed — two regiments, the 3d and the 7th South Caro-
lina, at Marye's House on the hill, and the rest of them In
the sunken road, with the left resting about the Stevens
House. The last regiment that arrived was the L-jth
South Carolina (Colonel De Saussure'si. He sheltered
his command behind the cemetery on the hill until his
prop<'r position was made known, when he moved delib-
erately and in perfect order down the road to the Stevens
House, and proceeded to the right of my line. Instead
of having two regiments engaged at that point, as (ien-
eral Hansom supposes, I had Hve regiments and a bat-
talion (my entire brigade), eai-h of which suffered more
or less severely. During these operations I received no
orders or directions from any officer but my division
commander, (General Mcl.aws. I recpiestod not to bo
relieved tliat night, and remained in that position until
the evacuation of Fredericksburg by the Union forces.
These facts were officially reported iit the time, and were
then too well known to be the subject of ndstake."
•1111
I
A HOT DAY ON MARYE'S HEIGHTS.
BY WILLIAM MILLER OWEN, FIRST LIEUTENANT, C. S. A.
ON the night of the 10th of December we, of the
New Orleans Washington Artillery, sat up late
in our camp on Marye's Heights, entertaining some
visitors in an improvised theater, smoking our
pipes, and talking of home. A final punch having
been brewed and disposed of, everybody crept
under the blankets and was soon in the land of
Nod. ' In an hour or two we were aroused by the
report of a heavy gun. I was up in an instant, for
if there should be another it would be the signal
that the enemy was preparing to cross the river.
Mr. Florence, a civilian in the bivouac, bounced
as if he had a concealed spring under his blanket,
and cried out, " Wake up ! wake up ! what's that ? "
The deep roar of the second gun was heard, and we
knew wliat we had to do. It was 4 o'clock. Our
orders were that upon the firing of these signal
guus we should at once take our places in the
redoubts prepared for us on Marye's Hill, and
await developments. "Boots and saddles" was
sounded, and the camp was instantly astir, and in
the gray of the morning we were on the Plank road
leading to the hill. The position reached, our nine
guns were placed as follows: Two 12-pounder
howitzers and two 12-pounder light Napoleon
guns of the 4th Company, under Captain Eshle-
man and Lieutenants Norcom and Battles, were
put in the work on the extreme right of the line
next to the Telegraph road ; two 12-poimder
Napoleon guns of the 3d Company, under Cap-
tain Miller and Lieutenant McElroy, in the center;
two 3-inch rifle-gims of the 1st Company, under
Captain Squires and Lieutenant Brown, on the left,
next to a little brick-house and in fi-ont of the Wel-
ford graveyard, and one 10-pounder PaiTott rifle,
under Lieutenant Galbraith, of the 1st Company,
next to the Plank road leading into Fredericksburg.
The 2d Company, mider Captain Richardson,
with four Napoleon guns, moved on across the
Telegraph road to the right, and reported as
ordered to General Pickett for service with his
troops. Without delay the men made the re-
doubts as snug as possible, and finding the epaide-
ments not to their liking, went to work with
pick and shovel throwing tlie dirt a little higher,
and fashioning embrasures to fire thi'ough. The
engineers objected, and said they were "ruining
the works," but the cannoneers said, "We have
to fight here, not you ; we will arrange them to
suit ourselves." AtkI General Longstreet approv-
ingly said, "If you save tlio finger of a man's
liand, that does some good." A dense fog covered
the country, and we could not discern what was
going on in tlie town.
Tlic morning of the 1 2th was also foggy, and it
was not until 2 i>. m. tliat it cleared ofl", and tliiMi
w(> could sec tlie Staff"ord Hoiglits, across the river,
densely packed with troops. At 3 P. M. a lieavy
column moved down toward one of the bridges
near tlie gas-works, and we opeiiod upon it, mak-
ing soni(> sph'iulid practice and apiiarcntly stirring
tlicin u]) ])ro(ligi()usly, for thoy soon sougiit cooler
localities. While our guns were tiring, the enemy's
long range batteries on the Stafford Heights opened
upon us, as much as to say, "What are you about
over there ? " We paid no attention to theii- in-
quiry, as our guns could not reach them.
At dawn the next morning, December 13th, in
the fresh and nipping air, I stepped upon the
gallery overlooking the heights back of the little
old-fashioned town of Fredericksburg. Heavy
fog and mist hid the whole plain between the
heights and the Rappahannock, but under cover
of that fog and within easy cannon-shot lay Burn-
side's army. Along the heights, to the right and
left of where I was standing, extending a length
of nearly five miles, lay Lee's army. The bugles
and the drum corps of the respective armies were
now sounding reveille, and the troops were pre-
paring for their early meal. All knew we should
have a battle to-day and a great one, for the en-
emy had crossed the river in immense force, upon
his pontoons during the night. On the Confeder-
ate side all was ready, and the shock was awaited
with stubborn resolution. Last night we had
spread our blankets upon the bare floor in the par-
lor of Marye's house, and now om- breakfast was
being prepared in its fire-place, and we were im-
patient to have it over. After hastily dispatching
this light meal of bacon and corn-bread, the
colonel, chief bugler, and I (tlie adjutant of the
battalion) mounted our horses and rode out to in-
spect our lines. Visiting first the position of the
10-pounder Parrott rifle on the Plank road, we
found Galbraith and his boj's wide-awake and ready
for business. Across the Plank road, in an earth-
work, was the battery of Donaldsonville Can-
noneers, of Louisiana, all Creoles and gallant
soldiers. Riding to the rear of Marye's house, we
visited in turn the redoubts of Squires, Miller, and
Eshleman, and found everything ready for instant
action. The ammunition chests had been taken off
the limbers and placed upon the ground behind the
traverses close to the guns. The horses and lijiibers
had been sent to the rear out of danger. We drew
rein and spoke a few words to each in passing, and
at the 3d Company's redoubt we were invited by
Sergeant " Billy " Ellis to partake of some "caf6
noir'' which his mess had prejiared in a horse
bucket. Nothing loath, we drank :i tin-cupfnl, and
found, not exactly "Mocha," or "Java," but the
best of parched corn. However, it was liot, the
morning was raw, and it did very well.
At 12 o'clock the fog had cleared, and wliile we
were sittingin Marye's yard smokiiigour]>ipes, after
a lunch of luird crackers, a courier came to Colonel
Walton, bearing a dispatch from General Long-
street for General Cobb, but, for our information as
well, to be read and tluMi given to liiin. It was as
follows: " Should General ,\nderson, on'your left,
be compelled to fall back to tlie second line of
lieights, j'ou must conform to his nioven'eiits."
Des<'en(ling the hill into tlie sunken road. I maile
my way through the troojjs. to a little house where
General Cobb had his headquarters, and handed
him the dispatch. He rea.l it carefully, and said.
98
A HOT DAY ON MA RYE'S HEIGHTS.
JAMES A. SEDDON, SECRETARY OF WAR TO THE SOUTHERN
CONFEDERACY, FROM NOVEMBrCR 20, 1862, TO JAN-
UARY 28, 1865. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
"Well! if they wait for me to fall back, they will
wait a long time." Hardly had he spoken, when
a brisk skirmish fire was heard in front, toward
the town, and looking over the stone-wall we saw
our skirmishers falling back, firing as they came ;
at the same time the head of a Federal column
was seen emerging from one of the streets of the
town. They came on at the double-quick, with
loud cries of " Hi ! Hi ! Hi ! " which we could dis-
tinctly hear. Their arms were carried at "right
shoulder shift," and their colors were aslant the
shoulders of the color-sergeants. They crossed the
canal at the bridge, and getting behind the bank to
the low ground to deploy, were almost concealed
from our sight. It was 12:30 P. M., and it was
evident that we were now going to have it hot and
heavy.
The enemy, having deployed, now showed him-
self above the crest of the ridge and advanced in
columns of brigades, and at once our guns began
their deadly work with shell and solid shot. How
beautifully tliey came on ! Their bright bayonets
glistening in the sunlight made the line look like
a huge sei-pent of blue and steel. The very force
of their onset leveled the broad fences bounding
the small fields and gardens that interspersed the
plain. We could see our shells bursting in their
ranks, making great gaps; but on they came, as
though they would go straight through and over
us. Now we gave them canister, and tliat staggered
them. A few more paces onward and the
Georgians in the road below us rose up,
and, glancing an instant along their rifle
barrels, let loose a storm of lead into the
faces of the advance brigade. This was
too much ; the column hesitated, and then,
turning, took refuge behind the bank.
But another line appeared from behind
the crest and advanced gallantly, and
again we opened om* guns upon them,
and through the smoke we could discei'n
the red breeches of the "Zouaves," and
hammered away at them especially. But
this advance, like the preceding one, al-
though passing the point reached by the
first column, and doing and daring all
that brave men could do, recoiled under
our canister and the bullets of the infan-
try in the road, and fell back in great con-
fusion. Spotting the fields in our front,
we could detect little patches of blue —
the dead and wounded of the Federal
infantry who had fallen facing the very
muzzles of our guns. Cooke's brigade
of Ransom's division was now placed in
the sunken road with Cobb's men. At
2 P. M. other columns of the enemy left
the crest and advanced to the attack; it
appeared to us that there was no end of
them. On they came in beautiful array^
and seemingly more 'determined to hold
the plain than before ; but our fire was
murderous, and no troops on earth could
stand the feu d'cnfcr we were giving
them. In the foremost line we distin-
guished the green flag with the golden
harp of old Ireland, and we knew it to be Meag-
her's Irish brigade. The gunners of the two rifle-
pieces, Corporals Payne and Hardie, were directed
to turn their guns against this column ; but
the gallant enemy pushed on beyond all former
charges, and fought and left their dead within five
and twenty paces of the sunken road. Our position
on the hill was now a hot one, and three regiments
of Ransom's brigade were ordered up to reenforce
the infantry in the road. We watched them as
they came marching in line of battle from the rear,
where they had been lying in reserve. They
passed through our works and rushed down the hill
with loud yells, and then stood shoulder to shoulder
with the Georgians. The 25th North Carolina
regiment, crossing Miller's guns, halted upon the
crest of the hill, dressed its line, and fired a deadly
volley at the enemy at close range, and then at the
command "Forward! " dashed down, the hill. It
left dead men on Miller's redoubt, and he had to
drag them away from the muzzles of his guns. At
this time General Cobb fell mortally wounded, and
General Cooke w^as borne from the field, also
wounded. Among other missiles a 3-inch rifle-ball
came crashing through the works and fell at our
feet. Kursheedt picked it up and said, "Boys,
let's send this back to them again"; and into the
gun it went, and was sped back into the dense
ranks of the enemy.
General Kershaw now advanced from the rear
A HOT DAY ON MA RYE'S HEIGHTS.
99
with two regiments of his infantry, to reenforce
the men in the sunken road, who were running
short of ammunition, and to take command.
The sharp-shooters having got range of our em-
brasures, we began to suffer. Corporal Kuggles
fell mortally wounded, and Pei-ry, who seized the
rammer as it fell from Ruggles's hand, received a
bullet in the arm. Eodd was holding "vent," and
away went his " crazy bone." In quick succession
Everett, liossiter, and Kursheedt were wounded.
Falconer in passing in rear of the guns was struck
behind the ear and fell dead. We were now so
short-handed that cvciydiicwasin the work, officers
and men putting tlicii- slmulilcrs to the wheels and
running up the gnus after each recoil. The frozen
ground had given way and was all slush and mud.
We were compelled to call uj)on the infantry to help
us at the guns. Eshleman crossed over fi'om the
right to report his guns nearly out of ammunition ;
the other officers reported the same. They were
reduced to a few solid shot only. It was now 5
o'clock, p. M., and there was a lull in the storm.
The enemy did not seem inclined to renew his
efforts, so our guns were withdrawn one by one,
and the batteries of Woolfolk and Moody were
substituted.
The little whitewashed brick-house to the right of
the redoubt we were in was so battered with bullets
during the four hours and a half engagement that
at the close it was transformed to a bright brick-
dust red. An old cast-iron stove lay against tlie
house, and as the bullets would strike it it would
give forth the sound of "bing! bing!" with dif-
ferent tones and variations. Dm-ing the hottest
of the firing old Mr. Florence, our non-combatant
friend, was peering around the end of the house
(in which, by the way, our wounded took refuge),
looking out to see if his son, who was at the gun,
was all right. A cannon-ball struck the top of the
work, scattering dirt all over us and profusely
down our necks, and, striking tlie end of the house,
carried away a cart-load of bricks, just where Mr.
Florence had been looking an instant before. We
thought surely he had met his fate, but in a mo-
ment we were jjleased to see his gray head *'bob
up serenely," determined to see * * what was the gage
of the battle."
After withdrawing from the liill the comnumd
was placed in bivouac, and the men threw them-
selves upon the ground to take a much-needed rest.
We had been under the hottest fire men ever ex-
perienced for four hours and a half, and our loss
had been three killed and twenty-four wounded.
Among them was Sergeant John Wood, our lead-
ing spirit in camp theatricals, who was severely
injured and never returned to duty. One gim was
slightly disabled, and we had exhausted all of our
canister, shell and case shot, and nearly every solid
shot in our chests. At 5 : 80 another attack was
made by the enemy, but it was easily repulsed, and
the battle of Fredericksburg was over, and Burn-
side was baffled and defeated.
WINTliK Sl'OKT IN A (.ONI-KIMCKATI
CONFEDERATE
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF- OFFICER.
BY W. ROY MASON, MAJOR, C. S. A.
FREDERICKSBURG was the first great battle that
I saw in its entire scope. Here the situation
of the country — a champaign tract inclosed in
hills — offered the opportunity of seeing the troops
on both sides, and the movements down the entire
lines. I witnessed the magnificent charges made
on our left by Meagher's Irish Brigade, and was
also a sorrowful witness of the death of our noble
T. R. R. Cobb of Georgia, who fell mortally wounded
at the foot of the stone-wall just at the door of Mrs.
Martha Stevens. This woman, the Molly Pitcher
of the war, attended the wounded and the dying
fearless of consequences, and refused to leave her
house, although, standing just between the advan-
cing line of the enemy and the stone-wall, the posi-
tion was one of danger. It is said that after using
all tlio iii;itci-i;ils for bandages at her command, she
tore tVoin her ]Mison most of her garments, even on
that letter cold (hiy, in her anxiety to administer to
necessities greater than her own.
Mrs. Stevens still lives in her old home at the foot
of Marye's Heights, honored by every Confederate
soldier. Not long ago, hearing that she was very
sick, I went out with a party of gentlemen friends
who were visitors in Fredericksburg to inquire for
her. Being told of our visit, she requested her son-
in-law to ask me in. When jocularly asked by him
if she was going to invite a gentleman into her
sick-room, the old lady replied: "Yes, ask Major
Mason in, — we were old soldiers together."
After Burnside had witlidrawn liis forces across
the Rappahannock, General Lee rode over to
Marye's Heights, where I then was, and said to me:
"Captain, those people [meaning the enemy] have
sent over a flag of truce, asking permission to send
a detachment to bury their dead. They have landed
near yotu- house, ' The Sentry Box.' Have you any
objection to taking this reply down ? " As he spoke,
he handed me a sealed envelope directed to General
Burnside. I accordingly rode into town and made
my way down to the river-front of my residence,
from which Burnside had only that morning re-
moved his ijontoons. There I found a Federal
lieutenant-colonel with two soldiers in a boat,
holding a flag of triice. I handed him the dispatch
and at the same time asked where Burnside was.
He answered, "Just up the hill across the river,
under an old persimmon-tree, awaiting the dis-
patch." Telling him my name, I said: " Give my
regards to General Burnside, and say to him that I
thought he was too familiar with the surroundings
of Fredericksburg to butt his brains out deliber-
ately against our stone-walls."
" Do you know General Burnside ? " inquired the
officer.
"Oh, yes!" I replied, "he is an old acquaint-
ance of mine."
" Then will you wait till I deliver your message
and return ? He may have something to say."
" I will wait then," was my answer.
In a very short time the flag of truce returned
with a request from Burnside that I would come
over in the boat to see him. I thoroughly appre-
ciated the fact that I was running the risk of a
court-martial from my own side in thus going into
the enemy's lines without permission ; but being
that rather privileged person, a staff-officer, from
whom no pass was required and of whom no ques-
tions were asked, I determined to accept this in-
vitation and go over.
NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER.
After passing the river and walking leisurely up
the hill, the idle Federal soldiers, seeing a Confed- .
erate officer oJi their side and feeling curious
ahout it, ran down in numbers toward the road.
For the first time I was frightened by this result
of my act, as I feared that our generals on the
hills with their strong glasses, seeing the commo-
tion, might inquire into it. As soon as I approached
Burnside, who met me with the greatest cordiality,
I expressed to him this fear. He at once sent out
couriers to order the soldiers back to camji, and
we then sat down on an old log, and being provided
with crackers, cheese, sardines, and a bottle of
■ brandy (all luxuries to a Confederate), we discussed
this lunch as well as the situation. General Burn-
side seemed terribly mortified and distressed at
his failure, but said that he wanted me to tell his
old army friends on the other side that he was not
responsible for the attack on Fredericksburg in
the manner in which it was made, as he was him-
self under orders, and was not much more than a
figure-head, or words to that effect.
We talked pleasantly for au hour about old
times, Burnside asking me many questions about
former friends and comrades, now on our side of
the fratricidal struggle. When I expressed my
wish to return, he WTapped up a bottle of brandy
to give me at parting, and sent me under escort to
the river. Having recrossed, I mounted my horse
and rode back to Marye's Heights, but, enjoyable
as this escapade had been, I said nothing, of course,
about it to my army friends till long afterward.
That day I witnessed with pain the bui'ial of
many thousands of Federal dead that had fallen
at Fredericksburg. The night before, the ther-
mometer must have fallen to zera, and the bodies
of the slain had frozen to the ground. The ground
was frozen nearly a foot deep, and it was necessary
to use pick-axes. Trenches were dug on the battle-
field and the dead collected and laid in line for
burial. It was a sad sight to see these brave
soldiers thrown into the trenches, without even a
blanket or a word of prayer, and the heavy clods
thrown upon them ; but the most sickening sight
of all was when they threw the dead, some four or
five hundred in number, into Wallace's empty ice-
house, where they were found — a hecatomb of skel-
etons— after the war. In 1865-66 some shrewd
Yankee contractors obtained government sanction
to disinter all the Federal dead on the battle-fields
of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Wilder-
ness, and Spotsylvania Court House. They were to
be paid per capita. When I went out to see the
skeletons taken from the ice-house, I fomid the con-
tractor provided with unpainted boxes of common
pine about six feet long and twelve inches wide ;
but I soou saw that this scoundrel was dividing the
remains so as to make as much by his contract as
possible. I at once reported what I had seen to
Colonel E. V. Sumner, Jr., then in command of the
Sub-district of the Rappahannock. He was utterly
shocked at this vandalism. I afterward heard that
the contract was taken away from the fellow and
given to more reliable parties.
One morning about this time I was at breakfast,
when the servant, terribly frightened, announced
a sergeant and file of soldiers in my ijorch asking
for me. The ladies immediately imagined that
this squad had been sent to arrest me, as they had
heard more than once that charges would be pre-
ferred against me by the United States Govern-
ment for extreme partisanship. Going to the door,
I was told by the sergeant that Colonel Sumner
had sent him to me to inquire as to the burial
places of the Federal soldiers whom I had found
dead iipon my lot and in my house after the battle
of Fredericksburg. I told him that I had found
one Federal soldier stretched on one of ray beds.
In my parlor, lying on the floor, was another whose
entire form left its imprint in blood on the floor, —
as may be seen to this day. In my own cham-
ber, sitting up in an old-fashioned easy-chair, I
had found a Federal lieutenant-colonel. WTien I
entered, I supposed him to be alive, as the back
of his head was toward me. Much startled, I
approached him, to find that he had been shot
through the neck, and, probably, placed in that
upright position that he might better breathe. He
was quite dead. I had all these bodies, and five
or six others found in my yard, buried in one grave
on the wharf. They had been killed, no doubt, by
Barksdale's Mississippi brigade, in tlieir retreat
from my lot. I made my report at Sumner's head-
quarters, after which I took the burial squad to
the grave, and then returned home to quiet the
apprehensions of my family.
NEWSPAPERS
CAMP. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
THE EEMOVAL OF McCLELLAN.
BY RICHARD B. IRWIN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. V.
IN some former notes ^ I tried to trace with an
impartial hand, and without intruding any prej-
udice or opinion of my own, the course of the un-
fortunate differences that had ai'isen between the
Government and the commander of the Army of the
Potomac. The acute stage was reached on the
Peninsula ; Pope's campaign marked the first crisis.
On the 1st of September McClelhm toiiiid liimself
a general without an army. On the L'd the ( iovern-
ment gave him what was left of two armies, and
only asked him to defend the capital. On the
nth the troops were in motion ; on the 7th, without
another word, and thus, as appears probable, over-
stepping the intentions of the Government, 3> he
set out to meet Lee in Maryland; and, moving
deliberately imder repeated cautions, ten days
later he once more gi-appled fiercely with his
antagonist, who stood waiting on the banks of
the Antietam. Antietam strained the back of
the Confederacy.
^ " The Adruinistration in the Poniusular Campaign,"
Vol. II. of this work, p. 435 ; " Washinjfton under Banks,"
Vol. II. of this work, p. 541.
% Ro(5 Vol. II., p. 542, and note. This is Btronf;l.y c.on-
lirnicd hy Chase's diary, Scptenibera (Warden's" Life of
C'liase,"!). .'->4i)) : "Tlie President repeated thai the whole
Heoi)et)f the order was simply to direct Met 'lellan toput
the troops iido the fortifications .and conunand them for
the defense of Washini^fton." Septond)er 3d (Ibid., p. 460),
the diary says : " . . . the President assin-ed
lliin[Poi)e] . . . that McClellan's command was only
temporary, and save him reason to expect tlnit another
anuy of active operations would be orf,Muize(l at once
which he fPopc] would lead." The same evening (Sep-
tember 3d) the President gave General Halleck an order,
Hardly had the echo of the guns died away than
again the angry ink began to flow. To follow its
track would here be as tedious and unnecessary as
it must always be painful. The sullen stage of the
disorder had been reached ; collapse was soon to fol-
low. As one turns the pages of the history of the
seven weeks after Antietam, or the scattered leaves
that are some time to be gathered into history, it
is impossible not to realize that we are reading of
the last days of the first and best-loved commander
of the Army of the Potomac ; that the last hour
is not far off.
Without going into the details, and without at-
tempting to pass judgment, it must be said that no
candid person, knowing anything of war and armies,
can doubt that the Army of the Potomac, in the
last days of September and early October, 18G2,
needed nearly everything before beginning a fresh
campaign of its own choice. For some things, such
as shoes, the troops were really suffering. It is
which never became known to General McClellan, "to
organize an army for active operations . . . independ-
ent of the forces ho may deem necessary for the de-
fense of Washin.gton, when such active army shall
take the field." (" Official Records," Vol. XIX., Part II.,
p. 169.)
The published extracts from Chase's diary, though
volunnnous in the earlier stages, are silent on the sub-
ject of McClellan's final renmval. In Warden's "Life of
Chase" (p. 506) we read: "Another chapter'^ ofi'ers a
few words relating to our hero's responsibility for that
fall," and the foot-note refei-s us to ""-Post Chapter
LVII.," but not another word is said, and "Chapter
LVI., Conclusion," ends the book. This is at least curi-
ous, if not significant,— R. B. J.
102
THE REMOVAL OF MCCLELLAN.
103
equally evident that the duty of providing these
essential supplies rested with the administrative
services in Washington ; that some of the supplies
did not reach the troops for a long time, 4 and that
certain subordinate chiefs were at least indulged in
expending an amount of energy in combating the
earnest representations that came poiu'ing in from
the army on the field; that they, or some one, might
well have been required to devote to the task of
seeing that the supplies reached the troops who
needed them, instead of resting content with per-
functory declarations that the stores had "been
sent." Nor can any commander of an anny be
blamed for not liking this. The wonder is, that a
railway journey of a few hours should have stood
in the way of a complete understanding and swift
remedy, on one side or the other.
President Lincoln visited General MeClellan on
the 1st of October, and went over the battle-fields
of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and Antietam
in his company. When the President left him on
the 4th, General MeClellan appears to have been
imder the impression that his military acts and
plans were satisfactory. ^ What these plans were
at this time, beyond the reorganizationandrefitting
of his army, in the absence of direct evidence, one
can but conjecture from a passage that occurs in
a private letter dated October 2d, printed in " Mc-
Clellan's Own Story" (p. 654). "His [the Presi-
dent's] ostensible purpose is to see the troops and
the battle-field ; I incline to think that the real
purpose of his visit is to push on into a premature
advance into Vii-ginia. . . . The real truth is
that my army is not fit to advance." \ However, on
the Gth, two days after Mr. Lincoln's departure,
General Halleck telegraphed to General MeClellan :
" The President directs that you croes the Potomac
and give battle to the enemy or tlri\ e hira south. Your
army must move now, while the roads are Rood. If you
cross the river between the enemy and Washington and
cover the latter by your operation, you can be reen-
forced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the
Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent
to you. The President advises the interior line between
Wiishingtou and the enemy, but does not order it. He is
very desirous that your army move as soon as possible."
General MeClellan at first selected the valley
route, but the tardy delivery of supplies delayed
his movement, and when he began crossing the
4. In particular the statement of General Rufus lu-
galls(" Official Records," Vol. XTX., Part I., p. 95) seems
to lue concliiHivc, altliough tlio contrary view isstrouiily
held by high aiitliority. K. B. I.
^ " We spent some time on the battle-field and eon-
versed fully on the state of affairs. He told me that ho
was eutirely satisfied with me and with all that I had
done; that ho would stand ))y me against 'all comers';
that he wished me to <'Outiuue my prejiaratioiis for a
new eam|iiiign, not to stir an inch until fully ready, and
when ready to do what \ tlionght l)est. He repealed that
he was (entirely satisfied wifli me; that I should l)c let
alone; that he would stand l>y me. 1 liaye no doubt he
meant exactly what he said. He parted from me willi
tile utmost cordiality. We never met again on tliis
earfli." |" Mc( 'lellan's Own Story," pp. 027, f)2H.]
"X President Lincoln's yiews as to tlie eomj>arative
readiness to moye of t lie Federal and ConfedtM'ate armies
may be found tersely e\]iressed in liis letter to (ieneral
MeClellan, dated Oefolier i;!tli, mv2. printed on p. lOr..
^ Among otlier filings, Stuart crossed tlie I'otomac
Potomac on the 2.'jth and advanced a few days
later, the circumstances had somewhat changed. ■j;^
Then, leaving the Twelfth Corps to hold Harper's
Ferry, he marched down the eastern side of the
Blue Kidge, as the President had originally desired,
picked up the Third and Eleventh corps and Bay-
ard's division of cavalry on striking the railway
opposite Thoroughfare Gap, and on the 5th of
November made his headquarters at Kectortown,
with all his arrangements in progress for concen-
trating the army near Warrenton.
This movement in eifect (although General Me-
Clellan does not appear to have known it definitely
until three days later) placed the Army of the
Potomac, with a force double that of the Army of
Northern Virginia, ) between the two halves of that
army, farther separated by the Blue Kidge ; for Lee,
with Longstreet's corps, had moved to Culpeper as
soon as it was seen that MeClellan was advancing
east of the Blue Eidge,^ and Jackson was still in
the Shenandoah, distant several days' march.
On that very day, November 5th, the President,
with his own hand, wTote the following order: 44-
"Executive Mansion,
Washington, , 186 .
" By direction of the President it is ordered that Major-
General MeClellan be relieved from the command of the
Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Bui nside
take eonnuand of that army. Also that Major-(;enenil
Hiniter take command of the corps in said army now
commanded by General Buruside.
"That Major-Geneial Fitz John Porter be relieved
from the command of the corps he now commands in
said array, and that Major-General Hooker take com-
mand of said corps.
" The general-in-chief is authorized, in [his] discretion,
to issue an order substantially as tho above, forthwith
or as soon as he may deem i)roper.
"A. Lincoln.
" November 5th, 1862."
Forthwith the following orders were issued:
"Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, November 5th, 1862.
"Ma.jor-General McCi.ellan, Commanding, etc.—
General : On receipt of the order of the President, seut
herewith, you will immediately turn oyer your com-
mand to MaJor-General Buruside, and repair to Trenton,
N. .L, reporting, on your arrival at that place, by tele-
graph, for further orders.
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"H. W. Halleck,
" General-in-Chief."
at Williamsport on the lOth of October, on his famous
raid into Maryland and Pennsyhania, rode completely
round the rear of the Army of the Potomac, and. eluding
Phasonton's vigorous but iuellectual piu-suit, safely
reerossed the river near the mouth of tlie Monocacy.
One eflect of this raid on tlie mind of the President is
indicated in an anecdote related in " Washington under
Banks," VoL IL of this work. p. .'-.44.- R. B. I.
) Tlie "Otlicial Kccoids" show that McCIellan's effe<-t-
iye force was about 14.-..0<i;), Le.-'s about 72,(XHi. Long-
street :ind .Tackson each had about :12,(KH».— R. B. I.
;^ Lee's inders for Longstreet's moy<ntcnt are dated
October 2Kth. The Army of the Potomac luulnot then
tlnislied crossing the riy<M-.— R. B. I.
Ult is yirfually certain that (i.iicral MeClellan ncyi-r
saw this order, which, in the form as written l>y the
President, was iieycr promulgated. G.neral Hunter
was not placed in coniiiiand of Tiiirnsidc's corps. Hooker
was ordered to iclicyc Porter by Special Orders from the
War Deiiartnunt. AiUntant-GeHeral's Office, dated No-
ycmber lOtli. l.Wi.
I04
THE REMOVAL OF MCCLELLAN.
This order was inclosed :
" War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, November 5tli, 1862.
"GENERAL Orders, No. 182: By direction of the
President of tlie United States, it is ordered that Major-
General McClellau be relieved from the command of the
Army of the Potomac, and that Msyor-General Burnside
take the command of that aiiuy.
" By order of the Secretary of War :
"E. D. TOWNSEND,
" Assistant Adjutant-General."
If we except Halleck's report of October 28t]i,
obviously called for and furnished as a record,
and containing nothing new, no cause or reason
was ever made public either officially or in any
one of the many informal modes in which official
action so often finds it convenient to let itself be
known until the appearance in "The Century"
majrazine for February, 1889, in which Messrs.
Hay and Nicolay make it clear that the President
had some time before made up his mind to remove
MeClellan "if he should jiermit Lee to cross the
Blue Ridge and place himself between Richmond
and the Army of the Potomac."
General C. P. Buckingham, the confidential assist-
ant adjutant-general of the Secretary of War, bore
these orders from Washington by a special train.
He arrived atRectortown in a blinding snow-storm.
First calling upon Burnside to deliver to him a
counterpart of the order, late on the night of No-
vember 7th these two officers proceeded together
to General McClellan's tent. MeClellan says : ^
" I at once [when he heard of Buckingham's arrival]
suspected that he brought the order relieving me from
command, but kept my own counsel. Late at night I
was sitting alone in my tent, writing to my wife. All
the staff were asleep. Suddenly some one knocked
upon the tent-pole, and upon my invitation to enter
there appeared Burnside and Buckingham, both look-
ing very solemn. I received them kindly and com-
menced conversation upon general subjects in the most
unconcerned manner possible. After a few moments
Buckingham said to Burnside : ' Well, General, I think
we had better tell General MeClellan the object of our
visit.' I very pleasantly said that I should be glad to
learn it. Whereupon Buckingham handed me the two
orders of which he was the bearer. . . .
"I saw that both — especially Buckingham — were
watching me most intently while I opened and read the
orders. I read the papers with a smile, immediately
turned to Burnside, and said : ' Well, Burnside, I turn
the command over to you.' " ^
The movements of troops that had already been
begun were completed on the Sth and 9th, at Gen-
eral Burnside's request; but there the execution
of General McClellan's plans stopped. Burnside
turned to the left and massed his army on the
Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg; Lee
conformed to this movement, called in Jackson,
and concentrated on the opposite heights. The
disaster of Fredericksburg followed.
On the 10th MeClellan bade farewell to the
Army of the Potomac. As he rode between the
lines, formed almost of their own accord to do
honor for the . last time to their beloved com-
mander, grief and disappointment were on every
face, and manly tears stood in many an eye that
had learned to look on war without a tremor.
In the simple, touching words of the gallant and
accomplished Walker: "Every heart was filled
with love and grief ; every voice was raised in
shouts expressive of devotion and indignation ;
and when the chief had passed out of sight, the
romance of war was over for the Army of the
Potomac." Jj'
In all that these brave men did, in all that they
suffered, and great were their deeds, unspeakable
their sufferings, never, perhaps, were their devotion
and loyalty more nobly proved than by their in-
stant obedience to this order, unwisely wrung
from the President as many of them believed it
to have been, yet still for them, as American sol-
diers, as American citizens, an implicit mandate.
The men who coidd talk so glibly of "praetorian
guards" knew little of the Army of the Potomac.
i^ " McClellan's Own Story," pp. 652, 653.
\ General Buckingham, in a letter printed in the
" Cliicago Tribune," of September 4th, 1875 (quoted in the
" History of the Civil War in America," by the Comte de
Paris, Vol. II., p. 555), writes substantifilly to the same
eflfect. He also states that General Burnside at first
declined the command (as there is good reason for believ-
ing he had done twice before, namely, in August, and
again early in September). Ho adds: "General Me-
Clellan has himself borne tcsfimony to the kind manner
in which I communicated tlir urdcr, and I can bear
testimony to his prompt and cheerful obedience to
it."— R.B.I.
^ "History of the Second Army Corps," by General
Francis A. Walker, p. 137.
From " McClcllini's Last Service to the P>cpublip," liy
George Ticknor Cui'tis (N. Y. : D. Ai>ph1nn A- Co.), pp.
81-83, we tnk(^ tlie following description of McClellan's
farewell to the Army of the Potomac :
"After he had readiort Warreiit.on, a day was spent in
vi(^\vins tlio i)()sitioii of \\n\ tr()<)i)s and in cnnforeiices with
(iciirtal I',uriisiili> icH)iC(tiii'r flit lire (ipcrations. In tlie
course of tiKit ilay tlie order was ])ii))lislied, and Gener.al
Mc('lell:in issiiod a farewell address to the army. On the
evening of Sunday, the 9th, there was an assembly of officers
who came to take leave of liim. On the lOtli he visited some
of the v.arioiia camps, and amid the iniiiassioned cries and
demonstrations of the men lie tool; a last look of tlii> troops
who had followed him with such luifalteriiiij; devotion. • His-
tory,' lie said to the ofQcers who crowded around him — ' his-
tory will do justice to the Army of the Potomac, even if the
ju'esent generation does not. I feel as if I had been intimately
connected \\ itli e:ieh and all of you. Nothing is more liinding
than tlic fiiiiMlsliiii of companions in arms. Stay yon all in
fntuie iiie.sei\c I he hish reputation of our army, and servo
all as well ami f:iitlitiiriy as you have 8er\-ed me.' (Ju tlio
11th, at Wariiiitiiii .) unction, he entered with liis staff a rail-
road train that w ;is iilidiit to start toward Washington. Here
there was stationed a detachment of 2000 troops. Tliey
were drawn up in line, and a salute was fired. The men then
broke their ranks, surrounded the car in wliich he was seated,
uncoupled it from the train and ran it back, insisting wildl.v
that he shcuild not leave them, and uttering the bitterest
imprecations against those who had (le]irive<l them of their
beloved comniamler. The scene has lieeii deseiilied to us liy
an officei who was present as one of tearful excitement. The
momeiil u.is critical. One word, one look of encouragement,
the liftiiii^dl :i liii-( r, would have been the signal forarevolt
a.gainst law fiil aiitliority, the consequences of which no man
can nn>asuTe. M<'Clell:in steiipeil upon the front ]»latform of
the car, and there w;is instant sileiHc. His address was
short. It ended in the memoralile woids, ' Stand liy General
Burnside as ron have stood liy me, and all will lie well.' The
soldiers were calmed. They rolled the caronward, recoupled
itto the train, and with one lonp; and mnmnfiil huzza bade
farewell to their late commander, whom many of them were
destined never to behold again. General MeClellan reached
Washington on the following dav, and without tarrying for
an hour proceeded at once to Trenton, where he arrived at
4 o'clock in the morning of the 12th. From that time he
never again saw Lincoln, or Stanton, or Halleck." —EDITORS.
V- -
'^^Xi^:^/ir^
HOT WORK FOR HAZARD'S BATTERr. SEE P. 116.
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DIVISION." j
BY DAKIUS N. COUCH, MAJOR-GENEKAL, U. S. V.
ON the evening of October 15th, 1862, a few days aftei' McClellan had phiced
me in command of the Second Corps, then at Harper's Ferry, the com-
manding general sent an order for Hancock to take his division the next
morning on a reconnoissance toward Charlestown, about ten miles distant.
The division started in good season, as directed. About 10 in the morning
General McClellan reined up at my headquarters and asked me to go out
with him to see what the troops were doing. Our people had met the enemy's
outpost five miles from the Ferry, and while artillery shots were being
exchanged, both of us dismounted, walked away by ourselves, and took seats
on a ledge of rocks. After a little while McClellan sent to an aide for a map
of Virginia. Spreading it before us, he pointed to the strategic features of the
valley of the Shenandoah, and indicated the movements he intended to make,
which would have the effect of compelling Lee to concentrate in the vicinity,
I think, of Gordons ville or Charlottesville, where a great battle would ho
fought. Continuing the conversation, he said, " But I may not have command
of the army much longer. Lincoln is down on me," and, taking a paper from
his pocket, he gave me my first intimation of the President'3 famous letter. ;J,
J It is due to General Couch to state that, with
limited time in which to prepare tliis paper, he
dictated it to a stenoj^rapher in answer to ques-
tions by the editors bearing cliiefiy on his personal
recollections.— Editors.
3^ Lincoln's letter is dated October 13th, 18r>2,
and begins: " My Dear Sir,— You remember my*
speaking to you of what I called your rtver-cautious-
ness. Are you not over-cautious wlien you assunu^
that you cannot do what tho enemy is constantly
VOL. III. 8. l(
doing ? Sliould you not claim to be at least his equal
in prowess, and act upon the claim f " Furtlier on
tho President says: "Ciiange positions witli tlie
enemy, and think you not he would break your
communication with Richmond within the next
twenty-four hours? You dread his going into
Pennsylvania ; but if he does so in full force, he
gives up his communication to you absolutely,
and you have notiiiiig to do but to follow and ruin
him. . . . Exclusive of the water-line, you aro
io6 SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DIVISION."
He read it aloud very carefully, and when it was finished I told him I thought
there was no ill-feeling in the tone of it. He thought there was, and
quickly added, " Yes, Couch, I expect to be relieved from the Ai'my of the
Potomac, and to have a command in the West ; and I am going to take three
or four with me," calling off by their names four prominent officers. I
queried if " so and so " would be taken along, naming one who was generally
thought to be a great favorite with McClellan. His cm^t reply was, " No, I
sha'n't have him."
This brief conversation opened a new world for me. I had never before
been to any extent his confidant, and I pondered whether on a change of the
commanders of the Army of the Potomac the War Department would allow
him to choose the generals whose names had been mentioned. I wondered
what would be the future of himself and those who followed his fortunes in
that untried field. These and a crowd of other kindred thoughts quite
oppressed me for several days. But as the time wore on, and preparations
for the invasion of Virginia were allowed to go on without let or hindrance
from Washington, I naturally and gladly inferred that McClellan's fears of
hostile working against him were groundless. However, the blow came, and
soon enough.
On the 8th of November, just at dark, I had dismounted, and, standing
in the snow, was superintending the camp arrangements of my troops,
when McClellan came up with his staff, accompanied by General Burn side.
McClellan drew in his horse, and the first thing he said was :
'' Couch, I am relieved from the command of the army, and Burnside is my
successor."
I stepped up to him and took hold of his hand, and said, " General McClel-
lan, I am sorry for it." Then, going around the head of his horse to Burnside,
I said, " General Burnside, I congratulate you."
Burnside heard what I said to General McClellan; he tui*ned away his head,
and made a broad gesture as he exclaimed ;
" Couch, don't say a word about it."
His manner indicated that he did not wish to talk about the change ; that
he thought it was not good policy to do so, nor the place to do it. He told me
afterward that he did not like to take the command, but that he did so to
keep it from going to somebody manifestly unfit for it. I assumed that he
meant Hooker. Those of us who were well acquainted with Burnside knew
that he was a brave, loyal man, but we did not think that he had the military
ability to command the Army of the Potomac.
McClellan took leave on the 10th. Fitz John Porter sent notes to the
corps commanders, informing them that McClellan was going away, and
suggesting that we ride about with him. Such a scene as that leave-taking
now nearer Richmond than the enemy is, by the sen, McClurg & Company) Isaac N. Arnold makes
route that you can and he 7nust take." And in President Lincoln say : " With all his failings as a
conclusion: "It is all easy if our troops march as soldier, McClellan is a pleasant and scholarly gen-
well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they tleman. He is an admirable engineer, but he
cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order." seems to have a special talent for a stationary
In his " Life of Abraham Lincoln " (Chicago : Jan- engine."— Editors.
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DIVISION." 107
CHAXriAM, OPPOSITE FREDERICKSBURG, ALSO KNOWN AS THE "LACY HOUSE." FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
had never been known in our army. Men shed tears and there was great
excitement among the troops. [See p. 104.]
I think the soldiers had an idea that McClellan would take care of them, —
would not put them in places where they would be unnecessarily cut up ; and
if a general has the confidence of his men he is pretty strong. But officers
and men were determined to serve Burnside loyally.
A day or two afterward Burnside called the corps commanders together,
mapped out a course that he intended to pursue ; and, among other things, he
said that he intended to double the army corps, and he proposed to call the three
new commands — or doubles — " grand divisions." Under this arrangement
my corps, the Second, and Willcox's, the Ninth, which had been Burnside's,
formed the Right Grand Division imder General Sumner. When Sum-
ner and I arrived near Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, November 17th,
we found the enemy in small force in readiness to oppose our crossing the
Eappahannock. Everybody knew that Lee would rush right in ; we could see
it. If the pontoons had been there, we might have crossed at once. [See p.
121.] Yet we lay there nearly a month, while they were fortifying before our
eyes ; besides, the weather was against us. Under date of December 7th, my
diary contains this entry : " Very cold ; x^lenty of snow. Men suffering ; cold
outdoors, ice indoors in my room."
Sumner's headquarters were at the Lacy House, while the Second Corps lay
back of the brow of the hill behind Falmouth.
On the night of the 9th, two niglits before the crossing, Sumner called a
council to discuss what we were to do, the corps, division, and bi-igade com-
manders being present. The result was a plain, free talk all around, in whicli
words were not minced, for the conversation soon drifted into a markeil dis-
approbation of the manner in which Burnside contemplated meeting the
enemy.
Sumner seemed to feel badly that the officers did not agree to Burnside's
mode of advance. That noble old hero was so faithful and loyal that lie wanted,
even against impossibilities, to carry out evei-ything Burnside suggested. I
io8
SUMNER'S ''RIGHT GRAND DIVISION:
THE PHILLIPS HOUSE, BUENSIDE'S HEADQUARTERS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN WHILE THE HOUSE WAS BURNING
should doubt if his judgment concurred. It was only chivalrous attachment
to Burnside, or to any commander. But there were not two opinions among
the subordinate officers as to the rashness of the undertaking.
Somebody told Burnside of our views, and he was irritated. He asked us
to meet him the next night at the Lacy House. He said he understood, in a
general way, that we were opposed to his plans. He seemed to be rather
severe on Hancock, — to my
.'- surprise, for I did not think
that officer had said as much
as myself in opposition to
the plan of attack. Burn-
side stated that he had
formed his plans, and all he
wanted was the devotion of
his men. Hancock made a
reply in which he disclaimed
any personal discourtesy,
and said he knew there was
a line of fortified heights on
the opposite side, and that it
would be pretty difficult for us to go over there and take them. I rose after
him, knowing that I was the more guilty, and expressed a desire to serve
Burnside, saying, among other things, that if I had ever done anything in
any battle, in this one I intended to do twice as much, French came in
while I was talking. He was rather late, and in his bluff way exclaimed:
" Is this a Methodist camp-meeting ! "
The heights on the morning of the 11th, before the bridges were thrown
across, did not offer a very animated scene, because the troops were mostly hid-
den. The bombardment for the purpose of dislodging the sharp-shooters who
under cover of the houses were delaying the bridge-making, was terrific, while
the smoke settled down and veiled the scene. After the bombardment had
failed to dislodge the enemy, the 7tli Michigan and the 19th and the 20th
Massachusetts of Howard's division sprang into the pontoons, and rowing
themselves over drove away Barksdale's sharp-shooters. This gallant action
enabled the engineers to complete the bridges. Howard's division was the
first to cross by the upper bridge [see map, p. 74], his advance having a lively
fight in the streets of Fredericksburg. Hawkins's brigade of Willcox's corps
occupied the lower part of the town on the same evening, and the town was not
secured without desperate fighting. I went over the next morning, Friday,
the 12tli, with Hancock's and French's divisions. The remainder of Willcox's
corps crossed and occupied the lower part of the town. . There was consider-
al)le looting. I placed a provost-guard at the bridges, with orders that nobody
should go back with plunder. An enormous pile of booty was collected there
by evening. But there came a time when we were too busy to guard it, and
I suppose it was finally carried off by another set of spoilers. The troops
of the two corps bivouacked tliat night in the streets and were not per-
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DiyiSION."
109
mitted to make fires. Late on that day we had oi'ders to be read^y to cross
Hazel Run, which meant that we were to join Frankhn. That was the only
pi-oper move to make, since we had done just what the enemj^ wanted us to
do, — lijid divided our army. The conditions were favorahle for a change of
position unknown to the enemj^ since tlie night was (hirk and the next morn-
ing was foggy. But it would have been very dilhcult to make the movenuMit.
I was much wori'ied in regard to ])uilding tlie necessary bridges over Hazel
Run and the dangers attending a fiauk movement at niglit in the preseiice ot"
the enemy. But the order to march never came. The orders tliat were gi\ «mi
by Burnside showed that he had no fixed plnn of battle. After getting in
the face of the enemy, his intentions seemed to be continually changing.
Early the next morning, Snturday, the llUh, I receive<l orders to make an
assault in front. My instructions came fcom (Jenenil Sunnier, who did not
no SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DIl^ISION."
cross the river during the fight, owing to a special understanding with which
1 had nothing to do, and which related to his supposed rashness. At Fan-
Oaks, Antietam, and on other battle-fields he had shown that he was a hard
fighter. He was a grand soldier, full of honor and gallantry, and a man of
great determination.
FEEDER ICKSBD EG FEOM THE EAST BANK OF THE EAPPAHANNOCK — I.
As I have said, on that Saturday morning we were enveloped in a heavy
fog. At 8:15, when we were still holding ourselves in readiness to move
to the left, I received the following order :
'* Headquarters, Right Grand Division, near Falmouth, Va., December 12tli, 1862.
** Major-General Couch, Commanding Second Corps d'Armee.
" General : The major-general commanding directs me to say to you that General Willcox has
been ordered to extend to the left, so as to connect with Franklin's right. Yon will extend your
right so far as to prevent the possibility of the enemy occupying the upper part of the town.
You will then form a column of a division for the purpose of pushing in the direction of the
Plank and Telegi-aph roads, for the purpose of seizing the heights in rear of the town. This
column will advance in three lines, with such intervals as you may judge proper, this movement
to be covered by a heavy line of skirmishers in front and on both flanks. You will hold another
division in readiness to advance in support of this movement, to be formed in the same manner
as the leading division. Particular care and precaution must be taken to prevent collision with
our own troops in the fog. The movement will not commence until you receive orders. The
watchword wUl be, ' Scott ! ' Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
"J. H. Taylor, Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant-General.
" P. S. The major-general tliinks that, as Howard's division led into the town, it is propei
that one of the others take the advance."
SUMNEK'S "RIGHT GRAND DIVISION."
Ill
French was at once directed to prepare his division in three brigade lines
for the advance, and Hancock was to follow with his division in the same
order. The distance between the brigade lines was to be about 200 yards.
Toward 10 o'clock the fog began to lift ; French reported that he was ready,
I signaled to Sumner, and about 11 o'clock the movement was ordered to begin.
French threw out a strong body of skirmishers, and his brigades filed out of
town as rapidly as possible by two parallel streets, the one on the right, which
FKEDERICKSBUKG FROM THE EAST BANK OF THE KAPPAHANNOCK — II.
was Hanover street, running into the Telegraph road, and both leading direct
to Marye's Hill, the stronghold of the enemy. On the outskirts of the town the
troops encountered a ditch, or canal, so deep as to be almost impassable except at
the street bridges, and, one of the latter being partly torn up, the troops had to
cross single file on the stringers. Once across the canal, the attacking forces
deployed under the bank bordering the plain over which they were to charge.
This plain was obstructed here and there by houses and fences, notably at a
fork of the Telegraph road, in the narrow angles of which was a cluster of
houses and gardens ; and also on the parallel road just south of it, where stood
a large square brick house. This cluster of houses and the brick house were
the rallying-points for parts of our disordered lines of attack. The fork in
the road and the ])rick house were less than 150 yards from the stone-wall,
which covered also as much more of the plain to the left of the brick liouse.
A little in advance of the brick house a slight rise in the ground alforded
protection to men lying down, against the musketry behind the stone-wall,
but not agahist the converging fire of the artillery on the heights. My head-
quarters were in the field on the edge of the town, overlooking the plain.^
A few minutes after noon French's division charged in the order of Kim-
ball's, Andrews's, and Palmer's brigades, a part of Kimball's men getting into
the cluster of houses in the fork of the road. Hancock followed them in th.'
order of Zook's, Meagher's, and Caldwell's brigades, the two former getting
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND Dl VISION ." 113
nearer to the stone-wall than any who had gone before, except a few of
Kimball's men, and nearer than any brigade which followed them.
Without a clear idea of the state of affairs at the front, since the smoke and
light fog veiled everything, I sent word to French and Hancock to carry the
enemy's works by storm. Then I climbed the steeple of the court-house, and
from al)ove the haze and smoke got a clear view of the field. Howard, who
was with me, says I exclaimed, " Oh, great God ! see how our men, our poor
fellows, are falling ! " I remember that the whole plain was covered with men,
prostrate and dropping, the live men running here and there, and in front
closing upon each other, and the wounded coming back. The commands
seemed to be mixed up. I had never befoi'e seen fighting like that, nothing
approaching it in terrible uproar and destruction. There was no cheering on
the part of the men, but a stubborn determination to obey orders and do
their duty. I don't think there was much feeling of success. As they
charged the artillery fire would break their formation and they would get
mixed; then they would close up, go forward, receive the withering infantry
fire, and those who were able would run to the houses and fight as best they
could ; and then the next brigade coming up in succession would do its duty
and melt like snow coming down on warm ground.
I was in the steeple hardly ten seconds, for I saw at a glance how they
were being cut down, and was convinced that we could not be successful in
front, and that our only chance lay by the right. I immediately ordered
Howard to work in on the right with the brigades of Owen and Hall, and
attack the enemy behind the stone-wall in flank, which was done. Before he
could begin this movement both Hancock and French had notified me that
they must have support or they would not be responsible for the maintenance
of their position. Sturgis, of Willcox's corps, who had been supporting my
left, sent the brigades of Ferrei-o and Nagle to the fruitless charge.
About 2 o'clock General Hooker, who was in command of the Center
Grand Division (Stoneman's and Butterfield's corps), came upon the field.
At an earlier hour Whipple's division of Stoneman's corps had crossed the
river and relieved Howard on the right, so that the latter might join in the
attack in the center, and Grifiiu's division of Butterfield's corps liatl come
over to the support of Sturgis. Humphreys and Sykes, (^f the latter corps,
came to my support. Toward 3 o'clock I received the following di8i>atch ;
" Headquarters, Right Grand Division, Army op the Potojiac, Dec. 13th, 1862.— 2: -K) p.m.
General Couch : Hooker has been ordered to put in^ verything. You must hold on until he eoiues
in. By command of Brevet Major-General Sumner. W. (1. Jones, Lieut., Aide-de-camp, etc."
Note to illustration.— The Artillery Reserve near the center of tlie ridge, and consisting of 27
posted on the eastern bank of the river comprised guns ; the Left Division, vnider Captain 0. A. l>e
four coiimiiinds, as follows : the Right Division, Russy, numbering 42 guns. When the order was
un.lcr Licutciiant-Coloiicl William Hays, extend- given to fire upon the town, only the guns of the
ing from Falmouth down to the raviue.'about 500 Right (Y'liter ami L«>ft Tenter could bi- bronglit to
yards below Falmouth (see map, p. 74), and con- bear effectually. Hays's batteries delivered a few
sisting of 40 rifled guns; the Right Center Division, shots. Tyler's gims opened tire, doing but little
undor Colonel C. H. Tom))kins, consisted of MS execution. Colonel Tomiikinsrej^orte.! that his bat-
gans ; the Left Center Division, under Colonel R. terios oi)em".l at 1 L' : :{0 l\ M. under orders to burn
O. Tyler, occupying the erest of the ri.lgo from the the town, and ceased tiring at 2 : 30 p. M., at which
middle bridge southward to the wooded ravine time several buildings were burning. — Editors.
114
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DIHS/ON.'
^-.4
ih"4
-w€s.f ;'•^,■.: " '
hnr
CUOSSING THE KIVER IN PONTOONS TO
DISLODGE THE CONFEDERATE
SHAKP-SHOOTEKS.
-s^- Hooker was the ranking general, and as I
^^^ understood that he was to take command of the
whole fighting line, the putting in of his fresh men
beside mine might make a success. His very coming
\ was to me, therefore, like the breaking out of the sun in a storm. I rode
\ back to meet him, told him what had been done, and said, " I can't
carry that hill by a front assault ; the only chance we have is to try to get
in on the right." Hookcu* replied, " I will talk with Hancock." He talked with
Hancock, and after a few minutes said, "Well, Couch, things are in such
a state I must go over and tell Burnside it is no use trying to carry this line
here," — or words to that effect, — and then he went off. His going away
left me again in command. Burnside was nearly two miles distant. It
was not much after 2 o'clock when he went away, and it was about 4
when he returned. This was after Humphreys had made his charge and the
figliting for the day was substantially finished. We were holding our lines.
Hooker left word that Humphreys, whose division was ready to advance,
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DinSION." 115
should take his cue from me. Butterfield also gave Humphreys orders to
that effect. After a lull in the battle General Caldwell, a brigade commander
under Hancock, sent word to the latter that the enemy were retreating
from Marye's house. It was probably only a shifting of the enemy's troops
for the relief of the front line. But, assuming that the report was true,
I said, " General Humphreys, Hancock reports the enemy is falling back ;
now is the time for you to go in ! " He was ready, and his troops around
him were ready. The order had evidently been expected, and after an
interval of more than twenty-five years I well recollect the grim deter-
mination which settled on the face of that gallant hero when he received
the words, " Now is the time for you to go in ! " Spurring to his work he
led his two brigades, who charged over precisely the same ground, Init
who did not get quite so near, to the stone-wall as some of French's and
Hancock's men.|
The musketry fire was very heavy, and the artillery fire was simply terrible.
I sent word several times to our artillery on the right of Falmouth that they
were firing into us, and were tearing our own men to pieces. I thought they
had made a mistake in the range. But I learned later that the fire came
from the guns of the enemy on their extreme left.
Soon after 4 o'clock, or about sunset, while Humphreys was at work, Getty's
division of Willcox's corps was ordered to the charge on our left by the unfin-
ished railroad. I could see them being dreadfully cut up, although they
had not advanced as far as our men. I determined to send a battery upon
the plain to shell the line that was doing them so much harm ; so I ordered
an aide to tell Colonel Morgan to send a battery across the canal and plant it
near the brick house. Morgan came to me and said: "General, a battery
can't live there." I replied, " Then it must die there ! "
Hazard took his battery out in gallant style and opened tire on the enemy's
lines to the left of the Marye House. Men never fought more gallantly, and he
lost a great many men and horses. When Hooker came he ordered Frank's
])attery to join Hazard. But this last effort did not last long. In the midst
of it I rode to the brick house, accompanied by Colonel Francis A. Walker,
Lieutenant Crushing, and my orderly. Long. The smoke lay so thick that we
could not see the enemy, and I think they could not see us, but we were aware
I Lieutonant-('olonel Carswell McClellan, As- tUuiiif; the war. His Thinl Bii«a«le rciuaiiioti iiiaHsed
sistant Adjutant-General, serving on General i^'^> Kiydericksburg during the. night of Deeeiuber I3th-
Humphreys's staff at Fredericksburg, writes to tlio
editors to correct a statement nia<le in Walker's Noticing, also, the denials of General Walker and
"History of the Second Army Corps" [p. 181], as otliers that General Humphreys's men approached
well as by other writers, implying that the charge "nearer to tlu> wall than any other troops liad
of Humphreys's division was supported by Sykes. reached," Colonel McClellan cites the fact that
Colonel McClellan says: General Humphreys, who made this statement,
..„,.,...,,, , ., r. I I was an eve-witiu'ss of the scene from his position
»yKVH», (Uvinum hail vol crossof t/ie I{ni>/>nlniiiii(>rh- . .'<.,•,... , •, »i ,i. >i..,„.i«i,u
when (icn,-ral IIui>.,.l.rc.v8'H t1r«t assault was nui.lc. and "' ffoi't "f '"« <l>vision. while on the other hand the
the head of his coluiiiu reached tlie bridge crossing officers of the burial-parties sent out a week later
the null-race on the Telegranli road, only after the (whose evidence has been relied on to support the
last charge made by (ieiieral Ilnmi.l.n-ys had been opi>osite view) could hardiv have identifie.l the nn-n
rei)ulw.>d. (Jeiieral Mykes's First ami .second Hrigades .' ,.,- . i" i . „ .. > ...i,. ..ii •!.«
„ncnn,n( relieved the troops upon the advanced ol the d.lTerent com.nands, because nenrl.N all tho
line on the Telegrai>h road. aii<l exp.Mieiu-ed on." of bodies had in the meantime been stripped of their
tUo most trying tours of duty exacted fnuu troops clothing.— Editoks,
lib
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DIVISION."
HE KINTH COUPS CROSSIN(i BY THE I'ONTOON-BRIDGK TO THE STEAM-
BOAT LANDING AT THE LOWEH END OF THE TOWN.
of the fact that some-
body in our front was
doing a great dt^al of
shooting. I found the
brick house packed with
men ; and behind it the
dead and the living
were as thick as they
could be crowded to-
gether. The dead were
rolled out for shelter,
and tlie dead horses were used for breastworks. I know I tried to shelter
myself behind the brick house, but found I could not, on account of the
men already there. The plain thereabouts was dotted with our fallen.
I started to cross to the fork of the road where our men, under Colonel John
E. Brooke, were holding the cluster of houses.
When it became dark the wounded were being lirought oif the plain, and
Hooker was talking about relieving my men in front by putting in Sykes's
division, and I said, " No ! No men shall take the place of the Second Corps
unless General Sumner gives the orders. It has fought and gained that
gi'ound and it shall hold it." Later the order came for Sykes to relieve the
Second Corps, which was done about 11 o'clock.
That night was bitter cold and a fearful one for the front line hugging the
hollows in the ground, and for the wounded who could not be reached. It
was a night of dreadful suff(>ring. Many died of wounds and exposure, and
as fast as men died they stiffened in the wintry air, and on the front line
were rolled forward for protection to the living. Frozen men were placed for
dumb sentries,
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DI VISION :
117
My corps again bivouacked in the town, and they were not allowed fires
lest they should draw the fire of the enemy's artillery.
At 2 o'clock in the morning Burnside came to my headquarters near the
center of the town. I was lying down at the time. He asked me to tell him
about the battle, and we talked for about an hour. I told him everything
that had occurred. " And now," I said, " Greneral Burnside, you must know
that everything that could be done by troops was done by the Second Coi^ps."
He said, " Couch, I know that ; I am perfectly satisfied that you did your
best." He gave no intimation of his plans for the next day. He was cheerful
in his tone and did not seem greatly oppressed, Ijut it was plain that he felt
he had led us to a great disaster, and one knowing him so long and well as
myself could see that he :\vished his body was also lying in front of Marye's
Heights. I never felt so badly for a man in my life.
The next day, Sunday, the 14th, our men began digging trenches along the
edge of the town. We were on the alert, for there was some fear of an
assault. Of course
there is no need of
denying that after
the battle the men
became strained.
The pressure of a
fight carries you
through, but after
it is all over and
you have been
whipped you do
not feel very pugnacious. The men, knowing that they had been unsuc-
cessful, were in a nervous state, and officers suffered also from the reaction,
the worst of it being that the mass of the army had lost confidence in its
commander.
About midday of the 14tli Burnside called a council of war, in which it was
decided to fall back, but to hold Fredericksburg. No attack was made by
us that day, though Burnside had said that lie sliould renew the assault on
Marye's Hill, with his old Ninth Corps, and that he would place himself at
its head. General Getty of that corps, a very gallant officer, touched me as
I passed him and said : " I understand that Burnside has given out that he
intends to lead seventeen regiments to the attack." He urged lue strongly
to dissuade him if possiV)le, as it would be a perfect slaughter of men.
WAREHOUSE IN FREDERICKSBURG USEH AS A HOSPITAL.
At the council Hooker
expresses
1 himself as against the movement ot
retrtuit, saying, "We nmst figlit tliose people. We are over there and we
must fight them." But, as I remember, he did not advocah' llir i>lan of
holding Fredericksburg if we were not to renew the light. 1 urged that the
army was not in a condition, after oui- repulse, to renew tlie assault, but tliat
we ought to hold Frcdericksbui-g at all hazards. I ha<l an argunuMit with
(Jeneral Burnside upon that poijit, telling him that T was willing to have him
throw all the responsibility upon me; that if wc held ihf town W(> should
SUMNER'S "R;GHT GRAND DJKISfON."
THE GROUND BETWEEN FREDERICKSBURG AND MARTE'S HEIGHTS. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
The portico of the Marye mansion is faintly marked senton the fourth day after the battle with a large detail
among the trees of the hill in the middle-background, to bury the dead. In his official report he says : " Those
The road on the right is the end of Hanover street and bodies nearest the enemy's works were recognized as
the beginning of the Telegiaph road, by which most of belonging to Kimball's brigade of French's division and
the attacking troops crossed the canal, or ditch, and, to the diflferent regiments of Hancock's division." In
filing to the left, formed line under the low bank. In the two days occupied by the burial he says he "found
the middle-ground, to the left of the road, is seen the and buried 913 of our soldiers, and brought to this side
square brick house mentioned by General Couch. Part of the river the bodies of five officers, making a total of
of the troops crossed the canal by a street on the left 918. Nearly all the dead were stripped entirely naked
parallel with Hanover street, and a few waded. Most by the enemy." A woman who lived in one of the houses
of the dead lay a short distance beyond the brick near the stone-wall has related that " the morning after
house. the battle the field was blue ; but the morning after the
Colonel John R. Brooke, of Hancock's division, was Federals withdrew the field was white."— Editors.
have a little something to show for the sacrifice of the day before ; that the
peophi would feel we had not failed utterly. It was agreed that Fredericks-
burg should be held-. Then Burnside dismissed us and sent Hooker and
myself to Fredericksburg to arrange for the defense. We held a council at
the corner of Hanover street.
It was decided that Hooker's troops should hold the town. The question
was how many men would he leave for that purpose, opinions varying from
ten to eighteen thousand. My limit was ten thousand men. General Tyler
turned to me and said: "Make it higher, General." We compromised on
twelve thousand. We remained in the town on the 15th, and that evening
my corps and the Ninth Corps recrossed the river. Next morning we found
that Fredericksburg had been evacuated. When Willcox and I left, we
thought, of course, it would be held. The talk was that during the night
Hook<;r prevailed upon Burnside to evacuate the town.
Our wing of the army thought the failure of the campaign was due in part
to the fact that we were put in where we ought not to have been. We were
asked to achieve an impossibility. We had something to do that was not
possible for us to do.
After the battle Burnside tried to regain the confidence of the army, and
there is no doubt that Sumner did a good deal to help him. Bm-nside con-
ceived the plan of crossing the Rappahannock a few miles above Fredericks-
burg, where the enemy were unprepared to receive us. The result was the
"mud march" of January 20th -21st. It was Burnside's effort to redeem
himself. To start off in the mud as we did with the army in its discouraged
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DIVISION."
119
state was perfect folly. There did not seem to be anything in the move to
recommend itself. If the weather had happened to tnrn cold, possibly he
might have surprised Lee and gotten across the river, above Fredericks-
bui'g, but it was a hazardous move, with the army out of confidence with
its commander and the enemy elated with brilliant success. The general
demoralization that had come upon us made two or three months of rest a
necessity. ^
When Hooker, on January 25tli, was placed in command of the army, many
of us were very much surprised ; I think the superior officers did not regard
him competent for the task. He had fine qualities as an officer, but not th.e
weight of character to take charge of that army. Nevertheless, under his
administration the army assumed wonderful vigor. I have never known men
to change from a condition of the lowest depression to that of a healthy fight-
ing state in so short a time. President Lincoln with his wife came down to
spend a few days with General Hooker, and to see the different officers and
talk with them. To further that, General Hooker gave a tiinner party at
^ In the coiu'se of a eorrespondeuee, relating to
tbeir sevei'al controversies with General Burnside,
Franklin wrote to Halleck, under date of June 1st,
18G3 : "I was of your opinion with regard to the
honesty and integrity of purpose of General Burn-
side, until after his relief from the command of the
Array of the Potomac. I lost all coniidenee in his
ability at the first Fredericksburg battle. There
was not a man in my command who did not believe
that everything he would undertake would fail,
and General Hooker iufcrmed me that that was
the general feeling in hip command. General Sum-
ner's feelings were noi so decided, but they were
nearly so. You can imagine that the beds of the
grand division oonmanders were not of roses, and
I came to thr conclusion that Burnside was fast
losing his nilid. So I looked upon the rain which
stopped iis second attempt to cross the river [the
' mud 'Jiarch '] as almost a providential interfer-
ence in our behalf." — Editors.
STUCiv IN Til
j^UI> — A l-I.AMi. MAKi II ACROSS fOlNTKV. IKo.M A WAUTIMK SKKTCII,
SUMNER'S "RIGHT GRAND DIHSION."
THE GKAND KE
r lAf.MoiTII l»tl;lN(j PRESIDENT
•KOM A WAK-TIME SKETCH.
which all the corps commanders were present, and also Mrs. Lincoln. Mr.
Lincoln would talk to the officers ou^ the subject that was uppermost in our
minds — how we were to get the bettei-of the enemy on the opposite hills.
Before he went away he sent for Hooke.^* and for me, I being second in
command, and almost his last injunction "vv-as : " Grentlemen, in your next
battle 2^i(t in all your menP Yet that is exactly- what we did not do at Chan-
cellorsville.
We had a grand review of the army in honor of tlae President. The Second
Corps paraded with Howard's Eleventh Corps, I thibk, for after I had saluted
at the head of my' corps I rode to the side of the Presvdent, who was on horse-
back, and while near him Genei-al Schurz approached t\i the head of his di-
vision. I said: "Mr. Lincoln, that is General Schurz," in'onouncing it Shios,
after the American fashion. Mr. Lincoln turned to me aLid said : " Not SJnos,
General Couch, but Shoort^y But he did it very pleasanitly, and I was just
a little surprised that our Western President should hay(\^, the advantage of
me. It was a beautiful day, and the review was a stirrihig sight. Mr. Lin-
coln, sitting there with his hat off, head bent, and seemingly meditating, sud-
denly turned to me and said : " General Couch, what do; you suppose will
become of all these men when the war is over?" And it s, truck me as very
pleasant that somebody had an idea that the war would soi^netime end.
THE CROSSING OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK BY THE 19th MASSACHUSETTS.
BY H. G. O. WEYMOUTH, CAPTAIN, 19TH MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT.
ON the morning of the 1 Ith of December, 1862,
about two hours before daylight, the regi-
mental coinmandei's of Colonel Norman J. Hall's
Third Brigade, of Howard's Second Division, Sec-
ond Army Corps, were assembled at brigade head-
quarters to receive preliminary orders for the
approaching battle. Our brigade commander in-
formed us that our regiment was to be the first to
cross the upper pontoon-bridge, which was to
be laid by the engineer corps by daylight, and
that we vrere to hold and occupy the right of the
town until the whole army should have crossed,
when the Right Grand Division, comprising the
Second and Ninth (,'orps, would charge the heights,
supported by artillery in front and on the right
flank. On 'our arrival at the river at daylight wo
found but a very small section of the bridge laid,
in consequence of the commanding position which
the enemy hold on the right bank of the river,
secreted as they were behind fences made musket-
proof by piling cord-wood and other materials
against them. After a fruitless attempt of eight
hours' duration to lay the bridge where the enemy
had alisoluti' control of the river front, the idea
was abandoned, and notice was sent down to us at
the river that the enemy would be shelled from the
heights, with orders to take to the pontoon-boats and
cross and dislodge the enemy in order to enable the
engineer corps to complete the bridge. The instant
the artillery ceased firing, the 7th Michigan and
19th Massachusetts took to the boats and poled
across the river under a heavy musketry fire from
the enemy. The 7th Michigan was the first to make
a landing, and marched up Farquhar street in a
direct line from the bridge. They immediately be-
came severely engaged, and the first two companies
of the 19th Massachusetts that had crossed went
forward and joined them. A few minutes later the
remainder of the 19th crossed, formed in line on
the bank of the river, left resting on Farquhar
street, and advanced, deploying as skirmishers in
order to drive back the enemy from the western
part of the city. We were met with such resist-
ance by Barksdale's brigade, very aptly styled by
General Longstreet "Confederate hornets," that
it was nearly dusk before we gained the north side
of Caroline street. It was now apparent that our
thin line could not make any farther advance
against the formidable barricades the enemy
had erected on the south side of the street, con-
sisting of barrels and boxes, filled with earth and
stones, placed between the houses, so as to form
a continuous line of defense, and the left of our
line was forced to fall back down Farquhar street,
fully one-half the distance from Caroline street.
On reporting our position to a staff-orticer our bri-
gade commander ordered the L'Otli Massachusetts
to clear the streets. They marched up Farquhar
street in company or division front, and on reach-
ing Caroline street wheeled to the right ; but before
the full regiment had entered tlie street the enemy,
from their snug retreats, pom-ed sudi a deadly fire
on tliem as to force them to retire with great loss.
Tliis action of the 20th enabled our left to re-
gain our position on Caroline street, wliich was
maintained until Barksdale withdrew his com-
mand to the heights, about an hour after dark.
At about 11 o'clock General Howard crossed over
to learn our position. Informing him tliat the
enemy had retired in our front, I asked him if we
should move forward. After making some inquiries
concerning our right, he thouglit notliing would be
gained by doing so. We remained in this i)Osition
until about noon of the 13th.
THE PONTONIERS AT FREDERICKSBURG.
BY WESLEY BRAINEllD, MAJOR 50TH, AND COLONEL 15TH, NEW YORK
ENO INKERS.
FROM certain remarks made by various writers
[see pp. 107 and 120] on the battle of Fred-
ericksburg, it inight be inferred that there was
some foundation for the general impression that
had the pontoons arrived in time, the crossing
could have been made before t)ie enemy concen-
trated, and the disastrous defeat whicli followed
might thus have been avoided.
The fact is that the engineers (inth and r>0(h
New York), with two full trains and material for
two pontoon-bridges, ciich 420 feet in length, ar-
rived opposite Fredericksburg and l)ivoua('ked in
rear of the Lacy house on the afternoon of Nov(>m-
ber 27tli, and could have thrown two bri<lges
across the stream witliout opposition that night
liad they been allowed to do so. There was no
force of the enemy in tiu> city, and General Jjong-
Htrei't, with (he advance of (lie Confederate arinv.
had by a forced raarcli occupied a ^lortion of the
heights in rear of the city on the 21st.
I distinctly remember that (ieneral Sumner rode
up to our position soon after our arrival on the 27tii
and asked Major Ira Spauliling, of the r.otli New
York, and myself if we could throw a bri<lge across
the river that night, to which we rejdied that wo
could throw two bridges across in three lionrs if lie
would give us the order to do so. After a little
hesitation, he replied tliat he would like to give us
tlie order, as there was certaiidy nothing to opjuisc
its execution, but tJnit lie did tiot care to assume
the res]>onsil)iIity, fearing that it jiiight contlict
witli (Jeiieral Burns! le's plans. He also remarked
that he could have forded the stream with a part of
liis command at Falmouth several days before had
lie been allowed to do so ; he then rode away. We
were ordered back into camp, and the "golden
122
IN FRONT OF THE STONE WALL AT FREDERICKSBURG.
opportunity " passed — a blunder for which we were
in no way responsible, but for which we were des-
tined to suffer.
We did not receive the order to leave Berlin, six
miles below Harper's Ferry, until late on the
seventh day after it was issued. ) We took up two
bridj,'es, each 1100 feet long, loaded and moved
tlicni by canal and land transportation to Wash-
ington, where we received 500 unbroken mules.
We then fitted up two trains, moved through the
mud to Occoquau, where we divided the trains, part
going by water and part by land to Aquia Creek,
where we again reloaded the entire equipment,
and arrived at the Lacy house but six days behind
Longstreet's advance, which had made a forced
march from the vicinity of Culpeper to reach the
heights in rear of Fredericksburg. These being the
facts, it can hardly be said, with justice, that the
engineers were slow in their movements.
The idea of crossing immediately in front of the
town seemed to have passed, temporarily at least,
from General Burnside's mind, and "demonstra-
tions " on an extensive scale were made to the right
and left.
Twice I crossed the river below the town and
J The " Official Records" show that this order, issued
by Captain J. C. Duane, Chief-Engineer of the Army of
the Potomac at Rectortown, on the 6th of November, did
examined the country for some distance inland, it
being rather difficult to find ground suitable for the
passage of artillery on both sides of the stream at
.all stages of the tide. The second time I crossed
at " Skinker's Neck," and made a thorough exam-
ination of the country for several miles around,
pacing off the distances, and furnished General
Burnside, in person, with my sketches. These ex-
peditions were, of course, made in the night.
" Skinker's Neck" seemed to me to be the proper
place for a crossing. At the time of my visit it was
not occupied by the enemy, except by a cavalry
patrol, which I easily avoided.
Six or eight miles above, where I made my first
crossing, it was somewhat difficult to make my
way through the picket lines. General Burnside
appeared to be gi-eatly pleased and relieved when
I reported favorably on the "Skinker's Neck"
crossing. He gave me to understand that we
should throw our bridges there, and we made our
arrangements accordingly.
What was my s^^rprise when, a few days after,
the orders came that mine was to be one of two
bridges that were to be thrown across directly in
front of the city, near the Lacy house.
not reach Major Spauldiug, at Berlin, until the afternoon
of November 12th. General Halleck's report exonerates
the engineers from all blame.— Editors.
IN FEONT OF THE STONE WALL AT FREDEEICKSBURG. 3>
BY JOHN W. AMES, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.
ON Saturday, December 13th, our brigade 4- had
been held in reserve, but late in the day we
were hurried to the battle only to see a field full of
flying men and the sun low in the west shining red
through columns of smoke, — six deserted field-
pieces on a slight rise of ground in front of us,
and :i cliceriiig column of troops in regular march
disa PI leaving on our left. But the day was then over
and the l)attlc lost, and our line felt hardly bullets
enough to draw blood before darkness put an end
to the uproar of all hostile sounds, save desultory
shell-firing. For an hour or two afterward shells
from Marye's Heights traced bright lines across
the black sky with their burning fuses. Then, by
command, we sank down in our lines, to get what
sleep the soggy ground and the danger might allow
us. Experience had taught us that when the
silent line of fire from the shells had flashed across
the sky and disappeared behind us the scream and
explosion tliat followed were harmless, but still it
required some effort to overcome the discomfort of
the damp ground, and the flash and report of burst-
ing shells, ajid to di-op quietly asleep at an order.
We finally slept, but wo were roused before mid-
night, and formed into line with whispered com-
mands, and then filed to the right, and, reaching the
S Condensed from the " Overland Monthly," 1869, Vol.
TIL. p. 432, !)>' pcnniHsion of Fisher Ames. General
Ji)hn W. Ames. U. 8. Surveyor-General of California,
died iu Han Rafael, iu that State, in 1878.
highway, marched away from the town. There
were many dead horses at exposed points of our
turning and many more dead men. Here stood a
low brick house, with an open door in its gable end,
from which shone a light, and into which we peered
when passing. Inside sat a woman, gaunt and
hard-featured, with crazy hair and a Meg Merrilies
face, still sitting by a smoking candle, though it was
nearly two hours past midnight. But what woman
could sleep, though never so masculine and tough
of fiber, alone in a house between two hostile
armies, — two corpses lying across her door-steps,
and within, almost at her feet, four more ! So,
with wild eyes and face lighted by her smoky can-
dle, she stared across the dead barrier into the
darkness outside with the look of one who heard
and saw not, and to whom all sounds were a terror.
We formed in two lines, — the right of each rest-
ing near and in front of this small brick house,
and the left extending into the field at right angles
with the highway. Here we again bivouacked,
finding room for our beds with no little difficulty,
because of tlie sliattered forms of those who were
here taking their last long sleep. We rose early.
The heavy fog was penetrating and chilly, and the
damp turf was no warm mattress to tempt us to
iThe 2d Brigade of regulars (Sykes's division. Fifth
Army Corps), comm.inded by Major George L. Andrews,
17tli U. 8. Infantry. General Ames was then a captain
iu the 11th U. 8. Infantry.— Editohs.
IN FRONT OF THE STONE WALL AT FREDERICKSBURG.
123
a morning nap. So we shook off sloth from our
moistened bodies willingly, and rolling up the gray
blankets set about breakfast. The bivouac break-
fast is a nearer approach to its civilized congener
than the bivouac bed. Coffee can be made hot
and good in blackened tins ; pork can be properly
frizzled only on a stick over an open fire ; hard-
tack is a better, sweeter morsel than the average
American housewife has yet achieved with her
saleratus, sour-milk, "empt'ins," and what-not;
and a pipe ! — who can estimate what that little
implement has done for mankind ? Certainly none
better than those who have sought its solace after
the bivouac breakfast that succeeds a bivouac bed,
in December.
We now began to take note, through the misty
veil, of the wreck of men and horses cumbering the
ground about us, and a slight lifting of the gray
fog showed us the story of yesterday's repeated
assaults and repeated failures. When our pipes
were exhausted we got up to inspect and criti-
cise the situation. Just here was the wreck of
a fence, which seemed to have been the high-
tide mark of our advance-wave of battle. The
fence was a barrier which, slight as it was, had
turned back the already wavering and mutilated
lines of assault. Almost an army lay about us and
scattered back over the plain toward the town.
Not only coi-pses, but many of the badly wounded,
liardly distinguishable from the dead, were here
too. To die, groveling on the ground or fallen
in the mire, is dreadful indeed. The pallid faces,
and the clammy hands clenching their muskets,
looked ghastly by the fog-light. The new, bright,
blue overcoats only made the sight the ghastlier.
About eighty yards in front the plowed field
was bounded by a stone-wall, and behind the wall
were men in gray uniforms moving carelessly
about. This picture is one of my most distinct
memories of the war — the men in gray behind this
wall, talking, laughing, cooking, cleaning mus-
kets, clicking locks, — there they were! — Lee's
soldiers! — the Army of Northern Virginia! We
were so absurdly near this host of yesterday's vic-
tors that we seemed wholly in their hands and a
part of their great mass ; cut off and remote from
the Federal army^ and almost within the lines of
the enemy — prisoners, of course. That was the
immediate impression, as we stupidly gazed in the
first moment of the awkward discovery.
But the sharp whistle of a bullet sounded in our
oars, and a rebel's face peered through the puff of
smoke, as he removed the rifle from liis sliouider;
Hicn rapidly half-a-dozon more bullets whistled
by us, and the warning sent us all to earth. The
order to lie down is theoretically infrequent, but
practically it is often given in modern warfare.
Napoleon's maxim tliat ''an army travels on its
belly" was metaphorical, but long-range and ro-
p(Miting rifles have gone far to make it true in a
literal sense. Our double linos of battle sought
the shelter of the ground as soon as blood was
drawn. This had the effect of hiding us from
the enemy, or partially so, for the fusillade slack-
ened.
It was irksome to keep one position, even at
full length, but the watch over us was very
vigilant ; hardly a movement was made at any
part of our line that did not draw fire from the
wall. Necessity compelled us, however, to keep
up something of a lookout upon the enemy at any
risk. A cautious inspection showed great care-
lessness in their lines, the men still strolling and
lounging — a group at cards, even, evidently ignor-
ant or careless of our proximity.
What to do about it was to us a topic second
only in interest to the probable action of the
enemy. Could we long lie thus without waking
up the big guns, whose black muzzles looked down
at us from the hill-tops on our right ? And if not,
what then ? From these guns there would be no
possible shelter. Retreat alone was more danger-
ous than to remain as we were, or even to advance.
The field behind us stretched away toward the
town, level and exposed — the focus of an arc of
battery-crowned hills, with no inequality of ground
to protect us from a convergence of fire that would
be singularly effective.
The situation had already forced upon us a policy
of masterly inactivity, which alone seemed to meet
our immediate difficulties. So we drifted into a com-
mon understanding that no doubt an abler coun-
cil of war would have approved. Shots might rouse
the enemy from his carelessness or ignorance;
certainly a volley from our line would not go unan-
swered, and the odds were gi-eat. Let them stick
to their cards and forget us if they would ! But
we arrived at this policy only as the least of
many evils.
The enemy riddled every moving thing in sight :
horses tied to the wheels of a broken gun-carriage
behind us; pigs that incautiously came grunting
fi'om across the road ; even chickens were brought
down with an accuracy of aim that told of a fatally
short range, and of a better practice than it would
have been wise for our numbers to face. They
applauded their own success with a hilarity we
could hardly share in, as their chicken-shooting
was across our backs, lea\ing us no extra room for
turning. But this was mere wantonness of slaugh-
ter, not indulged in when the higher game in blue
uniform was in sight. The men who ha«l left our
raTiks for water, or from any cause, before we were
pinned to the earth, came back at great peril. In-
deed, I believe not one of them reached our line
again unhurt. Some were killed outright; otliers
were mortally wounded, and died within a few
steps of us; and several who tried to drag them-
selves away flat upon their faces were put out of
their misery. This, too, sliowed us plainly what
we might expect, and fixed our Itounds to such
segments of the field as were hidd.-n from the
enemy. This was not alik<^ throughout tht> liiu^.
At one point the exposure was absolute, and still-
ness as absolute was the only safety. A slight
barrier was afterward formed at this point by a
i The fore- lirrc consistod of Rucliannn'H and Anrlrews's bHundort of n^tnilurs. of Pykew'H division, and
Stockton's brigade of volunteerH, of (irinin's division, Fiftli .\rmy Corps.— Editors.
124
IN FRONT OF THE STONE WALL AT FREDERICKSBURG.
disposal of the dead bodies in front, so that the
dead actually sheltered the living.
After two or three hours of this experience we
became somewhat accustomed to the situation, —
for man becomes accustomed to almost anything
that savors of routine, — and learned with consid-
erable exactness the limit inside which we might
move with safety, and the limit also of endurable
constraint. It was somewhat curious to see how
strong the tobacco hunger was with many, — jier-
haps with most. Men would jump to their feet
and run the length of a regiment to borrow to-
bacco, and in so doing run the gauntlet of a hun-
di-ed shots. This was so rarely accomplished in
entire safety that it won the applause' of our line
and hearty congratulations to any one fortunate
enough to save his life and sweeten it with the
savory morsel.
All this would have been ludicrous but for the
actual suffering inflicted upon so many. Men were
mortally hit, and there was no chance to bind up
their wounds ; they were almost as far beyond our
help as if they had been miles away. A little was
accomplished for their relief by passing canteens
from hand to hand, keeping them close to the
ground out of sight, and some of the wounded
were where a little manipulation could be done in
safety. It was sad to hear the cries fade away to
low moans, and then to silence, without a chance
to help. The laugh over a successful chase for
tobacco would die away only to change into a mur-
mur of indignation at the next cruel slaughter.
A young officer, boyish and riiddy, fresh from a
visit home, with brighter sword and shoulder-
straps than most of us, raised his head to look at
the enemy, and a bullet at once pierced his brain.
Without a word or groan his head sank again, his
rosy cheek grew livid, and his blood crimsoned his
folded hands. Next a leg or arm was shattered
as it became exposed in shifting from the weari-
someness of our position. Presently a system of
reporting the casualties became established ; the
names of the injured were passed from mouth to
mouth; — "Captain M , 17th, just killed";
"Private , Co. C, 11th , knocked over."
Those who were fortunate enough to have paper
and pencil, and elbow-room enough to get them
from pocket-depths, kept a list of the names of the
killed and wounded; the occupation this gave
proved a blessing, for tlie hours were very long
and weary.
I suppose ennni is hardly the word where nerves
are on the rack, and daiigc^r pinions one to a single
spot of earth, yet something like finiin came over
us. By chance I found a fragment of newspaper
which proved a charm that for a time banished the
irksome present with its ghastly field of dead men
and its ceaseless dangei-. Through this ragged
patch of advertisements I sailed away from Fred-
ericksburg with the good bark Ncptiote, which
had liad quick dispatch a moTith before, — for the
paper was of ancient date, — and was well on her
way to summer seas, when I obeyed the printed
injunction and api)lied on })oard for passage. And
oh, pleasant summer meadows of the peaceful
North ! who would have suspected you to lurk in
extracts of sarsaparilla and ointment for eruptive
skins ? But I found you there, and forgot the sun-
shine and the chill earth, the grim war, the rifle's
crack and the bullet's whistle, — forgot even the
dead hand that had stretched itself toward me all
the morning with its clutch of grass.
I was called back to the dull wet earth and the
crouching line at Fredericksburg by a request from
Sergeant Eead, who " guessed he could hit that
cuss with a spy-glass," — pointing, as he spoke,
to the batteries that threatened our right flank.
Then I saw that there was commotion at that part
of the Confederate works, and an officer on the
parapet, with a glass, was taking note of us. Had
they discovered us at last, after letting us lie here
till high noon, and were we now to receive the
plunging fire we had looked for all the morning?
Desirable in itself as it might be to have "that
cuss with a spy-glass" removed, it seemed wiser
to repress Read's ambition. The shooting of an
officer would dispel any doubts they might have
of our presence, and we needed the benefit of all
their doubts. Happily, they seemed to think us
not worth their powder and iron.
Were we really destined to see the friendly
shades of night come on and bring us release from
our imprisonment ? For the first time we began
to feel it probable when the groups left the guns
without a shot. I grew easy enough in mind to
find that sleep was possible, and I was glad to wel-
come it as a surer refuge from the snrroundings
than the scrap of newspaper. It was a little dis-
couraging to see a sleeping officer near me wakened
by a bullet, but as his only misfortune, besides a
disturbed nap, seemed to be a torn cap and
scratched face, he soon wooed back the startled
goddess. I had enjoyed sleep for its quiet and
rest, but never before for mere oblivion.
When I returned to consciousness I found the
situation unchanged, except that the list of casu-
alties had been swelled by the constant rifle prac-
tice, which was still as pitiless and as continuous
as before. It was almost startling to see, on look-
ing at the brick house, the MegMerrilies of the night
before standing at her threshold. With the same
lost look of helpless horror that her face had worn
by candle-light, she gazed up and down our pros-
trate lines, and the disenchantment of day and
sunshine failed to make her situation seem in any
way prosaic and commonplace. The desolate part
she had to play suited well her gaunt and witch-
like features. Shading her eyes with her hand at
last, as if to banish a vision and call her senses
back to earth, she searched our lines once more ;
then, with a hopeless shake of the head, she moved
slowly back into the dismal little tomb she was
forced to occupy. In which army was her husband
serving? Did she search our lines and the dead
ranks for any friend of hers ? Was maternal anx-
iety added to the physical terrors of her forced
isolation ?
Slowly the sun declined. He had been our friend
all day, shining through the December air with an
autujnn glow that almost warmed tlie chill earth ;
but at his last half-hour he seemed to hang mo-
tionless in the western sky. His going down would
IN FRONT OF THE STONE IVALL AT FREDERICKSBURG.
set us free ; free from the fire that was galling and
decimating us ; free from the fear of guns on the
right, and advance from the front; free from
numbness, and constraint, and irksomeness, and
free from the cold, wet earth. Also it would bring
us messengers from the town to call us back from
the exposed position and the field of dead bodies.
But he lingered and stood upon the order of his
going, until it seemed as if a Joshua of the Confed-
erates had caused him to stand still.
When at last the great disc stood, large and red,
upon the horizon, every face was turned toward it,
forgetting constraint, thirst, tobacco, and rebel
fire, in the eagerness to see the end of a day that
had brought us a new experience of a soldier's life,
and had combined the dangers of a battle-field and
the discomfort of a winter's bivouac with many
new horrors of its own.
At last the lingering sun went down. December
twilights are short ; the Federal line sprang to its
feet with almost a shout of relief. The reoel fire
grew brisker as they saw such a swarm of blue-
coats rising from the ground, but it was too late
to see the fore-sights on the rifles, and shots un-
aimed were not so terrible as the hated ground.
So we contemptuously emptied our rifles at them,
and before the smoke rolled away the coming dark-
ness had blotted out the wall and the hostile line.
With our line rose also a few men from the
ghastly pile of yesterday's dead, who hobbled up
on muskets used as crutches. These poor fellows
had bound up their own wounds, and the coffee we
had given them had cheered them into life and hope.
Their cheerfulness grew into hilarity and merri-
ment as they found themselves clear, at last, from
the dead, and facing toward home, with a hope not
by any means so impossible of realization as it had
seemed not long before. Poor fellows! their joy
was more touching than their sufferings, — which,
indeed, they seemed to have forgotten.
In our own brigade we found we had lost nearly
150, \ out of a present-for-duty strength of about
1000 men. This would have been a fair average
loss in any ordinary battle, but we had suffered it
as we lay on the ground inactive, without the ex-
citement and dash of battle and without the chance
to reply : a strain upon nerves and physical endur-
ance which we afterward remembered as severer
than many more fatal fields. In the midst of our
buzz of relief and mutual congi-atulation, the ex-
pected summons came for us to fall back to the
town. Once more w<' formed an upright line of
battle, then faced by the rear rank and inarclied
in retreat, with muffled canteens and many halts
and facings about toward a possible pursuit.
Reaching a slight bank, we descended to the
meadow through which the Fredericksburg race-
way was dug, and here we changed to a flank
march and filed into the highway. The highway
soon became a street, and we were once more in
Fredericksburg.
We marched past the court-house, — past
churches, schools, bank-buildings, private houses,
— all lighted for hospital purposes, and all in use,
though a part of the wounded had been transferred
across the river. Even the door-yards bad their
litter-beds, and were well filled with wounded men,
and the dead were laid in rows for burial. The
hospital lights and camp-fires in the streets, and
the smoldering ruins of burned buildings, with
the mixture of the lawless rioting of the demor-
alized stragglers, and the suffering and deatli in
the hospitals, gave the sacked and gutted town
the look of pandemonium.
In our new freedom we wandered about for the
first half of the night, loath to lie on the earth
again after om- day's experience. At last we
spread our blankets on a sidewalk and slept in
the lurid firelight with a sense of safety not war-
ranted by our position. The next morning we
made our toilets in wanton plenty. Water from a
pump! and we bathed in the falling splash. Our
"contraband" brought us a box of soap and an
uncut, unhemmed bolt of toweling from the de-
spised plunder of a store. The same source gave
us a table-cloth for our breakfast. This we spread
upon the sidewalk and furnished with variously
assorted crockery from an ownerless pantry. Cab-
bage fresh from a kitchen garden, with vinegar
from the deserted kitchen, added a welcome and
unusual luxury to the meal. And at the end we
rolled dishes and debris together into the paved
gutter by a comprehensive pull at the table-cloth.
Then we smoked the emblem of peace, tilted back
against the buildings in borrowed chairs, and were
very comfortable and happy. This was the holiday
of war, — vastly better than yesterday! But we
were hardly safer here, tliough more comfortal>le.
Lee might open bis guns at any moment. The
drum-beat made us tip down our chairs and fall
into line. We had roll-call and something like a
dress parade without music, then stacked arms
along the curb-stono and mounted sentinels over
them. A bright, beautifid day and tlie freedom
of an uninhabited and plundered city were be-
fore us.
\Tlic'M)lli(i;il Kec()ra8"(Vol. .XXL, Tt. I., p. liiCi
total. HO.-
:ivc \\u- lo,
Kdmous.
IN \i. kilUil, 114 wounded, 14 missing ;
WHY BURNSIDE DID NOT EENEW THE ATTACK AT FREDEEICKSBURG.
BY KUSH C. HAWKINS, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.
ny-rovEMBER 2 2d, 1862, the whole Union army
iN had reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericks-
burg, and General Lee, who had proved upon more
than one oecasiou his watchfulness and enterprise,
took means to insure the arrival, about the same
time, of the Army of Northern Virginia on the
heights in the immediate rear of Fredericksburg.
Without the slightest delay the enemy's line of
defense was marked out, nor did their labors cease
until their defensive lines were made formidable
and complete by the mounting of a large number
of guns. In the meantime the Army of the Potomac
had di'awn its abundant supply of daily rations, sub-
jected itself to some drilling and several reviews,
while its commander had been carrying on an ani-
mated correspondence with the powers at Wash-
ington, chiefly in relation to pontoons which had
been promised but had failed to reach Falmouth
until long after the arrival of both armies at the
points they then occupied. [See p. 121.] Some
time during the first week in December the much-
looked-for pontoou train appeared, and then came
the oft-repeated camp rumor of a "movement over
the river," which in a few days assumed a more
definite form, the actual plan of attack becoming
the topic of many a camp-fire. It was freely stated
that the whole army was to cross the river about
such a time, and that the chief attack was to be
made by General Sumner's Right Grand Division
upon the enemy's center immediately back of Fred-
ericksbui'g, where the hills were steepest and the
fortifications strongest.
There were a few ofiieers in the Army of the
Potomac who had watched the gradual growth
of the enemy's lines, and knew something of the
natural formations in that direction,— a suc-
cession of steep hills which, in themselves, were
almost as potent for defensive purposes as the
average artificial fortifications. I, for one, had
been over that groimd several times the August
before while engaged in ascertaining the best
line for a grand guard for the protection of the
roads leading from the back country into Fred-
ericksburg. The three or four officers who were
possessed of this knowledge expressed themselves
very strongly in opposition to the plan of attack
as foreshadowed by the gossips of the camp, and
the news of these adverse ()])iiiions having come to
General Buriiside, lie sent acireularto Tlie general
officers of the Right (iraii<l Division and colonels
commanding brigades to meet him at the Phillips
house on the evening of December 9th. At the
time iii>i)<)inted the large room of that mansion was
fiUeil with general officers, with here and there a
colonel and a few grand division stafl'-officers. Gen-
eral Burnside made a speech in which he partly
disclosed and explained his plan for the coming
battle. If was received without any ]>articular crit-
icism or <M,tniiieiit, but ({eiieral French, who was
very enthusiast i<-, said th<' battle would be won in
forty-eight liours, and called for three cheers for
the commander, which were given.
The meeting ended. Colonel J. H. Taylor, assist-
ant adjutant-general of the Right Grand Division,
and myself were standing together in the hall of the
house, when General Burnside came along and said
to me, "What do you think of it?" I answered,
"K you make the attack as contemplated it will
be the greatest slaughter of the war ; there isn't
infantry enough in our whole army to carry those
heights if they are well defended." He then
turned to Colonel Taylor and said, "Colonel,
what do you say about it f " The response came
quickly and was sufficiently definite, "I quite
agree with Colonel Hawkins. The carrying out of
your plan will be murder, not warfare." The com-
manding general was very much surprised and
irritated at these answers, and made a remark
about my readiness to throw cold water upon his
" plans " ; he repeated the assertion of French about
victory within forty-eight hours, and passed on.
The meeting dispersed, the officers who had
composed it going to their respective commands
and giving their final orders for the movement of
the following day. Besides attending to the de-
tails of moving my command on the morrow, I
f oimd time to write three letters — one to my
mother, another to my wife, and a third to Charles
P. Kirkland, of the city of New York. In each of
these defeat was distinctly and without qualifica-
tion predicted. The fii'st letter in the order men-
tioned has been preserved, and from it the follow-
ing quotations are given :
" Camp, near Falmouth, Va., December 10th, 1862.
" Dear Mother — . . . . To-monow, if our present
plans are carried out, the great battle of the war will
commence. ... I have little hoiie of the plans succeed-
ing. I do not think them good,— there will he a great
loss of life and nothing accomplished. I am sure we are
to fight against all chances of success. There is a rumor
and a hope that Banks may have landed on the James
River ; If so, a large part of the enemy's force will lie di-
verted from this point, hut if they have a force au.v-
where near our own in munber we are pretty certain to
get whipped."
The letter to Judge Kirkland was much stronger
and more explicit, and evoked an answer from
which one paragraph is quoted :
" New York, December 18th, 1862.
" How wonderfully prophetic is your letter, written on
the lOth of December. It foretells exactly the awful
disaster and reverse that our cause has met with. How
is it iiossihie, if you tlnis knew all this, tliat those liiir-
imj control were' iuiiorant of it J Tliis wliole transaction
sfcins iiowahnost incrcdilde. To think of the tliousaiids
of splendid, brave, i>atriotic fellows ab.solut.'ly butch-
ered without the least bcnelicial result : on the contrary,
with a result disgraceful and disheartening to us, but I
fervently trust a result from which we can recover."'
This matter of the letters is here referred to,
not in a spirit of pride, but simply to show a want
of knowledge, judgment, and foresight on the
part of those high in command.
We now pass over the bombardment of Decem-
ber 11th, the many disastrous attempts to lay the
pontoons in front of Fredericksburg, and come to 3
o'clock of that day, when volunteers were called for
to cross the river in open boats for the purpose of
JVHY BURNSIDE DID NOT RENEIV THE ATTACK.
127
dislodging the enemy from the opposite bank. For
this service the 7th Michigan, 19th and 20th Mas-
|i sachusetts of General Howard's division, and the
I 89th New York of my brigade answered the call.
' The first three regiments crossed under fire where
the first bridge was afterward laid, and the fourth
under sharper fire where the second was completed.
By 9 o'clock that night the division of General
Howard and my brigade had obtained possession
of the town, the former taking the right of the line
and the latter the left. The whole of the 12th of
December into the night was occupied in cross-
ing the army, and on the morning of the 1 3th the
battle began and continued at intervals until dark-
ness set in. During a considerable portion of that
day, while the attacks upon the enemy's center,
known as " Marye's Heights," were being made,
General George W. Getty, my division commander,
and myself were on the roof of the Slaughterhouse,
a high residence at the lower end of the city,
named after its owner. From this prominent posi-
tion our repeated repulses and the terrible de-
struction of the Union troops had been witnessed.
At about half-past 3 o'clock the order came for
General Getty's Third Division of the Ninth Corps
to make an attack upon that part of the enemy's
line to the left of where the principal attacks had
been made. The order was obeyed, but not until
I had tried to induce General Getty to protest
against its obedience and the further useless waste
of life. The attack of our division closed a battle
which was one of the most disastrous defeats to the
Union forces during the war. The sadness which
prevailed throughout the whole army on that
night can neither be described nor imagined. The
surgeons were the happiest of all, for they were so
busy that they had no time to think of our terrible
defeat.
About 9 o'clock that evening I found myself near
a building situated upon the main street of the
town, where several of the generals of the Right
Grand Division had assembled for the purpose of
discussing the attack to be made the next morn-
ing. Wlien I entered the room these oflicers were
looking at a map upon a table, showing the posi-
tion of the enemy. There were present Generals
Willcox, Humphreys, Getty, Butterfield, Meade,
and three or four others. They were seriously
discussing the proposed renewal of the attack the
next day as though it had been decided upon. I
listened until I was thoroughly irritated because
of the ignorance displayed in regard to our sit-
uation, and then uttered a solemn, earnest, and
emphatic protest against even the consideration of
another attack. With a pencil I made a i-ougli
drawing of the first line then occupied by tlie en-
emy, and also showed a second position a little
to the rear, to whicli they could fall back and
make a strong stand in the event of their being
driven out of their first line. It did not take long
to convince these officers that a second attack
would probably end more disastrously than the
first, aTul they united in a request that I should
go at once to try to persuade Burnside that the
attack ought not to be renewed.
It was a cheerless ride in the wet and cold, and
through the deep mud of an army-traveled road
that dark night, for I was already weary from
much care, watching, and loss of sleep, and besides
I was fully aware of the unpleasant fact that an
officer of very inferior rank was bent upon an
ungrateful errand to a general commanding one of
the largest armies of modern times. But a solemn
sense of duty, and a humane desire to save further
useless slaughter, convinced me that any sacrifice
of self ought to be made in tlie interest of the
men who were fighting oui- battles.
I arrived at the Phillips house about 1 1 o'clock
to learn that I had probably passed General Burn-
side on the road, who had gone to perfect the de-
tails for a second attack. Those present at the
Phillips house were Generals Sumner, Hooker,
Franklin, Hardie, and Colonel Taylor. I made a
brief statement and explanation of the object of
my mission, which deeply interested all present.
They united in a desire that I should wait until
the arrival of General Burnside, which occurred
about 1 o'clock. As he came through the door he
said : " Well, it's all arranged ; we attack at early
dawn, the Ninth Corps in the center, which I shall
lead in person"; and then seeing me he said:
" Hawkins, your brigade shall lead with the 9th
New York on the right of the line, and we'U make
up for the bad work of to-day."
When he had ceased there was perfect silence,
and he was evidently astonished that no one ap-
proved. With hesitation and gi-eat delicacy Gen-
eral Sumner then stated the object of my visit,
and suggested that General Burnside should ex-
amine the rough di-awing then upon the table,
and listen to some reasons why the attack con-
templated ought not to be made. After I had
explained the enemy's positions, called attention
to several pertinent circumstances, and made
something of an argument. General Burnside asked
General Sumner what he thought, and he replied
that the troops had undergone such gi-eat fatigue
and privation, and met with such a disaster, that it
would not be prudent to make another attack so
soon. General Hooker, who was lying full length
upon a bed in one corner of the room, upon being
appealed to by General Burnside, sat up and said
in the most frank and decided manner that the
attack ought not to be renewed that morning.
Then a general consultation took place, in which
all who were i)resent joined, the result of which was
a verbal order, transmitted through nu\ counter-
manding the arrangements for a second attack.
Of those present at the first interview, on the
Fredericksburg side, Generals Getty, Willcox, But-
terfield, and probably several others whom I do
not now remember, are living. The only survivors
of the Pliillips house interview are General Frank-
lin and myself. In one of his letters to me, dated
Hartford, Conn., December 17th, ISCcJ, he .says:
"... I distinctly ncoUo.l your talk to Hnniwidc.
to whii'li you n-fiT, and had lu- ben ho talked fo bcf.irc
lio crossed the rivir, many lives would have been saved,
as well as iiineh ereilit to himself and reputation to tho
Ballaiit Army of the Potoniae."
'^^Ty/^^
CHARGING ACROSS THE RAILROAD.
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIVISION,
BY WILLIAM PARRAR SMITH, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.
WHEN General Burnside assumed the command of the Army of the
Potomac on the 9tli of November, 1862, he gave up the immense
strategic advantage which McClellan had gained, and led the army to Fal-
mouth on the Eappahannock Eiver, opposite the city of Fredericksburg. A
few days after his arrival on the Rappahannock he called a council of war.
It was a conference rather than a council, for he stated that he called the
generals together to make known something of his plans, and not to put any
question l)efore them for decision. The grand division commanders, Sumner,
Franklin, and Hooker, were present, and also, I think, the corps commanders.
I was present as commander of the Sixth Army Corps. The entire army was
massed within a few miles of Falmouth, and the first object was to cross the
river in our front, and gain a fair field for a battle. From the same ground
Hooker afterward marched north-west, and by a series of fine movements
placed himself in a position to offer battle at Chancellorsville on at least
ecjual terms. The outcome of Hooker's campaign belied its beginning, but it
led to the battle of Gettysburg, which more than compensated in results for
the previous failui'e. J
General Burnside opened the conference by stating that within a few days
he proposed to cross the river to offer battle to General Lee, and that after
a close study of the reports of his engineers he had chosen Skinker's Neck as
^ When General Burnside determined to occupy
Fredericksburg it was not held hy a large force of
the enemy. A body of cavalry, sent from Warren-
ton, could have seized the place without serious
opposition, and could have held it until the advance
of the infantry came up. In the preliminary discus-
sion of the move from Warreuton to Fredericks-
burg, the notion that a serious battle was necessary
to enable the army to get into Fredericksburg was
not entertained by any one. Sumner, who had the
advance, reported that when he arrived at Fal-
mouth he could even then have occupied Freder-
icksburg without opposition, had his orders justified
liim in crossing the river.— W. B. Franklin.
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIl^ISION.'
129
the point of crossing. Skinker's Neck is a shoe-shaped bend in the Rappa-
hannock River, about twelve miles below Fredericksburg. It offered all
the necessary military features for forcing a crossing, but, like Butler's
famous " bottle " at Bermuda Hundred, also presented great facilities for pre-
venting the egress of an army which had effected an entrance on its penin-
sula. After developing to a limited extent his plans, the general said that
any one present was at liberty to express his views on the subject. General
Sumner, if I recollect aright, remarked only that he would do his utmost to
carry out the plans of the commanding general. General Franklin said that
we could doubtless effect a crossing at the designated place ; he assumed that
the movements, after crossing, had been carefully studied, and he stood ready
to execute any orders he might receive. General Hooker then said, in suh-
stance, that it was j^reposterous to talk about our crossing the river in the
face of Lee's army; that he would like to be in command of fifty thousand
men on the other side of the river, and have an enemy make the attemx)t. I
then stated that I would guarantee the crossing of the river if my command
had the advance. General Bui*nside closed the conference by stating that
his mind was made up ; that we must prepare our commands for the work
before them ; and that w^e should receive the proper orders in due time.
Three or four days after that I was at Burnside's headquarters, and he
invited me to take a ride with him. Riding along on the hills near the river,
?^«>=^- ■'
THE rONTOON-BKIDGKS AT FHANKI.INS TROSSI
The hills oociipied by Stonewall JacUson's «
1 R<1M A WVIt-TIMi; nUlTOC.KAl'U.
land aiv sctn in lln- tllHtnni'c.
130
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIl^ISfON.'
ii;r.!) AS si;i;\ i-i.-om iiaiiii.tdn's cijossim; ~ ii;i:i>i:i!I( ivsr.i
IN THE DISTANCE. FliUM A SKETCH MADE IN 1884.
he pointed out some fine positions for artillery, and said : " My reserve artil-
lery has as yet had no chance to show its value, and I am going to make the
crossing here and below, under cover of the guns of the reserve artillery."
To this I replied, " You can cross here without great difficulty, for this
bank dominates the other, but when your army is across your troubles will
begin," calling his attention at the same time to the range of hiUs on the
other side, a mile or more l)ack from the river.
" Oh ! " said Burnside, " I know where Lee's forces are, and I expect to
surprise him. I expect to cross and occupy the hills before Lee can bring
anything serious to meet me."
I then said, " If you are sure of that, there is no more to be said on the
subject."
On parting Gleneral Burnside said, " I wish you to say nothing to any one
about my change of plan. I will make it known at the proper time."
Though General Franklin and myself were on the most intimate terms, and
occupied the same tent, I gave him no hint of the change. Two or three
days before the movement G-eneral Franklin was notified of the point selected
for his crossing, and I then told him the story of the change of plan.
He merely said, " Your command is the strongest, and you must take the
advance."
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIVISION." 131
As I remember, it was on the afternoon of the 10th of December that
General Franklin received an order to have the head of his command at a
designated jjoint on the river, about one and a half miles below Fredericks-
burg, and since known as Franklin's Crossing, at daylight on the morning of
the nth, where he would at once begin crossing by Ijridges which would be
found ready.
On the morning of the 11th of December, at 5 o'clock, the First Corps,
under Major-Greneral John F. Reynolds, marched to take position at the
bridges, and cover the crossing of the Sixth Corps over the Rappahannock.
A brigade of the corps had mov^ed at 2 o'clock a. m., to protect the engineer
troops while throwing the bridges, which were expected to be finished by day-
light. The work was for a while suspended on account of the fire of sliarp-
shooters, covered by some fishing-huts and a thicket on the opposite shore.
Two batteries placed on the bank opened with canister and shell, and caused
the enemy to disappear, and work was resumed. When the head of the
Sixth Corps reached the bank at 7:30 A. m., only three or four pontoons of
each bridge had been placed in position, and the bridges were not comiJeted
till about 1 p. M. It was not until about 4 p. m. that I received orders to begin
the crossing.
General Devens's brigade held the post of honor and began the movement,
using both bridges. One of the commanders of the leading regiments, more
patriotic than wise, had placed his band at the head of the column, and
it was ordered to begin playing as it reached the bridge. This threw the
men on the bridges into "step," and for some minutes it looked as though
both bridges must go down. Fortunately, through the reckless riding of a
"Wild Irishman" on the staff, an order reached tlie colonel, and the nmsic
was stopi^ed before any harm was done.
The troops Were rapidly thrown across, when an order came to recross all
but one brigade. This was done and General Devens's brigade was left to
keep the bridge-head. The cause of this was that the upper bridges opposite
the town, intended for the use of the right wing, had not yet l)een finished.
Sharp-shooters in the ])rick houses near the river had interfered with the
work, and the heavy guns of the reserve artillerj^ could not make the same
impression on masonry walls that our field-batteries had produced on thicket
and hut. Some volunteers finally crossed the river to Fredericksburg in
boats and cleared the other bank, and the bridge was rapidly laid.
Of (iourse all chance of effecting a surprise was now over, and if W(^ per-
sisted in crossing we must figlit for the hills soutli of the river. There was,
however, a very fine opportunity for turning what had l»een done into a
feint, and crossing the main army elsewhere. But this was not done, and
early on the morning of the TJth the Sixth Corps recommen 1 the ]>assago
of the river, marched to the front about a mile, and formed line of battle.
Its right was thrown across Deep Run, which, between the Sixth Corps and
the river, was an impassal)l(^ stream, se})a rating us, until bridged, from the
right wing of the army. In the right front was an open field, traversed by
Deep Run from left to right, bounded by the Iiills and naiTowing as it
;^2
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIVISION."
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN ABOUT
^xrT^^^^^y^^ujjtluA^
approached a gorge a mile or more away. In front of the left and right at a
distance of perhaps half a mile was the ridge of hills occupied by the enemy.
The First Corps, imder Major-General John F. Reynolds, followed the
Sixth, and, forming on its left, curved back across the Richmond road and
rested its left on the Rapi)aliannock River. In its right front was the range of
hills at a short distance, which broke away, leaving an open space on the
left between it and the river. Here were two corps with an impassable stream
on their right, a formidable range of hills occupied by the enemy covering
almost their entire front, and at their back a river with two frail bridges con-
necting its shores. It takes soldiers who do not believe that war is an art to
be perfectly at their ease under such circumstances.
General Franklin, General Reynolds, and myself were on the most intimate
social and official terms. We always discussed questions of general interest
to the command, and after General Reynolds had placed his corps in position
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIVISION." 133
we met and looked over the situation as it then appeared to us. We unani-
mously agi-eed that there was but one thing to do, and that was to put the
forty thousand men of the Left Grand Division into columns of assault on
the right and left of the Richmond road, carry the ridge, and tm-ii Lee's right
flank at any cost. To do this the Sixth Corps must be relieved from its xjosi-
tion in line, where it was covering the bridge. This could only be done after
dark, but as it woidd take some time to get the columns formed, and as it was
necessary that the men should get some rest before morning, the work of prep-
aration must begin directly after dusk. In coming to this conclusion we had
consideri^d the fact that Lee being on the exterior had longer lines than those
of our army, and that therefore he could not have force enough on his riglit
to resist an assault by forty thousand men, and that the demonstration made
on his left would prevent the withdrawal of any of his force from that flank.
Besides this we had in front of Reynolds open country of sufficient width to
turn the hills which terminated to the right of the Richmond road.
About 5 p. M. General Burnside came to the left wing, and after he had
taken a hurried gallop along the lines General Franklin asked him to go to
his tent, and there gave him the above-described plan as the only one that
in om* judgment offered a fair hope of success. When General Burnside left
us we were all of the opinion that he agreed with us, and the last re(iuest,
urgently pressed upon him, was that he should at once give the order for
Birney's and Sickles's divisions of the Third Corps (Hooker's Center Grand
Division) to cross the bridge and be ready to begin to relieve the Sixth Corps
in the lines at dusk. Under the supposition that the orders asked for woidd
soon be received. General Franklin ga^e General Reynolds and myself ordei-s
to do all the preliminary work possible ; which being done, we returned to
General Franklin's headquarters to await the arrival of the messenger from
General Burnside. As the precious time passed by we fell to discussing the
condition of affairs. Burnside had proposed to effect a surprise, and now
before Lee could be attacked he would have had forty-eight hours for concen-
tration against us and for fortifying his positions on the hills. Burnside Iiad
persisted in crossing the river after all hope of a surprise hnd faded away,
and now we must fight our way out under great disadvantages. Had Bnrnsi(k»
been forced into a move by the Administration? Und(>r tlie circumstances
would he make a desperate fight or only go far enough to keep u]) a))) lea ranees ?
Whatever was in store for us the Left Grand Division was a unit in senii-
ment; the men were brave and well disciplined, and wc^ felt sure lliat wiili
our forty thousand men we could force back Lee's riglil Hank and get a
better i)ositi()n for a general battle, if one were then necessary. Would
P>urnsid(^ adopt our plan, and if so, why this delay whieli was costing us so
nuieh valuable time f We had all known Burnside socially, long and inti-
mately, but in his new position of grave responsibility he was to ns entirely
unknown.
The weary hours of that long winter night wore away in lliis |.i-olitl. ss
manner until about .") o'(dock, when (Jeneral K*eyno!.Is said : "1 kii"W I have
hard work ahead of me and I must get some sleej.. Send for me if I am
134
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIHSION."
RUINS OF "MANSFIELD," ALSO KNOWN AS THE "BERNARD HOUSE." FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
wanted." General Franklin tlien sent an aide to headquarters, who returned
with the answer that the orders would " come presently."
The order came, I think, at 7:45 a. m. : "Keep your whole command in
position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road." Two-thirds of
the command (the Sixth Corps) was so placed that it coiild not move, without
danger of losing the bridges, until relieved by other troops or until Lee's right
wing should be in full retreat. " And you will send out at once a division, at
least, to pass below Smithfield," — a hamlet occupied by Reynolds on the
previous evening, — " to seize if possible the heights near Captain Hamilton's,
on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its
line of retreat open.''''
. The peculiar wording of the order is positive evidence that when it .was
penned Burnside's mind was still filled with the fallacy of effecting a surprise.
The order recites that the division to be sent out by Franklin — and also
one to be jjushed forward by Sumner on the right — was to seize, or attempt
to seize, certain heights. The military man is habituated to use the word seize
when an unguarded position is to be occupied, or a point in the lines of the
enemy left weak through ignorance or neglect is to be taken by a sudden rush.
Both of these operations are in the nature of a military surprise. When an
advantage is to be gained by hard fighting or the weight of a mass of troops,
the word carrij is instinctively used. In corroboration of this proposition, I
will state that in the third interview I had with Burnside, after the battle, he
said, "I sliouLl have ordered Franklin to carry the heights at Captain Hamil-
ton's at all hazards." \
"\.Just as CJeneral Burnside was leavinfj, shortly suredme I would have the orders before miduight.
after nif^litfall, I asked to he permitted to order Had the permission been granted, the First and
General Stoneman's eorps (the Tliird) to cross at Sixth Corps would have been in position for the at-
once. He declined to give the permission, but as- tackby daylight, the Third Corps takingthe place of
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIVISION.
13^
Sns^
JACK-KNIFE RECORD ON THE STONE WALL
OF THE BERNAKD HOUSE.
The Sixth Corps had two divisions in line and one in reserve. It remained
in an exposed position during the day, and suffered severely from artillery
fire, while the enemy in its front were well covered by woods and rifle-pits.
In obedience to his orders Reynolds moved to the attack at 8:30 a. M.,with
his center division under Meade, which was to be supported by the division of
Gibbon on the right and next to the Sixth Corps. The third division, under
Doubleday, was in reserve and guarding
Meade's left, ik Meade crossed the ravine
in his front, and directed his course to-
ward a point of woods coming down
from the heights. The artillery on the
crest was silenced by three batteries,
and Meade pushed on, supported on
his right by Gibbon, and, after severe
fighting, carried the crest, capturing flags,
and prisoners. In the dense woods on
the height, the connection with Gibbon
was lost, and Meade, after a stubborn contest, was finally driven back, Gib-
l)on yet holding his ground. Two regiments from the Third Corps arriving
were sent to Gibbon's left, but were soon overpowert^d, and they were forced
back with Gibbon. The enemy made a strong show of- following up their
success, but the arrival of two fresh brigades from the Third Corps checked
them and drove them back to their sheltered positions. Gibbon's division,
after its retreat, was relieved by Sickles's division of the Third Corps.
Newton's division, the reserves of the Sixth Corps, arrived. late in the after-
noon and took position on the left, but was not engaged. The enemy's bat-
teries on their extreme right, ha^4ng a reverse fire upon Mi^ade, wlien he
advanced up the crest, maintained their position throughout the battles
Owing to the foggy character of the day our artillery on the left bank of the
Rappahannock was obliged to fire somewhat at random, and for the same reason
the fire from the enemy's batteries was not very well du-ected. The contest
ended at niglitfall, our troops having made no material permanent advance.
The military reader will see that had Meade and Gil)l)on had beliind them,
when they carried the enemy's lines, the 25,000 men of the Sixtli Corjts in-
stead of 2 regiments, simply, of the Tliird Corps, the probaliihties would all
tlio Rixtli, which woiihl luive attiiekod with the
First Corps, Had the necessary orders been re-
ceived, even by midnight, the movements wouhl
liiive boon made under cover of the darkness, and
tho whole iiiglit after midnight would have l)een
r("(|uired to make them. It seems that (Jeneral
IJiiruside went to bed as soon as lie arrived at his
headquarters, and did not write the orders until
I he next morning. None of my urgent messages
sent to him during the night were delivered to
him, although their receipt at head(iuarters was
acknowledged.
. It will be seen that the order sent by (IcMieral
Burnsidf^ under which the attack was made is
entirely dilTerent from that lor an attack by forty
thousand men, which I luul a right to expect from
what took place at our interview of the previous
evening. And its receipt at 7:4.". in the morning
[it was dated ;">:.">") A. M.], insteail of midnight,
was unaccountable, except uiuler the siijiposition
that Burnside, for some reason that was unknown
to us on the left, disai)proved of the plan to which
we thought he had assented, or that no serious at-
tack was tobemade from theleft.—W. H. FkaNKUN.
■5^ It came into action shortly aftt'r Meade's ad-
vance, to repel a threatened attack fnuu a largo
force of cavalry which developed between our left
and the M:issaponax Creek.— W. H. Fraxklin.
136
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIVISION.
have been in favor of a
success. When night fell
there were no longer forty
thousand men in the Left
Grand Division, and we
had gained no important
advance.
After Meade's division
had been withdrawn from
the front he came to Gen-
eral Franklin's headquar-
ters, and on being asked
some question about the
light said, " I found it
quite hot enough for me,"
taking off his slouched hat
and showing two bullet-
holes between which and
the top of his head there
must have been little space.
During one of the feeble,
skirmishing attacks made
BRIGADIKR-GENERAL GEORGE D. BAYARD, KILLED AT FREDERICKSBURG. OU tllC UnCS Ot tllC OlXth
EROM AN ENGRAVmG BY H. B. HALL. ^^^.^^ ^^1^1' iu thC daV,
Meade, who was still at headquarters, was expressing great uneasiness lest the
enemy should break through and capture the bridges. General Franklin quieted
him by saying that the Sixth Corps could not be driven from its position.
" Mansfield," as the Bernard house was called, was a large, stone mansion, that
looked down on the Rappahannock River close beneath it, and was approached
by an imposing drive, while behind was an open grove of magnificent trees ;
in this grove was the headquarters of General Franklin. The house was evi-
dently one of Virginia's ancestral homes, and had been in former days the
center of generous hospitality. Though under artillery fire, it was used as a
temporary hospital, and in it the brave Bayard died. The grove was filled
with saddled horses.^ not for the use of fair ladies and gay cavaliers, as in the
olden time, but for staff-officers and orderlies to carry orders into the fight
and bring back reports from the field. The testy owner, who remained about
the house during the early part of the day, and whose word had been law for
so many years to all the country side, did not realize, when he demanded the
immediate evacuation of his premises, that he spoke to a man who com-
manded 40,000 men, and one who on that day had little regard for proprietary
i-iglits, and did not stand much in awe of a Virginia magnate or constable. J
^Whoii I first arrivcil at tlic licniaril house I upon staying at the house to protect it. Eeyuolds
found Mr. Bernard hokling a lively interview with on such occasions was a man of few words, and I
Reynolds. It soenaed that Mr. Bernard protested presently saw Mr. Bernard hurrying toward the
against the use of Lis house and grounds liy tlie pontoon-bridges between two soldiers, and he was
troops because they would spoil Ihein, and insisted not seen again iu that vicinity.— W. B. Franklin.
FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND Dll/ISION:
'37
During this day, as in all days of battle, many sad and many linmorous
incidents occuiTed. Some of the shots that were fired too high for the Une of
battle went hurtling through the headquarters of General Franklin into the
open grove of large trees. General George D. Bayard, much endeared to us
by his social qualities and his rare merits as a cavalry leader, was mortally
wounded by a round shot through the thigh. Bayard and his friend, Captain
H. G. Gibson, commanding a battery of fljdng artillery, were within ten feet
of Franklin, and were just rising from the ground to go to luncheon when
the shot came. It severed Gibson's sword-belt without injury to him, and
struck Bayard. Many generals could have better been spared from the service.
A few days before the battle there had come to the Sixth Corps the first
importation of bounty men. They had been placed in the front to save
the veterans for heavy work, and
as their wounded men were car-
ried back through the ranks of the
old soldiers, the latter would cry
out, " Take good care of those men;
they have cost the Government a
great deal of money." The l:)ouuty
men were at first a by- word and a
cause of irritation to the real vol-
unteers. During the afternoon,
hearing some heavy musketry fir-
ing in my front, I went to ascer-
tain the cause, and while riding
along behind a regiment lying with
their faces to the ground, a round
shot struck the knapsack of a sol-
dier, and, cutting it open, sent a
cloud of underclothes into the air,
and high above them floated a scat-
tei-ed pack of cards. The soldici-,
hearing the shouts of laughtei',
turned over to see what was the
matter, and when he saw the mis-
liap which had befallen him made
a feeble effort to join in the laugh.
Between 1 and 2 a. m. of Decern- k
bei' 14th a council of war of the
grand division commanders was ordere(l, ;i
liis intention of leading the Ninth ('<)i-}»s (
against the works which the Second Corp.-^
Hancock, had failed to carry. For some reason the project was abantloned.
[See p. 127.] During the next two days the Left Grand Division remained
in position, with no disturbance except that produced by an angry skirmisli
line with an occasional artillery engagement.
VOL.111. 10
■S'^^/^s?
^m
J^ J^/i,Q^^^h^</H<^
(1 ( icMU'ral liiirnsii
lie announced
is oM commaiHl)
in an assault
leil liv such men
as Couch and
138 FRANKLIN'S "LEFT GRAND DIVISION."
Oil Monday afternoon (the 15th) I received an order from Greneral Franklin,
then detained at headquarters, to withdraw the Left Grand Division after
dark to the left bank of the river, and what remained of the forty thousand
men of that command recrossed during the night without loss and without
molestation from the enemy.
After the battle I had four interviews with Burnside. The first was on
Sunday, the l-ith of December. I found him alone in his tent walking up
and down, apparently in great distress of mind, and turning to me he said,
"Oh! those men! oh! those men!" I asked what he meant, and he said,
" Those men over there ! " pointing across the river where so many thousands
lay dead and wounded, " I am thinking of them all the time."
I made some remark about the fate of soldiers and changed the subject.
Burnside also said that he did not lead the Ninth Corps to the charge as he
had said he would, because the generals on the right made such statements with
reference to the demoralization of their commands that he feared to make
the attempt. After we had recrossed the river I saw him again, when he told
me that he had it in his mind to relieve Sumner from command, place Hooker
in arrest, and Franklin in command of the army.
In the third interview General Reynolds was with me. Burnside said
that the men on the left did not fight well enough. To this we replied that
the list of killed and wounded proved the contrary. He then said, " I did
not mean that ; I meant there were not muskets enough fired," adding, " I
made a mistake in my order to Franklin ; I should have directed him to carry
the hill at Hamilton's at all hazards." ■>:r
At the fourth interview he stated that the mistake was that Franklin did
not get the order early enough ; that he had started it at 4 o'clock in the
morning, but that General Hardie, to whom the order was committed, had
stopped an hour and a half in camp to get breakfast. I then told him that
we should have had the order before midnight in order to form such a column
of attack as we had proposed.
For a few days General Burnside was dazed by the defeat and grief -stricken
at the loss of life; but he soon recovered, and planned and attempted to carry
out his harmless " Mud Campaign," his last at the head of the Army of the
Potomac.
■5^ The Committee on the Conduct of the War their forces to such an extent that the position in front
received from General Burnside responses to ques- could be easily stormed and carried."
tions as follows • ^" " "^^ '^hat do you attribute his failure to accomplish
that?"
<?. "Do I understand you to say tliat yon expected A. "To the great strength of the position, and the
General Friinklin to carry tlir point at tlic extreme left accumulation of tlie enemy's forces there."
of tin- rid-.' in Ww rear of tin- town, and tlicrchy enable General Burnside then explained that the delay
°r'^z:i:i^:::"s::;::s::zt;;:i';::^z^:,.^, - '»"><>i"g /te bridge gave *» ene^y ,ime ,.
done would have placed our forces in rear of tlieir ex- accumulate his forces before he was able to order
treme right, and which I thought at the time would shake the attack. — W. B. FRANKLIN.
ri
TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE LINES DURING A TRUCE.
WITH JACKSON AT HAMILTON'S CEOSSINGJ
BY J. H. MOORE, C. S. A.
THE morning of the 13th [of December] dawned
with a dense fog enveloping the plain and city
of Fredericksbiu-g, thi-ough which the brilliant rays
of the sun struggled aboiit 10 in the morning.
In front of the right of the Confederate army
was tlisplayed the vast force of Franklin, march-
ing and countermarching, hastily seeking tlie
places assigned for the coming conflict. Here was
a vast plain, now peopled with an anny worthy
of its gi'and dimensions. A slight but dazzling
snow beneath, and a brilliant sun above, inten-
sified the leaping reflections from thousands of
gleaming bayonets. Officers, on restless horses,
rushed from point to point in gay uniforms. Field-
artillery was whisked into position as so many frag-
ile toys. Kank and file, foot and liorse, small-arms
and field-ordnance presented so magnificent a
pageant as to call forth the unbounded admira-
tion of their adversaries. In a word, this Avas the
grandest martial scene of the war. The contrast
between Stonewall Jackson's corps and Franklin's
grand division was very marked, and so far as ap-
pearances went the former was hardly better tiian
a caricature of the latter.
When all was in readiness, adjutants stepped to
the front and, plainly in oin- view, read the orders
of the day. This done, the fatal advance across the
plain commenced. With gay pennants. State, regi-
mental, and brigade standards flying, this magnifi-
cent army advanced in three closely compacted
lines of battle. At intervals, in front, preceded
by horse-artillery and flanked on either side by
numerous field-pieces, hundreds of heaAy field-
pieces from the north bank of the Rappahannock
belelied forth their missiles of destruetion and
swept the plain in advance of Franklin's columns,
while at the same moment his smaller field-pieces
in front and on the flanks joined in to sweep the
open space on all sides. This mighty cannonad-
ing was answered by the Confederate onlnance.
Onward, steady and imwavering, these three lines
advanced, preceded by a lieavy skirmish line, till
they neared the railroad, when Jackson's right and
right center poured into these sturdy ranks a
deadly volley from small-arms. Spaces, gaps, and
wide chasms instantly told the tale of a most fatal
encounter. Volley aft(>r volley of small-arms con-
tinued the work of destruction, wliile .lackson's
artillery jiosted on the Federal left and at right
angles to their line of advance kept up a withering
fire on the lessening ranks. The enemy advanced
far in front of tlie Kiver road [and crossing tlio
railroad cliarged tlie slopes upon whidi our troops
were posted], but at length wavered, lialted, and
suddenly retreated to the protection of the railroad
embankments. The struggle was kept up by shaqv
shooters for some time, wlien another general
advance was made against a furious cannonade of
} CoudeuHod from w article In tlio •'SoutUoru Bivouac " for Aufeniet, 1880.
130
40
IVJTH JACKSON AT HAMILTON'S CROSSING.
HAYS'S HRIGADE OF STONEWALL JACKSON'j
small-arms and artillery. Again the scene of de-
struction was repeated ; still the Federals crossed
the railroad, when a gap in Jackson's line between
Archer's and Thomas's brigades was discovered by
some of the assailants. [See map, p. 74.] This
interval was rushed for by a part of Franklin's
troops as a haven of safety, while the rest of his
command was repulsed in confusion.
The left of Archer's l)rigade, that is, the 14th
Tennessee and 19th Georgia, commanded by
Colonel Forbes, -jIV ^^^^ a part of the 7th Ten-
nessee, commanded by Colonel Goodner, believing
they were about to be surromided, gave way.
Their comrades on the right, unaware of the
condition of affairs on the left, and seeing the
enemy routed in their fi'ont, were amazed at
this confusion. Officers and men on the right
were enraged at what seemed to bo cowardice,
and, rushing towai'd the broken lines, leveled
their pistols and muskets and fired into these
fleeing comrades.
Presently the true condition of affairs appeared
when the victorious brigades of Franklin emerged
from the woods. Line and field officers rushed to
and fro, wildly shouting, "Into line, into line!"
and, even in the face of a flanking foo, the gallant
Colonel Turney, who temporarily commanded Arch-
er's brigade, succeeded in re-forming his regiments
at right angles to the former line of attack. This
gave a brief check to the victors. Still the infantry
and artillery fire scourged the line. The rout
t!V Colonel W. A. Forbes, of the 14tli TonncRsee, was
mortally wouncled at the second battle of Bull Run, and
the regiment wns etminiMndcd at rrcdcrickslmrg by
Llcutenant-fciloiicl ,l. w. Lockcii.— Kditoks.
or cajiture of the Confederates seemed inevitable.
Turney was struck by a minie-ball, which entered
his mouth and came out at his neck, and his ap-
parently lifeless body was hurriedly placed on a
blanket, and four of his devoted followers attempted
to carry him to the rear. They had not proceeded
far when a shell burst among them, and they in
turn lay helpless by the side of their bleeding com-
mander.^j Colonel Goodner also did gallant ser-
vice in preventing a rout, for. with a part of the
7th that still held its ground, he formed a line at
right angles to their former position, and aided in
checking this dangerous reverse.
Up to the time of the break in our line no one
in the ranks apprehended any danger. Those in
front and near this scene of defeat and confusion
made desperate efforts to rally the men and pre-
vent a stampede, for we looked for nothing but
defeat or capture. We were unaware of the fact
that we had any reserves. Presently Early's divis-
ion, in the very mood and spirit that had character-
ized Archer's brigade before the breaking of the
lines, came at double-quick to our relief, jesting
and yellijig at us : "Here comes old Jubal ! Let
old Jubal straiglittMi that fence ! Jubal's boys are
always getting Hill out o' trouble!"
A desperate encounter followed. The Federals
fought manfully, but the artillery on our right, to-
gether with the small-arms, litei'ally mowed them
down. Officers and men lost courage at the sight of
their lessening ranks, and in the utmost confusion
3j Colonel Turney, thus painfully and dangerously
wounded, has, for the last fifteen years, served the
Rtatc of Tennessee as one of its supreuje judges.—
.T. H. M.
IVITH JACKSON AT HAMILTON'S CROSSING.
141
they again sought the shelter of the railroad.
Archer's brigade, of Jackson's corps, was on the
extreme right of A. P. Hill's front line, composed
of the following regiments, posted in the order
named: 19th Georgia, 14th Tennessee, 7th Ten-
nessee, 1st Tennessee, and extended from the in-
terval or space left unoccupied by Gregg's brigade
to the railroad curve near Hamilton's Crossing.
We occupied groimd slightly higher than the level
of the plain over which the Federals had to pass.
In our immediate rear and left was an irregular
growth of timber of varied size, which obstructed
the view in the direction of the Gregg interval.
As the battle opened in the morning, the enemy
was plainly in our view, and we could distinctly see
their approach to the railroad in our front and to
the left, where in every attempt- to advance they
halted. Now and then they woiild make an effort
to advance from the railroad to our lines. We
who were on the right had no trouble to repulse
those in our front, and, in fact, we successfully met
every assault made on the right, and that, too, with
little or no loss. We regarded the efforts of the Fed-
erals, so far as the right was concerned, as futile in
the extreme. In fact, their assaults on this part of
the line appeared like the marching of men to cer-
tain defeat and slaughter. Our infantry fire, aided
by fifteen pieces of artillery placed at our right, did
terrible execution as the poor fellows emerged from
a slight railroad cut in front of a part of om- line. |
On the morning of the 13th General Jack-
son rode down his lines dressed in a new suit,
presented to him, as we understood, by General
Stuart. Some of our men facetiously remarked
that they prefen-ed seeing him with his i-usty
old cap on, as they feared he wouldn't get down
to work. He inspected all of his positions,
riding alone. After halting near the extreme
right, the artillery fire was begun, and here I
had an excellent opportunity to see him under
fire. I watched him closely, and was unable to
detect the slightest change in his demeanor. In
a few minutes he rode off in the direction of Lee's
headquarters.
A very general impression prevails, and it is in
a gi-eat measure confirmed by writers on Freder-
icksburg, that Jackson's lines were strongly for-
tified. This is not correct: we had no time to
construct anything like fortifications. D. H. Hill's
division had been at Port Royal, eighteen miles
below Fredericksburg, to prevent the Federals fi-om
crossing at that point ; he left Port Royal after the
enemy had abandoned the project of crossing there,
and did not reach the position assigned him until
about daj'light of the morning of the battle.
The next morning the scenes of caniage were
heart-sickening. To intensify the hoiTible pic-
ture, the dead and the mortally wounded were in
many instances burned in the sedge-grass, which
was set on fire by bursting shells.
4 The report of General Jolm F. Reynolds, comniand-
iug the Fii-st Coi-ps, coutuinH the followiu;; account of
the engagement of his troops at Hamilton's Crossing:
" About 8 : 30 A. M. Meade's division advanced across the
Smithfleld ravine, formed in column of two brigades,
with the artillery between them, the Third Brigade
marching by the flank on the left and rear. It moved
down the river some 50O or 600 jards, when it tiu-ned
sharp to the right and crossed the Bowling Green road.
The enemy's artillery opened tire from the crest and the
angle of the Bowling Green road. I directed General
Meade to put his column directly for the nearest point
of wood, and, having gained the crest, to extend his
attack along it to the extreme point of the heights,
where most of the enemy's artillerj^ was ]»)st('d. As the
column crossed the Bowling Green road the artillery of
his division was ordered into position on the rise of the
ground between this road and the railroad; Cooper's
and Ransom's l)atteii('H, to the front, soon joined by
Anisdcn'H, to oi>p()se those of the enemy on the crest,
while Simpson's liad to be thrown to the left, to oppose
that on till' Bowling (irocn road, which was taking the
column in Hank. Hall's ))attery was at the same time
thrown to the front, on the left of Gibbon's division,
which was advancing in line on Meade's right. The
artillery combat here raged furiously for some time,
until that of the enemy was silenced, when all of our
batteries were directed to sliell the wood, wliere his
infantry was supposed to be posted. This was con-
tinued some half-honr, when the column of Meade,
advancing in tine order and with gallant determina-
tion, was directed into the point of wood which ex-
tended this side of the railroad, with instructions, when
they carried the crest and road which ran along it in
their fi-ont, to move the First Brigade along the road,
the Second Brigade to advance aiid hold the road, while
the Third moved across the open Held, to support the
First in carrying the extreme point of the ridge. At
this time I sent orders to General Gil)bon to advance, iti
connection with General Meade, and carry the wood in
Ills front. The advanc<> was made under the fire of the
enemy's batteries on his right and front, to which (,;ili-
bon's batteries replied, while those of Smith joined in
on the right.
"Meade's division successfully carried the wood in
front, crossed the railroad, charged up the slope of the
hill, and gained the road and edge of the wood, driving
the enemy from his strong positions in the ditches and
railroad cat, captnringthe flags of 2 regimeutsaud send-
ing about 200 prisoners to the rear. At the same time
Gibbon's division had <rossed the railroad and entered
the wood, driving back the first line of the enemy and
capturing a number of prisoners; but, from the dense
character of the wood, the connection between his di-
vision and Meade's was broken. The infantry combat
was hero kept up with great spirit for a short time,
when Meade's column was vigorously assailed by the
enemy's nmsked force, and, after a severe contest,
forced back. Two regiments of Berry's brigade, Bir-
neys division, arrived al)out this time, and were Im-
mediately tlirown into the wood on Gibbon's left, to the
support of the line; l)ut they, too, were soon overpow-
ered, and the whole line retiretl from the wood, Meade's
in some confusion, and, after an inefTectual effort by
General Meade and myself to rally them under the
enemy's fire, that of the artillery having resumed almost
its original intensity, I directed Geiiernl Meade to n»-form
his division across the Bowling Green road, and ortlered
the remainder of Berry's brigade, which had come up,
to the supi)ort of the liatteries.
'•The enemy, showing himself in strong force in the
wood, scemeii disposed to follow onr retiring troops,
Imt the arrival of the other brigades of Birney's division
on tin' ground at this critical moment, to oec>ii>y our
line of battle, materially aided in saving Hall's l>atlery,
which was now seriously threat incd l>\ the eniiny.and,
together with our artillery tire, soon drove him to his
sheltered positions and cover, from which his infantry
did not again niiiiear.
"(Jcneral Gil)bon's division was assailed In turn In
the same manner, and compelled to retire from the
wood soon after Meade's." (Jcneral C. Feger Jackson
( onunanding the Third Brigade of Meade's division, was
killed within the enemy's lines.— Editoks.
IN THE EANKS AT FREDERICKSBURG.
I. BY GEORGE E. SMITH, PRIVATE, CO. E, 2D WISCONSIN VOLUNTEERS.
GENERAL W. F. Smith, in bis article on " Frank-
lin's Left Grand Division" [p. 137], makes
mention of a round shot that ripped open a sol-
dier's knapsack and distributed his clothing and
cards. It was not a round shot, but the second
" bolt " that came from the Whitworth gun that the
" Johnnies " had run in on our fiank. And although
we were surprised and durafounded at this attack
from a new arm that appeared to take in about
five miles of our line, the boys could not forego
their little joke ; so when that column of cards was
thrown some twenty feet in the air, on all sides
could be heard the cry, " Oh, deal me a hand! "
Three other shots in that battle did queer work.
Ours was the last brigade (the "Iron Brigade"
under Meredith) to cross on the pontoons, and we
came to a halt upon the river-bank, for a few mo-
ments, before going into position among the big
cotton-wood trees at the Bernard House. We had
been paid off that day, and the gamblers began to
play at cards the moment we halted. A man who
was about to " straddle" a "fifty-cent blind" had
his knapsack knocked from under him by a solid
shot, and he "straddled" half a dozen soldiers,
who were covered with a cart-load of dirt. This
was the first shot from the ' ' Johnnies " on our left.
Their second passed over the river and struck a
paymaster's tent. The struggle between the pay-
master and the stragglers for possession of the
flying greenbacks was both exciting and ridiculous.
The next day, December 13th, our officers and
the enemy's batteries kept us on the jump. Dur-
ing a moment's halt, behind a slight rise of ground,
we lay down. A soldier facing to the rear was in
earnest conversation with a comrade. Suddenly
he made a terrific leap in air, and from the spot
of ground on which he had been sitting a solid
shot scooped a wheelbarrow-load of dirt. It was
a clear ease of premonition, for the man could
give no reason for having jumped.
General Smith also speaks of the veterans'
ridicule of the bounty men. The 24th Michigan
became part of our brigade shortly after Antie-
tam, and we were told they were mostly bounty
men. [See below.] We made unmerciful sport of
them, but never a joke or word of abuse did I hear
after the 24th had shoTvn its mettle in the battle
of Fredericksburg.
On the evening of December 14th, General
Doubleday wanted our regiment (the 2d Wiscon-
sin) to go on picket and make an effort to stop the
firing upon the picket-line, for the shots of the
Confederates covered the whole field, and no one
could get any rest. We had not been in the picket-
line more than twenty minutes before we made a
bargain with the " Rebs," and the firing ceased,
and neither they nor ourselves pretended to keep
under cover. But at daylight the 24th Michigan
came to relieve us. Before they were fairly in
line they opened fire upon the Confederates with-
out the warning we had agreed to give. We yelled
lustily, but the rattle of musketry drowned the
sound, and many a confiding enemy was hit. This
irritated the Confederates, who opened a savage
fire, and the 24th Michigan were put upon their
good behavior; it was with difficulty a general
engagement was prevented. All that day, until
about 4 o'clock, the picket-firing was intense ; it
was abruptly ended by a Confederate challenging
a 6th Wisconsin man to a fist-fight in the mid-
dle of the turnpike. The combatants got the
attention of both picket-lines, who declared the
fight a " draw." They ended the matter with a
coffee and tobacco trade and an agreement to do
no more firing at picket-lines, unless an advance
should be ordered. It was this agreement that
enabled Lieutenant Rogers to save a long picket-
line that was to have been sacrificed when we fell
back.
Racine, Wis., October 3d, 1886.
II. BY ORSON B. CURTIS, CORPORAL, CO. D, 24TH MICHIGAN.
SINCE Private Smith, above, mentions the 24th
Michigan as "bounty men," let me state that
in July, 1802, a war meeting held in Detroit to
promote enlistments under Lincoln's call for
300,000 men was broken up by the disturbance
created by a large number of Confederate refugees
from Windsor, Canada, with the aid of some anti-
war men here. To wipe out the unexpected insult,
a second war meeting was held, which resolved to
raise immediately an entire regiment, — the 24th
Michigan, — in Wayne County alone, in addition to
its rcfiidar quota ; and within 20 days said regiment
was recruited and mustered, 1027 strong. Not a
man of us received a cent of State or county bounty.
Each man, however, did receive, in .advance, one
month's pay and $2;" of the regular $100 govern-
ment bounty promised to all soldiers enlisting for
two years ; G73 of the men who were credited to
Detroit received sums varying from $25 to $.50
apiece as a gratuity from patriotic friends, while
the remaining 354 of us never received a cent.
Assigned to the "Iron Brigade," our regiment
shared its hardships till the spring of 18G5, when
its remnant was sent to guard conscripts at Spring-
field, 111., and formed the escort at President Lin-
coln's funeral. At Gettysburg it suffered probably
as great a loss as any regiment of its size. One of
the first infantry regiments to engage the enemy
in the first day's fight, it went into that battle with
28 officers and 468 men; total, 496. It lost that
day 24 officers and 339 men ; total, 363, of which
number 272, or about bo per cent, of the command,
were hilled and wounded ; 91 were taken prisoners,
over a third of whom died in Southern prisons ;
twice that day was its entire color-guard shot down,
and only 3 officers and 95 men were left to respond
at roll-call. General Wadsworth thus commended
its conduct on that day : "Colonel Morrow, the only
fault I find with you is that you fought the 24th
Michigan too long, hut God only Icnows what would
have become of us had you not held the ground as
long as you did."
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FREDERICKSBURG, VA.
The composition, losaea, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official
Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded ; m w for mortally wounded ; m for captured or missing ; c for captured.
THE UNION ARMY.
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC— Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside.
Escort, etc. : Oneida (N. Y.) Cav., Capt. Daniel P. Maun ;
l8t U. S. Cav. (detachment), Capt. Marcus A. Reno ; A
and E, 4th U. 8. Cav., Capt. James B. Mclntyre. Prov-
ost Guard, Brig.-Gen. MarsenaR. Patrick: AandB, Me-
Clellan (111.) Dragoons, Capts. George W. Shears and
David C. Brown; G, 9th N. Y., Capt. Charles Child ; 93d
N. Y., Col. John S. Crocker ; 2d U. S. Cav., Maj. Charles
J. Whiting ; 8th U. S., Capt. Royal T. Frank. Volunteer
Engineer Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Daniel P. Woodbury : 15th
N. Y., Maj. James A. Magruder; 50th N. Y., Msy. Ira
Spaulding. Brigade loss : k, 8 ; w, 48 = 56. Battalion
JJ. S. Engineers, Lieut. Charles E. Cross. Loss : w, 1 ;
m, 2 = 3.
ABTiLi.ERY, Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Artillery Re-
serve, Lieut.-Col. William Hays: 5th N. Y., Capt. Elijah
D. Taft ; A, 1st Batt. N. Y., Capt. Otto Diederichs ; B, 1st
Batt. N. Y., Capt. Adolph Voegelee; C, 1st Batt. N. Y.,
Lieut. Bemhard Wever ; D, 1st Batt. N. Y., Capt. Charles
Kusserow; K, Ist U. S., Capt. WilUam M. Graham; A,
2d U. S., Capt. John C. Tidball; G, 4th U. 8., Lieut. Mar-
cus P. Miller; K, 5th U. S., Lieut. David H. Kinzie; C,
32dMass. (train guard), Capt. Josiah C. Puller. Unat-
tached Artillery, Maj. Thomas S. Trumbull : B, 1st
Conn. Heavy, Capt. Albert F. Brooker; M, Ist Conn.
Heavy, Capt. Franklin A. Pratt. Artillery reserve loss :
w, 8.
RIGHT GRAND DIVISION, Major-Gen. Edwin V.
Sumner.
SECOND ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Darius N. Couch.
Staff loss: w, 1.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Winfleld S. Hancock. Staff
loss : w, 3.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell (w), Col.
George W. von Schack : 5th N. H., Col. Edward E. Cross
(w), Maj. E. E. Sturtevant (k), Capt. James E. Larkin,
Capt. Horace T. H. Pierce ; 7th N. Y., Col. George W.
von Schack, Capt. G. A. von Bransen; 61st N. Y., Col.
Nelson A. Miles ^ (w) ; 64th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Enos C.
Brooks; ^ 81st Pa., Col. II. Boyd McKeen (w), Capt. Will-
iam Wilson ; 14.5th Pa., Col. Hiram L. Brown (w), Lieut.-
Col. David B. McCreary. Brigade loss: k, 108; w, 729;
m, 115 = 952. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F.
Meagher: 28th Mass., Col. Richard Byrnes; 63d N. Y.,
Maj. Joseph O'Neill (w), Capt. Patrick J. Condon; 69th
N. Y., Col. Rol)ert Nugent (w), Capt. James Saunders ;
88th N. Y., Col. Patrick Kiilly ; 116th Pa., Col. Dennis
Heenan (w), Lieut.-Col. St. Clair A. MulhoUand (w),
Lieut. Francis T. Quinlan. Brigade loss : k, 50 ; w, 421 ;
m, 74 = 545. Third Brigade, Col. Samuel K. Zook : 27th
Conn.. Col. Richard S. Bostwick; 2(1 Del., Col. William
P. Baily (w); .52d N. Y., Col. Paul Frank; 57th N. Y.,
Lieut.-Col. Alford B. Chapman (w), M!\j. N. Garrow
Throop (w), Capt. .Tames W. Britt ; 66th N. Y., Lieut.-Col.
James H. Bull (k), Capt. Julius Wehle (k), Capt. John S.
IlammcU (w), Lieut. James G. Derriekson ; .53d Pa., Col.
John li. Brooke. Brigade loss: k, 60; w, 427; m, 40 =
527. Artillery: B, Ist N. Y., Capt. Rufus D. Pettit ; C,
4th U. 8., Lieut. Evan Thomas. Artillery loss : k, 1 ; w,
4 = 5,
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gcn. Oliver O. Howard. Staff
loss: w, 1.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Sully: 19th Me., Col.
Frederick I). Sewall, Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Heath; 15th
Mass., Maj. Clia.sc I'liilbrick (w), Capt. John Murkland,
Capt. Charles II. Watson ; 1st Co. Mass. Sharp-shooters,
Capt. William Pliimer; Ist Minn., Col. Georg(> N. Mor
gan; 2d Co. Minn. 8harp-.shootcr8, Capt. William F.
Russell; 34th N. Y., Col. James A. Suiter; 82d N. Y. (2d
Militia), Lieut.-Col. James Huston. Brigade loss : k, 14 ;
w, 77 ; m, 31 = 122. Second Brigade, Col. Joshua T. Owtn :
69th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Dennis O'Kane ; 71st Pa., Lieut.-Col.
John Markoe; 72d Pa., Col. De Witt C.Baxter; lOCth
Pa., Col. Turner G. Morehead. Brigade loss: k, 27: w,
203; m, 28 = 258. Third Brigade, CoL Norman J. Hall:
19th Mass., Capt. H. G. O. WejTuouth ; 20th Mass. Capt.
George N. Macy; 7th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Henry Baxter
(w), Maj. Thomas II. Hunt : 42d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. George
N. Bomfoid; 59th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William Northedge;
127th Pa., Col. William W. Jennings. Brigade loss : k,
63; w, 419; m, 33=515. Artillery: A, 1st R. I., Capt.
William A. Arnold ; B, 1st R. I., Capt. John G. Hazard-
Ai'tillei-y loss : w, 18.
THIRD DIVISION, Brlg.-Geu. William H. Fi-ench.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Nathan Kimball (w). Col.
John S. Ma.son : 14th Ind., Ma^j. Elyah H. C. Cavins ;
24th N. J., Col. Wm. B. Robertson ; 28th N. J., Col. Moses
N. Wisewell (w), Lieut -Col. E. A. L. Roberts; 4th Ohio,
Col. John S. Mason, Lieut.-Col. James H. Godman (,w),
Capt. Gordon .\. Stewart ; 8th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frank-
lin Sawyer ; 7th W. Va., Col. Joseiih Snider (wi, Lieut.-Col.
Jonathan H. Lockwood. Brigade loss: k, 36; w, 420;
m, 64 = 520. Second Brigade. Col. Oliver H. Palmer: 14th
Conn., Lieut.-Col. Sauford H. Perkins (w), Capt. Samuel
H. Davis; 108th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles J. Powers;
130th Pa., Col. Henry I. Zinn (k), Capt. William M. Porter.
Brigade loss : k, 20 ; w, 207 ; m, 04 = 291. Th ird Brigade,
Col. John W. Andiews, Lieut.-Col. William Jameson,
Lieut.-Col. John \V. Mar.shaU : 1st Del., Maj. Thomas A.
Smyth ; 4th N. Y., Col. John D. MacGregor (w), Lieut.-
Col. William Jameson, M;y. Charles W. Kruger; lOth N.
Y., Col. John E. Bendix (w), Capt. Salmon Winchester
(m w), Capt. George F. Hopper; 132d Pa., Lieut.-Col.
Charles Albright. Brigade loss : k, 32 ; w, 271 ; m, 39 =
342. Artillery: G, 1st N. Y., Capt. John D. Frank; G,
Ist R. I., Capt. Charles D. Owen. Artillery loss: k, 1;
w, 6 = 7.
ARTILLERY RESERVE, Capt. Chaples H. Morgan : I, Ist
U. S., Lieut. Edmund Kirby ; A, 4th U. S., Lieut. Rufua
King, Jr. Artillery Reserve loss : w, 7.
NINTH ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Will-
cox. Escort: B, 6th N. Y. Cav., Capt. Hilhuan A. Hall ;
C, 6th N. Y. Cav., Capt. William L. Heermance.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gcu. William W. Burns.
First Brif/ade, Col. Orlando M. Poe : 2d Mich., Lieut.-
Col. Louis Dillman ; 17th Mich., Col. Williani H. With-
ington; 20th Mich., Col. Adolphus W. Williams: 79th N.
Y.. Lieut.-Col. Davitl Morrison. Brigade loss: k, 1; w,
12 = 13. Second Brigade, Col. Benjamin C. Christ : J9th
Mass., Licut.-Col. Joseph II. Barnes; 8th .Mich., MiO.
Ralph Ely; 27th N. .1.. Col. George W. Mindil: 4f.th N.
Y., Lieut.-Col. Joseph (ierhardt; 50th Pa., Lieut.-Col.
Thomas S. Brenholtz. Brigade loss: w, 7: ui, 1=8.
Third Brigade, Col. Daniel L«'asure: 3f.th Mass.. Col.
Henry Bowman; 4.5th Pa., Col. Thomas Welsh; looth
Pa., Lieut -Col. D.ivid A. Ix'ckey. Brigade loss : w. X
Arlillen/: I), 1st N. Y., Capt. Thomas W. Osborn ; L
and M. 3d IT. S., Lieut. Horace J. Hayden. .Vrtillery
loss: w, 2; m, 1=3.
SECOND DIVISION. Brig.-Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis. Staff
loss: w, 1.
First Brii/adc, Brig.-Gen. James Nagle: 2»J Md., Col.
Thomas I?. Allard ; f.th N. H.. C«d. Simon G. Griffln : 9th
N. H.. I,i.ut.-Col. John \V. Babbitt ; 48th Pa., Col. Joshua
K.Siglric<l; 7tli K. 1. Col. Zenus R. Bli.ss ; 12th K. I.. Col.
) Comniaiideil Gist ami (Mlli X. Y.. ci.usdlldated.
143
144
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FREDERICKSBURG.
I
George H. Browne. Brigade loss : k, 31 ; w, 421 ; m, 48
= 500. Second Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Edward Ferrero : 2l8t
Mass., Col. William S. Clark; 35th Mass., Maj. Sidney
WiUard (k), Capt. Stephen H. Andrews; 11th N. H., Col.
Walter Harrimau ; 51st N, Y., Col. Robert B. Potter ; Slst
Pa., Col. John F. Hartranft. Brigade loss : k, 60 ; w, 393 ;
m, 38 = 491. Artillerij : L, 2d N. Y., Capt. Jacob Roeiner ;
D, Pa., Capt. George W. Durell ; D, 1st R. I., Capt. Will-
iam W. Buckley ; E, 4th U. S., Lieut. George Dickenson
(k), Lieut. John Egau. Artillery loss : k, 3 ; w, 12 = 15.
TUiKD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.
First Bngade, Col. Rush C. Hawkins : 10th N. H., Col.
Michael T. Douohoe; 13th N. H., Col. Aaron F. Stevens;
25th N. J., Col. Andrew Derrora ; 9th N. Y., Lieut.-Col.
Edgar A. Kimball; 89th N. Y., Col. Harrison S. Fair-
child ; 103d N. Y., Col. Benjamin Ringold. Brigade loss :
k, 14 ; w, 187 ; m, 54i= 255. Second Brigade, Col. Edward
Harlaud: 8th Conn., Maj. John E. Ward, Capt. Henry M.
Hoyt; 11th Conn., Col. Grifflii A. Stedman, Jr.; 15th
Conn., Lieut.-Col. Samuel Tolles ; 16th Conn., Capt.
Charles L. Upham ; 2lHt Coun., Col. Arthur H. Dutton ;
4th R. I.. Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Curtis (k), Maj. Martin
P. Buflfum. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 29; m, 10 = 41.
Artillery: E, 2d U. S., Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin; A,
5th U. S., Lieut. James Gilliss.
CAVALRY DIVISION. Brig.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton.
First Brigade,BTig.-Gen. JohnF. Farnsworth: 8th 111.,
Col. William Gamble; 3d Ind., Maj. George H. Chap-
man; 8th N. Y., Col. BenjamiD F.Davis. Second Bri-
gade, Col. David McM. Gregg, Col. Thomas C. Devin:
6th N. Y., Col. Thomas C. Devin, Lieut.-Col. Duncan
Mc Vicar ; 8th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Amos E. Griffiths ; 6th U.
8., Capt. George C. Cram. Artillery : M, 2d U. S., Lieut.
Alexander C. M. Pennington, Jr.
CENTER GRAND DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Jos. Hooker.
THIRD ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. George Stoueman.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. David B. Birney.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson : 20th Ind.,
Col. John Van Valkenburg; 63d Pa., Maj. John A.
Danks; 68th Pa., Col. Andrew H. Tippin; 105th Pa., Col.
Amor A. MoKnight; 114th Pa.. Col. Charles H. T. Col-
lis; 141st Pa., Col. Henry J. Madill. Brigade loss:
k, 14; w, 106; m, 26=146. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen.
J. H. Hobart Ward: 3d Me., Col. Moses B, Lake-
man; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker; 38th N. Y., Lieut.-
Col. William Birney (w) ; 40th N, Y., Lieut.-Col. Nelson
A. Gesner (w) ; 55th N. Y., Col. P. Regis de Trobriand ; 57th
Pa., CoL Charles T. Cami)b(!ll (w), Lieut.-Col. Peter
Sides; 99th Pa.. Col. Asher S. Leidy (w), Lieut.-Col.
Edwin R. Biles. Brigade loss : k, 79 ; w, 397 ; m, 153 = 629.
Third Bngade, Brig.-Gen. Hiram G. Berry: 17th Me.,
Col. Thomas A. Roberts; 3d Mich., Maj. Moses B.
Houghton; 5th Mieh., Lieut.-Col. John Gilluly (k), Maj.
Edward T. Sherlock; 1st N. Y., Col. J. Frederick Pier-
son ; 37th N. Y., Col. Samuel B. Haymau ; lOlst N. Y..
Col. George F. Chester. Brigade loss : k, 19 ; w, 144 ; m,
2 = 165. Artillery, Capt. George E. Randolph : E, 1st R.
L, Lieut. Pardon S. Jastram ; F and K, 3d U. S., Lieut.
John G. Turnbull. Artillery loss : k, 2 ; w, 8= 10.
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gon. Daniel E. Sickles.
First Brigade, Brif^.-Ocn. Jo.scpli B. Carr: 1st Mass.,
Lieut.-Col. ClarkB. Kalilwin, Col. Napoleon B. McLaugh-
len; 11th Mass., Col. Williani I'.laisdcll; 16th Mass., Col
Thomas R. Tannatt; id N. H., Col. Gilman Marston ;
11th N. J., Col. Robert McAlli.ster; 26th Pa.. Lieut.-Col.
Benjamin C. Tilghman. Brigade loss : k, 11 ; w, 68 ; m, 2
= 81. Second Brigade, Col. George B. Hall: 70th N. Y.,
Col. J. Egbert Faniuiii ; 71st N. Y., Maj. Thomas Rafl'erty ;
72d N. Y., Col. William O. Stevens; 73d N. Y., Col. Will-
iam R. Brewster; 74th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William H.
I^uusbury ; 120th N. Y., Col. George H. Sharpe. Brigade
loss: w, 16. Third Brit/ade. Brig.-Gen. Joseph W. Re-
vere: 5th N. J., Col. William J. Sewell ; 6th N. J., Col.
George C. Burling; 7th N. .L, Col. Louis R. Froneiue ;
8th N. J., (;ol. Adolphus J. Johnson ; 2d N. Y., Col. Sid-
ney W. Park; 115th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William A. Olmsted.
Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 1 = 2. Artillery, Capt. James E.
Smith : 2d N. J., Capt. A. Judson Clark ; 4th N. Y.. Lieut.
Joseph E. Nairn; H, 1st U. S., Lieut. Justin E. Dimick;
K, 4th U. 8., Lieut. Francis W. Seeloy. Artillery loss : m, 1.
THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Amiel W. Whipple. Staff
loss: m, 1.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. Sanders Piatt, Col. Emlen
Franklin : 86th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Barna J. Chapin ; 124th
N. Y., Col. A. Van Home Ellis; 122d Pa., Col. Emlen
Franklin. Brigade loss : w, 3 ; m, 6 = 9. Second Brigade,
Col. Samuel 8. Carroll : 12th N. H., Col. Joseph H. Pot-
ter; 163d N. Y., Maj. James J. Byrne; 84th Pa., Col.
Samuel M. Bowman ; lioth Pa., Lieut.-Col. James
Crowther. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 88; m, 11 = 118. Artil-
lery : 10th N. Y., Capt. John T. Bruen ; 11th N. Y., Capt.
Albert A. von Puttkauimer; H, Ist Ohio, Lieut. George
W. Norton. Artillery loss : w, 1.
FIFTH ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Butterfleld.
Staff loss: k, 1 ; w,l=2.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.
First Brigade, Col. James Barnes : 2d Me., Lieut.-Col.
George Varney (w), Maj. Daniel F. Sargent ; 2d Co. Mass.
Sharp-shooters, Capt. Lewis E. Wentworth ; 18th Mass.,
Lieut.-Col. Joseph Hayes; 22d Mass., Lieut.-Col. William
8. Tilton ; Ist Mich., Lieut.-Col. Ira C. Abbott (w) ; 13th
N. Y., Col. Elisha G. Marshall (w), Lieut.-Col. Francis A.
Schoeffel; 25th N. Y., Capt. Patrick Connelly ; 118th Pa.,
Lieut.-Col. James Gwyn. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 381;
m, 89=500. Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer:
9th Mass., Col. Patrick R. Guiney ; 32dMas8., Col. Fran-
cis J. Parker ; 4th Mich., Lieut.-Col. George W. Lumbard ;
14th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Davies ; 62d Pa., Lieut.-
Col. James C. Hull. Brigade loss, k, 23 ; w, 193; m, 6 =
222. Third Brigade, Col. T. B. W. Stockton : 20th Me.,
Col. Adalbert Ames ; Brady's Co. Mich. Shai-p-shoot-
ers, Lieut. Jonas H. Titus, Jr. ; 16th Mich., Lieut.-Col.
Norval E. Welch; 12th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Robert M.
Richardson; 17th N. Y., Capt. John Vickers; 44th N.
Y., Lieut.-Col. Freeman Conner (w), Maj. Edward B.
Knox; 83d Pa., Col. Strong Vincent. Brigade loss:
k, 18 ; w, 158 ; m, 25 = 201. Artillery : 3d Mass., Capt.
Augustus P. Martin; 5th Mass., Capt. Charles A.
Phillips ; C, 1 st R. I. , Capt. Richard Waterman ; D,
.5th U. S., Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett. Artillery loss:
k, 2; w, 1 = 3. Sharji-shooters : 1st U. 8., Lieut.-Col.
Casper Trepp.
SECOND DIVISION, Brlg.-Geu. George Sykes.
First Brigade, Lieut.-Col. Robert C. Buchanan : 3d U.
S., Capt. John D. Wilkins ; 4th U. S., Capt. Htram Dryer;
l.st Battalion, 12th U. S., Capt. Matthew M. Blunt; 2d
BattaUon, 12th U. 8., Capt. Thomas M. Anderson ; 1st
Battalion, 14th U. S., Capt. John D. O'Connell ; 2d Bat-
talion, 14th U. S., Capt. Giles B. Overton. Brigade loss:
k, 5 ; w, 42 ; m, 4 = 51. Second Brigade, Maj. George L.
Andrews, Maj. Charles S. Lovell : 1st and 2d U. 8. (battal-
ion), Capt. Salem S. Marsh; 6th U. S., Capt. Levi C.
Bootes; 7th U. 8. (battalion), Capt. David P. Hancock;
10th U. S., Capt. Henry E. Mayuadier ; 11th U. S., Capt,
Charles S. RusseU ; 17th and 19th U. 8. (battalion), Capt.
John r. Wales. Brigade loss : k, 12; w, 114 ; m, H = 140.
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. GouverneurK. Warren : 5th N.
Y., Col. Cleveland Winslow; 140th N. Y., Col. Patrick H,
O'Rorke; 146th N. Y'., Col. Kenner Garrard. Brigade
loss : w, 6 ; m, 30 =36. Artillery : L, 1st Oliio, Lieut. Fred-
erick Dorries ; I, 5th U. 8., Lieut. Malbone F. Watson.
Artillery loss : w, 1.
THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys.
Staff loss : w, 3.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Erastus B. Tyler : 91et Pa.,
Col. Edgar M. Gregory (w) ; I26th Pa., CoL James G. El-
der (w), Lieut.-CoL David W. Rowe; 129th Pa., Col.
Jacob G. Frick; 134th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Edward O'Brien.
Brigade loss : k, 52 ; w, 321 ; m, 81 =454. Second Brigade,
Col. Peter H. AUabach : 123d Pa., CoL John B. Clark;
131st Pa., Lieut.-Col. William B. Shaut : 133d Pa., CoL
Franklin B. Speakman ; 1.55th Pa., Col. Edw.ard J. AUeu.
Brigade loss: k. 63; w, 448; n],.51=562. Artillery: C,
1st N. Y.. I>ieut. William H. Phillips; E and G, Ist U. 8.,
Capt. Alanson M. Randol.
CAVALRY BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. W^illiara W. Averell :
Ist Mass., Col. Horace B. Sargent; 3d Pa., Lieut.-CoL
Edward 8. Jones ; 4th Pa., Col. James K. Kerr ; 5th U. 8.,
Capt. James E. Harrison. Brigade loss: k, 1. Artillery:
B and L, 2d U. 8., Capt. James M. Robertson.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FREDERICKSBURG.
14=
LEFT GRAND DIVISION, Maj.-Gou. William B.
Fraiikliu.
Escort: Gtli Pa. Cav., Col. Richard H. Rush.
FIRST ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gea. John F. Reynolds.
EscoH : L, l8t Me. Cav., Capt, Constantino Taylor.
Escort loss : w, 3.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Abner Doubleday.
First Brigade, Col. Walter Phelps, Jr.: 22d N. Y.,
Lieut.-Col. John McKie, Jr.; 24th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Sam-
uel R. Beardsley; 30th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Morgan H.
Chrysler; 84th N. Y. (14th Militia), Lieut.-Col. William
H. de Bevoise; 2d U. S. Sharp-shooters, Maj. Homer R.
Stoughton. Brigade loss: k, 3 ; w, 24; m, 3=30. Sec-
ond Brigade, Col. James Gavin: 7th Ind., Lieut.-Col.
John F. Cheek; 76th N. Y., Col. William P. Wainwright;
95th N. Y., Col. George H. Biddle ; 56th Pa., Lieut.-Col.
J. William Hofmanu. Brigade loss: k, 5 ; w, 21=26.
Third Brigade, Col. WilUam F. Rogers : 21st N. Y., Capt.
George N. Layton ; 23d N. Y., Col. Henry C. Hoffman ;
35th N. Y., Col. Newton B. Lord ; 80th N. Y'. (20th Militia),
Lieut.-Col. Jacob B. Hardenbergh. Brigade loss : k, 10 ;
w, 54; m, 3 = 67. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Solomon
Meredith, Col. Lysauder Cutler: 19th Ind., Lieut.-Col.
Samuel J. Williams; 24th Mich., Col. Henry A. Mor-
row ; 2d Wis., Col. Lucius Fairchild ; 6th Wis., Col. Ly-
sander Cutler, Lieut.-Col. Edward S. Bragg; 7th Wis.,
Col. William W. Robinson. Brigade loss : k, 9 ; w, 40 ;
m, 16 =65. Artillenj, Capt. George A. Gerrish (w), Capt.
John A. Reynolds : 1st N. H., Lieut. Frederick M. Edgell ;
L, Ist N. Y., Capt. John A. Reynolds; B, 4th U. S..
Lieut. James Stewart. Artillery loss : k, 4 ; w, 22 =26.
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gcu. John Gibbon (w), Brig.-
Gen. Nelson Taylor. Staff loss : w, 1.
First Brigade, Col. Adrian R. Root : 16th Me., Lieut.-
Col. Charles W. Tilden ; 94th N. Y., Maj. John A. Kress ;
104th N. Y., Maj. Gilbert G. Prey; lOoth N. Y., Maj.
Daniel A. Sharp (w), Capt. Abraham Moore; 107th Pa.,
Col. Thomas F. McCoy. Brigade loss : k, 47 ; w, 373 ; m,
55 = 475. Second Brigade, Col. Peter Lyle : 12th Mass.,
Col. James L. Bates; 26th N. Y., Lieut.-Col, Gilbert S.
Jennings, Maj. Ezra F. Wetmore ; 90th Pa., Lieut.-Col.
William A. Leech ; 136th Pa., Col. Thomas M. Bayne.
Brigade loss : k, 51 ; w, 377 ; m, 32 = 460. Third Brigade,
Brig.-Gen. Nelson Taylor, Col. Samuel H. Leonard; 13th
Mass., Col. Samuel H. Leonard, Lieut.-Col. N. Walter
Batchelder; 83d N. Y'. (9th Militia*, Capt. John Hen-
drickson (w), Capt. Joseph A. Moesch (w), Lieut. Isaac E.
Hoagland; 97th N. Y., Col. Charles Wheelock; 11th Pa.,
Col. Richard Coulter (w), Capt. Christian Kuhn; 88th
Pa., Maj. David A. Griffith. Brigade loss : k, 41 ; w,
258; m, 15=314. Artillery, Capt. George F. Leppion :
2d Me., Capt. James A. Hall; 5tU Me., Capt. George
F. Leppien; C, Pa., Capt. James Thompson; F, 1st
Pa., Lieut. R. Bruce Ricketts. Artillery loss: k, 2; w,
15 = 17.
THiuD DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. George G. Meade.
First Brigade, Col. William Sinclair (wi. Col. William
McCandle-ss: Ist Pa. Rc.-icrvcs, Cai«t. William C. Talley;
2d Pa. Reserves, Col. William .M.-Candh'.-^s, Capt. Timo-
thy Mealey; 6th Pa. RoMcrvrw, Maj Wellington H. Ent;
13th Pa. Reserves (tst Uilhs), Caiit. Cliarlcs F.Taylor;
121.stPa., Col. Cliaimiaii P.id.lle. Rrigud.' lo.ss: k. 47 ; w,
386; m, 77 = 510. Seroiid lirigadr. Col. Albert L. Magil-
tou: 3d Pa. Reserves, Col. Horatio (}. Sickel; 4th Pa.
R(^serves, Lieut. -( 'id. Richard II. Woolworth; 7th Pa.
Reserves, Col. Henry C. Bolinger; 8th Pa. Reserves,
Mil,). Silas M. Baily; 142d Pa., Col. Robert P. Cummins.
Brigade loss: k, 65; w, 420; ju, 141 =0:12. Third lirigadr,
Brig.-Gen. C. Foger Jackson (k). Col. Josei)li W. Fisher,
Lieut. -Col. Robert Anderson: 5th Pa. Reserves, Col.
Josei)li W. Fisher, Lieut.-Col. George Dare; 9th Pa. Re-
servis, Lieut.-Col. Robert Anderson, Maj. James MeK.
Hnodgrass; loth Pa. Reserves, M.ij. James B. Knox;
11th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. Sanniel M. Jackson ; 12tli
Pa. Reserves, Capt. Richard Gustiu. Brigade loss: k.
66; w, 410; in, 215 = 681. Artillery: A, l.st Pa., Lieut.
John G. Simpson; B, 1st Pa., Capt. James H. Cooper ;
G, Ist Pa., Capt. Frank P. Amsdon ; C, 5tli IT. S.,
Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom. Artillery loss : k, 7; w, 19;
m, 4 = 30.
SIXTH ARMY' CORPS, Maj.-Gen. WiUiam F. Smith.
Escort: L, 10th N. Y. Cav., Lieut. George Vanderbilt;
I, 6th Pa. Cav., Capt. James Starr; K, 6th Pa. Cav.,
Capt. Fi'ederick C. Newhall.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William T. H. Brooke.
First Brigade, Col. Alfred T. A.Torbert: 1st N. J., Lieut.-
Col. Mark W. Collet; 2d N. J., Col. Samuel L. Buck ; 3d
N. J., Col. Henry W. Brown ; 4th N. J., Col. William B.
Hatch (w), Lieut.-Col. James N. Duffy; 15th N. J., Lieut.-
Col. Edward L. Campbell; 23d N. J., Col. Henry O.
Ryerson. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 94; m, 50 = 162. Sec-
ond Brigade, Col, Henry L. Cake : 5th Me., Col. Edward
A. Scammon; 16th N. Y.,Col. Joel J. Seaver; 27th N.Y'.,
Col. Alexander D. Adams; 121st N. Y., Col. Emory
Upton; 96th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Peter A. Filbert. Brigade
loss: k, 4; w, 13 = 17. Third Brigade, Britr.-Gen. David
A. Russell: 18th N. Y., Col. George R. Myers; 31st N.
Y., Lieut.-Col. Leopold C. Newman; 32d N. Y.. Capt.
Charles Hubbs; 95th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Elisha Hall. Bri-
gade loss: w, 10. Artillery: A, Md., Capt. John W.
Wolcott; Ist Mass., Capt. William H. McCartney; Ist
N. J., Capt. WiUiam Hexamer; D, 2d U. S., Lieut. Ed-
ward B. Williston. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 6=8.
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gcn. Calvin E. Pratt: 6th Me.,
Col. Hiram Burnham; 43d N. Y^, Col. Beiyamin F.
Baker; 49th Pa., Col. William H. Irwin; 119th Pa., Col.
Peter C. Ellmaker; 5th Wis., Col. Amasa Cobb. Brigade
loss: w, 23; m, 3 = 26. Second Brigade, Col. Henry
Whiting: 26th N. J., Col. Andrew J. Morrison; 2d
Vt., Lieut.-CoL Charles H. Joyce; 3d Vt., Col. Breed
N. Hyde; 4th Vt., Col. Charles B. Stoughton; 5th Vt.,
Col. Lewis A. Grant; 6th Vt., Col. Nathan Lord, Jr.
Brigade loss: k, 21 ; w, 121 ; m, 2 =144. Third Brigade,
Brig.-Gen. Francis L. Vinton (w). Col. Robert F. Taylor.
Brig.-Gen. Thomas II. Neill : 21st N. J., Col. Gilliam
VanHouten; 20th N.Y'., Col. Ernst von Vegesack; 33d
N. Y'., Col. Robert F. Taylor; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D.
Bidwell; 77th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Winsor B. French.
Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 14=15. Artillery: B, Md., Capt,
Alonzo Snow; 1st N. Y'., Capt. Andrew Cowan ; 3d N. Y.,
Lieut. William A. Harn ; F, 5th U. 8., Lieut. Leouai-d
Martin. Artillery loss ; w, 1.
THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Geu. John Newton.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gcn. John Cochrane: 65th N. Y.,
Col. Alexander Shaler; 67th N. Y., Col. Nelson Cross;
122d N. Y.,Col. Silas Titus; 23d Pa., M;y. John F. Glenn;
61st Pa., Col. George C. Spear; 82d Pa., Col. David H.
Williams. Brigade loss: k, 2 ; w, 19 ; m, 3 = 24. Second
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charh's Devens, Jr. : 7th Mass.,
Lieut.-Col. Franklin P. Harlow; 10th Mass., Col. Henry
L, Eustis; 37th Mass., Colonel Oliver Edwards; 36th N.
Y., Col. William H. Browne; 2d R. I.. Col. Frank
Wheaton, Lieut.-Col. Nelson Viall. Brigade loss : k, 3 ;
w, 14 =17. Third Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Rowley, Brig.-
Gen. Frank Wheaton: 62d N. Y'., M:y. Wilson Hubbell ;
93d Pa., Maj. John M. Mark ; 98th Pa.. Lieut.-Col. Adolph
Mehler; 102d Pa.. Lieut.-Col. Joseph M. Kinkead ; 139tb
Pa., Lieut.-Col. James D. Owens. Brigade lo.<s : w. 6;
m, 6 =12. Artillery : C. 1st Pa.. Capt. Jeremiah McCar-
thy; D. 1st Pa., Capt. Michael Hall; G. 2d U. S.. Lieut.
John H. Butler. Artillery loss : k, 2 ; w, 8 = 10.
CAVALRY BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. George I). Bayanl
(k). Col. David McM. Gregg: Indep't Co.. I). C.. Lieut.
Williams H. Orton ; 1st Me.. Lieut.-Ctd. Calvin S. Douty ;
Ist N. J.. Lieut.-Col. Joseph Kargo ; 2d N. Y.. Mii,i. Henry
E. Davies; 10th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William Irvine; 1st
Pa., Col. Owen Jcmes. Brigade loss : k. 1; w, 3=4. Ar-
tillery: C, :}d IT. S.. Capt. Horatio G. Gibson.
Total Union lo.ss : killed. 1284; wounded. 9«M)0: capt-
ured or missimi. 17C.9 = 12.653.
Refiarding the strength of his army on the morning of
December i:tth. General Burnsid.' says ("Ollieial Ree-
ords,'" Vol. XXL, p. 90) : "The forces now under com-
mand of (loneral Franklin consisted of ab..ut CO.OOOnien.
assln)wn by the mornim: reports, ami was composed a«
follows: sixth Corps. 21.0(H): First (^>rps. 18..'i00: Thini
Corps (two divisions). lO.(HX): Ninth Corps (Burns's divls-
i(mi. 4000 ; Bayard's cavalry. 3500. General Sumner had
about 27.000 men, comprising his own grand division,
146
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FREDERICKSBURG.
except Biirns's division of the NintU Corps. General According to Burnside's return for December lOth
Hooker's command was about 26,000 strong, two of ("Oflticial Records," Vol. XXI., p. 1121), tlie "present for
General Stoneman's divisions having reported to Gen- duty equippod," or available for luie of battle, was
eral Franklin." These numbers aggregate 113,000. 104,903 infantry, 5884 cavalry, and 5896 artiUery =116,683.
THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.— General Robert E. Lee.
FIRST ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Gen. James Longstreet.
McLAWs's DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. Lafayette McLaws. Staff
loss: k, 1; w, 1 = 2.
Eershato's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw :
2dS. C, Col. John D. Kennedy; 3d S. C, Col. James D.
Nance (w), Lieut.-Col. William D. Rutherford (w), Maj.
Robert C. Maffett (w;, Capt. William W. Hance (w), Capt.
John C. Summer (k), Capt. John K. G. Nance; 7th S. C,
Lieut.-Col. Elbert Bland; 8th 8. C, Capt. E. T. Stack-
house; 15th S. C, Col. W. D. De Saussure; 3d S. C. Bat-
talion, Lieut.-Col. W. G. Rice. Brigade loss : k, 38 ; w,
341—379. Barksdale's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William
Barksdale: 13th Miss., Col. J. W. Carter; 17th Miss.,
Lieut.-Col. John C Fiser ; 18th Miss., Lieut.-Col. WlUiam
H. Luse; 2l8t Miss., Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys.
Brigade loss : k, 29 ; w, 151 ; m, 62 = 242. Cobb's Brigade,
Brig.-Gen. Thomas R. R. Cobb (m w), Col. Robert Mc-
Millan: 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan; 18th Ga., Lieut.-
Col. 8. Z. Ruff; 24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan ; Cobb
(Ga.) Legion, ; "^ PhilUps (Ga.) Legion, CoL B. F.
Cook. Brigade loss : k, 33 ; w, 198 ; m, 4 = 235. Semtnes's
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Paul J. Semmes : 10th Ga., ;
60th Ga., ; 51st Ga., ; 53d Ga., . Brigade
loss: w, 4. ArtiUery, Col. Henry C. Cabell: N. C. Bat-
tery, Capt. Basil C. Manly ; Ga. Battery, Capt. J. P. W.
Read; 1st Richmond (Va.) Howitzers, Capt. E. S. Mc-
Carthy; Ga. Battery (Troup Art'y), Capt. Henry H.
Carlton. Artillery loss : w, 2. (Colonel CabeU also com-
manded Nelson's battalion, and Branch's, Cooper's
Dearing's, Ells's, Eubank's, Lane's, Macon's, and Ross's
batteries.)
ANDERSON'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. Richard H. Anderson.
Wilcox's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox: 8th
Ala.. ; 9th Ala., ; lOth Ala., ; 11th Ala..
; 14th Ala., . Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 15=18.
Mahone's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone: 6th Va.,
; 12th Va., ; 16th Va., ; 41st Va., ;
61st Va., . Brigade loss :k, 2 ; w, 6 = 8. Feathcrston's
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. S. Featherston : 12th Miss., ;
16th Miss.. ; 19th Miss.. ; 48th Miss. (5 co's),
. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 38 = 43. Wright's Brigade,
Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright : 3d Ga., Col. Edward J. Walker;
22d Ga., ; 48th Ga., Capt. M. R. Hall ; 2d Ga. Bat-
talion, Capt. C. J. Moffott. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 1=3.
Perry's Brigade, Brig.-(}en. E. A. Perry : 2d Fla., ;
5th Fla., ; 8th Fla.. Capt. David Lang (w), Capt.
Thomas R. Love. Brii,^i(lo. Iohh: k, 7; w, 38; m, 44 = 89.
Artillery: La. Battery (Doiiiild.sonville Art'y), Capt. Vic-
tor Maurin ; Va. Battery, (aiit. Frank Hugor; Va. Bat-
tery, Capt. John W. Lewis ; Va. Battery (Norfolk Light
Art'y Blues), Lieut. William T. Peet. Artillery loss : k,
1; w, 8 = 9.
PICKETT'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. George E. Pickett.
OarnetVs Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Ri(!hard B. Garnett:
8th Va., ; 18th Va., ; 19th Va., ; 28th Va.,
; 56th Va. , . Armistcad's Brigade, Brig.-Gen.
Lewis A. Arraistead: 9th Va., ; l4thVa., ; 38th
Va., ; 53d Va., ; 57th Va., . Kemper's Bri-
gade, Brig.-Gen. James L. Kemper : 1st Va., ; 3d
Va., ; 7th Va., ; lith Va., ; 24th Va.,
. Jenkins's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Micah Jenkins:
l8t S. C. (Ilagood's); 2d 8. C. Rifles, ; 5th 8. C,
; 6th 8. C, ; Hampton (S. C.) Legion,
; Palmetto (S. C.) Sharp-shooters, . Corse's
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Montgomery D. Corse: 15th Va.,
; 17th Va., ; 30th Va., ; 32d Va., .
Artillery (composition incomplete) : Va. Battery, Capt.
James Dearing ; Va. Battery (Fauquier Art'y), Capt. R.
M. Stribling; Va. Battery (Richmond Fayette Art'y),
Capt. Miles C. Macon. Division loss : k, 3 ; w, 50 ; m, 1 = 54.
HOOD'S DIVISION, Maj. -Gen. John B. Hood.
Law's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. Mclver Law: 4th Ala.,
; 44th Ala., ; 6th N. C, ; 54th N. C, Col.
J. C. 8. McDowell ; 57th N. C, Col. A. C. Godwin. Brigade
loss : k, 50 ; w, 164 ; m, 5 = 219. Robertson's Brigade, Brig.-
Gen. J. B. Robertson : 3d Ark., ; 1st Tex., ; 4th
Tex., ; 5th Tex., . Brigade loss: k,l; w, 4=5.
Anderson's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George T. Ander.son: 1st
Ga. (Regulars), ; 7th Ga., ; 8th Ga., ; 9th
Ga., ; 11th Ga., . Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 8; m,
4 = 14. Toombs's Brigade, Col. H. L. Benning : 2d Ga.,
; 15th Ga., ; 17th Ga., ; 20th Ga., .
Brigade loss : k, 1 ; w, 12 ; m, 2 = 15. Artillery : S. C.
Battery (German Art'y), Capt. W. K. Bachman ; 8. C.
Battery (Palmetto Light Art'y), Capt. Hugh R. Garden;
N. C. Battery (Rowan Art'y), Capt. James Reilly.
RANSOM'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr.
Ransom's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr.:
24th N. C, ; 25th N. C, Lieut.-Col. Samuel C. Bry-
son; 35th N. C, ; 49th N. C, ; Va. Battery,
Capt. J. R. Branch. Brigade loss : k, 27 ; w, 127 = 154.
Cooke's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John R. Cooke (w). Col. E.
D. Hall: 15th N. C, ; 27th N. C, Col. John A.
Gilmer, Jr.; 46th N. C, Col. E. D. Hall; 48th N. C,
Lieut.-Col. Samuel H. Walkup; Va. Battery (Cooper's).
Brigade loss : k, 52 ; w, 328 = 380.
CORPS ARTILLERY (not assigned to divisions).
WasJdngton (La.) Artillery, Col. J. B. Walton : 1st Co.,
Capt. C. W. Squires ; 2d Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson ; 3d
Co., Capt. M. B. Miller; 4th Co., Capt. B. F. Eshleman.
Battalion loss: k, 3; w, 24 = 27. Alexander's Battalion,
Lieut.-Col. E. Porter Alexander : Va. Battery (Bedford
Art'y), Capt. Tyler C. Jordan ; Va. Battery, Capt. J. L.
Eubank; La. Battery (Madison Light Art'y), Capt.
George V. Moody ; Va. Battery, Capt. William W. Par-
ker; 8. C. Battery, Capt. A. B. Rhett; Va. Battery,
Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr. Battalion loss : k, 1 : w, 10 = 11.
SECOND ARMY CORPS, Lieut.-Geiieral Thomas J.
Jackson.
HILL'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. Daniel H. Hill.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes : 3d Ala., ;
5th Ala., ; 6th Ala., ; 12th Ala., ; 26th
Ala., . Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 14 = 16. Second
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George Doles : 4th Ga., ; 44th
Ga., Col. John B. Estes ; 1st N. C, ; 3d N. C,
Brigade loss : k, 2 ; w, 25 = 27. Third Brigade, Brig..
Gen. A. H. Colquitt: 13th Ala., ; 6th Ga., ^ ;
23d Ga., ; 27th Ga., ; 28th Ga., . Bri-
gade loss: w, 15. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alfred
Iversou: 5th N. C, ; 12th N. C, ; 20th N. C,
; 23d N. C, . Brigade loss: k, 1 ; w, 12=13.
Fifth Brigade, Col. Bryan (Crimes: 2d N. C, ; 4th
N. C, ; 14th N. C, ; 30th N. C, . Bri-
gade loss : k, 8 ; w, 51 = 59. Artillery, M.njor H. P. Jones :
Ala. Battery, Capt. R. A. Hardaway ; Ala. Battery (Jeff
Davis Art'y), Capt. J. W. Bondurant; Va. Battery.
(King William Art'y), Capt. Thomas H. Carter; Va.
Battery (Morris Art'y), Capt. R. C. M. Page ; Va. Battery
(Orange Art'y), Capt. C. W. Fry. Artillery loss: k, 4;
W, 8 = 12.
LIGHT DIVISION, Maj.-Gcn. Ambrose P. Hill.
First Brigade, Col. J. M. Brock enbrough : 40th Va.,
; 47th Va., Col. Robert M. Mayo ; 55th Va.. ;
22d Va. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. E. P. Tayloe. Brigade
3>The dash Indicates that the name of the commanding officer has not been found in the " Official Records."— Editors.
THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FREDERICKSBURG.
147
loss: k, 10; w, 73 = 83. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen.
Maxcy Gregg (m w). Col. D. H. Hamiltoa : let 8.
C. (Prov. Army), Col. D. H. Hamilton; 1st S. C. Rifles,
; 12tli 8. C, ; 13th S. C, ; Uth S. C,
Col. Samuel McGowan. Brigade loss : k and w, 303.
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Edward L. Tliomas : 14tli
Ga., ; 35th Ga., ; 45th Ga., ; 49th Ga.,
. Brigade loss : k, 42 ; w, 288 = 330. Fourth Bri-
gade, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lano: 7th N. C, Lieut-Col. J.
L. Hill ; 18th N. C, Col. Thomas J. Purdie (w) ; 28th N.
C, Col. 8. D. Lowe ; 33d N. C, Col. Clark M. Avery ; 37th
N. C, Col. W. M. Barbour (w). Brigade loss: k, 62 ; w,
257; m, 216 = 535. Fifth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James J.
Archer: 5th Ala., Battalion, Miyor A. S. Van de Graaff
(w), Capt. 8. D. Stewart ; 19th Ga., Lieut.-Col. Andrew
J. Hut chins; 1st Teun. (Prov. Army), Col. Peter Turney
(w), Lieut.-Col. N. J. George (w), Capt. M. Turney (w),
Capt. H. J. Hawkins; 7th Tenn., Col. John F. Goodner ;
14th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. James W. Lockert. Brigade loss :
k, 40; w, 211; m, 166 = 417. Sixth Brigade, Brig.-Gen.
WilUani D. Pender (w), Col. AKred M. Scales: 13th N.
C, Col. Alfred M. Scales; 16th N. C, Col. John S. McEl-
roy; 22d N. C, Maj. Christopher C. Cole; 34th N. C,
; 38th N. C, . Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 153 =
169. Artillery, Lieut.-Col. R. L. Walker : N. C. Battery
(Branch Art'y — section), Lieut. J. R. Potts; Va. Battery
(Crenshaw's — section), Lieut. James EUett (k» ; Va. Bat-
tery (Fredericksburg Art'y), Lieut. E. A. Marye; Va.
Battery (Johnson's — section), Lieut. V. J. Clutter (w) ;
Va. Batterj- (Letcher Art'y), Capt. G. Davidson ; 8. C. Bat-
tery (Pee Dee Art'y), Capt. D. G. Mcintosh; Va. Battery
(Purcell Art'y), Capt. W. J. Pegram Artillery loss : k, 11 ;
w, 88 = 99. Division loss : k, 231 ; w, 1474 ; m, 417 = 2122.
EWELL'8 DIVISION, Brig.-Geu. Jubal A. Early.
Lawton's Brigade, Col. E. N. Atkinson (w and c). Col.
Clement A. Evans : 13th Ga., Col. J. M. Smith ; 26th Ga.,
Capt. B. F. Grace ; 3l8tGa., Col. Clement A.Evans; 38th
Ga., Capt. WilUam L. McLeod; 60th Ga., Col. W. H.
Stiles; 61st Ga., Col. J. H. Lamar (w), Maj. C. W. McAr-
thur. Brigade loss : k, 86 ; w, 633 = 719. Trimble's Bri-
gade, Col. Robert P. Hoke: 15th Ala., ; 12th Ga.,
; 21st Ga., Lieut.-Col. Thomas W. Hooper; 21st N.
C, ; 1st N. C. Battalion . Brigade loss : k, 8 ;
w, 98 = 106. Early's Brigade, Col. James A. Walker : 13th
Va., Lieut.-Col. James B. Terrill ; 25th Va., ; 3l8t Va.
; 44th Va., ; 49th Va., ; 52d Va., ;
58th Va., . Brigade loss : k, 17 ; w, 140= 157. Hays's
Brigade, Brig -Gen. Harry T. Hays: 5th La., ;6th
La., ; 7th La., ; 8th La., ; 9th La., .
Brigade loss : k, 9 ; w, 44 ; m, 1 = 54. Artillery, Capt. J. W.
Latimer: Va. Battery (Charlottesville Art'y), Capt. J.
McD. Carrington; Md. Battery (Chesapeake Art'y),
Lieut. John E. Plater; 1st Md. Battery, Capt. William F.
Dement ; Va. Battery (Courtney Art'y), Lieut. W. A.
Tanner; La. Battery (Guard Art'y), Capt. Louis D'Aquin
(k); Va. Battery (Staunton Art'y), Lieut. Asher W. Gar-
ber. Artillery loss : k, 4 ; w, 21 = 25.
JACKSON'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William B. Taliaferro.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. F. Paxton : 2d Va., Capt.
J. Q. A. Nad.iilwns.h; 4th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. D. Gard-
ner (w), Maj. William Terry; 5th Va., Lieut.-Col. H.
J. Williams; 27tli Va., Lieut.-Col. .lames K.Edmoudson ;
33d Va.. Col. Edwin (J. L(>e. Brigade loss : k. 3 ; w, 44 ;
in, 1 = 48. Seamd Brigade, Br\g.-Gon. Jolin R. Jones;
2l8t Va., ; 42d Va., ;'48th Va., ; 1st Va.
Battalion, . Brigade loss : k, 3 ; w, 34 = 37. Third
Brigade, Col. E. T. H. Warren : 47th Ala., Capt. James
M. Campbell; 48th Ala., Capt. C. B. St. John ; 10th Va.,
Capt. W. B.Yancey; 23d Va., Capt. A. J. Richardson;
37th Va., Col. T. V. Williams. Brigade loss : w, 9. Fourth
Brigade, Col. Edmund Pendleton: 1st La., Lieut.-Col.
M. Nolan; 2d La., Maj. M. A. Grogan ; lOth La., Maj.
John M. Legett; 14th La., Capt. H. M. Verlander; 15th
La., Lieut.-Col. McG. Goodwyn. Brigade loss: k, 2; w,
35=37. Artillery, Capt. J. B. Brockenbrough : Va. Bat-
tery (Carpenter's), Lieut. George McKendree; Va. Bat-
tery (Danville Art'y), Capt. George W. Wooding (w) ; Va.
Battery (Hani])den Art'y), Capt. William H. Cii.skie ; Va.
Battery (Lee Art'y), Lieut. C. W. Statham ; Va. Battery
(Lusk's). Artillery los.s : k, 2; w, 48; in, 1 = 51.
RESERVE ARTILLERY,^ Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton.
Broun' s Battalion, Col. J. Thompson Brown: Va. Bat-
tery, Capt. James V. Brooke ; Va. Battery (Powhatan
Art'y), Capt. Willis J. Dance; Va. Battery iSalem Art'y,
Hupp's), ; Va. Battery (Rockl)ridge Arfy). Capt.
William T. Poague; Va. Battery (3(1 Howitzers), Lieut.
James Utz (k) ; Va. Battery, Capt. David Wat.son. Bat-
talion loss: k, 10; w, 26 = 36. Sumter ( Ga.) Battalion,
Lieut.-Col. Allen S. Cutts : Co. A, Capt. H. M. Ross ; Co. B.
Capt. George M. Patterson ; Co. C, Capt. John Lane, y el-
son's Battalion, Miij. William Nelson: Va. Battery (Am-
herst Art'y), Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatriek ; Va. Battery
(Fluvanna Art'y», Capt. John L. Massie; Ga. Battery,
Capt. John Milledge, Jr. Miscellaneous Batteries (assign-
ments not indicated) : Ga. Battery (Ella's), Lieut. W. F.
Anderson; Va. Battery (Hanover Art'y), Capt. George
W. Nelson.
CAVALRY, M:ij.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart.
First Brigade (a detachment was on a raid to the rear
of the Union army), Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton : Ist N. C,
Col. L. 8. Baker; 1st 8. C, Col. J. L. Beach ; 2d S. C. Col.
M. C. Butler; Cobb (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. P. M. B.
Y'oung; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. William W.
Rich. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee : 1st
Va., Col. James H. Drake; 2d Va., Col. Thomas T. Mun-
ford; 3d Va., Col. T. H. Owen ; 4th Va., Col. AVilliams C.
Wickham; 5th Va. . Third Brigade, Brig.-(;en. W.
H. F. Lee : 2d N. C, Col. S. Williams ; 9th Va., Col. R. L.
T. Beale; 10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis; 13th Va.. Col.
J. R. Chambliss, Jr.; 15th Va.. Col. William B. Ball.
Brigade loss: w, 7. Artillery, Maj. John Pelham : Va.
Battery, Capt. James Breathed ; Va. Battery, Capt. R.
P. Chew; S. C. Battery, Capt. J. F. Hart; Va. Battery,
Capt. M. W. Henry ; Va. Battery, Capt. M. N. Moorman.
Artillery loss : k, 3 ; w, 22 = 25.
Total Confederate loss: Idlled, 608; wounded, 4116;
captured or missing, 653= 5377.
The "present for duty" in Lee's army (including all of
Stuart's cavalry), as shown by his retui-u for December
10th, was 78,513. To arrive at Lee's effective strength in
the battle (not ofticially stated) there should be dedn»-ted
the usual proitortion of noiwombatants. the detaclunent
of Hampton's cavalry brigade, on a mid to the north of
the Rappahannock, and the cavalry lirigade of W. E.
Tones serving in the Shenandoah Valley. Acconliiic to
the estimate of Mr. Thomas White, as given in Taylor's
"Four Years with General Lee" (p. l.^<8i. this was .">8.500of
all arms. Colonel Tuvlor (p. 81) says : " Less than 20.000
Confederate troops (about one-fourth of th«> army under
General Lee) were actively engaged."— Editoks.
i^ Majors Gariiett, Ilaniilton, and T. J. Paw, .Jr.. ar»> nieiitioiicti in the n-porta as coininun.liiitr artillery battalion,-;, but
the compo-sition of their coniinanils is not givou.— Editoks.
A BIT OF PARTISAN SEEVICE.
BY JOHN S. MOSBY, COLONEL, C. S. A.
BEFORE the first battle of Bull Run I had en-
listed as a private in a company of Confed-
erate cavalry of which William E. Jones, a West
Point officer, was the captain, and that had been
assigned to the 1st Virginia regiment of cav-
alry, commanded by Colonel J. E. B. Stuart. We
joined Stuart at Bunker Hill, a small village on
the pike leading from Winchester, where Greneral
Johnston had his headquarters, to Martinsburg,
where Patterson with his army was lying. Stuart
was watching Patterson. In a few days Patterson
advanced and took possession of our camp, and
our regiment retired tow^ard Winchester. Here
I took my first lessons in war. Patterson had
no cavalry except a battalion of regulars, and
we had no artillery; so he contented himself
with throwing an occasional shell at us, and we
got out of the way of them as fast as we could.
One day we were lying down in a large open field
holding our horses when a battery suddenly ap-
peared upon a hill about a mile off and opened on
us. I saw a shell burst within a few yards of
Captain Jones, who coolly ordered us to mount
and fall into line. I do not think I was so naueh
frightened at any time after that. Stuart sent one
company of cavalry down toward Charlestown to
observe Patterson, and with the remainder of his
regiment started for Manassas and took part in that
battle. I served also with Stuart on the Peninsula
and in the Antietara campaign.
When the year 18G3 arrived Fredericksburg had
been fought, and the two armies, in winter quarters,
were confronting each other on the Rappahannock.
Both sides sought rest ; the pickets on the opposite
banks of the river had ceased firing and gone to
swapping coffee and tobacco. The cavalry had
been sent to the rear to forage. But " quiet to quick
bosoms is a hell." I did not want to rust away my
life in camp, so I asked Stuart to give me a detail
of men to go over to Loudoun County, where I
thought I could make things lively during the win-
ter months. Always full of enterprise, Stuart
readily assented, and I started off on my career as
a partisan. At the time I had no idea of organiz-
ing an independent command, but expected to
return to Stuart when the campaign opened in the
spring. I was indifferent to rank, and would have
been as contented to be a lieutenant as a colonel.
I was somewhat familiar with the country where
I began operations, having picketed there the year
before. The lines of the troops attached to the
defenses of Washington extended from about
Occoquan, on the lower Potomac, through Centre-
ville, in Fairfax County, to the Falls of the upper
Potomac, and thence as far vpest as Harper's Ferry.
This was a long line to defend, and before I went
there had not been closely guarded. I began on
the picket-lines ; my attacks were generally in the
night-time, and usually the surprise compensated
for the disparity in numbers. They would be re-
peated the next, and often during the same night
at a different point, and this created a vastly ex-
aggerated idea of my foi-ce. Some conception may
be formed of the alarm it produced from a fact
stated by General Hooker, that in the spring of
] 863 the planks on Chain Bridge were taken up
every night to keep me out of Washington. At
that time I could not muster over twenty men. A
small force moving with celerity and threatening
many points on a line can neutralize a hundred
times its own number. The line must be stronger at
every point than the attacking force, else it is
broken. At that time Hooker asked that the cav-
alry division belonging to the defenses of Wash-
A BIT OF PARTISAN SERVICE.
149
ington be sent to the front to reenforee Pleason-
tou when he crossed the Eappahannock to engage
Stuart in the great cavalry combat of June 9th. ^ It
was refused on the ground that it was necessary to
keep it where it was, in order to protect the commu-
nication between the arm j^ and Washington. Afew
days before that fight we struck the railroad within
two miles of this cavalry camp, and captured and
burned a train of supplies going up to Pleasonton.
The 3000 men who came after me could not run any
faster than the twenty with me. We vanished like
the children of the mist, and the major-general who
pursued reported that we had been annihilated.
But within less than a week I pulled myself to-
gether again, crossed the Potomac about twelve
miles above Washington, and captured the cavalry
camp near Seneca.
I recur now to the time when I first arrived in
the country which became the theater of the
partisan war which I carried on until the surrender
at Appomattox. As I have said, the line of out-
posts belonging to the defenses of Washington
formed the arc of a circle extending from the
upper to the lower Potomac. The troops had been
having an easy, lazy life, which was described in
the stereotj'ped message sent every night to the
Northern press, "All quiet along the Potomac."
I saw that here was a bountiful harvest to be
gathered, and that the reapers were fevT^. I gave
constant employment to the Union troops, and they
no longer led a life of drowsy indolence. I procured
some guides who kuew every path of the countrj',
and with the aid of friendly citizens found out
where every picket was posted. A certain major-
general came after me with a division of cavalry
and a battery of artillery. After shelling the woods
in every direction so as to be sure of my extermi-
nation, and destroying many bats and owls, he took
off as prisoners all the old men he could find. Ho
had the idea that I was a myth and that these old
farmers were the raiders. One old man appealed
to his crutch to show the physical impossibility of
his being a guerrilla. But the major-general was
inexorable. He returned with his prizes to camp,
but I was there almost a^ soon as he was.
In the month of February, 1803, Brigadier-Gen-
eral E. H. Stoughton was in commend of the troops
in front of Washington, with his headquarters at
Fairfax Court House. There was a considerable
body also at Centreville, and a cavalry brigade was
encamped on the pike leading from that place to
Fairfax Court House, under command of Colonel
Percy Wyndham. Stoughton was a West Point
officer, and had served with distinction under
McClellan on the Peninsula. Wyndham was an
Englishman sei-ving as Colonel of the 1st New
Jersey Cavalry. The year before he had started
up the Shenandoah Valley to bag Ashby. but the
performance did not come up to the manifesto ; in
their first encounter Asliby bagged him. He was
now given a chance to redeem liis reputation. My
attacks on his linos had been incessant and very
annoying. He struck blindly around like the Cyclojis
in his cave, but nobody was hurt. The metliodical
tactics he had learned in European wars were of no
more use to him than a suit of armor of the Middle
Ages. My men would dart down on his outposts
like a hawk on its prey ; but when Wyndham came
up in solid column the partisans had gone. In his
vexation he sent me word that 1 was a horse-thief;
to which I replied that all the horses I had stolen
had had riders, and the riders had had sabers
and pistols.
While operating against the outposts it had been
my custom to examine my prisoners separately,
and in this way I learned all the interior arrange-
ments of their camps. I was then meditating a
bolder enterprise than I had ever undertaken, but
had commimicated it to no one. This was to pene-
trate the outer lines, and go right up to their head-
quarters and carry off the general commanding
and Colonel Wyndham. It looked extremely
hazardous to attempt it; but as nothing of the
sort ever had been done, I calculated there would
be no precaution to prevent it. I was right. While
I was maturing my plan I received aid from an
unexpected source. One day a deserter, named
Ames, wearing the stripes of a sergeant, came to me
from a New York cavalry regiment of WjTidham's
brigade. The Emancipation Proclamation which
had been put in operation was the reason he
gave for deserting the cause of the Union, but I
always suspected that it was some personal wrong
he had suffered. He seemed to be animated by the
most vindictive hatred for his former comrades. I
felt an instinctive confidence in his sincerity which
he never betrayed. After I had thoroughly tested
his fidelity I made him a lieutenant. He served
with me until he was killed in October, 180-4.
I questioned Ames closely about the location of
the camps and outposts, and he confirmed the
knowledge I had pro\'iously obtained. I deter-
mined first to take him on a trial-trip down into
Fairfax County. There was a cavalry post at a
certain school-house, and I started with Ames one
afternoon to attack it. A deep snow was on the
ground, and it was raining and sleeting. About
two weeks before, I had captured the same post,
but I thought they would not expect me back so
soon. To satisfy my men I did not let Ames carry
any arms, for they all were certain that lu^ had been
sent to decoy me into a trap. The soldiers in the
Union camps slept soundly that night, for they
felt sure that nothing but a wild animal would be
abroad in such weather. I stopped wlien I got
near the place I intended to attack, to make an
inqiiiry of a farmer who lived near there as to the
number of men on the ])ost. I called him out of
bed. He came to the door in his night-dress, and
the first thing he asked was, " How many men Imve
you?" I said, "Seventeen." "How many," I
asked, "are at the ])icket-post ?" "One hundred."
lie answered. "T liavo boon down there this even-
ing. You are certainly not going to attack thom
with so few menf" " Yes," I replied ; "it is so
dark they can't see us, and will think I have got a
hundred too." Contrary to my usual practice, I
went straight along the road. Wo got close on the
) At Rruiidy ."Station.— Editoks.
I50
A BIT OF PARTISAN SERVICE.
vedette, who challenged us, fired, and started into
camp at full speed. We dashed on as close to
his heels as the witches were on Tam O'Shanter's.
The men were asleep in the school-house and their
horses were tied with halters to the trees. If they
had staid inside they could easily have driven us
COLONEL JOHN 8. M08BT, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOORAl'II.
f)ff with their carbines. But every man ran for his
horse, and we were just in time to scatter them.
We got all the horses, but most of the men escaped
in the darkness. In the charge, Ames rode by
my side. We got off safe with our booty and
prisoners. After daybreak, Colonel Wyndham
followed at full speed for twenty miles on our
track. All that he did was to go back to camp
with a lot of broken down horses. Ames, like the
saints, had been tried by tii'e ; he was never
doubted afterward. The time had now come for
me to take a bolder flight and execute my plan of
making a raid on headquarters.
It was on the afternoon of March 7th, 1863, that I
started from Aldie with 29 men on this expedition.
Ames was the only one who knew its object. It was
pitch-dark before we got near the cavalry pickets at
Chantilly. We passed in between them and Centre-
ville. Here a good point in the game was won, for
once inside the Union lines we would be mistaken for
their own men. By an accident one-half of my com-
mand got separated in the dark from the other, and
it was nearly an hoxu* before I could find them. We
passed along close by the camp-fires, but the senti-
nels took us for a scouting party of their cavalry. I
had felt very cold in the early part of the night,
but my blood gi-ew warmer as I got farther in the
lines, and the chill passed away. I had no reputa-
tion to lose by failure but much to gain by suc-
cess. I remembered, too, the motto that Ixion in
heaven wrote in Minerva's album — "Adventures
are to the adventurous." We sti-uck the road lead-
ing from Fairfax Court House to the railroad sta-
tion and then went on to the village. There were a
few guards about, but they did not suspect us until
they saw a pistol pointed at them. Of course they
surrendered. Some refused to believe we were
Confederates after we told them who we wei*e. A
few sentinels hailed us with the formula, " Who
comes there?" and were answered, "5th New
York Cavalry." It was past midnight, and it was
necessary to do our work quickly if it was to be
done at all. The first thing I did was to detail
squads of men to gather prisoners and horses.
I was more anxious to catch Wyndham than any
one else ; so I sent Ames, with a detachment, after
him. But for once fortime had been propitious
to him. Ho had gone down to Washington that
evening. Ames got two of his staff and his imi-
form, and brought them to me. One of these offi-
cers was Captain Barker, of the 5th New York
Cavalry, who had been Ames's captain. Ames
brought him to me as a trophy, and seemed to feel
a malicious pride in introducing him. I had sent
another party to the house where Lieut. -Col. Kobert
Johnstone, commanding the cavalry brigade, was
sleeping. In some manner he had heard the alarm
and had slipped out through the back-way into the
garden in his night-clothes. His wife met my men
like a lioness at the door. I was gi-eatly disap-
pointed in not getting Wyndham. The capture of
his staff-officers and fine horses was not an equiva-
lent for the loss of the chief. The other details did
their work rapidly, and soon collected at oiir rendez-
vous in the court-yard a large number of prisoners
and fine steeds. The prisoners seemed to be utterly
dumfounded. About this time Joe Nelson rode up
to me with a prisoner who said he belonged to the
guard at General Stoughton's headquarters, and
with a party of five or six I immediately went there.
We dismounted, and with a loud rap on the front
door awoke the inmates. An upper window was
raised and some one called out, "Who is there ?"
A BIT OF PARTISAN SERVICE.
I5«
The answer was, " We have a dispatch for General
Stoughton." An officer (Lieutenant Prentiss) came
to the front door to get it. I caught hold of his
shirt and whispered my name in his ear, and told
him to lead me to the general's room. Eesistauee
was useless, and he did so. A light was struck,
and before us lay the sleeping general. He quickly
raised himself in bed and asked what this meant. I
said, "General, get up — dress quick — you are a
prisoner." " What ! " exclaimed the indignant gen-
eral. " My name is Mosby ; Stuart's cavalry are in
possession of this place, and General Jackson holds
Centreville." "IsFitz Leehere?" "Yes." "Then
take me to him; we were classmates." "Very
well; but dress quick." Two of my men assisted
him to put on his clothes. My motive in deceiving
him in regard to the amount of my force was to
deprive him of all hope of rescue. I was in a most
critical situation, for in addition to several thousand
troops in the surrounding camps, a considerable
number were quartered in the houses in the village.
If there had been the least concert among them
they could easily have driven us out ; but, although
we remained there an hour, not a shot was fii'ed ;
as soon as our presence became known each man
tried to save himself. Stoughton did not delay a
moment, for he had no idea how few of us there
were. A couple of men had been left to hold our
horses while we were in the house. One of these,
George Whitescarver, surrounded and captured a
guard of six men sleeping in a tent. Stoughton's
horses all stood at the door as we came out, with
saddles and bridles on. Lieutenant Prentiss
started, but soon parted company with us. We
could not see where he went. When I got to the
court-yard I found all my different squads col-
lected there with their prisoners and spoils. No
sign of resistance had been shown. The prisoners
outnumbered us three or four to one, and each
was mounted and leading a horse. The cavalcade
started in an opposite direction from where we ill-
tended to go, in order to deceive ourpui-suers. After
going a few hundred yards we turned and flanked
the cavalry camp, and struck the pike to Centreville.
Stoughton soon discovered how few of us there
were. I did not allow him to hold his bridle-reins,
but gave them to one of my men (Hunter), who rode
beside him. Stoughton remarked, " This is a bold
thing you have done; but you will certainly be
caught; our cavalry will soon be after you." " Per-
haps so," I said. It was so dark that the blue
could not be distinguished from the gray. Hence
the prisoners all thought there were at least one
hundred of us. We lost many of them before we
got beyond the lines. They were all formed in a
column of fours, and after we got on the pike I rode
some distance in the rear wliilo Hunter, with
Stoughton, was leading in front. We went at a
trot and the chances of our escape were improving.
No one seemed to be on our track, as oui* winding
about had baffled pursuit. It never entered the
head of any one that I would march up the pike in
the face of two or three thousand troops at Centre-
ville. When within a mile of that place, and just
about the break of day, we came \i\nni a camp-fire
which had e\adently just been deserted. A picket
had been posted there on the evening before to stay
during the night. The officer, thinking it unneces-
sary to remain longer, had gone into camp. As we
had taken the precaution to cut the telegraph wires,
no news had yet reached Centreville of our work
at the Com-t House. When I saw the picket-tii-e on
the pike I halted the column and galloped forward
to reconnoiter. Seeing that no one was there,
I called to Hunter to come on. It was necessary
to make a circuit aroimd Centreville, and to pass
between encampments of Union troops on both
sides of it. I was certain to be lost if I went either
too far to the left or the right. Just as we turned
off from the pike Captain Barker made a desperate
attempt to escape. He darted from the line, but
my Hungarian Jake was at his heels, and sent a
harmless shot after him just as his horse fell in a
ditch. I rode up to him and inquii-ed if he was
hurt. He said "No,'' and Jake assisted him to
mount. No one else eared to repeat the experi-
ment. We passed within a few hundred yards of the
forts, and could see the guns pointing through the
embrasures and hear the challenge of the sentinels
as they walked on the parapets. My heart began to
beat with joy. The odds were now rapidly getting in
my favor. We were soon on the other side of Centre-
ville. Although we could be plainly seen from there,
it was probably supposed that we were a scout-
ing party of Federal cavalry. When we got to Cub
Eun, it was so swollen by the melting snows that
it could not be forded. We were still within easy
cannon-shot of the guns on the heights, and there
was no time to be lost, I acted on the maxim of
plucking the flower safety from the nettle danger,
and plunging into the brimming stream swam over.
The rest followed, Stoughton being next to me.
The first thing he said as he shivered with cold was,
"This is the first rough treatment I have received."
I knew that no cavalry would ever swim after me,
LeaAang Hunter to come on with my men and pris-
oners, I galloped on ah<>ad with George Slater and
once more got on the i)ike at Groveton. This was
the very spot whore, tlu> year before. Fit/. John Por-
ter had made his disastrous assault on Jackson.
From this hill I had a view of the pike seven miles
back to Centreville. No enemy was in pursuit. I
was safe. Just then Hunter appeared and the sun
rose. It seemed to me that it never shone with
such splendor before. I turned over my jirisoners
to Stuart at Culpeper Court House. He was as
much delighted by wliat I had done as I was. and
published a general order announcing it to the
cavalry, in which lie said that it was "a iVat un-
paralleled in the war."
I
STONEMAN'S RAID IN THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN, i
THE original instructions to General Geoi-ge
Stoneman for the cooperation of the cavalry
in the Chancellorsville campaign directed him to
cross the Rappahannock on the 13th of April, at
some point west of the Orange and Alexandria
raih-oad, and throw his whole force, excepting one
brigade, between Lee's position on the Rappahan-
nock and his base at Richmond. The object was
the isolation of the enemy "from his supplies,
eliccking his retreat, and inflicting on him every
p()ssil)le injury which will tend to his discomfiture
and defeat." This movement was delayed by heavy
rains, and on the 28th of April the instructions
were modified. The new plan was to cross the Rap-
pahannock at the fords immediately north-west
of Fredericksburg on the evening of the 28th, or
the morning of the 29th, and move in two columns,
operating on the lines of the Orange and Alexan-
dria and the Richmond and Fredericksburg rail-
roads toward Richmond, The movements of the
corps are given in detail in the report of General
Stoneman :
" On April 27tli, I, then beins at Warrenton Junction,
■with the corps encamped along the Orange and Alexan-
dria railroad, received a telegram directing me with my
commanders to meet some persons from headquarters
Army of the Potomac at Morrisville on the following
(lay [the '2Sth] at 2 P. M. Arriving there with my com-
ukiikIcis, I found the comniandiug general and his staff,
and h^ariicd that a portion of the army was about to
cross the Uappahanuock at Kelly's Ford that day. . . .
From Morrisville to where the cavalry corps lay was
thirteen miles ; from there to where some of the extreme
pickets were was thirteen more, so that it was quite
late at night before the command was all assembled
and ready to start, and owing to the state of the roads,
the result of the recent heavy rains, and the darkness
of the night, rendered doubly obscure by a dense fog,
the corps did not reach the river imtil nearly 8 A. M. of
the 29th. Arriving at the river, we found but one ford
witliin the limits prescribed in our instructions which
eoiild be passed over, and that not by packed mules or
artillery. By dint of great exertion we succeeded In
getting all over the river by 5 p. M. I assembled the
division and brigade commanders, spread our maps, and
had a thorough understanding of what we were to
do. . . . Instructions were given to have all the
packed mules and led horses sent in the direction of
Gernninna Mills, and to follow in the rear of the army
and remain with it until we formed a junction there-
with, which we (xiK'ctcd \v(mld be in the vicinity of
ItichiMond, and for each offlcer and man to take with
him no more than he could carry on his horse, myself
and staff setting yje example."
Averell, with three brigades, was to advance on
Culpeper Court House, wliile Stoneman, with three
brigades numbering about 3500, under D. McM.
Gregg, was to take the shorter roTite via Stevensbiirg,
a liamlet 7 miles east of Culpeper Court House.
The operations the first day, the 29th, after cross-
ing, consisted in dri\angin the outpostswhieh were
encountered on both roads. The report continues :
"About 9 A. M., April ;)Oth, a staff-officer of General
Averell overtook me. . . . lie also handed me a note
picked up by some one, and sent me by General Averell,
and to the following effect :
"'[Important.] llKAnQiiAKTEits. Cavaluy Divi.siov, near
Brandy Station, Va., April '29tli, 186.S. fOLONF.i. (^iiamhliss,
13th Virginia Cavalry. Colonel: The major-general coni-
maiidiug directs me to say that he wishes you to get a mau
posted so as to have a view of tlie road leading down on the
other side to Kelly's loid, and tind out what kind of troops
marched down belniid \hr wai^oiis. The enemy liave made
a demonstration toward ^ti\ t-iisburg, but so far it amounts
to nothing. Tlie general is very anxious to know where to
look for Stoneman, as we have heardnothing from him. Most
respectfully, your obedient servant, R. Channing PidCE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.'
" Feeling eatisfled that wo should And Raccoon Ford
guarded, and that its passage would be disputed, I
strudv t lie Itapidan Kiver about six miles below ; crossed
over tlu- portion of the command under General Buford,
who .scut a iiarty under Captain Peter Peun Gaskell, of his
staff, who, at a dash, cleared the ford above, capturing
an officer, Lieutenant Bourier [James Boulware] of the
9th Virginia Cavab-y, and six privates of the 9th and 10th
major-general GEORGE STONEMAN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
Virginia Cavalry. The rest of the cavalry and the artil-
lery made their escape. The main body immediately
crossed at tlu' Raccoon Ford, the rear getting over about
10 p. M. No tires liuilt to-night, as we were in plain view
from Clark's Mountain, a few miles to the south of the
ford, and on the top of which the enemy have a signal
station. We learned here that Stuart, with Fitzhugh
Lee's brigade, had that morning crossed at Somerville
Ford, five miles above Raccoon Ford, and had gone
toward Frcdcricksl)nrg, and we thought it more than
probable that wc should find him on the Plank road at
Verdiervillc, where \vc hadto strike it on our way south.
Orders were is-ncil ti> be in the saddle at 2 o'clock in the
morning, and we lax down on the wet ground to get a
couple of liours' sleep. Two o'clock came, but the fog was
so thi( k that it was impossible to move, more particu-
larly as we had no guide to show us the road. Daylight
came, and we pushed on ; struck the turnpike ; found no
enemy, but saw by his trail that he had gone toward
Fredericksburg. From here I pushed Gregg's division
on to Louisa Court House, on the Virginia Central Kail-
road, where it arrived about 2 A. M., May 2d, and imme-
diately commenced tearing up the track of the railroad,
destro.^ing the telegraph, etc. Buford's brigade en-
camped that night on the south bank of the North Anna.
About 10 A. M., May 2d, I had the whole force united at
Louisa Court House. From here I pushed a squadron
i See map, p. 1.55 of this volume, and also p. 164 of Volume II.— Editors.
1-52
STONEMAN'S RAID IN THE CHANCELLOKSyiLLE CAMPAIGN.
133
of the let Maine, under Captain Tucker of that regi-
ment, toward Gordonsville to find out the whereabouts
of the enemy in that direction, as we knew that six or
seven trains had passed up the evening previous loaded
with troops. The captain drove in thi'ir i)ickets upon
the main body, the 9th Virginia Cavalry, which in turn
attacked him, killing 1 man, wounding 1, and captiu'ing
1 lieutenant and 23 men. Captain Lord, with the 1st U.
S. Cavalry, was sent to Tolcrsvillu Station, and from
there to Fredorickshall Station, twelve miles from
Louisa Court House. From here a party under Lieuten-
ant went to the Xorth Anna and destroyed Carr's
Bridge, which is on the main road leading from (Spotsyl-
vania to Goochland, on the James River, and is out; of
the principal highways. After having dcstr()yc<l the
Virginia Central railroad and telegraph, burned the de-
pots, water-tanks, etc., for eighteen miles, and accom-
plished all that time would permit, we pushed on to
Yanceyville, on the South Anna, and from there to
Thompson's Cross-roads, ten miles lower down the
river, where we arrived al>out 10 p. m.. May 2d.
"At this point the James and 8outh Anna rivers are less
than 12 miles apart, and here I determined to make the
most of my 35C0 men in carrying out my previously con-
ceived plan of operations. . . . One party, the 1st New
Jersej', under Colonel [Percy] Wyndham, was to strike
the James River at Columbia, at thejunctionof the James
and Rivanna rivers, to destroy, if possible, the large
canal aqueduct over the Rivanna, and from thence pro-
ceed along the canal in the direction of Richmond, doing
all the harm possilde. . . . Another party, the 2d New
York, Colonel [Judson] Kilpatrick, was to push onto the
railroad bridges over the Chickahominy, destroy them
and the telegrnph, and oi)erate in the direction of Rich-
mond, foui- miles distant from the bridges. Another force,
the 12tli Illinois Cavahy, Colonel Hasbrouck Davis, was
to strike the t \vi > lailroads at or in the vicinity of Ashland,
on the Fredernkslnirg, and Atlee's, on the Virginia Cen-
tral, and do all the harm it could. Another party, the ist
Maine and 1st Maryland, with a section of artillery, all
under General firegg, was to follow down the South
Anna River, destroy all the road bridges thereon, and,
if possible, th(^ two railroad bridges across that river.
Another party, the 5th U. S. Cavalry, under Captain
Drummond, was to follow this last and see that the de-
etrnction was eomplete. Captain Merritt, with a flying
party of the l-t Marvlaul, was sent out to do what he
thought he eould acidiiiiilish in the way of destroying
bridges, etc. These ditt'erent parties all got ofl' by 3 a. i\i.
on the 3d.
"... Colonels Wjnidham, Kilpatrick, and Davis
were directed either to return or to push on and bring up
at either Yorktown or (iloiicester Point. The rest were
ordered to return to the reserve with myself. Colonel
Wyndham and Captain Lord returned the same day.
GeneraKireggand Captainw Merritt and Drummond the
next day. Colonels Kili.atrick and Davis pushed on
through to (lloucester Point. . . . We remained at Shan-
non's Cross-roads during the 4th, and on the monung of
the .itli moved to Yatieey ville, on the South .\nna, where
we were Joined by (ieneral Oregg, Colonel Wyndham,
and Captains Merritt and Diumraond, each with his
command."
Tlie operations of the column under General
Avorell aro tlius described l)y him in a commu-
nication to the editors dated May 11 th, 1 :^S8 :
" We encountered the enemy's cavalry, two thousand
Strong, imdcr General W. H. F. Lee on the morning of
the 30th, and drove it through Culpeper Court House in
the direction of Rapidan Station.
" On the 1st we pressed the enemy's cavalry and
pushed our right to within three miles of Orange Court
House in an effort to dislodge the enemy from a strong
position occupied by him on the south hank of the Rapi-
dan, after he had crossed and destroyed the bridge.
" Whih^ thus engaged on the morning of the 2d we
were recalled to the Army of the Potomac at U. S. Ford
by orders from General Hooker. We reached Ely's
Ford of the Rapidan after dark on the evening of the
2d, and were fired upon by the enemy's infantry from
the opposite bank. A part of Mclntosli's Ijrigade forded
the river, dismounted, drove away the enemy, some of
the 13th North Carolina, and captured some prisoners.
Karly on the morning of the 3d we crossed the Rapi-
dan and entered the right of our lines.
" It was found necessary to issue immediate orders
sending cavalry to protect the right and rear of the
army, which had become exiiosed to danger from the
enemy's cavalry set fi-ee by our recall."
The column with Stoneman now prepared to re-
turn to the army. His report continues :
" The six days having now expired, during which we
were assured by the commanding general he would cer-
tainly communicate with us, and no communication
having been received, no retreating enemy having been
seen or heard of, and no information as to the condition
of things in the vicinity of Frederick.sburg, except vague
rumors of our defeat ami capture, having been obtained.
supplies for man and beast beeoming scarce, having ac-
complished all that we were sent to perfonn, and having
come to the conclusion that Ccdonels Kilpatrick and
Davis, with their commands, had gone in the direction
of Yorktown, I determined to make the best of oui- way
back to the Army of the Potomac.
"To take the enemy by surprise and penetrate his
coimtry was easy enough ; to withdraw from it was a
more difHcult matter. We knew that Lee and Hampton
were to the west of us. . . . We knew also that there
W!is a strong force at and in the vicinity of Gordonsville,
and heal (1 that anotlii'r force was at Louisa Coui-t House,
and a small force of infantry at Tolersville.
"After thinking the matter over. I determined to .«end
General Buford, with 650 picked horses of his brigade, to
threat<'n any force in the vicinity of Gordonsville, and
induce Lee and IIani[iton to believe that we were going
to get out l)y that way ; and another force, under Captain
Rodenbough, was sent in the direction of Bowling Green,
with the view of threatening the enemy's communica-
tion in that direction, and, under cover of night, with
the main body, to take the middle road leading through
Tolersville, and crossing the North Anna near the Vic-
toria Iron Works; from thence to Orange Springe, where
all were to rendezvous the next day.
"All our plans and calculations worked adminibly,
and though we had no little difficulty in finding and fol-
lowing the almost impassable roads, owing to the inky
darkness of the night and the inc.ssant pouring of the
rain, the whole command was asseml>l<d at Oningo
Springs at 1> m. on the fith. Here we first Jtcgan to hear
rumors. Through negroes, of the repulse and withdrawal
of our army to the north side of the Rappahannock.
"After watering and feeding our animals, we pushed
on to the riank road leading from Fredericksburg to
Orange Court House, and from thence to Raccoon Ford,
which, to onr great. joy, we found fordable, and were all
over safe by daylight on the uiorulng of the 7th."
Epitors.
FIFTH
THIRD
ELEVENTH
CORPS BADGES OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNDER HOOKER.
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN,
BY DARIUS N. COUCH, MAJOR-GENEKAL, U. S. V.
IN the latter part of January, 1863, the Army of the Potomac under Burn-
side was still occupying its old camps on the left bank of the Rappahan-
nock, opposite Fredericksburg. After the failures under Burnside it was
evident that the army must have a new commander. For some days there
had been a rumor that Hooker had been fixed upon for the place, and on
the 26th of January it was confirmed. This appointment, undoubtedly,
gave very general satisfaction to the army, except perhaps to a few, mostly
superior officers, who had grown up with it, and had had abundant oppor-
tunities to study Hooker's military character; these believed that Mr.
Lincoln had committed a grave error in his selection. The army, from its
former reverses, had become quite disheartened and almost sulky ; but the
quick, vigorous measures now adopted and carried out with a firm hand had
a magical effect in toning up where there had been demoralization and
inspiring confidence where there had been mistrust. Few changes were
made in the heads of the general staff departments, but for his chief -of-staff
Hooker applied for Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone, who, through some
untoward influence at Washington, was not given to him. This was a
mistake of the war dignitaries, although the officer finally appointed to the
office, Major-General Daniel Butterfield, proved himself very efficient. Burn-
side's system of dividing the army into three grand divisions was set aside,
and the novelty was introduced of giving to each army corps a distinct badge,
an idea which was very popular with officers and men. ^
} Roprinted with permission from the "Pliiladel-
pliia Times." — Editors.
3i Tliis idea originated with General Butterfield,
who not only instituted the badges, but devised
them in detail. As organized by Hooker the First
Corps was commanded by Reynolds ; the Second by
Couch; the Third by Sickles; the Fifth by Meade;
the Sixth by Sedgwick ; the Eleventh by Howard ;
the Twelfth by Slocum, and the cavalry corps by
Stoneman. In each corps the badge of the First
Division was red ; of the Second Division, white ; of
the Third Division, blue. After the battle of Chieka-
mauga (Sept. 19th and 20th, 1863), the Eleventh
and Twelfth corps were sent west, and on April
4th, 18G4, they were consolidated to form the new
Twentieth Corps, which retained the star of the
Twelfth for a badge. The old Twentieth lost its
designation Sept. 28th, 18G3.— Editors.
THE CHANCELLORSyiLLH CAMPAIGN.
155
Some few days after Mr. Liiieoln's visit to the army in April [see p. 11!)]
I was again thrown with the President, and it happened in this wise. My
pickets along the river were not only on speaking terms witli those of the
enemy on the other side of the river, but covertly carried on quite a trade
in exchanging coffee for toljacco, etc. This morning it was hallooed over
to our side : " You have taken Charleston," which news was sent to head-
quarters. Mr. Lincoln hearing of it wished me to ^come up and talk the
matter over. I went and was ushered into a side tent, occupied only by him-
self and Hooker. My entrance apparently interrupted a weighty conversa-
tion, for both were looking grave. The President's manner was kindly, while
the general, usually so courteous, forgot to be conventionally polite. The
Charleston rumor having been briefly discussed, Mr. Lincoln remarked that
it was time for him to leave. As he stepped toward the general, who had risen
from his seat, as well as myself, he said : " I want to impress upon you two
gentlemen in your next fight," — and turning to me he completed the sen-
tence,— " put in all of yom- men" — in the long run a good military maxim.
The weather growing favorable for military operations, on April 12th were
commenced those suggestive preliminaries to all great battles, clearing out the
hospitals, inspecting arms, looking after ammunition, shoeing animals, issuing
provisions, and making every preparation necessary to an advance. The next
day, the 13th, Stoneman was put in motion at the head of ten thousand finely
equipped and well organized cavalry to ascend the Eappahannock and, swing-
ing around, to attack the Confederate cavalry wherever it might be found,
and " Fight ! fight ! fight ! " At the end of two days' march Stoneman found
OUTLINK MAP OF TIIK ( H ANCKI.t.OItSVII.I.K CAMI'AION.
156
THE CHANCELLORSyiLLE CAMPAIGN.
THE RIGHT WING OF HOOKER'S ARMY CROSSING THE RAPPAHANNOCK AT KELLY'S FORD.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
the river so swollen by heavy rains that he was constrained to hold np, upon
which Hooker suspended his advance until the 27th. This unexpected delay
of the cavalry seemingly deranged Hooker's original plan of campaign. He
had hoped that Stoneman would have been able to place his horsemen on the
railroad between Fredericksburg and Eichmond, by which Lee received his
supplies, and make a wreck of the whole structure, compelling that general to
evacuate his stronghold at Fredericksburg and vicinity and fall back toward
Richmond.
I estimate the grand total of Hooker's seven corps at about 113,000 men ready
for duty, although the data from which the conclusion is arrived at are not
strictly official. This estimate does not include the cavalry corps of not less
than 11,000 duty men, nor the reserve artillery, the whole number of guns in
the army being 400. Lee's strength in and around Fredericksburg was placed
at between 55,000 and 60,000, not including cavalry. It is not known if
Hooker's information concerning the Confederate force was reliable, but Peck,
operating in front of Norfolk, notified him that two of Lee's di\dsions under
Long-street were on the south side of the James. The hour was, therefore,
auspicious for Hooker to assume the offensive, and he seized it with a boldness
which argued well for his fitness to command. The aim was to transfer his
army to the south side of the river, where it would have a manoeuvring footing
not confronted by intrenched positions. On the 27th of April the Eleventh
and Twelfth corps were set in motion for Kelly's Ford, twenty-five miles
up the Rappahannock, where they concentrated on the evening of the 28th,
the Fifth, by reason of its shorter marching distance, moving on the 28th.
The object of the expedition was unknown to the corps commanders until
communicated to them after their arrival at the ford by the commanding
THE CHANCELLOHSyiLLE CAMPAIGN. 157
general in person. | The Eleventh Corps crossed the Rappahannock, fol-
lowed in the morning by the Twelfth and Fifth corps — the two former
striking for Grermanna Ford, a crossing of the Rapidau, the latter for Ely's
Ford, lower down the same stream. Both columns, successfully effecting
crossings with little opposition from the enemy's pickets, arrived that-
evening, April 30th, at the point of concentration, Chancellorsville. It had
been a brilliantly conceived and executed movement.
In order to confound Lee, orders were issued to assemble the Sixth, Third,
and First corps under Sedgwick at Franklin's Crossing and Pollock's Mill,
some three miles below Fredericksburg, on the left, before daylight of the
morning of the 29th, and throw two Inidges across and hold them. This was
done under a severe fire of sharp-shooters. The Second Corps, two divisions,
marched on the 28th for Banks's Ford, four miles to the right ; the other
division, Gibbon's, occupying Falmouth, near the river-bank, was directed to
remain in its tents, as they were in full view of the enemy, who would readily
observe their withdrawal. On the 29th the two divisions of the Second
Corps reached United States Ford, held by the enemy ; but the advance of
the right wing down the river uncovered it, whereupon a In-idge of pontoons
was thrown across and the corps reached Chancellorsville the same night as
the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth. The same day, the 30th, Sedg^vick was
instructed to place a corps across the river and make a demonstration upon
the enemy's right, below Fredericksburg, and the Third Corps received orders
to join the right wing at Chancellorsville, where the commanding general
arrived the same evening, establishing his headquarters at the Chancellor
House, which, with the adjacent grounds, is Chancellorsville. All of the
army lying there that night were in exuberant spirits at the success of their
general in getting "on the other side" without fighting for a position. As I
rode into Chancellorsville that night the general hilarity pervading the camps
was particularly noticeable ; the soldiers, while chopping wood and lighting
fires, were singing merry songs and indulging in peppery camp jokes.
Tlie position at Chancellorsville not only took in reverse the entire system
of the enemy's riv^er defenses, but there were roads leading from it directly
to his line of communication. [See maps, pp. 155, 158.] But in order to gain
the advantages now in the commanding general's grasp he had divided his
army into two wings, and the enemy, no ordinary enemy, lay between them.
The line of communication connecting the wings was by way of United States
Ford and twenty miles long. It was of vital importance that the line be
shortened in order to place the wings within easy sui>port of each otlu^-. Tlio
possession of Banks's Ford, foreshadowed in the instructions given to Slocum,
would accomplish all that at present could be wished.
There were three roads over which the right wing could move upon Fred-
ericksburg : the Orange turnpike, from the west, passed through Chauceilors-
4 General Hooker sent for me on the niglit of the command. Althouf,'h antii-ipatinp the narrative,
27th to ride over to his heachiuartcrs, where lie I may say T tliink it was a si},Mial misfortune to
explained to me, as next in rank, his plan of earn- our aruis that he diil not delay joiiiiun tliat wiuj;
paign. Ho informed me tliat, under certain con- until tlie morning' of Miiy 1st. wIkmi he would liavo
tingeneies, the riglit wing would be placed at my found Banks's For.l in our possession.— D. N. C.
THE CHANCELLORSyiLLE CAMPAIGN. 159
ville, and was the most direct ; the United States Ford road, crossing the f onner
at Chancellorsville, became the Plank road, bent to the left and united with the
turnpike five miles or so from Chaucellors ville ; the third road fell back from
Chancellorsville toward the Rappahannock, passed along by Banks's Ford,
six miles distant, and continued to Fredericksburg. That wing was ready for
the advance at an early hour in the morning of May 1st, but somehow things
dragged ; the order defining the movement, instead of being issued the pre-
vious night, was not received by the corps commanders, at least by me, until
hours after light. Meade was finally pushed out on the left over the Banks's
Ford and turnpike roads, Slocum and Howard on the right along the Plank
road, the left to be near Banks's Ford by 2 p. m., the right at the junction of
its line of movement with the turnpike at 12 m. No opposition was met,
excepting that the division marching over the turnpike came upon the enemy
two or three miles out, when the sound of their guns was heard at Chancel-
lorsville, and Greneral Hooker ordered me to take Hancock's division and pro-
ceed to the support of those engaged. After marching a mile and a half or
so I came upon Sykes, who commanded, engaged at the time in drawing back
his advance to the position he then occupied. Shortly after Hancock's troops
had got into a line in front, an order was received from the commanding gen-
eral " to withdraw both divisions to Chancellors\dlle." Tui-ning to the officers
around me, Hancock, Sykes, Warren, and others, I told them what the order
was, upon which they all agreed with me that the gi-ound should not be aban-
doned, because of the open country in front and the commanding position.
An aide. Major J. B. Burt, dispatched to General Hooker to this effect, came
back in half an hour with positive orders to return. Nothing was to be done
but carry out the command, though Warren suggested that I should disobey,
and then he rode back to see the general. In the meantime Slocum, on the
Plank road to my right, had been ordered in, and the enemy's advance was
between that road and my right flank. Sykes was fii'st to move back, then
followed by Hancock's regiments over the same road. When all but two of the
latter had withdrawn, a third order came to me, brought by one of the gen-
eral's staff: " Hold on until 5 o'clock." It was then perhaps 2 p. m. Disgusted
at the general's vacillation and vexed at receiving an order of such tenor, I
rephed with warmth unbecoming in a subordinate : " Tell General Hooker he
is too late, the enemy are already on my right and rear. I am in full retreat."
The position thus abandoned was high ground, more or less open in front,
over which an army might move and artillery be used advantageously ; more-
over, were it left in the hands of an enemy, his batteries, established on its
crest and slopes, would command the position at Chancellorsville. Every-
thing on the whole front was ordered in. General Hooker knew tliat Lee
was apprised of his presence on the south side of the river, and must have
expected that his enemy would be at least on the lookout for an advance
upon Fredericksburg. But it was of the utmost importance that Banks's
Ford should fall hito our liands, therefore the enemy ouglit to liav(^ be(^n
pressed until their strength or weakness was developed; it would then have
been time enough to run away.
/, y^^^-r-^^^
THE CHANCELLORSl^ILLE CAMPAIGN. i6i
Mott's Run, with a considerable brushy ravine, cuts the tm-npike three-
fourths of a mile east of Chancellorsville. Two of Hancock's regiments, under
Colonel Nelson A. Miles, subsequently the Indian fighter, were directed to
occupy the ravine. Continuing my way through the woods toward Chancel-
lorsville, I came upon some of the Fifth Corps under arms. Inquiring for their
commanding officer, I told him that in fifteen minutes he would be attacked.
Before finishing the sentence a volley of musketry was fired into us from the
direction of the Plank road. This was the beginning of the battle of Chancel-
lors\alle. Troops were hurried into position, but the observer required no
wizard to tell him, as they marched past, that the high expectations which
had animated them only a few hours ago had given place to disappointment.
Proceeding to the Chancellor House, I narrated my operations in front to
Hooker, which were seemingly satisfactory, as he said: "It is all right.
Couch, I have got Lee just where I want him ; he must fight me on my own
ground." The retrograde movement had prepared me for something of the
kind, but to hear from his own lips that the advantages gained by the suc-
cessful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive
battle in that nest of thickets was too much, and I retired from his presence
with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man. The army
was directed to intrench itself. At 2 a. m. the corps commanders reported to
General Hooker that their positions could be held; at least so said Couch,
Slocum, and Howard.
Until after dark on May 1st the enemy confined his demonstrations to find-
ing out the position of our left with his skirmishers. Then he got some guns
upon the high ground which we had abandoned as before mentioned, and
cannonaded the left of our line. There were not many casualties, but that
day a shell severely wounded the adjutant-general of the Second Corps, now
General F. A. Walker. Chancellorsville was a strategic point to an offensive
or retreating army, as roads diverged from it into every part of Virginia ; but
for a defensive position it was bad, particularly for such an army as Hooker
had under him, which prided itself upon its artillery, which was perhaps equal
to any in the world. There were no commanding positions for artillery, and
but little open country to operate over ; in fact, the advantages of gi'ound for
this arm were mainly with the attacking party.
During the 29th and 30th the enemy lay at Fredericksburg observing
Sedgwick's demonstrations on the left, entirely unconscious of Hooker's suc-
cessful crossing of the right wing, until midday of the latter date, but that
night Lee formed his plan of operations for checking the farther advance
of the force which had not only turned the left fiank of his river defenses
but was threatening his line of communication with Kichmond as well as the
rear of his center at Fredericksburg. Stonewall Jackson, who was watching
Sedgwick, received instructions to withdraw his corps, march to the left,
across the front of Hooker's intrenched ]iosition, until its right Hank was
attained, and assault with his column of -J^,!)!)!) men, while iiis i-ommanding
general would, with what force he could si»are, guard the api>roaches to
Fredericksburg.
1 62
THE CHANCELLORSHLLE CAMPAIGN.
HOOKER'S HEADQUARTERS AT CHANCELLORSVIIXE, SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 2 — THE PICTURE
FACES SOUTH. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
On the morning of May 2d our line had become strong enough to resist a
front attack unless made in great force ; the enemy had also been hard at
work on his front, particularly that section of it between the Plank road and
turnpike. Sedgwick, the previous night, had been ordered to send the First
Corps (Reynolds's) to Chancellorsville. At 7 a. m. a sharp cannonade was
opened on our left, followed by infantry demonstrations of no particular
earnestness. Two hours later the enemy were observed moving a mile or
so to the south and front of the center, and later the same column was
reported to the commander of the Eleventh Corps by General Devens, whose
division was on the extreme right flank. At 9 : 30 a. m. a circular directed to
Generals Sloeum and Howard called attention to this movement and to the
weakness of their flanks. ^
At 11 A. M. om' left was furiously cannonaded by their artillery, established
on the heights in front of Mott's Run, followed by sharp infantry firing on the
fronts of the Second and Twelfth corps. As time flew along and no attack
came from the enemy seen moving in front, Hooker conceived that Lee was
retreating toward Gordons\alle. There was color for this view, as the main
road from I'redericksburg to that point diverged from the Plank road two
miles to the left of Chancellorsville, and passed along his front at about the
same distance. Hooker therefore jumped at the conclusion that the enemy's
army was moving into the center of Virginia. But instead of the hostile
column being on the Gordonsville road in retreat, it was Stonewall's corps mov-
ing on an interior neighborhood road, about one mile distant, and in search
i See p. 219 for a cony of this circular order. Maps showing: the positions of the Eleventh and
Twelfth corps appear on pages 191-201. — Editors.
THE CHANCELLORSyiLLE CAMPAIGN. 163
of our right flank and rear. At 2 p. m. I went into the Chancellor House, when
General Hooker greeted me with the exclamation: "Lee is in full retreat
toward Gordonsville, and I have sent out Sickles to capture his artillery."
I thought, without speaking it : " If your conception is correct, it is very
strange that only the Third Corps should be sent in pursuit." Sickles
received orders at 1 p. m. to take two divisions, move to his front and attack,
which he did, capturing some hundreds of prisoners. The country on the
front being mostly wooded enabled the enemy to conceal his movements and
at the same time hold Sickles in check with a rear-guard, which made such
a show of strength that reenforcements were called for and furuislied. In
the meantime Jackson did not for a moment swerve from his pm*pose, but
steadily moved forward to accomplish what he had undertaken.
It was about 5 : 30 in the evening when the head of Jackson's column
found itself on the right and rear of the army, which on that flank consisted
of the Eleventh Corps, the extreme right brigade receiving its first intimation
of danger from a volley of musketry fired into their rear, followed up so
impetuously that no efficient stand could be made by the brigades of the
corps that successively attempted to resist the enemy's charge. ^Mien
General Hooker found out what that terrific roar on his right flank meant
he quickly mounted and flew across the open space to meet the onset, passing
on his way stampeded pack-mules, officers' horses, caissons, with men and
horses running for their lives. Gathering up such troops as were nearest to
the scene of action, Berry's division from the Third Corps, some from the
Twelfth, Hays's brigade of the Second, and a portion of the Eleventh, an
effectual stand was made. Pleasonton, who was returning from the front,
where he had been operating with Sickles (at the time Jackson atta(.*ked),
taking in the state of things, rapidly moved his two regiments of cavalry
and a battery to the head and right flank of the enemy's advance columns,
when, making a charge and bringing up his own guns, with others of the
Eleventh and Third Corps, he was enabled to punish them severely.
Pickets had been thrown out on Howard's flank, but not well to the right
and rear. I suspect that the prime reason for the surprise was that the
superior officers of the right corps had been put off their guard by adopting
the conjecture of Hooker, "Lee's army is in full retreat to Gordonsville," as
well as by expecting the enemy to attack precisely where ample preparations
had been made to receive him. It can be emphatically stated that no corps
in the army, surprised as the Eleventh was at this time, could have held its
ground under similar circumstances.
At half-past two that afternoon the Second ('orps' lines were assaulted l>y
artillery and infantry. Just previous to Jackson's attack on the right a
desperate effort was made by Lee's people to carry the left at Mott's Kun, but
the men who held it were there to stay. Haoker, desiring to know X\\o enemy's
strength in front of the Twelfth Corps, advanced Slocum into tlic thicket,
but that officer found the hostile line too well defench^l for him to ix-netrate
it and was forced to recall the attacking party. When night ]mt an end to
the fighting of both combatants. Hooker was ol)lig<Ml to form a new line for
164
THE CHANCELLORSyiLLE CAMPAIGN.
\
''"' ' "''^^/ \ n< /'„'/,/ ^m%'H '1:1' "l"ll\ I
' '4
iXAJIl'LUli OF XllL LLEVE
his right flank perpendicular to the old one and barely half a mile to the
right of Chancellorsville. Sickles was retired, with the two columns, from his
advanced position in the afternoon to near where Pleasonton had had his
encounter, before mentioned, some distance to the left of the new line of our
right flank and close up to the enemy. The situation was thought to be a
very critical one by Greneral Hooker, who had simply a strong body in front
of the enemy, but without supports, at least near enough to be used for
that purpose. At the same time it was a menace to Jackson's right wing
or flank. Before midnight some of the latter's enterprising men pushed
forward and actually cut off Sickles's line of communication. When this
news was carried to Hooker it caused him great alarm, and preparations
were at once made to withdraw the whole front, leaving General Sickles to
his fate ; but that officer showed himself able to take care of his rear, for he
ordered after a little while a column of attack, and communication was
restored at the point of the bayonet.
The situation of Jackson's corps on the morning of May 3d was a desperate
one, its front and right flank being in the presence of not far from 25,000
men, with the left flank subject to an assault of 30,000, the corps of Meade and
Reynolds, by advancing them to the right, where the thicket did not present
an insurmountable obstacle. It only required that Hooker should brace
himself up to take a reasonable, common-sense view of the state of things,
when the success gained by Jackson would have been turned into an over-
whelming defeat. But Hooker became very despondent. I think that his
being outgeneraled by Lee had a good deal to do with his depression. After
the right flank had been established on the morning of the 3d by Sickles
THE CHANCELLORSniLE CAMPAIGN. 165
getting back into position our line was more compact, with favorable posi-
tions for artillery, and the reserves were well in hand. Meade had been
di-awn in from the left and Reynolds had arrived with the Fu-st Corps. The
engineers had been directed on the previous night to lay out a new line, its
front a half mile in rear of Chancellorsville, with the flanks thrown back,
the right to the Eapidan, a little above its junction with the Rappahannock,
the left resting on the latter river. The Eleventh Corps, or at least that
portion which formed line of battle, was withdrawn from the front and sent
to the rear to reorganize and get its scattered parts together, leaving the fol-
lowing troops in front : one division of the Second Corps on the left from
Mott's Run to Chancellorsville, the Twelfth Corps holding the center and
right flank, aided by the Third Corps and one division of the Second Corps
(French's), on the same flank ; the whole number in front, according to my
estimate, being 37,000 men. The Fkst and Fifth corps in reserve num-
bered 30,000, and, placing the number of reliable men in the Eleventh Corps
at 5000, it will be seen that the reserves nearly equaled those in line of battle
in front.
After the day's mishaps Hooker judged that the enemy could not have
spared so large a force to move around his front without depleting the
defenses of Fredericksburg. Accordingly, at 9 P. M., an imperative order was
sent to the commander of the left wing to cross the river at Fredericksburg,
march upon Chancellorsville, and be in the \dcinity of the commanding gen-
eral at daylight. But Sedgwick was already across the river and three miles
below Fredericksburg. It was 11 p. m., May 2d, when he got the order, and
twelve or fourteen miles had to be marched over by daylight. The night was
moonlight, but any officer who has had experience in making night marches
with infantry will understand the vexatious delays occurring even when the
road is clear ; but when, in addition, there is an enemy in front, with a line
of fortified heights to assault, the problem which Sedgwick had to solve will
be pronounced impossible of solution. However, that officer set his column
in motion by flank, leaving one division that lay opposite the enemy, who were
in force to his left. The marching column, being continually hai'assed by skir-
mishers, did not arrive at Fredericksburg until daylight. The first assault
upon the heights behind the town failed. Attempts to carry them by flank
movements met with no success. Finally a second storming party was organ-
ized, and the series of works were taken literally at tlie point of the bayonet,
though at heavy loss. It was then 11 a. m. The column immediately started for
Chancellorsville, being more or less obstructed by the enemy until its arrival
near Salem Heights, 5 or 6 miles out, where seven brigades under Early, six
of which had been driven from the defenses of Fredericksbm-g, made a stand
in conjunction with supports sent from Lee's army before Chancellorsville.
This was about the middle of the afternoon, when Sedgwick in force attacked
the enemy. Though at first successful, he was subsequently com})ell«'d to
withdraw those in advance and look to his own safety by throwing his own
flanks so as to cover Banks's Foi-d, the friendly proximity of which eventually
saved this wing from utter annihilation.
1 66
THE CHANCELLORS l^ILLE CAMPAIGN.
STATING JACKSON'S ADVANCE, SATURDAY EVENING, MAT 2, WITH ARTILLERY PLACED ACROSS
THE PLANK ROAD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
At about 5 A. M., May 3d, fighting was begun at Chaueellorsville, when
the Third (Sickles's) Corps began to retire to the left of our proper right
flank, and all of that flank soon became fiercely engaged, while the battle ran
along the whole line. The enemy's guns on the heights to our left, as well as
at every point on the line where they could be established, were vigorously
used, while a full division threw itself on Miles at Mott's Run. On the right
flank our guns were well handled, those of the Twelfth Corps being conspicu-
ous, and the opposing lines of infantry operating in the thicket had almost
hand-to-hand conflicts, capturing and recapturing prisoners. The enemy
appeared to know wiiat he was about, for pressing the Third Corps vigorously
he forced it back, when he joined or rather touched the left of Lee's main
body, making their line continuous from left to right. Another advantage
gained by this success was the possession of an open field, from which guns
covered the ground up to the Chancellor House. Upon the south porch of
that mansion Greneral Hooker stood leaning against one of its pillars, observ-
ing the fighting, looking anxious and much careworn. After the fighting had
commenced I doul)t if any orders were given by him to the commanders on
the field, unless, perhaps, "to retire when out of ammunition." None were
received by me, nor were there any inquiries as to how the battle was going
along my front. On the right flank, where the fighting was desperate, the
engaged trooj^s were governed by the corps and division leaders. If the ear
of the commanding general was, as he afterward stated, strained to catch
the sound of Sedg\vick's guns, it could not have heard them in the continuous
uproar that filled the air around him ; but as Sedgwick, who was known as a
fighting officer, had not appeared at the time set — daylight — nor for some
hours after, it was conclusive evidence that he had met with strong opposi-
tion, showing that all of Lee's army was not at Chaueellorsville, so that the
THE CHANCELLORSyiLLE CAMPAIGN. 167
moment was favorable for Hooker to try his opponent's strength with every
available man. Moreovei-, the left wing might at that very time be in jeopardy,
therefore he was bound by every patriotic motive to strike hard for its relief.
If he had remembered Mr. Lincoln's injunction (" Gentlemen, in your next
fight put in all of your men "), the face of the day would have been changed
and the field won for the Union arms.
Not far from 8:30 a. m. the headquarters pennants of the Third and Twelfth
corps suddenly appeared from the right in the open field of Chancellorsville ;
then the Third began to fall back, it was repoi'ted, for want of ammunition,
followed by that portion of the Twelfth fighting on the same flank, and the
division of the Second Corps on its right. It is not known whether any efforts
were made to supply the much-needed ammunition to the Third as well as
the Twelfth Corps, whose ammunition was nearly used up when it retu-ed.
My impression is that the heads of the ordnance, as well as of other impor-
tant departments, were not taken into the field during this campaign, which
was most unfortunate, as the commanding general had enough on his mind
without charging it with details.
The open field seized by Jackson's old corps after the Third Corps drew off
was shortly dotted with guns that made splendid practice through an open-
ing in the wood upon the Chancellor House, and everything else, for that
matter, in that neighborhood. Hooker was still at his place on the porch,
with nothing between him and Lee's army but Geary's division of the Twelfth
and Hancock's division and a battery of the Second Corps. But Geary's right
was now turned, and that flank was steadily being pressed back along his
intrenched line to the junction of the Plank road and the turnpike, when a
cannon-shot struck the pillar against which Hooker was leaning and knocked
him down. A report flew around that he was killed. I was at the time but
a few yards to his left, and, dismoimting, ran to the porch. The shattered
pillar was there, but I could not find him or any one else. Hurrying through
the house, finding no one, my search was continued through the back yard. All
the time I was thinking, " If he is killed, what shall I do with this disjointed
army!" Passing through the yard I came upon him, to my g]-eat joy, mounted,
and with his staff also in their saddles. Briefly congratulating him on his
escape — it was no time to blubber or use soft expressions — I went about my
own business. This was the last I saw of my connnanding general in front. The
time, I reckon, was from 9:15 to 9:30 a. m., I think nearer the former than the
latter. He prol^ably left the field soon after his hurt, but he neitlit>r notified
me of his going nor did he give any orders to me whatever. Having some
little time before this seen that the last stand would be about the Chancellor
House, I had sent to the rear for some of the Second Corps batteries, whicli
had been ordered there by the commanding general, but word came back that
they were so jammed in with other carriages that it was imp(^ssible to extii-
cate them. General ]\reade, heai-ing of my wants, kindly sent forward the ^th
Maine battery belonging to his corps. It was posted in rear of the Clianct^llor
House, where the United States Ford road entin-s the thickest. Witli sudi
precision did the artillery of Jackson's old cori)s i)lay ui^on this battery tliat
THE CHANCELLORS l^ILLE CAMPAIGN.
THE 29th PENNSYLVANIA (OF IvANE'S BRIGADE, GEARY'S DIVISION, TWEI-FTH CORPS) IN THE TRENCHES
UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE, MAY 3.
all of the officers and most of the non-commissioned officers and men were
killed or wounded. The gallant Kirby, whose guns could not be brought up,
was mortally wounded in the same battery \ of which I had for the time placed
him in command, and my horse was killed under me while I was trying to
get some men to train a gun on the flank of the force then pushing Geary's
division. The enemy, having 30 pieces in position on our right, now advanced
some of his guns to within 500 or 600 yards of the Chancellor House, where
there were only four of Pettit's Second Corps guns to oppose them, making
a target of that building and taking the right of Hancock's division in reverse,
a portion of which had been withdrawn from its intrenchments and thrown
back to the left to meet the enemy should he succeed in forcing Mott's Run.
This flank was stoutly held by Colonel Miles, who, by the bye, had been carried
off the field, shot through the body. Lee by this time knew well enough, if
he had not known before, that the game was sure to fall into his hands, and
accordingly plied every gun and rifle that could be brought to bear on us.
Still everything was firmly held excepting Geary's right, which was slowly
falling to pieces, for the enemy had his flank and there was no help for it.
Hiding to Geary's left, I found him there dismounted, with sword swinging
over his head, walking up and down, exposed to a severe infantry fire, when
he said : " My division can't hold its place ; what shall I do ? " To which I
replied : " I don't know, but do as we are doing ; fight it out."
\ The 5th Maine battery, Capt. G. F, Leppien, was the proper commander of Battery I, 1st U. S.
belonged to the First Corps. Captain Leppien and Artillery, Second Corps. The 5th Maine lost 6 men
Lieutenants G. T. Stevens and A. B. Twitchell were killed and 19 wounded ; 43 horses were disabled,
wounded, Capt. Leppien mortally. Lieut. E. Kirby and the guns were hauled off by hand.— Editors.
THE CHANCELLORSyiLLE CAMPAIGN.
169
It was not then too late to save the day. Fifty pieces of artillery, or even
forty, brought up and run in front and to the right of the Chancellor House,
would have driven the enemy out of the thicket, then forcing back Geary's
right, and would have neutralized the thirty guns to the right which were
pounding us so hard. But it is a waste of words to write what might have
been done. Hooker had made up his mind to abandon the field, otherwise he
would not have allowed the Third and part of the Twelfth Corps to leave
their ground for want of ammunition. A few minutes after my inter^dew
with Geary a staff-officer from General Hooker rode up and requested my
presence with that general. Turning to General Hancock, near by, I told
him to take care of things and rode to the rear. The Chancellor House was
then burning, having been fired in several places by the enemy's shells.
At the farther side of an open field, half a mile in the rear of Chancellors-
ville, I came upon a few tents (three or four) pitched, around which, mostly
dismounted, were a large number of staff-officers. General Meade was also
present, and perhaps other generals. General Hooker was \ji\\g down I
think in a soldier's tent by himself. Raising himself a little as I entered, he
said : " Couch, I turn the command of the army over to you. You will with-
draw it and place it in the position designated on this map," as he pointed to
a line traced on a field-sketch. This was perhaps three-quarters of an horn*
after his hurt. He seemed rather dull, but possessed of his mental faculties.
I do not think that one of those officers outside of the tent knew what orders
I was to receive, for on stepping out, which I did immediately on getting my
instructions, I met Meade close by, looking inquiringly as if he expected that
SECOND LINE UE LNIUN UEEENSE AI' TUE JEM. HON Ul TUE ROM>S TO ELY
FORDS. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.
170 THE CHANCELLORSl^ILLE CAMPAIGN.
finally he would receive the order for which he had waited all that long
morning, " to go in." Colonel N. H. Davis broke out : " We shall have some
fighting now." These incidents are mentioned to show the temper of that
knot of officers. No time was to be lost, as only Hancock's division now held
Lee's army. Dispatching Major John B. Burt with orders for the front to
retire, I rode back to the thicket, accompanied by Meade, and was soon
joined by Sickles, and after a little while by Hooker, but he did not interfere
with my dispositions. Hancock had a close shave to withdraw in safety, his
line being three-fourths of a mile long, with an exultant enemy as close in
as they dared, or wished, or chose to be, firing and watching. But every-
thing was brought off, except five hundred men of the Second Corps who,
through the negligence of a lieutenant charged by Hancock with the
responsibility of retiring the force at Mott's Run, were taken prisoners.
However, under the circumstances, the division was retired in better shape
than one could have anticipated. General Sickles assisted in getting men
to draw off the guns of the Maine battery before spoken of. General Meade
wished me to hold the strip of thicket in rear of Chancellorsville, some six
hundred yards in front of our new line of defense. My reply was : " I shall
not leave men in this thicket to be shelled out by Lee's artillery. Its posses-
sion won't give us any strength. Yonder [pointing to the rear] is the line
where the fighting is to be done." Hooker heard the conversation, but made
no remarks. Considerable bodies of troops of different corps that lay in
the brush to the right were brought within the lines, and the battle of
Chancellorsville was ended. My pocket diary. May 3d, has the following:
" Sickles opened at about 5 a. m. Orders sent by me at 10 for the front to
retire; at 12 m. in my new position " ; the latter sentence meaning that at that
hour my corps was in position on the new or second line of defense.
As to the charge that the battle was lost because the general was intoxicated,
I have always stated that he probably abstained from the use of ardent spirits
when it would have been far better for him to have continued in his usual
habit in that respect. The shock from being violently thrown to the ground,
together with the physical exhaustion resulting from loss of sleep and the
anxiety of mind incident to the last six days of the campaign, would tell on
any man. The enemy did not press us on the second line, Lee simply varying
the monotony of watching us by an occasional cannonade from the left, a part
of his army having been sent to Salem Church to resist Sedgwick. Sedgwick
had difficulty in maintaining his ground, but held his own by hard fighting
until after midnight. May 4tli-5th, when he recrossed at Banks's Ford.
Some of the most anomalous occurrences of the war took place in this
campaign. On the night of May 2d the commanding general, with 80,000
men in his wing of the army, directed Sedgwick, with 22,000, to march to his
relief. While that officer was doing this on the 3d, and when it would be
expected that every effort would be made by the right wing to do its part,
only one-half of it was fought (or rather half -fought, for its ammunition was
not replenished), and then the whole wing was withdrawn to a place where
it could not be hurt, leaving Sedgwick to take care of himself.
THE CHANCELLORSl^ILLE CAMPAIGN. 171
At 12 o'clock on the ni^lit of the 4th-5th General Hooker assembled his
corps commanders in council. Meade, Sickles, Howard, Reynolds, and my-
self were present; Greneral Slocum, on account of the long distance from
his post, did not arrive until after the meeting was broken up. Hooker
stated that his instructions compelled him to cover Washington, not to
jeopardize the army, etc. It was seen by the most casual observer that he
had made up his mind to retreat. We were left by ourselves to consult,
upon which Sickles made an elaborate argument, sustaining the views of the
commanding general. Meade was in favor of fighting, stating that he
doubted if we could get off our guns. Howard was in favor of fighting,
qualifying his views by the remark that our present situation was due to the
bad conduct of his corps, or words to that effect. Reynolds, who was lying
on the ground very much fatigued, was in favor of an advance. I had
similar views to those of Meade as to getting off the guns, but said I
" would favor an advance if I could designate the point of attack." Upon
collecting the suffrages, Meade, Reynolds, and Howard voted squarely for
an advance, Si(.-kles and myself squarely no ; upon which Hooker informed
the council that he should take upon himself the responsibility of retiring the
army to the other side of the river. As I stepped out of the tent Reynolds,
just behind me, broke out, " What was the use of calling us together at this
time of night when he intended to retreat anyhow?"
On the morning of May 5th, corps commanders were ordered to cut roads,
where it was necessary, leading from theii* positions to the United States
Ford. During the afternoon there was a very heavy rainfall. In the mean-
time Hooker had in person crossed the river, but, as he gave orders for the
various corps to march at such and such times during the night, I am not aware
that any of his corps generals knew of his departure. Near midnight I got
a note from Meade informing me that General Hooker was on the other side
of the river, which had risen over the bridges, and that communication was
cut off from him. I immediately rode over to Hooker's headquarters and
found that I was in command of the army, if it had any commander. General
Hunt, of the artillery, had brought the information as to the condition of the
bridges, and from the reports there seemed to be danger of losing them
entirely. After a short conference with Meade I told him that the recrossing
would be suspended, and that "we would stay where we were and fight it
out," returning to my tent with the intention of (Mijoying what I had not had
since the night of the 30tli ultimo — a good sleep; but at 2 a. m., communi-
cation liaving been reestablished, I received a sliarp message from Hookei-,
to order the recrossing of the army as he had directed, and everything was
safely transferred to the north bank of the Rappahannock.
In looking for the causes of the loss of ChancellorsvilIt\ tlit» ]»riin;n-y ones
were tliat Hooker expected Lee to fall 1)ack without risking battle. Finding
himself mistaken he assumed the defensive, and was (mtgentM-aled and
became demomlized by the superior tactical boldness of the enemy.
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.
BY ALFRED PLEASONTON, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.
IN the latter part of April, 1863, GeDeral Hooker
decided to undertake an offensive campaign with
the Army of the Potomac against the Army of North-
ern Virginia, under General Lee. At this time the
two armies faced each other : Lee's, numbering about
UMON cAv*LRv-M*Ns HAT. 60,000 mcu, bciug at Fredericksburg, and the Army of
the Potomac, numbering about 130,000 men, at Falmouth, on the north side
of the Rappahannock River opposite Fredericksburg. Hooker directed
three corps of the army, the First, the Third, and the Sixth, comprising
59,000 men, under the command of General Sedgwick, to cross the Rappa-
hannock River below Fredericksburg and hold Lee's army in that position,
while he himself moved secretly and with celerity three corps, the Fifth,
the Eleventh, and the Twelfth, numbering 42,000 men, up the river, cross-
ing it and concentrating them at Chancellorsville, ten miles west of Fred-
ericksburg, with the purpose of moving down upon General Lee's army to
take it in rear and flank — two divisions of the Second Corps being placed
to cover Banks's Ford, the third division being left at Falmouth, while a
brigade and battery were stationed at United States Ford to facilitate the
crossing. The Cavalry Corps, with the exception of one small brigade
of three regiments and a battery of horse artillery, which was left under
my command with the army, was ordered under the command of Gen-
eral Stoneman to make a raid in rear
of Lee's army, and destroy his railroads
and his communications with Richmond. J
-=-=ii j:^-v \A-
B^S^-%
.::s^^j
PABADE AT FALMOUTH OF THE llOTH PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
Tliis rogiraeiit (of N\Tiipple'6 division, Third CorpH) with the 84th Pcnnsylv.'iuia performed desperate service near
Fairview on Sunday morning, May 3d, the 84th losing 215 men and the llOth losing 45 men.— Editors.
\ This corps did great service by drawing off Gen-
eral Lee's cavalry, niulor General J. E. B. Stuart,
to Brandy Station and Oulpeper, tlius depriving
General Lee of their services ; for General Hooker
moved the three corps with him with such celerity
that they passed between Stuart and Lee's army,
and Stuart could not get through to communicate
to Lee what was going on. It will bo seen later on
what a loss this was to Lee, and what a great ad-
vantage it was to the Army of the Potomac. — A. P.
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORSHLLE.
'73
ABANDONING THE WINTER CAMP AT FALMOUTH.
)M A wAit-rnit
On the 26tli of April General Hooker gave his orders for the right wing of
the army to move, the Eleventh and Twelfth corps to be followed by the
Fifth ; the Eleventh and Twelfth to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford,
and the Rapidan River at Germanna Ford ; the Fifth Corps marching from
Kelly's Ford to Ely's Ford, nearer to the mouth of the Rapidan and to Chan-
cellorsville. The left wing of the army, under General Sedgwick, was oi-dered
to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg on the morning of the
29th ; its duty was to keep the enemy as long as possible before Fredericks-
burg, to pursue him if he attempted to fall back on Richmond, and to take
possession of his works and his line of retreat if he marched upon Chancellors-
ville; in other words, Sedgwick was told to hold Lee at Fredericksburg until
Hooker could come down upon him from Chancellorsville and crush liini.
The right wing of the army crossed Kelly's Ford on the morning of the
29th, and the Eleventh and Twelfth corps reached Germanna Ford that
evening. I had the advance of this column with two regiments of cavalry
and a battery of horse artillery ; the third regiment of the cavalry brigade I
sent with the Fifth Corps to Ely's Ford. In the afternoon, at Germanna
Ford, I surprised and captured a picket of some fifty of Stuart's cavalry
soldiei-s. With them was an engineer officer belonging to Stuart's statf. On
searching the party, as is done with all prisoners, I found on this engineer
officer a very bulky volume, which proved to be a diary tliat he had been
keeping throughout the war. I spent the greater part of the night in reading
it, in hopes of finding something that would be of advantage to us ; nor was
I disappointed. This diary stated that in the first week in ^Farch a council
of war had been held at General Stnart's luMidcinarters, which had been
attended by Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, Kwell, and Stuart. They were in
conference over five hours, and came to the decision tiiat the next battle
would be at or near Chancellorsville, and thai tliat i)ositi<»ii mnsl be prepai-ed.
174
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORSyiLLE.
The next day, the 30th of April, I moved on toward Chancellorsville, and
at 1 o'clock in the day I captured a courier or orderly from General Lee, who
had a dispatch from Lee, dated at Fredericksburg, noon of that day, and
addressed to Major-Greneral McLaws, stating that he had just been informed
that the enemy had concentrated in force near Chancellorsville, inquiring
why he had not been kept advised, and saying that he wished to see McLaws
as soon as possible at headquarters. At 2 o'clock p. m., one hour later, I
reported to Greneral Hooker at Chancellorsville, and submitted to him the
diary and General Lee's dispatch, both of which he retained, and I suggested
that we had evidently surprised General Lee by our rapid movements across
the river, and, as Lee had prepared for a battle at Chancellorsville, we had
better anticipate him by moving on toward Fredericksburg. A march of
three or four miles would take us out of the woods into a more open country,
where we could form our line of battle, and where our artillery could be used
to advantage ; we would then be prepared to move on Fredericksburg in the
morning. Besides, such a movement would enable us to uncover Banks's
Ford, which would shorten our communication with General Sedgwick over
5 miles, and bring us within 3^ miles of Falmouth by that Ford.
I was much surprised to find that General Hooker, who up to that time
had been all vigor, energy, and activity, received the suggestion as a matter
of secondary importance, and that he considered the next morning sufficiently
early to move on Fredericksburg. Up to that time General Hooker's strategy
had l^een all that could have been desired. He had outflanked the enemy
and had surprised him by the rapidity of his movements. At 2 o'clock p. m.,
on the 30th of April, General Hooker had ninety chances in his favor to ten
UNION TUOOPS CROSSING THE RAPIDAN AT ELYS FORD. FROM A AVAR-TIME SKETCH.
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORSI^ILLE.
17s
against him. The very cavahy under Stuart that Lee depended on to keep
him ad\dsed had been cut off by the prompt action of the army, and we had
it over the signature of Greneral Lee himself that his army had been suii3rised.
General Hooker had it in his power at that time to have cioished Lee's army
and wound up the war. The Army of the Potomac never had a better oppor-
tunity, for more than half its work had been done before a blow had been
struck, by the brilliancy of its strategy in moving upon Chancellorsville.
I camped my command about a mile from General Hooker's headquarters,
which were at the Chancellor House, and such were my misgivings as regarded
the situation of the army that about dusk I called upon the general again
and stated to him our perilous position.
To the east, toward Fredericksburg, the woods were thick for three or four
miles ; to the south, toward Spotsylvania Court House, the woods extended
about the same distance; to the west, from Hazel Grove, the same condition
of things existed; while the country between Chancellorsville and the Rappa-
hannock River, in our rear, was rough, broken, and not at all suitable for the
operations required of an army. The position of the army at Chancellorsville
extended about three miles from east to west in the narrow clearings, which
did not afford sufficient ground to manoeuvre an army of the size of the Army
of the Potomac. Besides this, we were ignorant of what might be going on
outside of this cordon of woods, and were giving the enemy every opportu-
nity to take us at a disadvantage. Every instinct indu(,'ed me to suggest to
General Hooker, to relieve ourselves from our emlmrrassments, to send the
Eleventh Corps, which was in a miserable position in the woods, down to
Spotsylvania Court House by the Jack Shop road, and make the line of battle
from Chancellorsville to Spotsylvania. This proposition was not approved,
and I then asked permission to send some cavalry to Spotsylvania, to find out
what was going on in the open country beyond the woods. General Hooker
assented to this, and I ordered the 6th New York Cavalry, under Lieuten-
ant-Colonel Duncan Mc Vicar, to proceed down the road from Chancellors-
ville to Spotsylvania, ascertain if the enemy were anywhere in that vicinity,
and, having done so, retui'n before daybreak. This could easily be done, as
the distance was not more than eight miles. Colonel McVicar executed his
orders in splendid style ; he went to Spotsylvania, saw no enemy, but on his
return, it being moonlight, he found a body of cavalry in liis front, barring
his passage to Chancellorsville. He immediately dej)loyed his Regiment, s(^mo
three or four hundred strong, and after a murdci-ous lire from the saddle he
charged the enemy with sabers and comi>let«>ly routed them. This force was
the 5th Virginia Cavalry, and with it were (leiuM-al Stuai-t and statV. They
scattered in every direction and were ]>ursued by the (ith New Yt)rk Cav-
alry until the 2d Virginia Regiment, coming to their assistance, sto])i)ed the
pursuit. The fith New York Cavalry tlien, unmolested, returned to Chancel-
lorsville, but without tlieii- brave conunan<ler, who was killed in the thickest
of the fray.
This action made a strong inqn-ession on llie Confederates, ;ind Stuart, in
order to avoid another such encounter, started his cavah-y in the direction
176
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORSHLLE.
of Spotsylvania Court House, but hw
rear-guard threw the whole column
into confusion by the cry, " The enemy
is upon us." Major von Borcke, a dis-
tinguished officer, who was on General
Stuart's staff, and was present on
this occasion, in describing it, says:
" Shots were fired at hazard in every
direction. The 1st and 3d Virginia
Regiments, no longer recognizing each
other, charge upon each other mutu-
ally ; Stuart's mounted men, generally
so brave and so steadfast, no longer
obey the orders of their officers, and
gallop off in great disorder. At last
quiet is restored, and the brigade final-
ly reaches Spotsylvania Court House,
while the small band which has caused
so much alarm to Stuart was quietly
returning to Chancellorsville."
The next morning at daylight (Fri-
day, May 1st) I reported to General
Hooker the result "of this reconnois-
sance, and he began to realize the im-
portance of the information that had
been conveyed the day before in the
diar}^ of Stuart's engineer officer. The 6th New York Cavahy were only
able to report that they had cut their way through a heavy body of cavalry,
and this by moonlight ; they were unable to say whether any infantry or
artillery were in that direction.
To move the army down on Fredericksburg with an unknown force on its
rear and flank was a hazardous experiment. What could have been done
with safety the day before now became doubtful, and it was this uncertainty
that paralyzed the vigor and action of General Hooker throughout the 1st of
May. Although he started the Second, Fifth, Twelfth, and Third corps in
the direction of Tabernacle Church on the way to Fredericksburg, the move-
ment was not of such a character as to bring success. Upon meeting a stub-
born resistance from General Jackson's forces, and fearing that if he should
become deeply engaged a force from Spotsylvania would take him in the rear
and flank, he withdrew the army and placed it in position at Chancellorsville,
From that time the whole situation was changed. Without striking a blow,
the army was placed on the defensive. The golden moment had been lost,
and it never appeared again to the same extent afterward — an illustration
that soldiers' legs have as much to do with winning victories as theii" arms.
General Lee knew that General Hooker had taken his army back to its
position at Chancellors\dlle. The Third Corps had already been taken from
MAJOR-GENERAL HIRAM G. BERRY, COMMANJ>ING
SECOND DIVISION, THIRD CORPS, KILLED MAY
3, 1863. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORSHLLE. 177
General Sedgwick at Fredericksburg, and at 2 o'clock on the morning of May
2d the First Corps was also ordered up to Chancellors ville, leaving Sedgwick
with the Sixth Corps. These movements did not escape the attention of Gen-
eral Lee, so he decided to assume the offensive and put in operation the plan
which had been suggested by Generals Jackson, A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Stuart
at their council of war in the first week in Marcli. He left a sufficient force
at Fredericksburg to watch Sedgwick, while with the bulk of his army he
moved on Chancellorsville, sending a force under Generals Jackson, A. P.
Hill, and Stuart, to make a turning movement and to attack the Union
forces in the rear and right flank, and roll them up. Lee himself, in the
meantime, with the remainder of his forces, occupied the attention of
the left and center of Hooker's ai'my, to prevent any interference with
the flank movement. General Lee's strategy was the same that Hooker
had carried out so successfully until he stopped at Chancellorsville. Lee
was equally successful in his movements, and we will now investigate the
causes of his failure to give the Army of the Potomac a crushing blow.
On the 2d day of May the right of the Army of the Potomac was the
Eleventh Corps, in the woods near Dowdall's Tavern (Melzi Chancellor's) ; the
Thu'd Corps connected it with the Twelfth Corps at Fairview and Chancellors-
ville, facing south toward the woods ; while the Second and the Fifth corps
were posted to prevent any attack taking the position in the rear and flank
from the east. Throughout the morning of the 2d of May, attacks w«.n'e made
on different portions of our line from the east to the west. These attacks
occurred at intervals of an hour or more, but always farther to the west. I
was satisfied this was done to withdraw oui* attention from the real point of
attack, and I mentioned this to Hooker, who had become more and more im-
pressed with the belief that the information contained in the diary of Stuart's
engineer officer was correct, and that Lee had adopted a plan to carry it out.
In the afternoon of May 2d General Sickles, commanding the Third Corps,
sent in word that the enemy were retreating toward Gordonsville, and that
their wagons and artillery could be seen passing by the Furnace road some
three miles to the south. General Hooker sent for me on receiving this
report, and stated that he was not sure the enemy were retreating; that he
wanted an officer of experience in that part of the field, and that he wished me
to take my command there and keep him promptly informed of everything
that was going on. I asked him if he considered me to be under the orders of
anyone. He replied (piickly, "You are under my orders only; use your
best judgment in doing whatever you think ought to be done."
On arriving at Hazel Grove, about one mile from Chancellorsville, 1 found
that General Sickles was moving two of the divisions of the Third Cori»s in
the direction of Catherine Furnace, and shortly aftei- ho became engaged
there with a strong rear-gnard. Hazel Grove was the liigliest ground in
the neighborhood and was the key of our position, and I saw that if Lee's
forces gained it the Army of the Potomac woidd be worst <m1.
General Sickles wanted some cavaliy to ])roteet liis thinks, and 1 gave him
the Gth New York. This left me witli* onlv the Sth and 17th Pennsylvania
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLOKS^JLLE. 179
regiments and Martin's New York battery of horse artillery. I posted this
command at the extreme west of the clearing, about two hundred yards
from the woods in which the Eleventh Corps was encamped. This i)osi-
tion at Hazel Grrove was about a quarter of a mile in extent, running nearly
north-east and south-west, but was in no place farther than two hundi'ed
yards from the woods, and on the south and east it sloped off into a marsh
and a creek. It commanded the position of the army at Fairview and Chan-
cellorsville and enfiladed oui* line. The moving out to the Furnace of the
two divisions of the Third Corps left a gap of about a mile from Hazel Grove
to the right of the Twelfth Corps. Shortly after General Sickles had been
engaged at the Furnace, he sent me word that the enemy were gi\ang way
and cavalry could be used to advantage in pursuit. Before moving my com-
mand I rode out to the Furnace to comprehend the situation. It was no jjlaee
for cavalry to operate, and as I could hear spattering shots going more and
more toward the north-west, I was satisfied that the enemy were not retreat-
ing. I hastened back to my command at Hazel Grove ; when I reached it,
the Eleventh Corps to oui' rear and our right was in full flight, panic-stricken
beyond description. We faced about, having then the marsh behind us. It
was an ugly marsh, about fifty yards wide, and in the stampede of the
Eleventh Corps, beef cattle, ambulances, mules, artiUery, wagons, and horses
became stuck in the mud, and others coming on crushed them down, so that
when the fight was over the pile of debris in the marsh was manj^ feet high.
I saw that something had to be done, and that very quickly, or the Ai-my of
the Potomac would receive a crushing defeat. The two cavalry regiments
were in the saddle, and as I rode forward Major Keenan of the 8th Pennsyl-
vania came out to meet me, when I ordered him to take the regiment, charge
into the woods, which, as we had previously stood, were to our rear, and
hold the enemy in check until I coidd get some guns into position.^ He
replied, with a smile at the size of the task, that he would do it, and started
off hnniodiately. Thirty men, including Major Keenan, Captain Arrowsniith,
and Adjutant Haddock, never came back. I then directed Captain Martin to
bring his guns into battery, load with double charges of canister, and aim them
so that the shot woidd hit the ground half-way between the guns and the woods.
I also stated that I would give the order to fire. Just then a handsome young
lieutenant of the 4th U. S. Ai'tillery, Frank B. Crosby (son of a distinguished
lawyer of New York City), who was killed the next day, galloped up and said,
" General, I have a battery of six guns ; where shall T go ? wliat shall I do ? '' I
told him to place his battery in line on the right of Martin's battery, and gave
him the same instructions I had given Martin as to liow I wanted him to serve
his guns. These 2 batteries gave me 12 guns, and to obtain more I then
charged 3 squadi'ons of the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry on the stragglers of
the Eleventh Corps to clear the gi-onnd, and with the assistance of tlie rest
of the regiment succeeded in placing 10 more jiicces of artiller\- in line.
The line was then ready for Stonewall Jackson's onset. It was dnsk when
his men swarmed out of the W(H)ds for a (piarter of a mile in our front
3^Seo also statomcnts of Major Edward J. CarpoiittT ami others on p. 1 ST.— Kditors.
i8o
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF C HAN CELLO RSi^l LIE.
(our rear teu minutes before). They came on in line five and six deep, with
but one flag — a Union flag dropped by the Eleventh Corps.
I suspected deception and was ready for it. They called out not to shoot,
they were friends ; at the same time they gave us a volley from at least
five thousand muskets. As soon as I saw the flash I gave the command
to fire, and the whole line of artillery was discharged at once. | It fairly
swept them from the earth ; before they could recover themselves the line
of artillery had been loaded and was ready for a second attack. After
the second discharge, suspecting that they might play the trick of having
their men lie down, draw the fire of the artillery, then jump up and charge
before the pieces could be reloaded, I poured in the canister for about twenty
minutes, and the affair was over. \
When the Eleventh Corps was routed, the situation was this : The nearest
infantry to me was the right of the Twelfth Corps, over a mile off, and
engaged by the forces under Greneral Lee, who was trying to prevent them
from impeding the movements of General Jackson. The two divisions of the
Third Corps were nearly a mile to the west, at the Furnace. Had Jackson
4. Major Clifford Thomson, aide-de-camp on Gen-
eral Pleasonton's staff, in a letter written in 1866
gives the following account of the fight at Hazel
Grove :
" General Pleasonton rode from gun to gun, directing
the gunners to aim low, not to get excited, to make
every shot tell ; the staff-ofticers, catching their cue from
him, did the same, and while at lii'st there had beeu cou-
siderahle excitement and apprehension among us, it
soon quieted down, and every thought and action was
directed to getting the best service out of those guns
that they were capable of rendering. Recovering from
the disorder into which Keenan's charge had thrown
them, the enemy could be seen forming line of battle
in the edge of woods now in oiu' front. They were
scarcely two hundred yards distant ; yet such was the
gloom that they could not be clearly distinguished.
General Pleasonton was about to give the order to fire,
when a sergeant at oue of the guns said :
'" (Jciicral, aren't those our troops? I see our colors
in tlu! Hue!' This was true, for where he pointed our
colors could be seen — trophies picked upon the field.
General Pleasonton turned to me and said :
" ' Mr. Thomson, ride out there and see who those
people are.'
" For myself, I was not at all curious about ' those
people,' being perfectly willing to wait till they intro-
duced themselves. Riding out between our guns, I
galloped to within thirty or forty yards of them; all
along the line they cried out to me, ' Couie on; we're
friends! ' It was quite dark and I (!ould not make out
their uniforms, liut I could hc<; three of our flags, and
these CMUscd me to liesit;(te; I ciinie to u halt, peering
into tlie darkness to uiiike. sure, when a bullet whistled
by ine, ;ind then came ' the rebel yell.' The line charged
up the liill toward our guns, and I led it ! Lying down
upon mv hors(!'s neck, I gave him the si)ur. and the yells
of the ' .Tohnnics ' behind further st iuiulated him. so that
wo got overtlie ground in a lively manner. P.nf with the
report of the first shot fired at me (Jeneral I'leascuiton
had opened fire, and those twenty-two guns belche-dforth
destruction at a fearfully rapid rate. Although lying
down on my horse I kept an eye on the guns and guided
my horse between the flashes, and in less time than it
takes to tell it T was on the safe side of them. It was
load and fire at will for some minutes ; the enemy was
mowed down in lieaps; they could make no headway
against such a cyclone, and ran back down the slope to
the cover of the woods. But still the canister was
poured into them, and a second attempt to charge
the guns failed. Soon Sickles's corps moved from its
advanced position and interposed between us and the
woods ; parties sent out over the field which had been
swept by our guns found the dead and dying lying in
heaps. Old artillery officers have informed me that they
never before heard such rapid firing as occurred at t lat
engagement ; the roar was a continuous one, and the
execution terrific. After it had ceased I rode up to
General Pleasonton and said :
" • General, those people out there are rebels ! '
" There was a grave twinkle in his eye as he held out
his hand and replied :
" ' Thomson, I never expected to see you again ; I
thought if they didn't kill you I should, but that was no
time to stop for one man.'
" I should have agreed with him more cordially if
that one man had been somebody else. After .Sickles
had made his dispositions in our front, we were Mith-
drawn to get forage for our horses, and our part in the
battle of Chanceliorsville was done. Word had gone
out through the army that Pleasonton and his staff
had l)een killed ; so, when tired, sleepy, very dirty, and
extremely hungry, we next morning rode quietly into
our headquarters camp, at the rear, we were looked
upon as persons risen fi-om the dead. One thing I have
forgotten to mention, and that is that we had virtually
no support for those twenty-two guns during the action.
There was a portion of the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry
under the hill, but the men were new recruits and had
not, I beUeve, been imder fire previous to that occasion.
Had the enemy succeeded in gaining the crest of the
knoll, the support would not have made a mouthful for
a single company of Jackson's men. When President
Lincoln visited the army a day or two after this fight,
Oent>ral Pleasonton chanced to caU at Hooker's head-
quarters, when that olflcer said :
" ' Mr. President, this is General Pleasonton, who
saved the Army of the Potomac the other night.'
"The President acknowledged the service in his
usual grateful manner. Only Insjiiration, or the instinct
of a natural soldier, could have enabled Pleaso!it(m to
accomplisli s:> much in so short a time with so small a
force. The fight at Hazel Grove was one of those sharp
and decisive actions pregnant with great results."
\ See also statements of Captain James F. Hun-
tington on p. 188. — Editoks.
THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORSyiLLE. i8i
captured the position at Hazel Grove, these two divisions would have been
cut off from the army. He would have seen General Hooker and his staff'
getting what troops he could to prevent the routed Eleventh Corps from
demoralizing the rest of the army, and the fatal position which that portion
of the army occupied rendered it an easy task to have crushed it. Neither
the Second Corps nor the Twelfth Corps was in position to have defended
itself against an attack by Jackson from Hazel Grove.
For half an hour General Jackson had the Army of the Potomac at his
mercy. That he halted to re-form his troops in the woods, instead of forging
ahead into the clearing, where he could re-
form his troops more rapidly, and where he
could have seen that he was master of the
situation, turned out to be one of those
fatahties by which the most brilliant pros-
pects are sacrificed. When he advanced
upon the artillery at Hazel Grove Jackson
had another opportunity to win, if his in-
fantry had been properly handled. The fire
of his infantry was so high it did no harm ;
they shoidd have been ordered to fire so low
as to disable the cannoneers at the guns.
Had his infantry fire been as effective as
that of our artillery, Jackson would have TIkdVr of'thk^tiViui) divVsiV.n'of the
. T ,-, •,. " rm ,•■,-, n THIRD CORPS, MORTALLY WOINDKD BY
carried the position. The artillery fire w^as a shakp-suootek on the mornin.; of
effective because I applied to it that priii- may4,i863. from a photograph.
ciple of dynarnics in which the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of
reflection, — that is to say, if the muzzle of a gun is three feet from the ground
and it is discharged so that the shot will strike the gi'ound at a distance of
one hundred yards, it will glance from the earth at the same angle at which
it struck it, and in another one hundred yards will be three feet from the
ground. I knew my first volley must be a crushing one, or Jackson, Avitli his
superior numbers, would charge across the short distance which separated
us and capture the artillery before the guns could be reloaded.
After the fight at Hazel Grove I sent into the woods and captured a nnnibcr
of Jackson's men. I asked them to what commarid they belonged. Om^ of
them said to General A. P. Hill's corps, and added, "Tliat was a pretty trick
you })layed us this evening." I asked to what he referred. He replied, " By
withdrawing your infantry, and catching us on your guns," — tlius sliowiiig
that the flight of the Eleventh Corps was looked upon as a ruse. To my
question, if they had suffered much, he said that they had been badly cut
up; that General Jackson had been badly wounded; also General A. W Hill,
and their chief of artillery. I asked how he knew General Jackson had been
wounded. He stated that lie saw him when lie was carried otT the field in a
litter. This information I immediately rejtorted to General Hooker, when lie
directed me to withdraw my command from that ])osition and go into camp
on the north side of the Rappahannock Kiver. It was 4 a. m. of the ;>d of
MAJOR-OENKRAL AMIKI, W. WllUlM.E, COM-
1 82 THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CHANCELLORS^ILLE.
May when I moved from Hazel Glrove. Sickles, with the two divisions of
the Third Corps, reached Hazel drove from the Furnace between half-past
nine and ten on the night of the 2d of May. Some of his troops had fighting
in the woods before I left, but I am unable to say what was its character.
On the morning of the 3d of May (Sunday) General Stuart was in com-
mand of Jackson's forces, Jackson and A. P. Hill having been wounded, as
reported by the prisoner taken the night before. Stuart prepared, with his
usual impetuosity, to renew the attack early that morning, and by one of
those unfortunate occm-rences so prevalent during the war, he caught the
Third CorjDS in motion to take up a new position, connecting with the Twelfth
Corps at Fairview, and facing to the west. This withdrawal enabled Stuart
to take the position at Hazel Grove from which Jackson had been repulsed
the evening before. He saw its advantages at once, and, placing some thirty
pieces of artillery there, he enfiladed the Twelfth Corps at Fair\4ew and
Chancellorsville, and punished the Third Corps severely. The Third Corps
was fighting throughout the day under great disadvantages. To add to the
embarrassments of the army, General Hooker that morning was disabled by
a concussion, and the army was virtually without a head, the different corps
commanders fighting their commands on the defensive. Such extraordinary
conditions forced the Army of the Potomac to fall back from Chancellors-
ville and Fairview, and form a new line of battle to the north and some dis-
tance from Chancellorsville. This line presented a front to the enemy that
could not be enfiladed or turned. Desultory fighting, especially with artillery,
was kept up on the 4th of May ; but Hooker's battle ended on the 3d, after
the army had gained its new position.
It is useless to speculate what General Hooker would have done if he had
not been disabled. Up to the evening of the 2d of May the enemy had
suffered severely, while the Army of the Potomac had comparatively but
few killed and wounded ; but the unfortunate circumstances that contracted
the lines of om* army enabled the enemy to inflict the severest punishment
uj^on all the troops that were engaged. In fact, the greatest injury was
inflicted on the 3d of May, while the army had no commander. Had the First
Corps, which had not been engaged, and the Fifth Corps, still fresh, been
thrown into the action in the afternoon of Sunday, the 3d of May, when Lee's
troops were exhausted from the struggle, they would certainly have made
Chancellorsville what it should have been, — a complete success. These two
corps mustered from 25,000 to 30,000 men. There was no one to order them
into the fight, and a second golden opportunity was lost. The army recrossed
the Rappahannock River on the night of May 5th, and took up again the
position at Falmouth which they had occupied before the campaign.
WHEN STONEWALL JACKSON TURNED OUR RiaHT.
BY JOHN L. COLLINS, 8tH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
ON the afternoon of May 2d, 18G3, the Sth
Pennsylvania Cavalry were ordered to dis-
mount, slack saddle-girths, and rest in the vicinity
of General Hooker's headquarters at Chancellors-
ville. Some of the men fell asleep holding their
horses, some began talking of the battle, while a
knot of officers, who always improved such occa-
sions in this way, sat down to their favorite game
of poker. Suddenly an order from headquarters
made a complete change in the scene. At the
word "Mount! " the sleepers as well as the talkers
sprang to their saddles, the gamblers snatched up
their stakes and their cards, and a regiment of
cavalry took the place of a lounging crowd.
Passing to the left of the Chancellorsville House,
we crossed our line of battle at the edge of a wood
and came up with a reconnoitering party that had
captured the 23d Georgia. We had heard that
Lee was retreating, and supposed that this un-
fortunate regiment had been sacrificed to give the
main body a chance to escape ; but while we were
commiserating the poor fellows, one of them de-
fiantly said, "You may think you have done a
big thing just now, but wait till Jackson gets
round on your right."
We laughed at his harmless bravado, for we
did not think he would betray Jackson's move had
he known anything about it; but while we were
yet trying to get through the thick wood the roar
of musketry and artillery on our right confirmed
his speech. We now came back at a gallop toward
a point between the place where we were rest-
ing and the place where the battle was raging.
As we rode into an elevated clearing, called
Hazel Grove, the regiment (the Sth Pennsylvania)
was brought into line. We surmised a disaster
and neiTously braced ourselves for the ordeal, not
knowing whether we wore to make an attack or
wait there to receive one.
The roar of musketry was now heavier and
nearer; the vast woods between us and Dowdall's
tavern seemed to shake with it. There was no
time to ask or to wonder what had happened, for
the regiment was ordered off at a gallop. After
riding about three hundred yards we turned into a
narrow road that promised to take us into the midst
of the enemy. Half a dozen horsemen in cadet
gray — most likely a general's staff reconnoitering,
as they did not ride in ranks — were in the road
ahead of us, and turned and fled back to their
lines.
The word "Charge!" was now passed from tlie
leading squadron, and sabers flew into the air along
oui' line ; but none too soon, for we were already
in tlie midst of the foe, and they were ready for us.
The UTifortunato scpiailron tliat led caught all the
fire as we dashed along t lie narrow lane, and we wlio
rode next it got oidy the smoke from the enemy's
guns. We could reach nothing as yet, and could
see nothing but fire and smoke. f<ir their line of
battle was safely posted behind a thicket that lined
the left of the road, while their rifles were aimed
through it.
It was a long lane and a hot lane to go through ;
but the lane had a turn, and we got to it at last
when we reached the Plank road and struck
Rodes's division right in the front. We struck it as
a wave strikes a stately ship : the ship is staggered,
maybe thrown on her beam ends, but the wave is
dashed into spray, and the ship sails on as before.
Major Keeiian, who led his battalion in the
charge, the captain in command of the leading
squadron, the adjutant, and a few score of their
followers went down at this shock together. The
detail sent over to recover their bodies after the
battle said that the major had thirteen bullets in
his body, the adjutant nine, and others fewer. It
was reported by some who rode close upon the
major that in falling he shouted, "To the right! "
seeing that the impenetrable masses on his left
could not be forced, and that there was no way
out but over the thinner lines on the right, "\r\lien
turning at full speed, my horse was killed and I
was pitched over his neck on the roadside. Here
I parted company with the regiment. When I
jumped to my feet I had time to take only one
glance at my surroimdings. My sole thought was
to escape capture or death. On one side were
the heavy lines of Confederate infantry doubled
and bent by the charge, their officers trying to
recover their alignment ; on the other side the sur-
vivors of the leading squadrons were galloping in
the Plank road, the others breaking over the Con-
federate skirmish lines as far back as I could see
into the woods.
By instinct I tin-ned toward the woods on the
right of the Plank road as the best way out, and
made a dash at the lines, which had just recovered
from their surprise that a cavalry regiment should
have ridden over them, and were firing after it.
They were loading when I ran out between them,
and when they began to fire I dropped down be-
hind some trees that had been cut to make an
abatis, or had been shot down by tlie cannon;
when the volley was over I jumped up and ran
as fast as before.
Tiie Plank road, and the woods that bordered
it, presented a scene of terror and confusion such
as I had never seen before. Men and animals
were dashing against one another in wild dismay
before the line of fire that came crackling and
crashing after them. The constantly approaching
rattle of musketry, the crash of the shells tlirough
tlio trees, seemed to come from tliree sides upon
the broken fragments of tlio Eleventh Corps that
crowded each other on tlu^ road. Tlie horses of
the men of my regiment who had been shot,
mingled with the pack-muli>s tliat carried the am-
munition of the Eleventli (\irjis. tore like wild
beasts through the woods. I triotl in vain to catch
one.
Tliis
employment of the mules for ammunition
184
WHEN STONEIVALL JACKSON TURNED OUR. RIGHT.
MAJOR PETER KEENAX, KILLED IN THE CHARGE OF
THE 8th PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
service was a device of General Hooker's, and this
was the only field where they played their part.
Each mule carried four or five boxes of spare am-
munition, and being tied in couples, they seemed
easier to catch than a horse. As a pair of them
made for opposite sides of a tree, I ran toward them
to get one, but before I could succeed a shell from
the direction of the Plank road struck the tree,
exploded the ammunition, and slaughtered the
mules.
T now gave up hope of a mount, and seeing the
Confederate lines coming near me, tried to save
myself on foot. Once, when throwing myself down
to escape the fury of the fire, I saw a member of
my own regiment, whose horse also had been shot,
hiding in a pine top that had been cut down by a
shell. He had thrown his arms away that he
might run the faster, and he begged me to do the
same. This I refused to do, and I got in safely
with my arms, while he was never seen again. I
turned into the Plank road to join the very bad
company that came pouring in by that route. More
than half of the runaways had thrown their arms
away, and all of them were talking a language that
I did not understand, but, by their tones, evidently
blaming some one for the disgrace and disaster that
had befallen their corps. They appeared to share
the prevailing confusion on that part of the field,
where the front and the rear seemed reversed.
Yet, as misery loves company, I cast my lot vrith
them and continued my flight.
I doubt if any of us knew where we were going,
further than that we were fleeing before the pur-
suing lines of the enemy. One of my own com-
pany, who was captured in the cliarge, afterward
told me that in leaping an abatis, he was lifted
from his saddle by a vine and remained suspended
till made a prisoner.
In the very height of the flight, we came upon
General Howard, who seemed to be the only man
in his own command that was not running at that
moment. He was in the middle of the road and
mounted, his maimed arm embracing a stand of
colors that some regiment had deserted, while with
his sound arm he was gesticulating to the men to
make a stand by their flag. ^ With bared head he
was pleading with his soldiers, literally weeping as
he entreated the unheeding horde. Under different
circumstances I should have considered it my duty
to follow and find my command, and report for duty
with it. But I could not go past the general.
Maimed in his person and sublime in his patri-
otism, he seemed worthy to stand by, and out of
pure compliment to his appearance I hooked up
my saber and fell into the little line that gathered
about him. As the front became clear, we fired
a few shots at the advance line of the Confeder-
ates, but a fresh mass of fugitives in blue soon
filled the road, and we had to stop firing. The
general now ordered us to cover the whole line of
retreat so as to let none pass, and the oflicers, in-
spired by his devotion, ran in front of their men,
drew their swords, and attempted to stop them.
As the number constantly increased, the press-
ure became greater upon the line that blocked
the way ; but this line was constantly reenforced
by officers and others, and offered some resistance
to the pressure. At last the seething, surging sea
of humanity broke over the feeble barrier, and
General Howard and his oflSeers were carried
away by main force with the tide. Pharaoh and
his chariots could have held back the walls of the
Eed Sea as easily as those officers could resist
this retreat. I started again on my race for life,
this time alone, and toward the slopes of the Chan-
cellorsville plateau, where it seemed to me prob-
able that my regiment would re-form after the
charge.
My course was right-oblique from the road, and
I had not gone far before I saw lines that I knew
were not retreating. Their flags were flying, and
my heart took a bound as I beheld battery after
battery galloping into position, and regiment after
regiment wheeling into line behind them. A line of
battle showed itself at last ; the Third Corps had
come up to stop the successful charge, and Jack-
son's men would find a difference between attack-
ing the Third Corps in front and the Eleventh in
the rear. Seeing the guns unlimber and load. I
made my greatest effort at speed, but not caring
for a few fugitives, the guns belched forth their
fire before I could get in. However, I came safely
through, and at last paused for a long breath. While
congratulating myself upon my escape, I looked
behind the line of battle, and there saw my own
regiment drawn up for a charge, the line not so
long as half an hour before by one-third, but still as
shapely and resolute as ever. The horses were
blown and nervous, and the men were, no doubt,
a little depressed by the rough usage they had
met with. A horse, that had followed the com-
pany riderless from the charge, was given to me.
) See Gcucral Howard's descriiitioii on p. 200.— Editors.
Pl^HEN STONtWALL JACKSON TURNED OUR RIGHT.
i8s
ami my confidence and self-respect came back as
I mounted him, for I was no longer a fugitive, but
a soldier.
The fighting now began in earnest. The splen-
did divisions of Birney, Berry, and Whipple had to
be met and vanquished before a farther advance
could be made, and before Jackson could attain
the great object of his
mai'ch to our rear. The
gathering darkness was
favorable to the Con-
federates, for th<\\-
could get near the gun^
before being seen; but
it also added to the tci -
ror of tlie batteries
which were discharge
double-shotted at the
assailants, and lit u
the heavens with fii
that seemed supernal
The slope was so steep that a line of battle could
be formed in front of the guns and a double skir-
mish line in front of that.
Oui- regiment now moved up to the guns, enabling
us to see better the slopes and the woods when lit
up by the fiashes. Sometimes darkness and still-
ness would reign for a few minutes, and we would
ural. Tliu dusky liiii'S I'l'U luu'k iiitu tlic wumls
in disorganized masses as often as th(>y advanced,
and the cheers of our troops rang out at each re-
treat. From tlie ))()ldness and tiie freiiuency of
the Confederate charges it was found necessary to
move the infantry in front of the guns, lest the
enemy should seize them before being discovered.
VOL. HI. 13
think till' h>Mg day's lighting was over, but it w«>uld
ircsinlly breakout again. Tlio steiiltiiy rush from
the woods could bo heard tirst, then the sharp
crack of the skirmishei-'s ritle. then a yell and »i
louder nisliing of tiicir lines nu't by tlie loud roll
of tlie line ..f l.attl.'"s lire. As th.' cheer of our
nu'u announced that the enemy's line was again
in retreat, the blaze of f.u-ty or lifty cannons from
the right to the left w«.uM light up the scene and
carry death over the heads of our men into the
woods beyon«l.
i86 THE CHARGE OF THE EIGHTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY.
At last Jackson's men paused, for they had been
marching and fighting since morning, and human
nature could endure no more. But they were not
allowed to hold the ground they had won ; an ad-
vance was now ordered on our side, and it was
made with a vigor that avenged the discomfiture
of our comrades. Though it was now midnight
the woods were lit up with the flame of the mus-
ketry as the combatants came face to face among
the trees, and the battle began anew. The artil-
lerists pushed on their guns by hand a hundred
yards behind the infantry line, and shook the
woods in their depths, as they had the hills to
their foundations. At last, at 2 o'clock in the
morning, we were told to sleep on our arms. But
who could sleep while counting the dead of our
commands ? Comrades were gone ; file-leaders and
file-closers were gone ; officers of every grade had
perished. Stonewall Jackson himself had gone
down in his greatest charge ; and his men never
again fought as on that day, nor came down on our
flank with such fury.
THE CHARaE OF THE EIGHTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY. Z,
I. BY PENNOCK HUEY, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.
JUST as we reached Hazel Grove, at Scott's Run
Crossing, at half -past 6 o'clock p. M., May 2d,
a staff-officer rode up in a state of great excite-
ment and reported to General Sickles that the
enemy had flanked General Howard's corps, and
that he had been sent for a regiment of General
Pleasonton's cavalry. General Sickles immediately
ordered General Pleasonton to send a regiment.
General Pleasonton then ordered me to report with
my regiment as quickly as possible to General
Howard, whom I would probably find near the old
Wilderness church. There were no other orders
given to me or to any officer of my regiment. 4-
I found the regiment, standing to horse, on the op-
posite or north side of Hazel Grove, near the road.
The wood in front was so thick with underbrush
that a bird could scarcely fly through it ; much less
could a cavalry charge have been made. On in-
quiring for the adjutant of the regiment, and on
being informed by some of the men where he was,
I rode to the poiut designated and found Major
Peter Keeiian, Captain William A. Dailey, Adju-
tant J. Haseltine Haddock, and Lieutenant Andrew
B. Wells playing cards under a tree. When I
ordered them to mount their commands they were
all in high spirits about the game, Keenan remark-
ing : "Major, you have spoiled a good game ! "
After mounting the regiment I rode off at its
head in my proper place, followed by four other
officers, all of whom belonged in front except
Lieutenant Carpenter, who commanded the second
company of the first squadron, and might properly
have been in the rear of the first company, where
he undoubtedly would have been had I supposed
there was danger ahead. The officers in front were :
Major PennockHuey, commander of the regiment;
Major Peter Keenan, commander of the first bat-
talion; Captain Charles Arrowsmith, commander
of the first squadron ; Lieutenant J. Edward Car-
penter, commander of the second company; and
Adjutant J. Haseltine Haddock, whose place was
with me unless otherwise ordered. We rode through
the wood toward the Plank road; there was no
unusual stir or excitement among the men or oflfi-
l3> Extracted by permission and coudeused from " A
True History of the Cliargc of the 8th Pennsylvania
Cavalry at Chanecllorsville," by rcunock Huey, Phila-
delphia, 1885.— Editors.
cers of the regiment, the impression being that the
enemy were retreating, and all who had not heard
of General Howard's disaster felt happy with the
thought that the battle was almost over. No one
in the regiment, with the exception of myself, knew
where we were going or for what purpose.
From the information I had received from Gen-
eral Pleasonton, and from hearing the aide make
his report before I started, I had no idea that we
would meet the enemy till after I had reported to
General Howard. Therefore the surprise was as
great to us as to the enemy, as we were entirely
unprepared, our sabers being in their scabbards.
When we arrived almost at the Plank road, we dis-
covered that we had ridden right into the enemy,
the Plank road in our front being occupied by
them in great force, and that we were completely
surroimded, the woods at that point being filled
with flankers of Jackson's column, who were
thoroughly hidden from our view by the thick
undergrowth. It was here that I gave the com-
mand to " draw sabers and charge,'' which order
was repeated by Major Keenan and other officers.
The charge was led by the five officers already
named, who were riding at the head of the regi-
ment when we left Hazel Grove. On reaching the
Plank road it appeared to be packed about as
closely with the enemy as it possibly could be.
We turned to the left, facing the Confederate
column, the regiment crowding on, both men and
horses in a perfect fi'enzy of excitement, which
nothing but death could stop. We cut our way
through, trampling down all who could not escape
us, and using our sabers on all within reach, for a
distance of about 100 yards, when we received a
volley from the enemy, wliicli killed Major Keenan,
Captain Arrowsmith, and Adjutant Haddock, three
of the noblest and most gallant officers of the war,
besides a large number of men. All three of the
above-named officers fell at the same time and
from the same volley, Major Keenan falling against
me and lighting on the ground under my horse. A
few days afterward liis body was found near the
spot where he had fallen.
4- General Huey was at this time Ma,ior (afterward
Colonel) of the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, and was
the senior offlcer present with it. [See also p. 187.]—
Editors.
THE CHARGE OF THE EIGHTH PENNSYLyANIA CAK4LRY.
187
BY J. EDWARD
CARPENTER, MAJOR, 8TH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY. |
THERE was no confusion at Hazel Grove when
the regiment received its orders and left that
place. No enemy was in sight. Indeed, until after
the 8th Pennsylvania had left the place there was
not the slightest evidence that the enemy was in
the immediate neighborhood, excepting, perhaps,
that the musketry-firing seemed to be drawing
nearer. The charge of the regiment was made on
the Plank road, about three-quarters of a mile
from where Pleasonton was at Hazel Grove, and
was first 'ordered by the commanding officer of
the regiment at the moment when the emergency
arose.
The writer of this, although himself a participator
in the charge, was unable to recognize General
Pleasonton's description of it and the surround-
ing scenes attending it. [See p. 179.] A letter
from the writer to a member of his family, vsTitten
three days after the charge, is now before him.
From this letter the following is extracted:
" We lost, however, I regret to say, three gallant offi-
cers, Major Keeuan, Captain Arrowsmlth and Adjufant
Haddock. Major Huey and . . . were the only ones
who came out from the head of the column. All the rest
were killed, wounded, or prisoners."
Wlien this letter was written on the 5th of May,
IS 03, there was no thought of controversy. It
was intended only for the eye of the person to
whom it was written, with no idea that it would be
preserved.
General Pleasonton's report of the operations of
his command at Chancellorsville, dated May 18th,
18 63, makes no mention of Keenan, but com-
mends Huey as the commander of the regiment
and indorses his report. In Major Huey's report
of the operations of the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry,
dated May 9th, 1863, he states that he was
ordered to report, with his command, to General
Howard, and no mention is made of any order
from General Pleasonton to charge. This report
was before Pleasonton when his own report was
made, and no exception was ever taken to it.
In Colonel Thomas C. Deviu's report of the 2d
brigade, dated May 12th, 1863, he states that
the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry was sent to the sup-
port of General Howard, and Major Huey is com-
plimented as the commander of the regiment. No
mention is made of an order to Keenan to charge,
and Keenan is only referred to as having gallantly
fallen.
III. BY ANDREW B. WELLS, CAPTAIN, CO. P, STH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY. |
OUR regiment, on the second day of May, 1863,
was awaiting orders in a clearing of wooded
country called Hazel Grove. We had been there
some little time. Everything was quiet on the
front. The men were gathered in groups, chatting
and smoking, and the officers were occupied in
much the same manner, wondering what would
turn up next.
About 4 o'clock I suggested a game of draw
poker. An empty cracker-box, with a blanket
thrown over it, served as a card-table. The party
playing, if I mistake not, was composed of Major
Keenan, Adjutant Haddock, Captain Goddard,
Captain W. A. Daily, and myself. We had been
playing about two hours — the game was a big one
and we were all absorbed in it — when, about 6 P. M.,
it was brought to an abrupt end by the appearance
of a mounted officer. Riding up to where we were
playiTig, he asked in an excited manner : " Who is in
command of this regiment ? " Major Keenan, who
was seated beside me, turned his head and said, in
a joking way: "I am; what's the trouble?" Our
visitor replied : " General Howard wants a cavalry
regiment." And before wo had time to ask further
questions he was off, and the next moment we were
all on our feet, and our game was ended. I remem-
ber it perfectly well, for I was out of pocket on the
play. ^ The regiment was mounted, I mountinp: at
the same time and alongside of Major Keenan. We
then moved out of Hazel Grove by twos. Keenan,
Haddock, Arrovvsmith, Huey, and Cai-penter moved
out with the first squadron. I remember distinctly
seeing that group of officers, and did not see Gen-
eral Pleasonton at the time.
I was under the impression, and believe that the
other officers also were, that we were on our road
to report to General Howard. Anyhow, I fell in
with the second squadron, Captain William A.
Corrie being in command, and he and I rode to-
gether at the head of it. When we passed out of
the clearing there were no officers or men on our
flank, all was in order ahead, and the command
was moving at a walk. The command entered
the woods and was still moving on a walk, when,
at the distance of about one mile from where
we had mounted, Captain Corrie and myself saw
the first squadron take the trot, leaving a space
between us of about twenty-five yards. At the
same time we heard the command, " Draw sabers,"
and saw the first squadron draw them. We then
heard the musketry-firing. It was given in con-
tinuous but distant volleys.
We of the second squadron knew that our time
was at liand, and Cai>tain Corrie gave the onler to
draw sabers and charge. Taking a trot, we found
that the road took a bend as we jiroceedecl. Wlu-n
we turned the corner of the wood-road a sight met
our eyes that it is impossible for me to describe.
After charging over tlie dead men and horses of
the first squadroTi we charged into .Tnckson's col-
umn, and. as luck would liave it, found them with
empty guns — thanks to our poor comrades ahead.
I Taken by pcrraiseion from the " Philadolpliia Weekly Press." Octolier 13th, 1886. and oondonsed.— Editors*.
A Captain Wells has elsewhere said that at G:JO by liis watdi, Major TIncy rodo up and pave the order to
mount.— Editors.
THE ARTILLERY AT HAZEL GRO^E.
The enemy were as thick as bees, and we appeared
to be among thousands of them in an instant.
After we reached the Plank road we were in
columns of foui-s and on the dead run, and when
we struck the enemy there occurred a "jam" of
living and dead men, friends and enemies, and
horses, and the weight of the rear of our squadron
broke us into utter confusion, so that at the mo-
ment every man was for himself.
The third squadron, which Captain P. L. Goddard
commanded, was in our rear, and came thundering
along after us, but as to the balance of the regi-
ment I do not know how they came in or got out.
The enemy wei'e as much surprised as we were,
and thought, no doubt, as they now say, that the
whole cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac
was charging them. I distinctly remember hearing
a number of them call out, " I surrender, I sur-
render." We did not stop to take any prisoners
for fear of being captured ourselves, — I had been
caught once and was just out of Libby prison and
did not want to be captm-ed again, — but made for
our lines as best we could.
The whole affair was accidental. We were on
our way to report to General Howard, some three
miles from where we were encamped, and the
country that General Howard's staff-officer had
just passed over in quest of the cavalry had in the
meantime been crossed by Stonewall Jackson's
troojjs, and in following tjae same track we natu-
rally ran into them. The officers who were at the
head of our column, seeing the situation, had only
an instant to determine what was to be d6ne. We
could not turn around and get out in the face of
the enemy, and the only thing left for us was to go
through them, " sink or swim."
Can any man who was a soldier for one moment
imagine an officer deliberately planning a charge
by a regiment of cavalry, strung out by twos in a
eolvmin half a mile long in a thick wood ?
THE ARTILLERY AT HAZEL GROVE.
BY JAMES F. HUNTINGTON, CAPTAIN, BATTERY H, IST OHIO ARTILLERY,
^rxT'HEN Jackson's advance struck the Eleventh
VV Corps, four batteries had been for some
time waiting orders in the extensive clearing
known as Hazel Grove. Of these, "H," 1st Ohio
Light Artillery, and the 10th and 11th New York
Independent Batteries belonged to Whipple's di-
vision of the Third Corps. They were left there
when that division passed through en route to join
the force operating imder General Sickles near the
Furnace. Later, Martin's horse battery, with
Devin's cavalry brigade, arrived and took gi'ound
on the opposite or south side of the field. When
the sound of battle indicated that the enemy were
driving in the right of the army, and were ap-
proaching Hazel Grove, the batteries of Whipple's
division were brought into position under my
direction, as acting chief of artillery. Although
the movement was delayed by causes beyond my
control until its execution had become exceedingly
difficult, our eighteen guns were established in
battery, ready to open before the enemy fired
a shot or were in a position to do so. General
Pleasonton seems to be unaware of that fact, or
he would hardly have failed to allude to it. It is,
f^Jw reply to statements contained in General Pleas-
oiitoii'H paper, y. 179.— Editors.
^ (ieiKial Sickles says in lii8 official report: " I coa-
fliled to I'lcasoiitou tlie direction of the artillery — three
batteries of my reserve — Clark's, Lewis's |loth New
York, of Huntington's command] andTurnbnll's. and his
own horse-battery. . . . The fugitives of tlie Kleventh
Corps swarmed from the woods and swept frantically
over the cleared fields in which my artillery was parked.
. . . The enemy showing himself on the plain. Pleas-
onton met the attack at short range with the well-
directed fire of twenty-two pieces doulih-sliot fed with
canister." According to this one of Huntington's three
therefore, fair to presume that his attention was
engrossed by the supervision of Martin's battery,
as detailed in his paper. General Sickles, on his
arrival, soon after the firing ceased, sent for
me and warmly expressed his approbation of the
manner in which my command had held the
ground. )
Nothing on wheels from the Eleventh Corps
passed through Hazel Grove. The vehicles that
stampeded through my lines while in process of
formation were forges, battery-wagons, ambu-
lances, etc., belonging to the Third Corps, left in
the cross-road leading to the Plank road, when
that corps went out to the Furnace to attack Jack-
son's column. So whatever else may have formed
the components of the remarkable tumi(lus de-
scribed by General Pleasonton, it certainly did not
contain the debris of the Eleventh Corps. As for
the tiinudus itself, it escaped my observation when
I crossed the bog he refers to on Sunday morning
with my battery, or what there was left of it, at the
pressing solicitation of Archer's Confederate bri-
gade.
Boston, October 14th, 188G.
batteries (Lewis's 10th New York) was placed under
Pleasonton's control. Probably this battery, with Turn-
bull's, Clark's, and Martin's, made up the twenty-two
guns mentioned by both Sickles and Pleasonton. Gen-
eral Hunt, the chief of artillery of the army, says : " When
the Eleventh Corjis was broken up and routed on the
2d, . . . (4eTieral Pleasonton collected some batteries
belonging to different corps (Martin's Horse Artillery,
Gth New York, six 3-ineh guns, Clark's B, 1st New
Jersey, six lO-pounders ; Lewis's 10th New York, six
light IS-pounders; TurnbuU's F and K, 3d U. S., six 12-
pounders), and with them formed a large battery of
twenty-four guns."— Editors.
RACE ON THE PLANK ROAD FOR RIGHT OF WAY, BETWEEN THE NINTH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY AND A BAGGAGE TRAIN.
THE ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.
BY OLIVER O. HOWARD, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.
THE country around Chancellorsville for the most part is a wilderness,
with but here and there an opening. If we consult the recent maps (no
good ones existed before the battle), we notice that the two famous rivers, the
Rapidan and the Eappahannock, join at a point due north of Chancellors-
ville ; thence the Rappahannock runs easterly for two miles, till suddenly at
the United States Ford it turns and flows south for a mile and a half, and
then, turning again, completes a horse-shoe bend. Here, on the south shore,
was Greneral Hooker's battle-line on the morning of the 2d of May, 1863.
Here his five army corps, those of Meade, Slocum, Couch, Sickles, and
Howard, were deployed. The face was toward the south, and the ranks
mainly occupied a ridge nearly parallel with the Rapidan. The left touched
the high ground just west of the horse-shoe bend, while the bristling front,
fringed with skirmishers, ran along the Mineral Spring road, bent forward to
take in the cross-roads of Chancellorsville, and then, stretching on westerly
through lower levels, retired to Dowdall's Tavern. Just beyond Dowdall's
was a slight backward hook in the line, partially encircling Talley's Hill, a
sunny spot in the forest between the Orange Plank road and the j^ike. This
pike is an old roadway which skirts the northern edge of Talley's farm, and
makes an angle of some forty degrees with the Orange Plank roatl.
At dawn of that eventful day General Hooker was at Chancellorsville.
Slocum and Hancock were just in his front, infantry and artillery deployed
to the right and left. French's division was in his rear. ^Meade occupied the
extreme left, and my corps, the Eleventh, the right. Sickles connectcil me
with Slocum. Our lines covered between five and six miles of frontage, and
Hooker was near the middle point. The main body of our cavalry, under
Stoneman, had gone off on a raid upon Lee's communications, and the
remainder of the Army of tlie Potomac was under the sturdy Sedgwick,
beyond Fredericksbui-g.
Our opponents, under (Jeneral l^.l)ei-t E. Lee, the evening before, were
about two miles distant towai-d Fi-edeiicksbuig, and thus between us and
Sedgwick. Lee had immediately witli him the divisions of ^NFcLaws, Andei--
son, Rodes, Colston, and A. P. liill, besides some cavalry under Stuart. He
190
THE ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSyiLLE.
THE OLD CHANCELLOR HOUSE, BURNED DURING THE BATTLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
held, for his hue of battle, a comparatively short front between the Rappa-
hannock and the Catherine Furnace, not exceeding two miles and a half in
extent. His right wing, not far from the river, was behind Mott's Run, which
flows due east, and his left was deployed along the Catherine Furnace road.
Could Hooker, on the first day of May, have known Lee's exact location,
he never could have had a better opportunity for taking the offensive. But
he did not know, and after the few troops advancing toward Fredericksburg
had met the approaching enemy he ordered all back to the " old position,"
the Chancellorsville line, which I have just described.
On the preceding Thursday, the last of April, the three corps that con-
stituted the right wing of the army, Meade's, Slocum's, and mine, had crossed
from the north to the south side of the Rapidan, and by 4 o'clock in the after-
noon had reached the vicinity of Chancellorsville, where Slocum, who was
the senior commander present, established his headquarters. I, approaching
from Germanna Ford, halted my divisions at Dowdall's Tavern and encamped
them there. Then I rode along the Plank road through the almost continuous
forest to the Chancellorsville House. There I reported to Slocum. He said
that the orders were for me to cover the right of the general line, posting my
command near Dowdall's Tavern. He pointed to a place on the map marked
"Mill" near there, on a branch of Hunting Run [see map, p. 193], and said,
" Establish your right there." General Slocum promised, with the Twelfth
Corps, to occupy the space between his headquarters and Dowdall's clearing ;
but, finding the distance too great, one of his division commanders sent me
word that I must cover the last three-quarters of a mile of the Plank road.
THE ELEl/ENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSl^/LLE.
191
POSITION OF THEIVj; CORPS
at 6p.Tn.yray2. 1863.
SCALE or 1 MILE
This was done by a brigade of General Steinwehr, the commander of my left
division, though with regret on oui' part, because it required all the corps
reserves to fill up that gap.
The so-called Dowdall's Tavern was at that time the home of Melzi Chan-
cellor. He had a large family, including several gi'own people. I placed my
headquarters at his house. In front of me, facing south along a curving
ridge, the right of Stein wehr's division was located. He had but two brigades.
Barlow on the Plank road and Buschbeck on his right. With them Stein-
wehr covered a mile, lea\ang but two regiments for reserve. These he put
some two hundred yards to his rear, near the little "Wilderness Church."
Next to Stein wehr, toward our right, came General Carl Schurz's division.
First was Captain Dilger's battery. Dilgcn* was one of those handsome,
hearty, active young men that
everybody liked to have near.
His guns pointed to the south-
west and west, along the
Orange Plank road. Next
was Krzyzanowski's brigade,
about half on the front and
half in reserve. Schurz's right
brigade was that of Schim-
melfennig, disposed in the
same manner, a part deployed
and the remainder kept a few
hundred yards back for a re-
serve. Schurz's front line of
infantry extended along the
old turnpike and faced to the
south-west. The right di\'ision
of the corps was commanded
by General Charles Devens,
afterward attorney-general in the cabinet of President Hayes. Devens
and I together had carefully reconnoitered both the Orange Plank road
and the old tm-npike for at least three miles toward the west. After this
reconnoissance he established his division, — the Second Brigade, under
McLean, next to Schurz's first, and then pushing out on tlie i)ike for half a
mile lie deployed the other, Gilsa's, at right angles facing west, connecting
his two parts by a thin skirmish-line. Colonel Gilsa's brigaile was afterward
drawn back, still facing west at right angles to the line, so as to make a more
solid connection, and so that, constituting, as it did, the main rigiit tlank,
the reserves of the corps could be brought more promj^tly to its support,
by extending its right to the north, should an enemy by any p(^ssible con-
tingency get so far around. A section of Dieckniann's battery wliicli looked
to the west along the old ])ike was located at the angle.
The reserve batteries, twelve gims, wiM-e put upon a ridge alneast of the
Uttle church and pointed toward the north-west, with a view to sweep all
192 THE ELEl/ENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSl^ILLE.
approaches to the north of Gilsa, firing np a gradually ascending slope. This
ridge, where I stood during the battle, was central, and, besides, enabled the
artillerymen to enfilade either roadway, or meet an attack from south, west,
or north. Here epaulments for the batteries were constructed, and cross-
intrenchments for the battery supports
were dug, extending from the little
church across all the open ground that
stretched away from the tavern to the
right of Devens's line.
To my great comfort. General Sickles's
corps came up on Friday, May 1st, and
took from our left Stein wehr's three-
quarters of a mile of the Plank road.
Thus he relieved from the front line
Barlow's large brigade, giving me,
besides the several division reserves,
' ' - General Barlow with 1500 men as a
DowDALL's TAVERN, HOWARD'S HEADQUARTERS, gcucral rcscrvc for tlic corps. Thcse
KROH A WAR-TIME PHOTooRAPH. ^^^.^ masscd ucar thc cross-iutrcnch-
ments, and held avowedly to support the batteries and protect General
Devens's exposed right flank.
As to pickets, each division had a good line of them. My aide, Major
Charles H. Howard, assisted in connecting them between divisions, and dur-
ing the 2d of May that fearless and faithful staff-officer, Major E. Whittlesey,
rode the entire circuit of their front to stimulate them to special activity.
Those of Devens were "thrown out at a distance from a half-mile to a
mile and stretching well around covering our right flank " ; J and the picket-
posts in front on the pike were over two miles beyond the main line.
The nature of the country in the neighborhood of the three adjoining farms,
Dowdall's, Talley's, and Hawkins's, became well known to the Army of the
Potomac in subsequent experiences, never to be forgotten. It is the terrible
" Wilderness " where, later in the war, so many brave men fell. Here were
stunted trees, such as scraggy oaks, bushy firs, cedars, and junipers, all entan-
gled with a thick, almost impenetral)le undergrowth, and criss-crossed with an
abundance of wild vines. In places all along the
south-west and west front the forest appeared ^^>^^^
impassable, and the skirmishers could only \lj^^A^suJi^>^^^^^^
work their way through with extreme difficulty. ^_y^S^^ / /"'^a
To the officers of the Eleventh Corps tlie r '^'^ - ' ' R
position was never a desirable one. It pre-
sented a flank in the air. We were more than
four miles south from Ely's ford, where were
Hooker's nearest cavalry flankers. In his re- ' ^
port after the battle, General Schurz says : dowdall's tavern in issi.
^See General Devens's report of Chaneellorsville (''Official Records," Vol. XXV., Part I.,
p. 632).— O. O. H.
THE ELEl^ENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSl/lLLE.
'93
THE WILDERNESS CHURCH (IN THE LEFT MIDDLE-GROUND) AND HAWKINS'S FARM (ON THE RIGHT)
AS SEEN FROM THE PLANK ROAD IN FRONT OF DOWDALL'8 TAVERN.
" Our right ought to have been drawn back toward the Eapidan, to rest on
that river at or near the mouth of Hunting Run, the corps al)andouing so
much of the Plank road as to enable it to establish a solid line." Yes ; but
we were ordered to Dowdall's Tavern, and not to the Eapidan, three or four
miles in our rear ! And our right was fixed for us at the " Mill." It is true
the mill no longer existed, but the point required was not doubted. Again,
this position, which Schurz reconnnended in his report subsequent to our
battle, was the very one into which Hooker's whole army was forced two
days afterward. He was so cramped by it that he did not dare to take the
offensive. In that position, "solid" and fortified as it was, our army, out-
numbering Lee's, was so badly handled by the enemy that Hooker at last
deemed it safer to return to the north side of the Rappahannock.
The strength of Hooker's five corps, and Reynolds's, wliich was not far
behind, was, on the morning of the 2d of May, about OO,^)!)!) effectives. The
right corps, the Eleventh, had in all, artillery and infantiy, twi^lve thousand
men. Lee faced us with five large divisions, having on the spot alunit 40,000
rifles, with considerable artillery.
In my youth my brother and I had a favorite spot in an upper field of my
father's farm from wiiicli we were accustomed, after the first s>nuptoms of a
coming storm, to watch the operations of the contending winds ; the sudden
194
THE ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSyiLLE.
gusts and whirlwinds; the sideling swallows excitedly seeking shelter; the
swift and swifter, black and blacker clouds, ever rising higher and pushing
their angry fronts toward us. As we listened we heard the low rumbling
from afar; as the storm came nearer the woods bent forward and shook
fiercely their thick branches; the lightning zigzagged in flashes, and the
deep-bassed thunder echoed more loudly, till there was scarcely an interval
between its ominous crashing discharges. In some such manner came on that
battle of May 2d to the watchers at Dowdall's Tavern and Talley's farm-house.
The first distant symptom occurred on the evening of May 1st. Then was
heard the sudden crack of rifle-shooting. It began with Steinwehr's skir-
mishers, and then passed on to Schurz. Schimmelfennig pushed out a
brigade straightforward toward the south-west and received a sudden fire of
artillery from the intruders. They left him and pushed on.
It was " a rolling recohnoissance," evidently to determine, for Lee's and Jack-
son's information, the position of our flank. They probably had, however, some
more certain knowledge, gained from one or two of the enterprising residents
let loose during that Friday by our general forward movement. We forgot
these friends to Lee as we excitedly marched to Friday's battle. When we
unexpectedly came back, some of these residents, with little baskets of pro-
visions in hand, were gone beyond recall. I suspect that the commander of
the "roUing reconnoissance " and the said residents formed part of the
famous night conference of Lee and Jackson, where cracker-boxes served as
seats and tables. G-eneral Lee says : " It was therefore resolved to endeavor
to turn his right flank and gain his rear, leaving a force in front to hold him
in check and conceal the movement. The execution of this plan was intrusted
to Lieutenant-General Jackson with
his three divisions."
Jackson's movement, with a stronger
indication of battle, began at sunrise,
Rodes, Colston, and A. P. Hill, in the
order named, following the old road
by the Catherine Furnace, there shov-
ing off farther south to get beyond
the sight of our men ; then sweeping
around by a private road, well known
to them, up to the Orange Plank road ;
and thence on, perhaps a mile farther,
through the wild forest till the old
turnpike was found and crossed. The
Catherine Furnace, nearly opposite
Sickles's right and two and a half
miles distant, gave an open reach and
fully exposed the moving column to
view. Except at that point the Con-
federates were covered by woods and
by Stuart's busy and noisy cavalry.
THE WILDERNESS CHURCH. FROM A WAR-TIME
PHOTOGRAPH. SEE PREVIOUS PAGE.
THE ELEl^ENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSl^lLLE.
193
>_..-.
, ''^' J
About sunrise at Dowdall's I heard cheering. It Avas a hearty sound, with
too much bass in it for that of the enemy's charge. It was occasioned l)y
General Hooker, with Colonel Comstock and a few staff-officers, riding along
slowly and inspecting the lines. Oeneral Sickles says of this : " It is impos-
sible to pass over without mention the irrepressible enthusiasm of the troops
for Major-General Hooker, which was evinced in hearty and prolonged cheers
as he rode along the lines of the Third, Eleventh, and Twelfth corps."
I was ready, mounted, and with my officei-s joined the ever-increasing caval-
cade. Hooker observed the troops in position ; Barlow, who filled the cross-
trenches an hour later, had not yet come out of the front line, so that my
reserves just at that time were small. Hooker noticed the breastworks,
unusually well built by Schurz and Devens. He passed to the extreme right,
and then returned by the shortest route. As he looked over the barricades,
while receiving the salutes and cheers of the men, ho said to me, " How
strong ! How strong ! "
I still had much extension, so that there were gaps along Scluirz's and
Devens's fronts. Colonel Comstock spoke to me in his quiet way : " General,
do close in those spaces ! "
I said, "The woods are thick and entangled; will anybody c*)!!!.' throui^di
there ? "
" Oh, they may ! "
His suggestion was heeded. During the I'ortMioon (Jciieral Sickles discov-
ered Jackson's moving colu!nn. It was i)assing toward Orange Court HiMise,
so everybody said. Sickles forwarded all reports to General Hooker, who
now returned to Chancellorsville. He tried to divine Jacksi^iV ])urpose.
About midday Sickles received General Hooker's orders to advance scnith
cautiously. Soon after, perhaps by 2 r. m., there was a stronger apprehension
196 THE ELEl/ENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSl/lLLE.
of a conflict, for there was a sharp skirmish in the direction of Catherine
Fiu-nace. The rattle of musketry followed ; then in a little time was heard
the booming of cannon. I sent the news to every division and said, " Be
ready." ^ Slocum went forward to the aid of Sickles, and Hancock was behind
him with support. Next, the enemy was reported to be in full retreat.
General Hooker so telegraphed to Sedgwick; Captain Moore, of his staff,
who had gone out with Birney to see the attack upon Jackson, came hurriedly
to me with an order from Gleneral Hooker for my reserve brigade, Barlow's.
Major Howard rode rapidly to Sickles, that he might point out exactly
where to locate the brigade. The major was also to ascertain the nearest
route, so as to save time and not weary the men by a circuitous march.
It was already past 4. There was much excitement among the groups of
officers at the different points of observation. We who were at Dowdall's had
been watching the enemy's cavalry, which kept pushing through the woods
just far enough to receive a fire, and then withdrawing. Devens and his bri-
gade and regimental commanders gathered, in various ways, all the informa-
tion possible, while from a high point they obtained glimpses of a moving
column crossing the Plank road and apparently making off. I sent out scouts,
who returned with reports that the enemy was not more than three or four
miles off, and in motion. Schurz was anxious and, with my approval, moved
a part of his reserves to the north of Hawkins's farm into good position to
cover Devens's flank. Devens held at least two regiments well in hand, for the
same purpose, and Steinwehr's whole division I knew could just face about
and defend the same point. A few companies of cavalry came from Pleason-
ton. I sent them out. " Go out beyond my right ; go far, and let me know
if an assault is coming." All my staff, Asmussen, Meysenberg, Whittlesey,
C. H. Howard, Schofield, Dessauer, Stinson, Schirmer, and Hoffmann, were
keenly on the alert. We had not a very good position, it is true, but we did
expect to make a good strong fight should the enemy come.
General Hooker's circular order to " Slocum and Howard " neither reached
me, nor, to my kaowledge, Colonel Meysenberg, my adjutant-general. | From
some confused notion it was issued to " Slocum and Howard," when Slocum
was no longer within two miles of me, and had not been in command of my
corps after Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. Slocum, naturally supposing
that I had a copy, would not think of forwarding a joint order to me after
that, and certainly no such order came to me. But Generals Devens, Scliurz,
and Stoinwehr, my division commanders, and myself did precisely what we
should have done had that order come. The three reserve batteries were
put in position, and the infantry reserves were held well in hand for the pos-
sible emergency. My aide had now returned from Sickles, near the Furnace,
3^ Devens states in his official report that at inter- in one of the two "Letters Received" hooks of
valsVjetween 11 A. M. and 6 :30 p.m. he reported to Howard's headquarters. The entry in Howard's
corps headquarters that the enemy in force was book appears to have been made in the latter part
threatening his front and his right flank. — Editors, of June. In Hooker's book a notation in red ink
4- See pp. 219 and 220. The original dispatch reads, "Copy furnished General Howard"; and
is not on file in the War Records Office, but a copy the inference is that it was this "copy" that was
of it exists in Hooker's "Letters Sent" book and entered in Howard's book in June.— Editors.
THE ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSl^lLLE.
197
and reported in substance that he (Sickles) was glad to receive the help ; that
he was abont to make a grand attack, having been for some time dri\dug the
enemy, and expected soon a brilliant result; that he desired to place my
reenforcement upon his right flank in the forward movement.
Such was the state of things when, through Captain Moore, GTeneral Hooker
directed to Sickles's attack, at the Furnace, all of my general infantry reserves,
consisting of Barlow's stanch brigade. Steinwehr and I, with Major Howard
as guide, went far enough southward to see what was to be done with our
men, and to see if Steinwehr's di-
vision, as was probable, must swing
in to the left in support of Sickles's
promised attack. There was no real
battle there, so we returned rapidly
to our post at the tavern and dis-
mounted.
Meanwhile the Confederate Gen-
eral Rodes had been reaching his
place in the Wilderness. At 4 p. m.
his men were in position; the line
of battle of his own brigade touched
the pike west of us with its right and
stretched away to the north ; beyond
his brigade came Iverson's in the
same line. On the right of the pike
was Doles's brigade, and to his right
Colquitt's. One hundred yards to
the rear was Trimble's division (Col-
ston commanding), with Ramseur on the right following Colquitt. After
another interval followed the division of A. P. Hill. The advance Confeder-
ate division had more men in it than there were in the Eleventh Corps, now
in position. Counting the ranks of this formidable column, beginning with
the enveloping skirmish line, we find 7, besides the 3 ranks of file-closers.
Many of them were brought into a solid mass by the entanglements of the
forest, and gave our men the idea that battalions were formed in close
columns doubled on the center. With as little noise as possible, a little
after 5 r. m., the steady advance of the enemy began. Its first lively effects,
like a cloud of dust driven before a coming shower, ajipeariMl in tlie startled
rabbits, squirrels, quail, and other game flying wildly hitlier and thither in
evident terror, and escaping, where possible, into adjacent clearings.
The foremost men of Doles's brigade took about half an hour to strike our
advance picket on the pike. This picket, of course, created no delay. Fif-
teen minutes later he reached our skirmishers, who seem to have resisted
effectively for a few minutes, for it required a main line to dislodge them.
Doles says, conc(U-ning the next check he received, "After a resistance of
about ten minutes we drove him [Devens] from his ])ositiou on the left and
carried his battery of two guns, caissons, and hoi'ses/'
MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ. FROM A PnOTOGRAPH.
198 THE ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSJ/ILLE.
This was the fire that Stein wehr and I heard shortly after our return from
Barlow. Somebody's guns thundered away for a few short minutes, and then
came the fitful rattle of musketry; and before I could again get into the
saddle there arose the ceaseless roar of the terrible storm.
I sent out my chief-of -staff, Colonel Asmussen, who was the first officer to
mount, — " The firing is in front of Devens, go and see if all is in order on the
extreme right." He instantly turned and galloped away. I mounted and set
off for a prominent place in rear of Schm*z's line, so as to change front to the
north-west of every brigade south-east of the point of attack, if the attack
should extend beyond Devens's right flank ; for it was divined at once that
the enemy was now west of him. I could see numbers of our men — not the
few stragglers that always fly like chaff at the first breeze, but scores of
them — rushing into the opening, some with, arms and some without, running
or falling before they got behind the cover of Devens's reserves, and before
General Schurz's waiting masses could deploy or charge. The noise and the
smoke filled the air with excitement, and to add to it Dieckmann's guns and
caissons, with battery men scattered, rolled and tumbled like runaway wag-
ons and carts in a thronged city. The guns and the masses of the right bri-
gade struck the second line of Devens before McLean's front had given way ;
and, more quickly than it could be told, with all the fury of the wildest hail-
storm, everything, every sort of organization that lay in the path of the mad
current of panic-stricken men,^ had to give way and be broken into fragments.
My own horse seemed to catch the fury ; he sprang — he rose high on his
hind legs and fell over, throwing me to the ground. My aide-de-camp, Des-
sauer, was struck by a shot and killed, and for a few moments I was as help-
less as any of the men who were speeding without arms to the rear. But
faithful orderlies helped me to remount. Schurz was still doing all he could
to face regiments about and send them to Devens's northern flank to heliD the
few who still held firm. Devens, already badly wounded, and several officers
were doing similar work. I rode quickly to the reserve batteries. A staff-
ofificer of Greneral Hooker, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Dickinson, Assistant
Adjutant-Genera], joined me there; my own staff gathered around me. I
was eager to fill the trenches that Barlow would have held. Buschbeck's
second line was ordered to change front there„ His men kept thek ranks,
but at first they appeared slow. Would they never get there !
Dickinson said, " Oh, General, see those men coming from that hill way off
to the right, and there's the enemy after them. Fire, oh, fire at them ; you
may stop the flight ! "
" No, Colonel," I said, " I will never fire on my own men ! "
\ Colonel von Gilsa's report of the crisis is as " The enemy iittacked now from the front and rear,
follows: find then of conrse my brave hoys were obliged to fall
ba(!k, the 54th New York and the right wing of the
"... A patrol of the 45th New York regiment 153d PeunHylviuiia forciug their way back through the
reported masses of the enemy in au open field opposite enemy's skirminliors in their roar. . . . Retreating I
mj^ line. I reported this fact at onee to the division (^xpe(•ted surely to rally my lirigade behind our second
commander, and at tlu^ sauie moment my skirmishers line, formed by the Thli'd Division, but I did not find the
were driven in by ovcrwhclniiug forces of the enemy. second line; it was abandoned before we reached it."
The whole lino at once litcaiiKMUgaged furiously, and ,. ^ , .„ ,
my brigade stood bravely, fired three times, and stood ^ o» Gilsa's brigade lost 133 killed and wounded
still until after they had outflanked me on my right. out of an effective of 1400 men.— Editors.
THE ELEyENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSl^ILLE.
199
2. RELICS OF THE DEAD IN
THE WOODS NEAR THE
PLANK ROAD.
FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN
IN 1864.
As soon as our men were near
enough the batteries opened, firing
at first shells and then canister over
their heads. As the attacking force
emerged from the forest and rushed
on, the men in front would halt and
fire, and, while these were reloading,
another set would run before them,
halt and fire, in no regular line, but
in such multitudes that oui' men went
down before them like trees in a hur-
ricane.
By extraordinary efiiort we had filled
all our long line
of cross-intrench-
ments, mainly with
fragments of or-
ganizations and in-
dividual soldiers.
Many oflScers mn-
ning away stojiped
there and did what
they could, but
others shouted,
"We've done all we
can," and ran on.\
Schirmer managed
the reserve artillery
fairly. Dilger, the
battery commander
on Schurz's left, roll-
ed the balls along
the Plank road and
shelled the wood.
General Stoinwchr was on hand, cool,
collected, and judicious. Like Blair at
Atlanta, he had made his men (who
were south of Dowdall's) spring to the
reverse side of their intrenchments
and be ready to fire the instant it was
possibl(\
Let us pause here a monuMit and fol-
low Doles, who led the enemy's attack.
He states that, after his first success-
\ General Sclmrz states in liis report that the masses
diieh
rallietl liere were rporpniiz*'*! and
led forward'two or three times, but were dispersed by the enemy's flank lire.- Editors.
200 THE ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORS^ILLE.
ful charge, " the command moved forward at the double-quick to assault
the enemy, who had taken up a strong position on the crest of a hill in
the open field." This position was the one on Hawkins's farm where
Devens's and Schm*z's reserves began their fight. But wave after wave of
Confederate infantry came upon them, and even their left flank was unpro-
tected the instant the runaways had passed it. To our sorrow, we, who
had eagerly observed their bravery, saw these reserves also give way, and
the hill and crest on Hawkins's farm were quickly in the hands of the men
in gray, ik
Doles, who must have been a cool man to see so clearly amid the screech-
ing shells and all the hot excitement of battle, says again : " He " (meaning
our forces from Schimmelfennig's and Buschbeck's brigades, and perhaps
part of McLean's, who had faced about and had not yet given way) " made a
stubborn resistance from behind a wattling fence on a hill covered thickly
with pines."
Among the stubborn fighters at this place was Major Jeremiah Williams.
The enemy was drawing near him. His men fired with coolness and delib-
eration. His right rested among scrubby bushes and saplings, while his left
was in comparatively open ground. The fire of the approaching enemy was
murderous, and almost whole platoons of our men were falling ; yet they held
their ground. Williams waited, rapidly firing, till not more than thirty paces
intervened, and then ordered the retreat. Out of 333 men and 16 commis-
sioned officers in the regiment (the 25th Ohio), 130, including 5 officers, were
killed or wounded. Major WiUiams brought a part of the living to the breast-
works near me; the remainder, he says, were carried off to the rear by another
regimental commander.
During the delays we had thus far caused to the first division of our
enemy, all his rear lines had closed up, and the broad mass began to
appear even below me on my left front to the south of Steinwehr's knoll.
Then it was, after we had been fighting an hour, that Sickles's and Pleas-
onton's guns began to be heard, for they had faced about at Hazel Grove
obliquely toward the north-west, and were hurrying artiUery, cavalry, and
infantry into position to do what they could against the attack now reach-
ing them.
I had come to my last practicable stand. The Confederates were slowly
advancing, firing as they came. The twelve guns of Schirmer, the corps
chief of artillery, increased by a part of Dilger's battery, fired, at first with
rapidity ; but the battery men kept falling from death and wounds. Sud-
denly, as if by an order, when a sheet of the enemy's fire reached them, a
large number of the men in the supporting trenches vacated their positions
and went off.
No officers ever made more strenuous exertions than those that my staff
and myself put forth to stem the tide of retreat and refill those trenches,
_ -^ In justice to the men of Devens's division who first resisted Doles it shonld be stated that the offi-
cial report of the latter shows that his column was engaged at the outset by Union skirmishers, and
" subjected to a heavy musketry fire, with grape, canister, and shell."— Editors.
THE ELEI/ENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSyiLLE.
20 1
EXPLANATION
Positions Ercning- of May 2
Second Positions of \
FirstVivision Morning- )
Dowdalls»i Tavern
:^^5Si'#"
but the panic was too great. Then
our artillery fire became weaker and
weaker.
I next ordered a retreat to the edge
of the forest toward Chancellorsville,
so as to uncover Steinwehr's knoll, the
only spot yet fii^mly held. The batter-
ies, except four pieces, were drawn off
and hurried to the rear. The stand at
the edge of the forest was necessarily
a short one.
General Steinwehr, being now ex-
posed from flank and rear, having
held his place for over an hour, drew
off his small remnants and all moved
rapidly through openings and woods,
through low ground and swamps, the
two miles to the first high land south
of Hooker's headquarters.
Captain Hubert Dilger with Ms bat-
tery sturdily kept along the Plank road,
firing constantly as he retired. The
Confederate masses rushed after us in
the forest and along all paths and
roads with triumphant shouts and re-
doubled firing, and so secured much
plunder and many prisoners.
It was after sundown and growing
dark when I met General Hiram G.
•Berry, commanding a division of the Third Corps, as I was ascending the
high ground above named. " AVell, General, where now % " he asked. " You
take the right of this road and I will take the left and try to dct'ciid it,''
I replied.
Oui' batteries, with many others, were on the crest facing to the rear, and as
soon as Steinwehr's troops had cleared the way these guns began a terril>lo
cannonade and continued it into the night. They fired into the forest, now
full of Confederates, all disorganized l)y their exciting chase, and every effort
of the enemy to advance in that direction in the face of the fire waseff'ectually
barred by the artillery and supporting troops.
Stonewall Jackson fell that evening from bullet-wounds, in the forest in
front of Berry's position. And here, on the forenoon of the next day, May
3d, the gallant General Berry met his death. It was here, to<\ tliat officers
of the Eleventh Corps, tliough mortified by <lefeat, successfully rallied tlu»
scattered brigades and divisions, and, after shielding the battcrii's, went
during the night to replace the men of the Fifth C(>rj)s and thereafter
defend the left of the general line
POSITIONS OF THE
31) CORPS, COVEKIX
ni COKI-S AND r.VKT OK THE
CHAXCKI.LOKS-
LATEAU, MAY 2 AND 3.
THE ELEVENTH CORPS AT CHANCELLORSyiLLE.
Twenty-three years ago, in my report to General Hooker, I wrote the fol-
lowing :
" Now, as to the causes of this disaster to my corps : 1st. Though con-
stantly threatened and apprised of the moving of the enemy, yet the woods
were so dense that he was able to mass a large force, whose exact where-
abouts j neither patrols, reconnoissances, nor scouts ascertained. He suc-
ceeded in forming a column opposite to and outflanking my right.
" 2d. By the panic produced by the enemy's reverse fire, regiments and
artillery were thrown suddenly upon those in position.
"3d. The absence of G-eneral Barlow's brigade, which I had previously
located in reserve and en echelon with Colonel von Gilsa's, so as to cover his
right flank. This was the only general reserve I had."
Stonewall Jackson was victorious. Even his enemies praise him ; but,
providentially for us, it was the last battle that he waged against the Ameri-
can Union. For, in bold planning, in energy of execution, which he had the
power to diffuse, in indefatigable activity and moral ascendency, Jackson
stood head and shoulders above his confreres, and after hit death Gleneral
Lee could not replace him.
I General Devens's report is very explicit upon
this point, and states as follows :
"Colonel von Gilsa'e sMrmisliers were, between 3 and
4 o'clock in the afternoon, attacked by the skirmishers
of the enemy with the evident intention of feeling our
position. After this Colouel von Gilsa's skirmishers
were pushed farther to the front, and the major-general
commanding the corps again rode down the line. After
his return a company of cavalry was sent me for the
purpose of making further examination of the woods,
which examination, though not thoroughly made, was
still sufficient to show that the enemy's cavalry were
deployed along the front of my First Brigade, accom-
panied by some pieces of horse artillery. I directed the
captain commanding the cavalry to retuna and report
at corps headquarters."
See also note on p. 198. — Editors.
KESCUING THE WOUNDED ON SUNDAY, MAY ^D, 1 KO.M THE UUltMNG WOODS.
FROM A WAK-TIME SKETCH.
STONEWALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
BY THE REV. JAMES POWER SMITH, CAPTAIN AND ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL. C. S. A.
T daybreak on the morning of the 29th of April, 1863,
sleeping in our tents at corps headquarters, near Hamil-
ton's Crossing, we were aroused by Major Samuel Hale, of
Early's staff, with the stirring news that Federal troops
were crossing the Rappahannock on pontoons under cover
of a heavy fog. General Jackson had spent the night at
Mr. Yerby's hospitable mansion near by, where Mrs. Jack-
sTONEWALWACKsoK's SOU [hls sccoud wlfc] had brought her infant child for the
^, . T ^ XT f 11 • father to see. He was at once informed of the news, and
Mnjor Jprt. Hotclikiss, _ ....
who owns the " oirt gray promptly issued to his division commanders orders to pre-
cap," writes that Jackson „ . *. i • t ,. t t -i ,i
wore it through the vai- parc lor actiou. At his directioii 1 rode a mile across the
omi ulZ^aYcimvlS^t ^elds to amiy headquarters, and finding General Robert E.
At Frederick City, in "the Lec still slumbcring quietlv, at the suggestion of Colonel
Antietam campaign, be o x .. 7 00
bought a soft hat for bis Vcuable, wliom I fouud Stirring, I entered the general's
icksburg, gave bini the cap tcut and awokc him. Tumiug Ms feet out of his cot he
as a souvenir.- EDITORS. ^^^ ^^^^^ .^^ ^-^^ ^^ j ^^^^ j^.^ ^^^ ^.^^^^ ^^.^^^ ^^^ ^^,^^^^
Expressing no surprise, he playfully said : " Well, I thought I heard firing,
and was beginning to think it was time some of you young fellows were
coming to tell me what it was all about. Tell your good general that I am
sm'e he knows what to do. I will meet him at the front very soon."
It was Sedgwick who had crossed, and, marching along the river front to
impress us with his numbers, was now intrenching his line on the river road,
under cover of Federal batteries on the north bank.
All day long we lay in the old lines of the action of December preceding,
watching the operation of the enemy. Nor did we move through the next day,
the 30th of April. During the forenoon of the 29th General Lee had been
informed by General J. E. B. Stuart of the movement in force by General
Hooker across the Rappahannock upon Chancellorsville ; and during the
night of Thursday, April 3()th, General Jackson withdrew his corps, leaWng
Early and his division with Barksdale's brigade to hold the old lines from
Hamilton's Crossing along the rear of Fredericksburg.
By the light of a brilliant moon, at midnight, that jiassed into an early
dawn of dense mist, the troops were mm-ed, by the Old ^line road, out of
sight of the enemj^, and al)out 11 a. m. of Friday, ^lay 1st, they readied
Anderson's position, confronting Hooker's advance from Chancellorsville,
near the Tabernacle Church on the Plank road. To ihccI the whole Army
of the Potomac, under Hooker, General Lee liad of all arms about (.)(),0l)0
men. General Longstreet, with part of his coqis, was absent below Peters-
burg. General Lee had two divisions of Longstreet's corps, Anderson's, and
McLaws's, and Jackson's corps, consisting of four divnsions, A. P. Hill's, D. H.
Hill's, commaiKled by Rodes, Trimble's, conimande<l l>y Colston, and Early's;
204
STONEIVALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
I
LEI AND JACKSON IN COUNCIL ON THE NIGHT OF MAT 1.
and about 170 pieces of field-artillery. The divisions of Anderson and
McLaws had been sent from Fredericksburg to meet Hooker's advance from
Chancellorsville ; Anderson on Wednesday, and McLaws (except Barksdale's
brigade, left with Early) on Thursday. At the Tabernacle Church, about four
miles east of Chancellorsville, the opposing forces met and brisk skirmishing
began. On Friday, Jackson, reaching Anderson's position, took command of
the Confederate advance, and urged on his skirmish line under Brigadier-
General Ramseur with great vigor. How the muskets rattled along a front
of a mile or two, across the unfenced fields, and through the woodlands!
What spirit was imparted to the line, and what cheers rolled along its length,
when Jackson, and then Lee himself, appeared riding abreast of the line along
the Plank road ! Slowly but steadily the line advanced, until at night-fall all
Federal pickets and skirmishers were driven back upon the body of Hooker's
force at Chancellorsville.
Here we reached a point, a mile and a half from Hooker's lines, where
a road turns down to the left toward the old Catherine Furnace [see map,
p. 158] ; and here at the fork of the roads General Lee and General Jack-
son spent the night, resting on the pine straw, curtained only by the close
shadow of the pine forest. A little after night-fall I was sent by General
Lee upon an errand to General A. P. Hill, on the old stone turnpike a mile
or two north ; and returning some time later with information of matters on
our right, I found General Jackson retired to rest, and General Lee sleeping at
STONEWALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE. • 205
the foot of a tree, covered with his army cloak. As I aroused the sleeper, he
slowly sat up on the ground and said, "Ah, Captain, you have retui-ned, have
you ? Come here and tell me what you have learned on the right." Laying
his hand on me he drew me down by his side, and, passing his arm around
my shoulder, di-ew me near to him in a fatherly way that told of his wann
and kindly heart. When I had related such informatiou as I had secui'ed for
him, he thanked me for accomplishing his commission, and then said he
regi-etted that the young men about General Jackson had not relieved him
of annoyance, by finding a battery of the enemy which had harassed our
advance, adding that the young men of that day were not equal to what they
were when he was a young man. Seeing immediately that he was jesting and
disposed to rally me, as he often did young officers, I broke away from the
hold on me which he tried to retain, and, as he laughed heartily through the
stillness of the night, I went off to make a bed of my saddle-blanket, and,
with my head in my saddle, near my horse's feet, was soon wi-apped in the
heavy slumber of a wearied soldier.
Some time after midnight I was awakened by the chill of the early morn-
ing hours, and, turning over, caught a glimpse of a little flame on the slope
above me, and sitting up to see what it meant, I saw, bending over a scant
fire of twigs, two men seated on old cracker boxes and warming their hands
over the little fire. I had but to rub my eyes and collect my wits to recog-
nize the figures of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson. Who can tell the
story of that quiet council of war between two sleeping armies ? Nothing
remains on record to tell of plans discussed, and dangers weighed, and a
gi-eat purpose formed, Ijut the story of the great day so soon to follow.
It was broad daylight, and the thick beams of yellow sunlight came through
the pine branches, when some one touched me rudely with his foot, saying :
" Get up. Smith, the general wants you ! " As I leaped to my feet the rhyth-
mic click of the canteens of marching infantry caught my ear. Already in
motion ! What could it mean ! In a moment I was mounted and at the side
of the general, who sat on his horse by the roadside, as the long line of our
troops cheerily, but in silence as directed, poured down the Furnace road.
His cap was pulled low over his eyes, and, looking up from under the visor,
with lips compressed, indicating the firm purpose within, he nodded to me,
and in brief and rapid utterance, without a superfluous word, as though all
were distinctly formed in his mind and beyond question, ho gave me orders
for our wagon and ambulance trains. From the open fields in our rear, at
the head of the Cathari)in road, all trains were to be moved upon that road
to Todd's Tavern, and tlience west l)y interior roads, so that our troops would
be between them and the enemy at Chancellors ville. ]\[y (M-ders having l)een
deUvered and the trains set in motion, I retui-ned to the site of (Uir niglit's
bivouac, to find that General Jackson and his staff had followed the march-
ing column.
Slow and tedious is the advance of a mounted officer who has to pass, in
narrow wood roads thi-ough d(Mise thickets, the ])acked column of niareliing
infantry, to be recognized all along tlie line and good-naturedly chaffed by
^o6 . STONEiVALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
many a gay-spirited fellow: "Say, here's one of Old Jack's little boys let
him by, boys ! " m the most patronizing tone. " Have a good breakfast this
nTi;/?'Y • " " ^'^^'' ^''"'^"^ ^P' ^^ ^^^'^^ ^^t^^ it for getting behind."
lell Old Jack we're all a-comin'." "Don't let him begin the fnss till we
get thar ! " And so on, until about 3 p. m., after a ride of ten miles of tortuous
road, I found the general, seated on a stump by the Brock road, writing this
dispatch, which, through the courtesy of the Virginia State Library is here
given m f ac-simile : '
^t^A^
7'
STONEWALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THO:\IAS .lONATIIAN JACKSON, C. 8. A. FKOM A PIIOTOGRArH
TAKEN IN WINCHESTER, VA., IN 1862.
The place here mentioned as Chancellor's was also known as Dowdall's
Tavern. It was the farm of the Rev. Melzi Chancellor, two miles west of
Chancellors\alle, and the Federal force found here and at Talley's, a mile
farther west, was the Eleventh Corps, under General Howard. General Fitz
Lee, with cavahy scouts, had advanced until he had ^dew of the jiosition of
Howard's corps, and found them unsuspicious of attack.
Keaching the Orange Plank road. General Jackson himself rode witli Fitz
Lee to reconnoiter the position of Howard, and then sent the Stonewall
l)rigade of Virginia troops, under Brigadier-General Paxton, to hold the
point where the Germanna Plank road obliquely enters the Orange road.
Leading the main column of his force farther on the Brock r<iad to the old
turnpike, the head of the column turned shari)ly eastward toward Chancel-
lorsville. [See maps, pp. I.IH, 191.] About a mile had been i)assed, when he
halted and began the dis})osition of his force's to attack Howard. H<^des's
division, at the head of the column, was thrown into line of l>attle, with Col-
ston's forming the second line and A. P. Hill's th<' third, while th.' artillery
under Colonel Stapleton Crutchficld moved in colmnii on tlu' road, or was
])arked in a field on the right. The wcll-li-aiiicd skinnishcr^ of K'odes's
division, under Major Eugene Bhu'kfonl, were thrown to the tV..ni. It must
have been between 5 and (> o'clock in the evening, Satunlay, May iM, when
208
ST0NEHC4LL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
these- dispositions were completed. Upon his stout-built, long-paced little
sorrel, General Jackson sat, with visor low over his eyes and lips compressed,
and with his watch in his hand. Upon his right sat Greneral Robert E. Rodes,
the very picture of a soldier, and every inch all that he appeared. Upon the
right of Rodes sat Major Blackford.
" Ai-e you ready. General Rodes f " said Jackson.
" Yes, sir ! " said Rodes, impatient for the advance.
" You can go forward then," said Jackson.
A nod from Rodes was order enough for Blackford, and then suddenly the
woods rang with the bugle call, and back came the responses from bugles on
the right and left, and the long line of skirmishers, through the wild thicket
of undergrowth, sprang
eagerly to their work,
followed promptly by
the quick steps of the
line of battle. For a
moment all the troops
seemed buried in the
depths of the gloomy
forest, and then sudden-
ly the echoes waked and
swept the country for
miles, never failing un-
til heard at the head-
quarters of Hooker at
Chancellors\ille — the
wild " rebel yell " of the
long Confederate lines.
Never was assault de-
livered with grander
enthusiasm. Fresh from
the long winter's waiting, and confident from the preparation of the spring,
the troops were in fine condition and in high spii'its. The boys were all back
from home or sick leave. " Old Jack" was there upon the road in their midst ;
there could be no mistake and no failure. And there were Rodes and A. P.
Hill. Had they not seen and cheered, as long and as loud as they were per-
mitted, the gay-hearted Stuart and the long-bearded Fitz Lee on his fiery
charger? Was not Crutchfield's array of brass and iron "dogs of war "at
hand, with Poague [Rockbridge Artillery] and Palmer [1st Richmond How-
itzers, then under McCarthy], and all the rest!
Alas ! for Howard and his unformed lines, and his brigades with guns
stacked, and officers at dinner -or asleep under the trees, and butchers deep
in the blood of beeves ! Scattered through field and forest, his men were pre-
paring their evening meal. J A little sliow of earth- work facing the south was
quickly taken by us in reverse from the west. Flying battalions are not
^But see notes, pp. 198 ami 202.— Editors.
ST(JNE\VALL
SORKKL.
This picture is from a pliotograpli taken at tlie Maryland State, Fair at
Hagerstown, in 1884. At that time "Old Sorrel" was thought to he about
thirty-four years old. At the fair, relic-hunters plucked away much of liis
mane and tail.— Editoks.
STONEIVALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
209
flying buttresses for an army's
stability. Across Talley's fields the
rout begins. Over at Hawkins's
liill, on the north of the road, Carl
Schurz makes a stand, soon to be
driven into the same hojDeless
panic. By the quiet Wilderness
Church in the vale, leaving wound-
ed and dead everywhere, by Melzi
Chancellor's, on into the deep
thicket again, the Confederate
lines pressed forward, — now bro-
ken and all disaligned by the den-
sity of bush that tears the clothes
away; now halting to load and
deliver a volley upon some regi-
ment or fragment of the enemy
that will not move as fast as
others. Thus the attack upon
Hooker's flank was a grand suc-
cess, beyond the most sanguine
expectation.
The writer of this narrative, an
aide-de-camp of Jackson's, was
ordered to remain at the point
where the advance began, to be
a center of communication be-
tween the general and the cavalry on the flanks, and to deliver orders
to detachments of artillery still moving up from the rear. A fine black
charger, with elegant trappings, deserted by his owner and found tied to a
tree, became mine only for that short and eventful night-fall; and about
8 p. M., in the twilight, thus comfortably mounted, I gathered my couriers
about me and went forward to find General Jackson. The storm of battle
had swept far on to the east and become more and more faint to the ear,
until silence came with night over the fields and woods. As I rode along
that old turnpike, passing scattered fragments of Confederates looking for
their regiments, parties of prisoners concentrating under guards, wounded
men by the roadside and under the trees at Talley's and Chancellor's, 1 had
reached an oi)en field on the right, a mile west of Chancellorsville, when, in
the dusky twilight, I saw horsemen near an old cabin in the tield. Turning
toward them, I found Rodes and his staft' engaged in gathering the br«)ken
and scattered troops that had swept the two mih's of battle-lield. "Central
Jackson is just ahead on .the road, Captain," said li.xNs; "tell him I will be
here at this cabin if I am wanted." I had not gone a hundred yards before 1
heard firing, a shot or two, and then a conii)any volle\- upon tlie right of the
road, and another upon the l*>t't. A few moments farther on I met Captain
BRIGADIER-GENERAT- E. V. I'AXTON, CI).M.MAM>1N(. lilt.
"STONEWALL" BRIGADE OF COLSTON'S Iin'ISION,
KILLED MAY 3. FROM AN AMBROTYl'E.
210
STONEIVALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
STONEWALL JAlKSO>
>AD IN ADVANCE OF lllS LINE OF BATTLE.
Murray Taylor, an aide of A. P. Hill's, with tidings that Jackson and Hill
were wounded, and some around them killed, by the tire of their own men.
Spurring my horse into a sweeping galloj^, I soon passed the Confederate
line of battle, and, some three or four rods on its front, found the general's
horse beside a pine sapling on the left, and a rod beyond a little party of men
caring for a wounded officer. The story of the sad event is briefly told, and,
in essentials, very much as it came to me from the lips of the wounded
STONEWALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
general himself, and in everything confirmed and completed by those who
were eye-witnesses and near companions.
When Jackson had reached the point where his line now crossed the turn-
pike, scarcely a mile west of Chancellors ville, and not half a mile from a line
of Federal troops, he had found his front line unfit for the farther and vigor-
ous advance he desired, by reason of the irregular character of the fight-
ing, now right, now left, and because of the dense thickets, through which it
was impossible to preserve alignment. Division commanders found it more
and more difficult as the twilight deepened to hold theii* broken brigades
in hand. Eegretting the necessity of
relieving the troops in front, General
Jackson had ordered A. P. Hill's divis-
ion, his third and reserve line, to be
placed in front. "While this change was
being effected, impatient and anxious, the
general rode forward on the turnpike,
followed by two or three of his staff and
a number of couriers and signal ser-
geants. He passed the swampy depres-
sion and began the ascent of the hill
toward Chancellorsville, when he came
upon a line of the Federal infantry lying
on their arms. Fired at by one or two
muskets (two musket-balls from the en-
emy whistled over my head as I came
to the front), he turned and came back
toward his line, upon the side of the road
to his left. As he rode near to the Con-
federate troops, just placed in position
and ignorant that he was in the front, the
left company l)egan firing to the front, and two of his party fell from their
saddles dead — Captain Boswell, of the Engineers, and Sergeant Cunlift'o, of the
Signal Corps. Spurring his horse across the road to his right, ho was mot by
a second volley from the right company of Pender's North Carolina brigade.
Under this volley, when not two rods from the troops, the general rooeivod
three balls at the same instant. One penetrated the palm of his right hand
and was cut out that night from the l)ack of his hand. A second jiassod
around the wrist of the left arm and out tlirough tho loft hand. A tliinl ball
passed through the left arm half-way from shoulder to elbow. Tho large bono
of the upper arm was splintered to the elbow- joint, and tlio wound bled
freely. His horse turned quickly from the fire, through tin
which swept the cap from tho general's lu^id, and scratelie*
leaving drops of blood to stain his face. As he lost liis
bridlo-roin, he reeled from the saddle, and was caught by tho
tain Wilbourn, of tho Signal Corps. Laid upon tho ground, there eamo at onoe
to his succor General A. P. Hill and members of his staff. The writer roaehcHl
'%J
MAJOR-GENERAL
FROM
E. COLSTON,
■HOTOCRAril.
k bushes
forehead,
upon tho
inns of Cap-
thi
hi>
ol,l
212
STONEWALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
his side a minute after, to find General Hill holding the head and shoulders
of the wounded chief. Cutting .open the coat-sleeve from wrist to shoulder,
I found the wound in the upper arm, and with my handkerchief I bound the
arm above the wound to stem the flow of blood. Couriers were sent for Dr.
Hunter McGuire, the surgeon of the corps and the general's trusted friend,
and for an ambulance. Being outside of our lines, it was urgent that he
should be moved at once. With difficulty litter-bearers were brought from the
line near by, and the general was placed upon the litter and carefully raised
to the shoulder, I myself bearing one
corner. A moment after, artillery from
the Federal side was opened upon us ;
gi-eat broadsides thundered over the
woods ; hissing shells searched the dark
thickets through, and shrapnels swept
the road along which we moved. Two
or three steps farther, and the litter-
bearer at my side was struck and fell,
but, as^the litter turned. Major Wat kins
Leigh, of Hill's staff, happily caught it.
But the fright of the men was so great
that we were obliged to lay the litter
and its burden down upon the road.
As the litter-bearers ran to the cover
of the trees, I threw myself by the gen-
eral's side and held him firmly to the
ground as he attempted to rise. Over
us swept the rapid fire of shot and
shell — grape-shot striking fire upon
the flinty rock of the road all around us, and sweeping from their feet
horses and men of the artillery just moved to the front. Soon the firing
veered to the other side of the road, and I sprang to my feet, assisted the
general to rise, passed my arm around him, and with the wounded man's
weight thrown heavily upon me, we forsook the road. Entering the woods,
he sank to the ground from exhaustion, but the litter was soon brought, and
again rallying a few men, we essayed to carry him farther, when a second
bearer fell at my side. This time, with none to assist, the litter careened,
and the general fell to the ground, with a groan of deep pain. G-reatly
alarmed, I sprang to his head, and, lifting his head as a stray beam of moon-
light came through clouds and leaves, he opened his eyes and wearily said :
" Never mind me. Captain, never mind me." Raising him again to his feet,
he was accosted by Brigadier-General Pender : " Oh, General, I hope you
are not seriously wounded. I will have to retire my troops to re-form
them, they are so much broken by this fire." But Jackson, rallying his
strength, with firm voice said: "You must hold your gi^ound, General
Pender; you must hold your ground, sir!" and so uttered his last com-
mand on the field.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. T. NICHOLL8, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.
STONEWALL JACKSON'S LAST BATTLE.
213
(tv^vncellDW-vilU [y^u^t.
This i)icture is from a photograph taken at a reunion
of Union and Confederate officers and soldiers in May,
1884. The original house (see p. 190) was set on fire by
Confederate shells on Sunday, May 3d, shortly after
Hooker was injured while standing on the porch. The
picture faces south; Jackson attacked the Eleventh
Corps fiom the left (west) by the Plank road, which
passes in front of the Chancellor House. The cross-
road in the foreground leads northward to Ely's Ford
and United States Ford. See map, p. 158.— Editors.
Again we resorted to the litter, and with difficulty Lore it throug